diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile
index 3fb6393c90..d3222a086c 100644
--- a/Makefile
+++ b/Makefile
@@ -957,7 +957,8 @@ MKIMAGEFLAGS_u-boot.kwb = -n $(srctree)/$(CONFIG_SYS_KWD_CONFIG:"%"=%) \
 	-T kwbimage -a $(CONFIG_SYS_TEXT_BASE) -e $(CONFIG_SYS_TEXT_BASE)
 
 MKIMAGEFLAGS_u-boot-spl.kwb = -n $(srctree)/$(CONFIG_SYS_KWD_CONFIG:"%"=%) \
-	-T kwbimage -a $(CONFIG_SYS_TEXT_BASE) -e $(CONFIG_SYS_TEXT_BASE)
+	-T kwbimage -a $(CONFIG_SYS_TEXT_BASE) -e $(CONFIG_SYS_TEXT_BASE) \
+	$(if $(KEYDIR),-k $(KEYDIR))
 
 MKIMAGEFLAGS_u-boot.pbl = -n $(srctree)/$(CONFIG_SYS_FSL_PBL_RCW:"%"=%) \
 		-R $(srctree)/$(CONFIG_SYS_FSL_PBL_PBI:"%"=%) -T pblimage
diff --git a/arch/arm/mach-mvebu/Kconfig b/arch/arm/mach-mvebu/Kconfig
index 53117c4296..412bda4160 100644
--- a/arch/arm/mach-mvebu/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/arm/mach-mvebu/Kconfig
@@ -1,5 +1,9 @@
 if ARCH_MVEBU
 
+config HAVE_MVEBU_EFUSE
+	bool
+	default n
+
 config ARMADA_32BIT
 	bool
 	select CPU_V7
@@ -23,6 +27,7 @@ config ARMADA_375
 config ARMADA_38X
 	bool
 	select ARMADA_32BIT
+	select HAVE_MVEBU_EFUSE
 
 config ARMADA_XP
 	bool
@@ -146,4 +151,34 @@ config SYS_VENDOR
 config SYS_SOC
 	default "mvebu"
 
+config MVEBU_EFUSE
+	bool "Enable eFuse support"
+	default n
+	depends on HAVE_MVEBU_EFUSE
+	help
+	  Enable support for reading and writing eFuses on mvebu SoCs.
+
+config MVEBU_EFUSE_FAKE
+	bool "Fake eFuse access (dry run)"
+	default n
+	depends on MVEBU_EFUSE
+	help
+	  This enables a "dry run" mode where eFuses are not really programmed.
+	  Instead the eFuse accesses are emulated by writing to and reading
+	  from a memory block.
+	  This is can be used for testing prog scripts.
+
+config SECURED_MODE_IMAGE
+	bool "Build image for trusted boot"
+	default false
+	depends on 88F6820
+	help
+	  Build an image that employs the ARMADA SoC's trusted boot framework
+	  for securely booting images.
+
+config SECURED_MODE_CSK_INDEX
+	int "Index of active CSK"
+	default 0
+	depends on SECURED_MODE_IMAGE
+
 endif
diff --git a/arch/arm/mach-mvebu/Makefile b/arch/arm/mach-mvebu/Makefile
index 65e90c4fc9..d4210af9d2 100644
--- a/arch/arm/mach-mvebu/Makefile
+++ b/arch/arm/mach-mvebu/Makefile
@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ ifndef CONFIG_SPL_BUILD
 obj-$(CONFIG_ARMADA_375) += ../../../drivers/ddr/marvell/axp/xor.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_ARMADA_38X) += ../../../drivers/ddr/marvell/a38x/xor.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_ARMADA_XP) += ../../../drivers/ddr/marvell/axp/xor.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_MVEBU_EFUSE) += efuse.o
 endif # CONFIG_SPL_BUILD
 obj-y	+= gpio.o
 obj-y	+= mbus.o
diff --git a/arch/arm/mach-mvebu/efuse.c b/arch/arm/mach-mvebu/efuse.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..67fcadcf60
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/arm/mach-mvebu/efuse.c
@@ -0,0 +1,264 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2015-2016 Reinhard Pfau <reinhard.pfau@gdsys.cc>
+ *
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier:	GPL-2.0+
+ */
+
+#include <config.h>
+#include <common.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <asm/io.h>
+#include <asm/arch/cpu.h>
+#include <asm/arch/efuse.h>
+#include <asm/arch/soc.h>
+#include <linux/mbus.h>
+
+#if defined(CONFIG_MVEBU_EFUSE_FAKE)
+#define DRY_RUN
+#else
+#undef DRY_RUN
+#endif
+
+#define MBUS_EFUSE_BASE 0xF6000000
+#define MBUS_EFUSE_SIZE BIT(20)
+
+#define MVEBU_EFUSE_CONTROL (MVEBU_REGISTER(0xE4008))
+
+enum {
+	MVEBU_EFUSE_CTRL_PROGRAM_ENABLE = (1 << 31),
+};
+
+struct mvebu_hd_efuse {
+	u32 bits_31_0;
+	u32 bits_63_32;
+	u32 bit64;
+	u32 reserved0;
+};
+
+#ifndef DRY_RUN
+static struct mvebu_hd_efuse *efuses =
+	(struct mvebu_hd_efuse *)(MBUS_EFUSE_BASE + 0xF9000);
+#else
+static struct mvebu_hd_efuse efuses[EFUSE_LINE_MAX + 1];
+#endif
+
+static int efuse_initialised;
+
+static struct mvebu_hd_efuse *get_efuse_line(int nr)
+{
+	if (nr < 0 || nr > 63 || !efuse_initialised)
+		return NULL;
+
+	return efuses + nr;
+}
+
+static void enable_efuse_program(void)
+{
+#ifndef DRY_RUN
+	setbits_le32(MVEBU_EFUSE_CONTROL, MVEBU_EFUSE_CTRL_PROGRAM_ENABLE);
+#endif
+}
+
+static void disable_efuse_program(void)
+{
+#ifndef DRY_RUN
+	clrbits_le32(MVEBU_EFUSE_CONTROL, MVEBU_EFUSE_CTRL_PROGRAM_ENABLE);
+#endif
+}
+
+static int do_prog_efuse(struct mvebu_hd_efuse *efuse,
+			 struct efuse_val *new_val, u32 mask0, u32 mask1)
+{
+	struct efuse_val val;
+
+	val.dwords.d[0] = readl(&efuse->bits_31_0);
+	val.dwords.d[1] = readl(&efuse->bits_63_32);
+	val.lock = readl(&efuse->bit64);
+
+	if (val.lock & 1)
+		return -EPERM;
+
+	val.dwords.d[0] |= (new_val->dwords.d[0] & mask0);
+	val.dwords.d[1] |= (new_val->dwords.d[1] & mask1);
+	val.lock |= new_val->lock;
+
+	writel(val.dwords.d[0], &efuse->bits_31_0);
+	mdelay(1);
+	writel(val.dwords.d[1], &efuse->bits_63_32);
+	mdelay(1);
+	writel(val.lock, &efuse->bit64);
+	mdelay(5);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int prog_efuse(int nr, struct efuse_val *new_val, u32 mask0, u32 mask1)
+{
+	struct mvebu_hd_efuse *efuse;
+	int res = 0;
+
+	res = mvebu_efuse_init_hw();
+	if (res)
+		return res;
+
+	efuse = get_efuse_line(nr);
+	if (!efuse)
+		return -ENODEV;
+
+	if (!new_val)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/* only write a fuse line with lock bit */
+	if (!new_val->lock)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/* according to specs ECC protection bits must be 0 on write */
+	if (new_val->bytes.d[7] & 0xFE)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (!new_val->dwords.d[0] && !new_val->dwords.d[1] && (mask0 | mask1))
+		return 0;
+
+	enable_efuse_program();
+
+	res = do_prog_efuse(efuse, new_val, mask0, mask1);
+
+	disable_efuse_program();
+
+	return res;
+}
+
+int mvebu_efuse_init_hw(void)
+{
+	int ret;
+
+	if (efuse_initialised)
+		return 0;
+
+	ret = mvebu_mbus_add_window_by_id(
+		CPU_TARGET_SATA23_DFX, 0xA, MBUS_EFUSE_BASE, MBUS_EFUSE_SIZE);
+
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
+	efuse_initialised = 1;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int mvebu_read_efuse(int nr, struct efuse_val *val)
+{
+	struct mvebu_hd_efuse *efuse;
+	int res;
+
+	res = mvebu_efuse_init_hw();
+	if (res)
+		return res;
+
+	efuse = get_efuse_line(nr);
+	if (!efuse)
+		return -ENODEV;
+
+	if (!val)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	val->dwords.d[0] = readl(&efuse->bits_31_0);
+	val->dwords.d[1] = readl(&efuse->bits_63_32);
+	val->lock = readl(&efuse->bit64);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int mvebu_write_efuse(int nr, struct efuse_val *val)
+{
+	return prog_efuse(nr, val, ~0, ~0);
+}
+
+int mvebu_lock_efuse(int nr)
+{
+	struct efuse_val val = {
+		.lock = 1,
+	};
+
+	return prog_efuse(nr, &val, 0, 0);
+}
+
+/*
+ * wrapper funcs providing the fuse API
+ *
+ * we use the following mapping:
+ *   "bank" ->	eFuse line
+ *   "word" ->	0: bits 0-31
+ *		1: bits 32-63
+ *		2: bit 64 (lock)
+ */
+
+static struct efuse_val prog_val;
+static int valid_prog_words;
+
+int fuse_read(u32 bank, u32 word, u32 *val)
+{
+	struct efuse_val fuse_line;
+	int res;
+
+	if (bank < EFUSE_LINE_MIN || bank > EFUSE_LINE_MAX || word > 2)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	res = mvebu_read_efuse(bank, &fuse_line);
+	if (res)
+		return res;
+
+	if (word < 2)
+		*val = fuse_line.dwords.d[word];
+	else
+		*val = fuse_line.lock;
+
+	return res;
+}
+
+int fuse_sense(u32 bank, u32 word, u32 *val)
+{
+	/* not supported */
+	return -ENOSYS;
+}
+
+int fuse_prog(u32 bank, u32 word, u32 val)
+{
+	int res = 0;
+
+	/*
+	 * NOTE: Fuse line should be written as whole.
+	 * So how can we do that with this API?
+	 * For now: remember values for word == 0 and word == 1 and write the
+	 * whole line when word == 2.
+	 * This implies that we always require all 3 fuse prog cmds (one for
+	 * for each word) to write a single fuse line.
+	 * Exception is a single write to word 2 which will lock the fuse line.
+	 *
+	 * Hope that will be OK.
+	 */
+
+	if (bank < EFUSE_LINE_MIN || bank > EFUSE_LINE_MAX || word > 2)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (word < 2) {
+		prog_val.dwords.d[word] = val;
+		valid_prog_words |= (1 << word);
+	} else if ((valid_prog_words & 3) == 0 && val) {
+		res = mvebu_lock_efuse(bank);
+		valid_prog_words = 0;
+	} else if ((valid_prog_words & 3) != 3 || !val) {
+		res = -EINVAL;
+	} else {
+		prog_val.lock = val != 0;
+		res = mvebu_write_efuse(bank, &prog_val);
+		valid_prog_words = 0;
+	}
+
+	return res;
+}
+
+int fuse_override(u32 bank, u32 word, u32 val)
+{
+	/* not supported */
+	return -ENOSYS;
+}
diff --git a/arch/arm/mach-mvebu/include/mach/cpu.h b/arch/arm/mach-mvebu/include/mach/cpu.h
index 66f7680fb3..d241eea956 100644
--- a/arch/arm/mach-mvebu/include/mach/cpu.h
+++ b/arch/arm/mach-mvebu/include/mach/cpu.h
@@ -36,7 +36,9 @@ enum cpu_target {
 	CPU_TARGET_ETH01 = 0x7,
 	CPU_TARGET_PCIE13 = 0x8,
 	CPU_TARGET_SASRAM = 0x9,
+	CPU_TARGET_SATA01 = 0xa, /* A38X */
 	CPU_TARGET_NAND = 0xd,
+	CPU_TARGET_SATA23_DFX = 0xe, /* A38X */
 };
 
