openssl: fix CVE-2014-0224
http://www.openssl.org/news/secadv_20140605.txt SSL/TLS MITM vulnerability (CVE-2014-0224) An attacker using a carefully crafted handshake can force the use of weak keying material in OpenSSL SSL/TLS clients and servers. This can be exploited by a Man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack where the attacker can decrypt and modify traffic from the attacked client and server. The attack can only be performed between a vulnerable client *and* server. OpenSSL clients are vulnerable in all versions of OpenSSL. Servers are only known to be vulnerable in OpenSSL 1.0.1 and 1.0.2-beta1. Users of OpenSSL servers earlier than 1.0.1 are advised to upgrade as a precaution. (Patch borrowed from Fedora.) (From OE-Core rev: f19dbbc864b12b0f87248d3199296b41a0dcd5b0) Signed-off-by: Paul Eggleton <paul.eggleton@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>
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@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
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Fix for CVE-2014-0224
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Only accept change cipher spec when it is expected instead of at any
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time. This prevents premature setting of session keys before the master
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secret is determined which an attacker could use as a MITM attack.
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Thanks to KIKUCHI Masashi (Lepidum Co. Ltd.) for reporting this issue
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and providing the initial fix this patch is based on.
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Patch borrowed from Fedora
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Upstream-Status: Backport
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Signed-off-by: Paul Eggleton <paul.eggleton@linux.intel.com>
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diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/ssl3.h.keying-mitm openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/ssl3.h
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--- openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/ssl3.h.keying-mitm 2014-06-02 19:48:04.518100562 +0200
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+++ openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/ssl3.h 2014-06-02 19:48:04.642103429 +0200
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@@ -388,6 +388,7 @@ typedef struct ssl3_buffer_st
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#define TLS1_FLAGS_TLS_PADDING_BUG 0x0008
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#define TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY 0x0010
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#define TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE 0x0020
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+#define SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK 0x0080
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/* SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE is set when we
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* restart a handshake because of MS SGC and so prevents us
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diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s3_clnt.c.keying-mitm openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s3_clnt.c
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--- openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s3_clnt.c.keying-mitm 2013-02-11 16:26:04.000000000 +0100
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+++ openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s3_clnt.c 2014-06-02 19:49:57.042701985 +0200
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@@ -559,6 +559,7 @@ int ssl3_connect(SSL *s)
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case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A:
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case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B:
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+ s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
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ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A,
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SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B);
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if (ret <= 0) goto end;
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@@ -916,6 +917,7 @@ int ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL *s)
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SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT);
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goto f_err;
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}
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+ s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
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s->hit=1;
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}
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else /* a miss or crap from the other end */
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diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s3_pkt.c.keying-mitm openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s3_pkt.c
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--- openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s3_pkt.c.keying-mitm 2014-06-02 19:48:04.640103383 +0200
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+++ openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s3_pkt.c 2014-06-02 19:48:04.643103452 +0200
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@@ -1298,6 +1298,15 @@ start:
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goto f_err;
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}
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+ if (!(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK))
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+ {
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+ al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
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+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
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+ goto f_err;
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+ }
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+
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+ s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
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+
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rr->length=0;
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if (s->msg_callback)
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@@ -1432,7 +1441,7 @@ int ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s)
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if (s->s3->tmp.key_block == NULL)
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{
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- if (s->session == NULL)
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+ if (s->session == NULL || s->session->master_key_length == 0)
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{
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/* might happen if dtls1_read_bytes() calls this */
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SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_DO_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
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diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s3_srvr.c.keying-mitm openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s3_srvr.c
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--- openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s3_srvr.c.keying-mitm 2014-06-02 19:48:04.630103151 +0200
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+++ openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s3_srvr.c 2014-06-02 19:48:04.643103452 +0200
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@@ -673,6 +673,7 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
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case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
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case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
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+ s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
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/* we should decide if we expected this one */
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ret=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
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if (ret <= 0) goto end;
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@@ -700,6 +701,7 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
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case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
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case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
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+ s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
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ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
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SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
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if (ret <= 0) goto end;
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@@ -770,7 +772,10 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
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s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
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#else
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if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
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+ {
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+ s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
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s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
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+ }
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else
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s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
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#endif
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@ -41,6 +41,7 @@ SRC_URI += "file://configure-targets.patch \
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file://openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0195.patch \
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file://openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0198.patch \
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file://openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0221.patch \
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file://openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0224.patch \
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"
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SRC_URI[md5sum] = "66bf6f10f060d561929de96f9dfe5b8c"
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