 enum cpu_attrib {
diff --git a/arch/arm/mach-mvebu/include/mach/efuse.h b/arch/arm/mach-mvebu/include/mach/efuse.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..ef693e6749
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/arm/mach-mvebu/include/mach/efuse.h
@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2015 Reinhard Pfau <reinhard.pfau@gdsys.cc>
+ *
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier:	GPL-2.0+
+ */
+
+#ifndef _MVEBU_EFUSE_H
+#define _MVEBU_EFUSE_H
+
+#include <common.h>
+
+struct efuse_val {
+	union {
+		struct {
+			u8 d[8];
+		} bytes;
+		struct {
+			u16 d[4];
+		} words;
+		struct {
+			u32 d[2];
+		} dwords;
+	};
+	u32 lock;
+};
+
+#if defined(CONFIG_ARMADA_38X)
+
+enum efuse_line {
+	EFUSE_LINE_SECURE_BOOT = 24,
+	EFUSE_LINE_PUBKEY_DIGEST_0 = 26,
+	EFUSE_LINE_PUBKEY_DIGEST_1 = 27,
+	EFUSE_LINE_PUBKEY_DIGEST_2 = 28,
+	EFUSE_LINE_PUBKEY_DIGEST_3 = 29,
+	EFUSE_LINE_PUBKEY_DIGEST_4 = 30,
+	EFUSE_LINE_CSK_0_VALID = 31,
+	EFUSE_LINE_CSK_1_VALID = 32,
+	EFUSE_LINE_CSK_2_VALID = 33,
+	EFUSE_LINE_CSK_3_VALID = 34,
+	EFUSE_LINE_CSK_4_VALID = 35,
+	EFUSE_LINE_CSK_5_VALID = 36,
+	EFUSE_LINE_CSK_6_VALID = 37,
+	EFUSE_LINE_CSK_7_VALID = 38,
+	EFUSE_LINE_CSK_8_VALID = 39,
+	EFUSE_LINE_CSK_9_VALID = 40,
+	EFUSE_LINE_CSK_10_VALID = 41,
+	EFUSE_LINE_CSK_11_VALID = 42,
+	EFUSE_LINE_CSK_12_VALID = 43,
+	EFUSE_LINE_CSK_13_VALID = 44,
+	EFUSE_LINE_CSK_14_VALID = 45,
+	EFUSE_LINE_CSK_15_VALID = 46,
+	EFUSE_LINE_FLASH_ID = 47,
+	EFUSE_LINE_BOX_ID = 48,
+
+	EFUSE_LINE_MIN = 0,
+	EFUSE_LINE_MAX = 63,
+};
+
+#endif
+
+int mvebu_efuse_init_hw(void);
+
+int mvebu_read_efuse(int nr, struct efuse_val *val);
+
+int mvebu_write_efuse(int nr, struct efuse_val *val);
+
+int mvebu_lock_efuse(int nr);
+
+#endif
diff --git a/arch/arm/mach-mvebu/include/mach/soc.h b/arch/arm/mach-mvebu/include/mach/soc.h
index 0f69f3341b..0900e4008c 100644
--- a/arch/arm/mach-mvebu/include/mach/soc.h
+++ b/arch/arm/mach-mvebu/include/mach/soc.h
@@ -67,6 +67,7 @@
 #define MVEBU_REG_PCIE_BASE	(MVEBU_REGISTER(0x40000))
 #define MVEBU_AXP_USB_BASE      (MVEBU_REGISTER(0x50000))
 #define MVEBU_USB20_BASE	(MVEBU_REGISTER(0x58000))
+#define MVEBU_REG_PCIE0_BASE	(MVEBU_REGISTER(0x80000))
 #define MVEBU_AXP_SATA_BASE	(MVEBU_REGISTER(0xa0000))
 #define MVEBU_SATA0_BASE	(MVEBU_REGISTER(0xa8000))
 #define MVEBU_NAND_BASE		(MVEBU_REGISTER(0xd0000))
diff --git a/arch/arm/mach-mvebu/serdes/a38x/ctrl_pex.c b/arch/arm/mach-mvebu/serdes/a38x/ctrl_pex.c
index 98c447ce94..9e5b647e25 100644
--- a/arch/arm/mach-mvebu/serdes/a38x/ctrl_pex.c
+++ b/arch/arm/mach-mvebu/serdes/a38x/ctrl_pex.c
@@ -13,6 +13,11 @@
 #include "ctrl_pex.h"
 #include "sys_env_lib.h"
 
+__weak void board_pex_config(void)
+{
+	/* nothing in this weak default implementation */
+}
+
 int hws_pex_config(const struct serdes_map *serdes_map, u8 count)
 {
 	u32 pex_idx, tmp, next_busno, first_busno, temp_pex_reg,
@@ -77,6 +82,9 @@ int hws_pex_config(const struct serdes_map *serdes_map, u8 count)
 
 	/* Support gen1/gen2 */
 	DEBUG_INIT_FULL_S("Support gen1/gen2\n");
+
+	board_pex_config();
+
 	next_busno = 0;
 	mdelay(150);
 
diff --git a/arch/arm/mach-mvebu/serdes/a38x/ctrl_pex.h b/arch/arm/mach-mvebu/serdes/a38x/ctrl_pex.h
index 5f7e2c7aa2..ca8a4d206a 100644
--- a/arch/arm/mach-mvebu/serdes/a38x/ctrl_pex.h
+++ b/arch/arm/mach-mvebu/serdes/a38x/ctrl_pex.h
@@ -83,4 +83,6 @@ int pex_local_bus_num_set(u32 pex_if, u32 bus_num);
 int pex_local_dev_num_set(u32 pex_if, u32 dev_num);
 u32 pex_config_read(u32 pex_if, u32 bus, u32 dev, u32 func, u32 reg_off);
 
+void board_pex_config(void);
+
 #endif
diff --git a/arch/arm/mach-mvebu/spl.c b/arch/arm/mach-mvebu/spl.c
index e1c9cdba50..3cf02a54ce 100644
--- a/arch/arm/mach-mvebu/spl.c
+++ b/arch/arm/mach-mvebu/spl.c
@@ -13,8 +13,6 @@
 #include <asm/arch/cpu.h>
 #include <asm/arch/soc.h>
 
-DECLARE_GLOBAL_DATA_PTR;
-
 static u32 get_boot_device(void)
 {
 	u32 val;
diff --git a/board/gdsys/p1022/controlcenterd-id.c b/board/gdsys/p1022/controlcenterd-id.c
index 2c6c698fb3..1648f13340 100644
--- a/board/gdsys/p1022/controlcenterd-id.c
+++ b/board/gdsys/p1022/controlcenterd-id.c
@@ -43,15 +43,6 @@
 #define CCDM_AUTO_FIRST_STAGE
 #endif
 
-/* enums from TCG specs */
-enum {
-	/* capability areas */
-	TPM_CAP_NV_INDEX	= 0x00000011,
-	TPM_CAP_HANDLE		= 0x00000014,
-	/* resource types */
-	TPM_RT_KEY	= 0x00000001,
-};
-
 /* CCDM specific contants */
 enum {
 	/* NV indices */
diff --git a/cmd/tpm.c b/cmd/tpm.c
index 312503fb96..625fc43d26 100644
--- a/cmd/tpm.c
+++ b/cmd/tpm.c
@@ -646,6 +646,64 @@ TPM_COMMAND_NO_ARG(tpm_end_oiap)
 
 #endif /* CONFIG_TPM_AUTH_SESSIONS */
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_TPM_FLUSH_RESOURCES
+static int do_tpm_flush(cmd_tbl_t *cmdtp, int flag, int argc,
+			char * const argv[])
+{
+	int type = 0;
+
+	if (argc != 2)
+		return CMD_RET_USAGE;
+
+	if (strcasecmp(argv[1], "key"))
+		type = TPM_RT_KEY;
+	else if (strcasecmp(argv[1], "auth"))
+		type = TPM_RT_AUTH;
+	else if (strcasecmp(argv[1], "hash"))
+		type = TPM_RT_HASH;
+	else if (strcasecmp(argv[1], "trans"))
+		type = TPM_RT_TRANS;
+	else if (strcasecmp(argv[1], "context"))
+		type = TPM_RT_CONTEXT;
+	else if (strcasecmp(argv[1], "counter"))
+		type = TPM_RT_COUNTER;
+	else if (strcasecmp(argv[1], "delegate"))
+		type = TPM_RT_DELEGATE;
+	else if (strcasecmp(argv[1], "daa_tpm"))
+		type = TPM_RT_DAA_TPM;
+	else if (strcasecmp(argv[1], "daa_v0"))
+		type = TPM_RT_DAA_V0;
+	else if (strcasecmp(argv[1], "daa_v1"))
+		type = TPM_RT_DAA_V1;
+
+	if (strcasecmp(argv[2], "all")) {
+		uint16_t res_count;
+		uint8_t buf[288];
+		uint8_t *ptr;
+		int err;
+		uint i;
+
+		/* fetch list of already loaded resources in the TPM */
+		err = tpm_get_capability(TPM_CAP_HANDLE, type, buf,
+					 sizeof(buf));
+		if (err)
+			return -1;
+		res_count = get_unaligned_be16(buf);
+		ptr = buf + 2;
+		for (i = 0; i < res_count; ++i, ptr += 4)
+			tpm_flush_specific(get_unaligned_be32(ptr), type);
+	} else {
+		uint32_t handle = simple_strtoul(argv[2], NULL, 0);
+
+		if (!handle)
+			return -1;
+		tpm_flush_specific(cpu_to_be32(handle), type);
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_TPM_FLUSH_RESOURCES */
+
 #define MAKE_TPM_CMD_ENTRY(cmd) \
 	U_BOOT_CMD_MKENT(cmd, 0, 1, do_tpm_ ## cmd, "", "")
 
@@ -701,6 +759,10 @@ static cmd_tbl_t tpm_commands[] = {
 	U_BOOT_CMD_MKENT(get_pub_key_oiap, 0, 1,
 			 do_tpm_get_pub_key_oiap, "", ""),
 #endif /* CONFIG_TPM_AUTH_SESSIONS */
+#ifdef CONFIG_TPM_FLUSH_RESOURCES
+	U_BOOT_CMD_MKENT(flush, 0, 1,
+			 do_tpm_flush, "", ""),
+#endif /* CONFIG_TPM_FLUSH_RESOURCES */
 };
 
 static int do_tpm(cmd_tbl_t *cmdtp, int flag, int argc, char * const argv[])
@@ -750,6 +812,14 @@ U_BOOT_CMD(tpm, CONFIG_SYS_MAXARGS, 1, do_tpm,
 "  get_capability cap_area sub_cap addr count\n"
 "    - Read <count> bytes of TPM capability indexed by <cap_area> and\n"
 "      <sub_cap> to memory address <addr>.\n"
+#ifdef CONFIG_TPM_FLUSH_RESOURCES
+"Resource management functions\n"
+"  flush resource_type id\n"
+"    - flushes a resource of type <resource_type> (may be one of key, auth,\n"
+"      hash, trans, context, counter, delegate, daa_tpm, daa_v0, daa_v1),\n"
+"      and id <id> from the TPM. Use an <id> of \"all\" to flush all\n"
+"      resources of that type.\n"
+#endif /* CONFIG_TPM_FLUSH_RESOURCES */
 #ifdef CONFIG_TPM_AUTH_SESSIONS
 "Storage functions\n"
 "  loadkey2_oiap parent_handle key_addr key_len usage_auth\n"
diff --git a/doc/README.armada-secureboot b/doc/README.armada-secureboot
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..157cb5a231
--- /dev/null
+++ b/doc/README.armada-secureboot
@@ -0,0 +1,373 @@
+The trusted boot framework on Marvell Armada 38x
+================================================
+
+Contents:
+
+1. Overview of the trusted boot
+2. Terminology
+3. Boot image layout
+4. The secured header
+5. The secured boot flow
+6. Usage example
+7. Work to be done
+8. Bibliography
+
+1. Overview of the trusted boot
+-------------------------------
+
+The Armada's trusted boot framework enables the SoC to cryptographically verify
+a specially prepared boot image. This can be used to establish a chain of trust
+from the boot firmware all the way to the OS.
+
+To achieve this, the Armada SoC requires a specially prepared boot image, which
+contains the relevant cryptographic data, as well as other information
+pertaining to the boot process. Furthermore, a eFuse structure (a
+one-time-writeable memory) need to be configured in the correct way.
+
+Roughly, the secure boot process works as follows:
+
+* Load the header block of the boot image, extract a special "root" public RSA
+  key from it, and verify its SHA-256 hash against a SHA-256 stored in a eFuse
+  field.
+* Load an array of code signing public RSA keys from the header block, and
+  verify its RSA signature (contained in the header block as well) using the
+  "root" RSA key.
+* Choose a code signing key, and use it to verify the header block (excluding
+  the key array).
+* Verify the binary image's signature (contained in the header block) using the
+  code signing key.
+* If all checks pass successfully, boot the image.
+
+The chain of trust is thus as follows:
+
+* The SHA-256 value in the eFuse field verifies the "root" public key.
+* The "root" public key verifies the code signing key array.
+* The selected code signing key verifies the header block and the binary image.
+
+In the special case of building a boot image containing U-Boot as the binary
+image, which employs this trusted boot framework, the following tasks need to
+be addressed:
+
+1. Creation of the needed cryptographic key material.
+2. Creation of a conforming boot image containing the U-Boot image as binary
+   image.
+3. Burning the necessary eFuse values.
+
+(1) will be addressed later, (2) will be taken care of by U-Boot's build
+system (some user configuration is required, though), and for (3) the necessary
+data (essentially a series of U-Boot commands to be entered at the U-Boot
+command prompt) will be created by the build system as well.
+
+The documentation of the trusted boot mode is contained in part 1, chapter
+7.2.5 in the functional specification [1], and in application note [2].
+
+2. Terminology
+--------------
+
+	           CSK - Code Signing Key(s): An array of RSA key pairs, which
+                         are used to sign and verify the secured header and the
+                         boot loader image.
+	           KAK - Key Authentication Key: A RSA key pair, which is used
+                         to sign and verify the array of CSKs.
+	  Header block - The first part of the boot image, which contains the
+			 image's headers (also known as "headers block", "boot
+			 header", and "image header")
+                 eFuse - A one-time-writeable memory.
+               BootROM - The Armada's built-in boot firmware, which is
+                         responsible for verifying and starting secure images.
+	    Boot image - The complete image the SoC's boot firmware loads
+			 (contains the header block and the binary image)
+	   Main header - The header in the header block containing information
+			 and data pertaining to the boot process (used for both
+			 the regular and secured boot processes)
+	  Binary image - The binary code payload of the boot image; in this
+			 case the U-Boot's code (also known as "source image",
+			 or just "image")
+	Secured header - The specialized header in the header block that
+			 contains information and data pertaining to the
+			 trusted boot (also known as "security header")
+     Secured boot mode - A special boot mode of the Armada SoC in which secured
+                         images are verified (non-secure images won't boot);
+                         the mode is activated by setting a eFuse field.
+    Trusted debug mode - A special mode for the trusted boot that allows
+			 debugging of devices employing the trusted boot
+			 framework in a secure manner (untested in the current
+			 implementation).
+Trusted boot framework - The ARMADA SoC's implementation of a secure verified
+                         boot process.
+
+3. Boot image layout
+--------------------
+
++-- Boot image --------------------------------------------+
+|                                                          |
+| +-- Header block --------------------------------------+ |
+| | Main header                                          | |
+| +------------------------------------------------------+ |
+| | Secured header                                       | |
+| +------------------------------------------------------+ |
+| | BIN header(s)                                        | |
+| +------------------------------------------------------+ |
+| | REG header(s)                                        | |
+| +------------------------------------------------------+ |
+| | Padding                                              | |
+| +------------------------------------------------------+ |
+|                                                          |
+| +------------------------------------------------------+ |
+| | Binary image + checksum                              | |
+| +------------------------------------------------------+ |
++----------------------------------------------------------+
+
+4. The secured header
+---------------------
+
+For the trusted boot framework, a additional header is added to the boot image.
+The following data are relevant for the secure boot:
+
+		   KAK: The KAK is contained in the secured header in the form
+		        of a RSA-2048 public key in DER format with a length of
+			524 bytes.
+Header block signature: The RSA signature of the header block (excluding the
+                        CSK array), created using the selected CSK.
+Binary image signature: The RSA signature of the binary image, created using
+                        the selected CSK.
+             CSK array: The array of the 16 CSKs as RSA-2048 public keys in DER
+	                format with a length of 8384 = 16 * 524 bytes.
+   CSK block signature: The RSA signature of the CSK array, created using the
+                        KAK.
+
+NOTE: The JTAG delay, Box ID, and Flash ID header fields do play a role in the
+trusted boot process to enable and configure secure debugging, but they were
+not tested in the current implementation of the trusted boot in U-Boot.
+
+5. The secured boot flow
+------------------------
+
+The steps in the boot flow that are relevant for the trusted boot framework
+proceed as follows:
+
+1) Check if trusted boot is enabled, and perform regular boot if it is not.
+2) Load the secured header, and verify its checksum.
+3) Select the lowest valid CSK from CSK0 to CSK15.
+4) Verify the SHA-256 hash of the KAK embedded in the secured header.
+5) Verify the RSA signature of the CSK block from the secured header with the
+   KAK.
+6) Verify the header block signature (which excludes the CSK block) from the
+   secured header with the selected CSK.
+7) Load the binary image to the main memory and verify its checksum.
+8) Verify the binary image's RSA signature from the secured header with the
+   selected CSK.
+9) Continue the boot process as in the case of the regular boot.
+
+NOTE: All RSA signatures are verified according to the PKCS #1 v2.1 standard
+described in [3].
+
+NOTE: The Box ID and Flash ID are checked after step 6, and the trusted debug
+mode may be entered there, but since this mode is untested in the current
+implementation, it is not described further.
+
+6. Usage example
+----------------
+
+### Create key material
+
+To employ the trusted boot framework, cryptographic key material needs to be
+created. In the current implementation, two keys are needed to build a valid
+secured boot image: The KAK private key and a CSK private key (both have to be
+2048 bit RSA keys in PEM format). Note that the usage of more than one CSK is
+currently not supported.
+
+NOTE: Since the public key can be generated from the private key, it is
+sufficient to store the private key for each key pair.
+
+OpenSSL can be used to generate the needed files kwb_kak.key and kwb_csk.key
+(the names of these files have to be configured, see the next section on
+kwbimage.cfg settings):
+
+openssl genrsa -out kwb_kak.key 2048
+openssl genrsa -out kwb_csk.key 2048
+
+The generated files have to be placed in the U-Boot root directory.
+
+Alternatively, instead of copying the files, symlinks to the private keys can
+be placed in the U-Boot root directory.
+
+WARNING: Knowledge of the KAK or CSK private key would enable an attacker to
+generate secured boot images containing arbitrary code. Hence, the private keys
+should be carefully guarded.
+
+### Create/Modifiy kwbimage.cfg
+
+The Kirkwook architecture in U-Boot employs a special board-specific
+configuration file (kwbimage.cfg), which controls various boot image settings
+that are interpreted by the BootROM, such as the boot medium. The support the
+trusted boot framework, several new options were added to faciliate
+configuration of the secured boot.
+
+The configuration file's layout has been retained, only the following new
+options were added:
+
+		KAK - The name of the KAK RSA private key file in the U-Boot
+                      root directory, without the trailing extension of ".key".
+		CSK - The name of the (active) CSK RSA private key file in the
+		      U-Boot root directory, without the trailing extension of
+		      ".key".
+	     BOX_ID - The BoxID to be used for trusted debugging (a integer
+	              value).
+	   FLASH_ID - The FlashID to be used for trusted debugging (a integer
+	              value).
+	 JTAG_DELAY - The JTAG delay to be used for trusted debugging (a
+	              integer value).
+          CSK_INDEX - The index of the active CSK (a integer value).
+SEC_SPECIALIZED_IMG - Flag to indicate whether to include the BoxID and FlashID
+		      in the image (that is, whether to use the trusted debug
+		      mode or not); no parameters.
+       SEC_BOOT_DEV - The boot device from which the trusted boot is allowed to
+		      proceed, identified via a numeric ID. The tested values
+		      are 0x34 = NOR flash, 0x31 = SDIO/MMC card; for
+		      additional ID values, consult the documentation in [1].
+      SEC_FUSE_DUMP - Dump the "fuse prog" commands necessary for writing the
+		      correct eFuse values to a text file in the U-Boot root
+		      directory. The parameter is the architecture for which to
+		      dump the commands (currently only "a38x" is supported).
+
+The parameter values may be hardcoded into the file, but it is also possible to
+employ a dynamic approach of creating a Autoconf-like kwbimage.cfg.in, then
+reading configuration values from Kconfig options or from the board config
+file, and generating the actual kwbimage.cfg from this template using Makefile
+mechanisms (see board/gdsys/a38x/Makefile as an example for this approach).
+
+### Set config options
+
+To enable the generation of trusted boot images, the corresponding support
+needs to be activated, and a index for the active CSK needs to be selected as
+well.
+
+Furthermore, eFuse writing support has to be activated in order to burn the
+eFuse structure's values (this option is just needed for programming the eFuse
+structure; production boot images may disable it).
+
+ARM architecture
+ -> [*] Build image for trusted boot
+    (0)   Index of active CSK
+ -> [*] Enable eFuse support
+    [ ]   Fake eFuse access (dry run)
+
+### Build and test boot image
+
+The creation of the boot image is done via the usual invocation of make (with a
+suitably set CROSS_COMPILE environment variable, of course). The resulting boot
+image u-boot-spl.kwb can then be tested, if so desired. The hdrparser from [5]
+can be used for this purpose. To build the tool, invoke make in the
+'tools/marvell/doimage_mv' directory of [5], which builds a stand-alone
+hdrparser executable. A test can be conducted by calling hdrparser with the
+produced boot image and the following (mandatory) parameters:
+
+./hdrparser -k 0 -t u-boot-spl.kwb
+
+Here we assume that the CSK index is 0 and the boot image file resides in the
+same directory (adapt accordingly if needed). The tool should report that all
+checksums are valid ("GOOD"), that all signature verifications succeed
+("PASSED"), and, finally, that the overall test was successful
+("T E S T   S U C C E E D E D" in the last line of output).
+
+### Burn eFuse structure
+
++----------------------------------------------------------+
+| WARNING: Burning the eFuse structure is a irreversible   |
+| operation! Should wrong or corrupted values be used, the |
+| board won't boot anymore, and recovery is likely         |
+| impossible!                                              |
++----------------------------------------------------------+
+
+After the build process has finished, and the SEC_FUSE_DUMP option was set in
+the kwbimage.cfg was set, a text file kwb_fuses_a38x.txt should be present in
+the U-Boot top-level directory. It contains all the necessary commands to set
+the eFuse structure to the values needed for the used KAK digest, as well as
+the CSK index, Flash ID and Box ID that were selected in kwbimage.cfg.
+
+Sequentially executing the commands in this file at the U-Boot command prompt
+will write these values to the eFuse structure.
+
+If the SEC_FUSE_DUMP option was not set, the commands needed to burn the fuses
+have to be crafted by hand. The needed fuse lines can be looked up in [1]; a
+rough overview of the process is:
+
+* Burn the KAK public key hash. The hash itself can be found in the file
+  pub_kak_hash.txt in the U-Boot top-level directory; be careful to account for
+  the endianness!
+* Burn the CSK selection, BoxID, and FlashID
+* Enable trusted boot by burning the corresponding fuse (WARNING: this must be
+  the last fuse line written!)
+* Lock the unused fuse lines
+
+The command to employ is the "fuse prog" command previously enabled by setting
+the corresponding configuration option.
+
+For the trusted boot, the fuse prog command has a special syntax, since the
+ARMADA SoC demands that whole fuse lines (64 bit values) have to be written as
+a whole. The fuse prog command itself allows lists of 32 bit words to be
+written at a time, but this is translated to a series of single 32 bit write
+operations to the fuse line, where the individual 32 bit words are identified
+by a "word" counter that is increased for each write.
+
+To work around this restriction, we interpret each line to have three "words"
+(0-2): The first and second words are the values to be written to the fuse
+line, and the third is a lock flag, which is supposed to lock the fuse line
+when set to 1. Writes to the first and second words are memoized between
+function calls, and the fuse line is only really written and locked (on writing
+the third word) if both words were previously set, so that "incomplete" writes
+are prevented. An exception to this is a single write to the third word (index
+2) without previously writing neither the first nor the second word, which
+locks the fuse line without setting any value; this is needed to lock the
+unused fuse lines.
+
+As an example, to write the value 0011223344556677 to fuse line 10, we would
+use the following command:
+
+fuse prog -y 10 0 00112233 44556677 1
+
+Here 10 is the fuse line number, 0 is the index of the first word to be
+written, 00112233 and 44556677 are the values to be written to the fuse line
+(first and second word) and the trailing 1 is the value for the third word
+responsible for locking the line.
+
+A "lock-only" command would look like this:
+
+fuse prog -y 11 2 1
+
+Here 11 is the fuse number, 2 is the index of the first word to be written
+(notice that we only write to word 2 here; the third word for fuse line
+locking), and the 1 is the value for the word we are writing to.
+
+WARNING: According to application note [4], the VHV pin of the SoC must be
+connected to a 1.8V source during eFuse programming, but *must* be disconnected
+for normal operation. The AN [4] describes a software-controlled circuit (based
+on a N-channel or P-channel FET and a free GPIO pin of the SoC) to achieve
+this, but a jumper-based circuit should suffice as well. Regardless of the
+chosen circuit, the issue needs to be addressed accordingly!
+
+7. Work to be done
+------------------
+
+* Add the ability to populate more than one CSK
+* Test secure debug
+* Test on Armada XP
+
+8. Bibliography
+---------------
+
+[1] ARMADA(R) 38x Family High-Performance Single/Dual CPU System on Chip
+    Functional Specification; MV-S109094-00, Rev. C; August 2, 2015,
+    Preliminary
+[2] AN-383: ARMADA(R) 38x Families Secure Boot Mode Support; MV-S302501-00
+    Rev.  A; March 11, 2015, Preliminary
+[3] Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1: RSA Cryptography
+    Specifications Version 2.1; February 2003;
+    https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3447.txt
+[4] AN-389: ARMADA(R) VHV Power; MV-S302545-00 Rev. B; January 28, 2016,
+    Released
+[5] Marvell Armada 38x U-Boot support; November 25, 2015;
+    https://github.com/MarvellEmbeddedProcessors/u-boot-marvell
+
+2017-01-05, Mario Six <mario.six@gdsys.cc>
diff --git a/drivers/net/phy/marvell.c b/drivers/net/phy/marvell.c
index 4eeb0f6ede..c3058a40b2 100644
--- a/drivers/net/phy/marvell.c
+++ b/drivers/net/phy/marvell.c
@@ -480,6 +480,49 @@ static int m88e1310_config(struct phy_device *phydev)
 	return genphy_config_aneg(phydev);
 }
 
+static int m88e1680_config(struct phy_device *phydev)
+{
+	/*
+	 * As per Marvell Release Notes - Alaska V 88E1680 Rev A2
+	 * Errata Section 4.1
+	 */
+	u16 reg;
+	int res;
+
+	/* Matrix LED mode (not neede if single LED mode is used */
+	phy_write(phydev, MDIO_DEVAD_NONE, MIIM_88E1118_PHY_PAGE, 0x0004);
+	reg = phy_read(phydev, MDIO_DEVAD_NONE, 27);
+	reg |= (1 << 5);
+	phy_write(phydev, MDIO_DEVAD_NONE, 27, reg);
+
+	/* QSGMII TX amplitude change */
+	phy_write(phydev, MDIO_DEVAD_NONE, MIIM_88E1118_PHY_PAGE, 0x00fd);
+	phy_write(phydev, MDIO_DEVAD_NONE,  8, 0x0b53);
+	phy_write(phydev, MDIO_DEVAD_NONE,  7, 0x200d);
+	phy_write(phydev, MDIO_DEVAD_NONE, MIIM_88E1118_PHY_PAGE, 0x0000);
+
+	/* EEE initialization */
+	phy_write(phydev, MDIO_DEVAD_NONE, MIIM_88E1118_PHY_PAGE, 0x00ff);
+	phy_write(phydev, MDIO_DEVAD_NONE, 17, 0xb030);
+	phy_write(phydev, MDIO_DEVAD_NONE, 16, 0x215c);
+	phy_write(phydev, MDIO_DEVAD_NONE, 22, 0x00fc);
+	phy_write(phydev, MDIO_DEVAD_NONE, 24, 0x888c);
+	phy_write(phydev, MDIO_DEVAD_NONE, 25, 0x888c);
+	phy_write(phydev, MDIO_DEVAD_NONE, MIIM_88E1118_PHY_PAGE, 0x0000);
+	phy_write(phydev, MDIO_DEVAD_NONE,  0, 0x9140);
+
+	res = genphy_config_aneg(phydev);
+	if (res < 0)
+		return res;
+
+	/* soft reset */
+	reg = phy_read(phydev, MDIO_DEVAD_NONE, MII_BMCR);
+	reg |= BMCR_RESET;
+	phy_write(phydev, MDIO_DEVAD_NONE, MII_BMCR, reg);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
 static struct phy_driver M88E1011S_driver = {
 	.name = "Marvell 88E1011S",
 	.uid = 0x1410c60,
@@ -580,6 +623,16 @@ static struct phy_driver M88E1310_driver = {
 	.shutdown = &genphy_shutdown,
 };
 
+static struct phy_driver M88E1680_driver = {
+	.name = "Marvell 88E1680",
+	.uid = 0x1410ed0,
+	.mask = 0xffffff0,
+	.features = PHY_GBIT_FEATURES,
+	.config = &m88e1680_config,
+	.startup = &genphy_startup,
+	.shutdown = &genphy_shutdown,
+};
+
 int phy_marvell_init(void)
 {
 	phy_register(&M88E1310_driver);
@@ -592,6 +645,7 @@ int phy_marvell_init(void)
 	phy_register(&M88E1011S_driver);
 	phy_register(&M88E1510_driver);
 	phy_register(&M88E1518_driver);
+	phy_register(&M88E1680_driver);
 
 	return 0;
 }
diff --git a/drivers/pci/pci_mvebu.c b/drivers/pci/pci_mvebu.c
index 0f449703de..da0aa29865 100644
--- a/drivers/pci/pci_mvebu.c
+++ b/drivers/pci/pci_mvebu.c
@@ -91,25 +91,26 @@ static void __iomem *mvebu_pcie_membase = (void __iomem *)MBUS_PCI_MEM_BASE;
 #if defined(CONFIG_ARMADA_38X)
 #define PCIE_BASE(if)					\
 	((if) == 0 ?					\
-	 MVEBU_REG_PCIE_BASE + 0x40000 :		\
-	 MVEBU_REG_PCIE_BASE + 0x4000 * (if))
+	 MVEBU_REG_PCIE0_BASE :				\
+	 (MVEBU_REG_PCIE_BASE + 0x4000 * (if - 1)))
 
 /*
  * On A38x MV6820 these PEX ports are supported:
  *  0 - Port 0.0
- *  1 - Port 0.1
- *  2 - Port 0.2
+ *  1 - Port 1.0
+ *  2 - Port 2.0
+ *  3 - Port 3.0
  */
-#define MAX_PEX 3
+#define MAX_PEX 4
 static struct mvebu_pcie pcie_bus[MAX_PEX];
 
 static void mvebu_get_port_lane(struct mvebu_pcie *pcie, int pex_idx,
 				int *mem_target, int *mem_attr)
 {
-	u8 port[] = { 0, 1, 2 };
-	u8 lane[] = { 0, 0, 0 };
-	u8 target[] = { 8, 4, 4 };
-	u8 attr[] = { 0xe8, 0xe8, 0xd8 };
+	u8 port[] = { 0, 1, 2, 3 };
+	u8 lane[] = { 0, 0, 0, 0 };
+	u8 target[] = { 8, 4, 4, 4 };
+	u8 attr[] = { 0xe8, 0xe8, 0xd8, 0xb8 };
 
 	pcie->port = port[pex_idx];
 	pcie->lane = lane[pex_idx];
@@ -351,9 +352,9 @@ void pci_init_board(void)
 		mvebu_get_port_lane(pcie, i, &mem_target, &mem_attr);
 
 		/* Don't read at all from pci registers if port power is down */
-		if (pcie->lane == 0 && SELECT(soc_ctrl, pcie->port) == 0) {
-			i += 3;
-			debug("%s: skipping port %d\n", __func__, pcie->port);
+		if (SELECT(soc_ctrl, pcie->port) == 0) {
+			if (pcie->lane == 0)
+				debug("%s: skipping port %d\n", __func__, pcie->port);
 			continue;
 		}
 
diff --git a/drivers/phy/marvell/comphy_a3700.c b/drivers/phy/marvell/comphy_a3700.c
index faa62f90ae..5afd23c052 100644
--- a/drivers/phy/marvell/comphy_a3700.c
+++ b/drivers/phy/marvell/comphy_a3700.c
@@ -884,11 +884,10 @@ void comphy_dedicated_phys_init(void)
 	}
 
 	node = fdt_node_offset_by_compatible(blob, -1,
-					     "marvell,armada-3700-sdio");
+					     "marvell,armada-8k-sdhci");
 	if (node <= 0) {
-		debug("No SDIO node in DT, looking for MMC one\n");
-		node = fdt_node_offset_by_compatible(blob, -1,
-						     "marvell,xenon-sdhci");
+		node = fdt_node_offset_by_compatible(
+			blob, -1, "marvell,armada-3700-sdhci");
 	}
 
 	if (node > 0) {
diff --git a/drivers/tpm/Kconfig b/drivers/tpm/Kconfig
index 7ab34ce863..3490ee0c3b 100644
--- a/drivers/tpm/Kconfig
+++ b/drivers/tpm/Kconfig
@@ -82,4 +82,10 @@ config TPM_ST33ZP24_SPI
 	  to the device using the standard TPM Interface Specification (TIS)
 	  protocol
 
+config TPM_FLUSH_RESOURCES
+	bool "Enable TPM resource flushing support"
+	depends on TPM
+	help
+	  Enable support to flush specific resources (e.g. keys) from the TPM.
+	  The functionality is available via the 'tpm' command as well.
 endmenu
diff --git a/include/tpm.h b/include/tpm.h
index 9a6585d3d4..800f29c101 100644
--- a/include/tpm.h
+++ b/include/tpm.h
@@ -47,6 +47,42 @@ enum tpm_nv_index {
 	TPM_NV_INDEX_DIR	= 0x10000001,
 };
 
+enum tpm_resource_type {
+	TPM_RT_KEY	= 0x00000001,
+	TPM_RT_AUTH	= 0x00000002,
+	TPM_RT_HASH	= 0x00000003,
+	TPM_RT_TRANS	= 0x00000004,
+	TPM_RT_CONTEXT	= 0x00000005,
+	TPM_RT_COUNTER	= 0x00000006,
+	TPM_RT_DELEGATE	= 0x00000007,
+	TPM_RT_DAA_TPM	= 0x00000008,
+	TPM_RT_DAA_V0	= 0x00000009,
+	TPM_RT_DAA_V1	= 0x0000000A,
+};
+
+enum tpm_capability_areas {
+	TPM_CAP_ORD		= 0x00000001,
+	TPM_CAP_ALG		= 0x00000002,
+	TPM_CAP_PID		= 0x00000003,
+	TPM_CAP_FLAG		= 0x00000004,
+	TPM_CAP_PROPERTY	= 0x00000005,
+	TPM_CAP_VERSION		= 0x00000006,
+	TPM_CAP_KEY_HANDLE	= 0x00000007,
+	TPM_CAP_CHECK_LOADED	= 0x00000008,
+	TPM_CAP_SYM_MODE	= 0x00000009,
+	TPM_CAP_KEY_STATUS	= 0x0000000C,
+	TPM_CAP_NV_LIST		= 0x0000000D,
+	TPM_CAP_MFR		= 0x00000010,
+	TPM_CAP_NV_INDEX	= 0x00000011,
+	TPM_CAP_TRANS_ALG	= 0x00000012,
+	TPM_CAP_HANDLE		= 0x00000014,
+	TPM_CAP_TRANS_ES	= 0x00000015,
+	TPM_CAP_AUTH_ENCRYPT	= 0x00000017,
+	TPM_CAP_SELECT_SIZE	= 0x00000018,
+	TPM_CAP_DA_LOGIC	= 0x00000019,
+	TPM_CAP_VERSION_VAL	= 0x0000001A,
+};
+
 #define TPM_NV_PER_GLOBALLOCK		(1U << 15)
 #define TPM_NV_PER_PPWRITE		(1U << 0)
 #define TPM_NV_PER_READ_STCLEAR		(1U << 31)
@@ -594,4 +630,13 @@ uint32_t tpm_get_permanent_flags(struct tpm_permanent_flags *pflags);
  */
 uint32_t tpm_get_permissions(uint32_t index, uint32_t *perm);
 
+/**
+ * Flush a resource with a given handle and type from the TPM
+ *
+ * @param key_handle           handle of the resource
+ * @param resource_type                type of the resource
+ * @return return code of the operation
+ */
+uint32_t tpm_flush_specific(uint32_t key_handle, uint32_t resource_type);
+
 #endif /* __TPM_H */
diff --git a/lib/tpm.c b/lib/tpm.c
index 88f24060f0..fb1221472a 100644
--- a/lib/tpm.c
+++ b/lib/tpm.c
@@ -645,6 +645,35 @@ uint32_t tpm_get_permissions(uint32_t index, uint32_t *perm)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_TPM_FLUSH_RESOURCES
+uint32_t tpm_flush_specific(uint32_t key_handle, uint32_t resource_type)
+{
+	const uint8_t command[18] = {
+		0x00, 0xc1,             /* TPM_TAG */
+		0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x12, /* parameter size */
+		0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xba, /* TPM_COMMAND_CODE */
+		0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, /* key handle */
+		0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, /* resource type */
+	};
+	const size_t key_handle_offset = 10;
+	const size_t resource_type_offset = 14;
+	uint8_t buf[COMMAND_BUFFER_SIZE], response[COMMAND_BUFFER_SIZE];
+	size_t response_length = sizeof(response);
+	uint32_t err;
+
+	if (pack_byte_string(buf, sizeof(buf), "sdd",
+			     0, command, sizeof(command),
+			     key_handle_offset, key_handle,
+			     resource_type_offset, resource_type))
+		return TPM_LIB_ERROR;
+
+	err = tpm_sendrecv_command(buf, response, &response_length);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+	return 0;
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_TPM_FLUSH_RESOURCES */
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_TPM_AUTH_SESSIONS
 
 /**
diff --git a/tools/Makefile b/tools/Makefile
index cefcedf683..f5ac6313e1 100644
--- a/tools/Makefile
+++ b/tools/Makefile
@@ -142,8 +142,12 @@ ifdef CONFIG_SYS_U_BOOT_OFFS
 HOSTCFLAGS_kwbimage.o += -DCONFIG_SYS_U_BOOT_OFFS=$(CONFIG_SYS_U_BOOT_OFFS)
 endif
 
+ifneq ($(CONFIG_ARMADA_38X)$(CONFIG_ARMADA_39X),)
+HOSTCFLAGS_kwbimage.o += -DCONFIG_KWB_SECURE
+endif
+
 # MXSImage needs LibSSL
-ifneq ($(CONFIG_MX23)$(CONFIG_MX28)$(CONFIG_FIT_SIGNATURE),)
+ifneq ($(CONFIG_MX23)$(CONFIG_MX28)$(CONFIG_ARMADA_38X)$(CONFIG_ARMADA_39X)$(CONFIG_FIT_SIGNATURE),)
 HOSTLOADLIBES_mkimage += \
 	$(shell pkg-config --libs libssl libcrypto 2> /dev/null || echo "-lssl -lcrypto")
 
diff --git a/tools/kwbimage.c b/tools/kwbimage.c
index 69844d9169..93797c99da 100644
--- a/tools/kwbimage.c
+++ b/tools/kwbimage.c
@@ -1,30 +1,47 @@
 /*
  * Image manipulator for Marvell SoCs
- *  supports Kirkwood, Dove, Armada 370, and Armada XP
+ *  supports Kirkwood, Dove, Armada 370, Armada XP, and Armada 38x
  *
  * (C) Copyright 2013 Thomas Petazzoni
  * <thomas.petazzoni@free-electrons.com>
  *
  * SPDX-License-Identifier:	GPL-2.0+
  *
- * Not implemented: support for the register headers and secure
- * headers in v1 images
+ * Not implemented: support for the register headers in v1 images
  */
 
 #include "imagetool.h"
 #include <limits.h>
 #include <image.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
 #include <stdint.h>
 #include "kwbimage.h"
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_KWB_SECURE
+#include <openssl/rsa.h>
+#include <openssl/pem.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#endif
+
 static struct image_cfg_element *image_cfg;
 static int cfgn;
+#ifdef CONFIG_KWB_SECURE
+static int verbose_mode;
+#endif
 
 struct boot_mode {
 	unsigned int id;
 	const char *name;
 };
 
+/*
+ * SHA2-256 hash
+ */
+struct hash_v1 {
+	uint8_t hash[32];
+};
+
 struct boot_mode boot_modes[] = {
 	{ 0x4D, "i2c"  },
 	{ 0x5A, "spi"  },
@@ -55,22 +72,63 @@ struct nand_ecc_mode nand_ecc_modes[] = {
 #define BINARY_MAX_ARGS 8
 
 /* In-memory representation of a line of the configuration file */
+
+enum image_cfg_type {
+	IMAGE_CFG_VERSION = 0x1,
+	IMAGE_CFG_BOOT_FROM,
+	IMAGE_CFG_DEST_ADDR,
+	IMAGE_CFG_EXEC_ADDR,
+	IMAGE_CFG_NAND_BLKSZ,
+	IMAGE_CFG_NAND_BADBLK_LOCATION,
+	IMAGE_CFG_NAND_ECC_MODE,
+	IMAGE_CFG_NAND_PAGESZ,
+	IMAGE_CFG_BINARY,
+	IMAGE_CFG_PAYLOAD,
+	IMAGE_CFG_DATA,
+	IMAGE_CFG_BAUDRATE,
+	IMAGE_CFG_DEBUG,
+	IMAGE_CFG_KAK,
+	IMAGE_CFG_CSK,
+	IMAGE_CFG_CSK_INDEX,
+	IMAGE_CFG_JTAG_DELAY,
+	IMAGE_CFG_BOX_ID,
+	IMAGE_CFG_FLASH_ID,
+	IMAGE_CFG_SEC_COMMON_IMG,
+	IMAGE_CFG_SEC_SPECIALIZED_IMG,
+	IMAGE_CFG_SEC_BOOT_DEV,
+	IMAGE_CFG_SEC_FUSE_DUMP,
+
+	IMAGE_CFG_COUNT
+} type;
+
+static const char * const id_strs[] = {
+	[IMAGE_CFG_VERSION] = "VERSION",
+	[IMAGE_CFG_BOOT_FROM] = "BOOT_FROM",
+	[IMAGE_CFG_DEST_ADDR] = "DEST_ADDR",
+	[IMAGE_CFG_EXEC_ADDR] = "EXEC_ADDR",
+	[IMAGE_CFG_NAND_BLKSZ] = "NAND_BLKSZ",
+	[IMAGE_CFG_NAND_BADBLK_LOCATION] = "NAND_BADBLK_LOCATION",
+	[IMAGE_CFG_NAND_ECC_MODE] = "NAND_ECC_MODE",
+	[IMAGE_CFG_NAND_PAGESZ] = "NAND_PAGE_SIZE",
+	[IMAGE_CFG_BINARY] = "BINARY",
+	[IMAGE_CFG_PAYLOAD] = "PAYLOAD",
+	[IMAGE_CFG_DATA] = "DATA",
+	[IMAGE_CFG_BAUDRATE] = "BAUDRATE",
+	[IMAGE_CFG_DEBUG] = "DEBUG",
+	[IMAGE_CFG_KAK] = "KAK",
+	[IMAGE_CFG_CSK] = "CSK",
+	[IMAGE_CFG_CSK_INDEX] = "CSK_INDEX",
+	[IMAGE_CFG_JTAG_DELAY] = "JTAG_DELAY",
+	[IMAGE_CFG_BOX_ID] = "BOX_ID",
+	[IMAGE_CFG_FLASH_ID] = "FLASH_ID",
+	[IMAGE_CFG_SEC_COMMON_IMG] = "SEC_COMMON_IMG",
+	[IMAGE_CFG_SEC_SPECIALIZED_IMG] = "SEC_SPECIALIZED_IMG",
+	[IMAGE_CFG_SEC_BOOT_DEV] = "SEC_BOOT_DEV",
+	[IMAGE_CFG_SEC_FUSE_DUMP] = "SEC_FUSE_DUMP"
+};
+
 struct image_cfg_element {
-	enum {
-		IMAGE_CFG_VERSION = 0x1,
-		IMAGE_CFG_BOOT_FROM,
-		IMAGE_CFG_DEST_ADDR,
-		IMAGE_CFG_EXEC_ADDR,
-		IMAGE_CFG_NAND_BLKSZ,
-		IMAGE_CFG_NAND_BADBLK_LOCATION,
-		IMAGE_CFG_NAND_ECC_MODE,
-		IMAGE_CFG_NAND_PAGESZ,
-		IMAGE_CFG_BINARY,
-		IMAGE_CFG_PAYLOAD,
-		IMAGE_CFG_DATA,
-		IMAGE_CFG_BAUDRATE,
-		IMAGE_CFG_DEBUG,
-	} type;
+	enum image_cfg_type type;
 	union {
 		unsigned int version;
 		unsigned int bootfrom;
@@ -89,6 +147,14 @@ struct image_cfg_element {
 		struct ext_hdr_v0_reg regdata;
 		unsigned int baudrate;
 		unsigned int debug;
+		const char *key_name;
+		int csk_idx;
+		uint8_t jtag_delay;
+		uint32_t boxid;
+		uint32_t flashid;
+		bool sec_specialized_img;
+		unsigned int sec_boot_dev;
+		const char *name;
 	};
 };
 
@@ -103,6 +169,7 @@ struct image_cfg_element {
 static const char *image_boot_mode_name(unsigned int id)
 {
 	int i;
+
 	for (i = 0; boot_modes[i].name; i++)
 		if (boot_modes[i].id == id)
 			return boot_modes[i].name;
@@ -112,6 +179,7 @@ static const char *image_boot_mode_name(unsigned int id)
 int image_boot_mode_id(const char *boot_mode_name)
 {
 	int i;
+
 	for (i = 0; boot_modes[i].name; i++)
 		if (!strcmp(boot_modes[i].name, boot_mode_name))
 			return boot_modes[i].id;
@@ -122,6 +190,7 @@ int image_boot_mode_id(const char *boot_mode_name)
 int image_nand_ecc_mode_id(const char *nand_ecc_mode_name)
 {
 	int i;
+
 	for (i = 0; nand_ecc_modes[i].name; i++)
 		if (!strcmp(nand_ecc_modes[i].name, nand_ecc_mode_name))
 			return nand_ecc_modes[i].id;
@@ -154,6 +223,32 @@ image_count_options(unsigned int optiontype)
 	return count;
 }
 
+#if defined(CONFIG_KWB_SECURE)
+
+static int image_get_csk_index(void)
+{
+	struct image_cfg_element *e;
+
+	e = image_find_option(IMAGE_CFG_CSK_INDEX);
+	if (!e)
+		return -1;
+
+	return e->csk_idx;
+}
+
+static bool image_get_spezialized_img(void)
+{
+	struct image_cfg_element *e;
+
+	e = image_find_option(IMAGE_CFG_SEC_SPECIALIZED_IMG);
+	if (!e)
+		return false;
+
+	return e->sec_specialized_img;
+}
+
+#endif
+
 /*
  * Compute a 8-bit checksum of a memory area. This algorithm follows
  * the requirements of the Marvell SoC BootROM specifications.
@@ -221,14 +316,500 @@ static uint8_t baudrate_to_option(unsigned int baudrate)
 	}
 }
 
+#if defined(CONFIG_KWB_SECURE)
+static void kwb_msg(const char *fmt, ...)
+{
+	if (verbose_mode) {
+		va_list ap;
+
+		va_start(ap, fmt);
+		vfprintf(stdout, fmt, ap);
+		va_end(ap);
+	}
+}
+
+static int openssl_err(const char *msg)
+{
+	unsigned long ssl_err = ERR_get_error();
+
+	fprintf(stderr, "%s", msg);
+	fprintf(stderr, ": %s\n",
+		ERR_error_string(ssl_err, 0));
+
+	return -1;
+}
+
+static int kwb_load_rsa_key(const char *keydir, const char *name, RSA **p_rsa)
+{
+	char path[PATH_MAX];
+	RSA *rsa;
+	FILE *f;
+
+	if (!keydir)
+		keydir = ".";
+
+	snprintf(path, sizeof(path), "%s/%s.key", keydir, name);
+	f = fopen(path, "r");
+	if (!f) {
+		fprintf(stderr, "Couldn't open RSA private key: '%s': %s\n",
+			path, strerror(errno));
+		return -ENOENT;
+	}
+
+	rsa = PEM_read_RSAPrivateKey(f, 0, NULL, "");
+	if (!rsa) {
+		openssl_err("Failure reading private key");
+		fclose(f);
+		return -EPROTO;
+	}
+	fclose(f);
+	*p_rsa = rsa;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int kwb_load_cfg_key(struct image_tool_params *params,
+			    unsigned int cfg_option, const char *key_name,
+			    RSA **p_key)
+{
+	struct image_cfg_element *e_key;
+	RSA *key;
+	int res;
+
+	*p_key = NULL;
+
+	e_key = image_find_option(cfg_option);
+	if (!e_key) {
+		fprintf(stderr, "%s not configured\n", key_name);
+		return -ENOENT;
+	}
+
+	res = kwb_load_rsa_key(params->keydir, e_key->key_name, &key);
+	if (res < 0) {
+		fprintf(stderr, "Failed to load %s\n", key_name);
+		return -ENOENT;
+	}
+
+	*p_key = key;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int kwb_load_kak(struct image_tool_params *params, RSA **p_kak)
+{
+	return kwb_load_cfg_key(params, IMAGE_CFG_KAK, "KAK", p_kak);
+}
+
+static int kwb_load_csk(struct image_tool_params *params, RSA **p_csk)
+{
+	return kwb_load_cfg_key(params, IMAGE_CFG_CSK, "CSK", p_csk);
+}
+
+static int kwb_compute_pubkey_hash(struct pubkey_der_v1 *pk,
+				   struct hash_v1 *hash)
+{
+	EVP_MD_CTX *ctx;
+	unsigned int key_size;
+	unsigned int hash_size;
+	int ret = 0;
+
+	if (!pk || !hash || pk->key[0] != 0x30 || pk->key[1] != 0x82)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	key_size = (pk->key[2] << 8) + pk->key[3] + 4;
+
+	ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
+	if (!ctx)
+		return openssl_err("EVP context creation failed");
+
+	EVP_MD_CTX_init(ctx);
+	if (!EVP_DigestInit(ctx, EVP_sha256())) {
+		ret = openssl_err("Digest setup failed");
+		goto hash_err_ctx;
+	}
+
+	if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, pk->key, key_size)) {
+		ret = openssl_err("Hashing data failed");
+		goto hash_err_ctx;
+	}
+
+	if (!EVP_DigestFinal(ctx, hash->hash, &hash_size)) {
+		ret = openssl_err("Could not obtain hash");
+		goto hash_err_ctx;
+	}
+
+	EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
+
+hash_err_ctx:
+	EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(ctx);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int kwb_import_pubkey(RSA **key, struct pubkey_der_v1 *src, char *keyname)
+{
+	RSA *rsa;
+	const unsigned char *ptr;
+
+	if (!key || !src)
+		goto fail;
+
+	ptr = src->key;
+	rsa = d2i_RSAPublicKey(key, &ptr, sizeof(src->key));
+	if (!rsa) {
+		openssl_err("error decoding public key");
+		goto fail;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+fail:
+	fprintf(stderr, "Failed to decode %s pubkey\n", keyname);
+	return -EINVAL;
+}
+
+static int kwb_export_pubkey(RSA *key, struct pubkey_der_v1 *dst, FILE *hashf,
+			     char *keyname)
+{
+	int size_exp, size_mod, size_seq;
+	uint8_t *cur;
+	char *errmsg = "Failed to encode %s\n";
+
+	if (!key || !key->e || !key->n || !dst) {
+		fprintf(stderr, "export pk failed: (%p, %p, %p, %p)",
+			key, key->e, key->n, dst);
+		fprintf(stderr, errmsg, keyname);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * According to the specs, the key should be PKCS#1 DER encoded.
+	 * But unfortunately the really required encoding seems to be different;
+	 * it violates DER...! (But it still conformes to BER.)
+	 * (Length always in long form w/ 2 byte length code; no leading zero
+	 * when MSB of first byte is set...)
+	 * So we cannot use the encoding func provided by OpenSSL and have to
+	 * do the encoding manually.
+	 */
+
+	size_exp = BN_num_bytes(key->e);
+	size_mod = BN_num_bytes(key->n);
+	size_seq = 4 + size_mod + 4 + size_exp;
+
+	if (size_mod > 256) {
+		fprintf(stderr, "export pk failed: wrong mod size: %d\n",
+			size_mod);
+		fprintf(stderr, errmsg, keyname);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	if (4 + size_seq > sizeof(dst->key)) {
+		fprintf(stderr, "export pk failed: seq too large (%d, %lu)\n",
+			4 + size_seq, sizeof(dst->key));
+		fprintf(stderr, errmsg, keyname);
+		return -ENOBUFS;
+	}
+
+	cur = dst->key;
+
+	/* PKCS#1 (RFC3447) RSAPublicKey structure */
+	*cur++ = 0x30;		/* SEQUENCE */
+	*cur++ = 0x82;
+	*cur++ = (size_seq >> 8) & 0xFF;
+	*cur++ = size_seq & 0xFF;
+	/* Modulus */
+	*cur++ = 0x02;		/* INTEGER */
+	*cur++ = 0x82;
+	*cur++ = (size_mod >> 8) & 0xFF;
+	*cur++ = size_mod & 0xFF;
+	BN_bn2bin(key->n, cur);
+	cur += size_mod;
+	/* Exponent */
+	*cur++ = 0x02;		/* INTEGER */
+	*cur++ = 0x82;
+	*cur++ = (size_exp >> 8) & 0xFF;
+	*cur++ = size_exp & 0xFF;
+	BN_bn2bin(key->e, cur);
+
+	if (hashf) {
+		struct hash_v1 pk_hash;
+		int i;
+		int ret = 0;
+
+		ret = kwb_compute_pubkey_hash(dst, &pk_hash);
+		if (ret < 0) {
+			fprintf(stderr, errmsg, keyname);
+			return ret;
+		}
+
+		fprintf(hashf, "SHA256 = ");
+		for (i = 0 ; i < sizeof(pk_hash.hash); ++i)
+			fprintf(hashf, "%02X", pk_hash.hash[i]);
+		fprintf(hashf, "\n");
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int kwb_sign(RSA *key, void *data, int datasz, struct sig_v1 *sig, char *signame)
+{
+	EVP_PKEY *evp_key;
+	EVP_MD_CTX *ctx;
+	unsigned int sig_size;
+	int size;
+	int ret = 0;
+
+	evp_key = EVP_PKEY_new();
+	if (!evp_key)
+		return openssl_err("EVP_PKEY object creation failed");
+
+	if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA(evp_key, key)) {
+		ret = openssl_err("EVP key setup failed");
+		goto err_key;
+	}
+
+	size = EVP_PKEY_size(evp_key);
+	if (size > sizeof(sig->sig)) {
+		fprintf(stderr, "Buffer to small for signature (%d bytes)\n",
+			size);
+		ret = -ENOBUFS;
+		goto err_key;
+	}
+
+	ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
+	if (!ctx) {
+		ret = openssl_err("EVP context creation failed");
+		goto err_key;
+	}
+	EVP_MD_CTX_init(ctx);
+	if (!EVP_SignInit(ctx, EVP_sha256())) {
+		ret = openssl_err("Signer setup failed");
+		goto err_ctx;
+	}
+
+	if (!EVP_SignUpdate(ctx, data, datasz)) {
+		ret = openssl_err("Signing data failed");
+		goto err_ctx;
+	}
+
+	if (!EVP_SignFinal(ctx, sig->sig, &sig_size, evp_key)) {
+		ret = openssl_err("Could not obtain signature");
+		goto err_ctx;
+	}
+
+	EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
+	EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(ctx);
+	EVP_PKEY_free(evp_key);
+
+	return 0;
+
+err_ctx:
+	EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(ctx);
+err_key:
+	EVP_PKEY_free(evp_key);
+	fprintf(stderr, "Failed to create %s signature\n", signame);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+int kwb_verify(RSA *key, void *data, int datasz, struct sig_v1 *sig,
+	       char *signame)
+{
+	EVP_PKEY *evp_key;
+	EVP_MD_CTX *ctx;
+	int size;
+	int ret = 0;
+
+	evp_key = EVP_PKEY_new();
+	if (!evp_key)
+		return openssl_err("EVP_PKEY object creation failed");
+
+	if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA(evp_key, key)) {
+		ret = openssl_err("EVP key setup failed");
+		goto err_key;
+	}
+
+	size = EVP_PKEY_size(evp_key);
+	if (size > sizeof(sig->sig)) {
+		fprintf(stderr, "Invalid signature size (%d bytes)\n",
+			size);
+		ret = -EINVAL;
+		goto err_key;
+	}
+
+	ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
+	if (!ctx) {
+		ret = openssl_err("EVP context creation failed");
+		goto err_key;
+	}
+	EVP_MD_CTX_init(ctx);
+	if (!EVP_VerifyInit(ctx, EVP_sha256())) {
+		ret = openssl_err("Verifier setup failed");
+		goto err_ctx;
+	}
+
+	if (!EVP_VerifyUpdate(ctx, data, datasz)) {
+		ret = openssl_err("Hashing data failed");
+		goto err_ctx;
+	}
+
+	if (!EVP_VerifyFinal(ctx, sig->sig, sizeof(sig->sig), evp_key)) {
+		ret = openssl_err("Could not verify signature");
+		goto err_ctx;
+	}
+
+	EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
+	EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(ctx);
+	EVP_PKEY_free(evp_key);
+
+	return 0;
+
+err_ctx:
+	EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(ctx);
+err_key:
+	EVP_PKEY_free(evp_key);
+	fprintf(stderr, "Failed to verify %s signature\n", signame);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+int kwb_sign_and_verify(RSA *key, void *data, int datasz, struct sig_v1 *sig,
+			char *signame)
+{
+	if (kwb_sign(key, data, datasz, sig, signame) < 0)
+		return -1;
+
+	if (kwb_verify(key, data, datasz, sig, signame) < 0)
+		return -1;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+
+int kwb_dump_fuse_cmds_38x(FILE *out, struct secure_hdr_v1 *sec_hdr)
+{
+	struct hash_v1 kak_pub_hash;
+	struct image_cfg_element *e;
+	unsigned int fuse_line;
+	int i, idx;
+	uint8_t *ptr;
+	uint32_t val;
+	int ret = 0;
+
+	if (!out || !sec_hdr)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	ret = kwb_compute_pubkey_hash(&sec_hdr->kak, &kak_pub_hash);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		goto done;
+
+	fprintf(out, "# burn KAK pub key hash\n");
+	ptr = kak_pub_hash.hash;
+	for (fuse_line = 26; fuse_line <= 30; ++fuse_line) {
+		fprintf(out, "fuse prog -y %u 0 ", fuse_line);
+
+		for (i = 4; i-- > 0;)
+			fprintf(out, "%02hx", (ushort)ptr[i]);
+		ptr += 4;
+		fprintf(out, " 00");
+
+		if (fuse_line < 30) {
+			for (i = 3; i-- > 0;)
+				fprintf(out, "%02hx", (ushort)ptr[i]);
+			ptr += 3;
+		} else {
+			fprintf(out, "000000");
+		}
+
+		fprintf(out, " 1\n");
+	}
+
+	fprintf(out, "# burn CSK selection\n");
+
+	idx = image_get_csk_index();
+	if (idx < 0 || idx > 15) {
+		ret = -EINVAL;
+		goto done;
+	}
+	if (idx > 0) {
+		for (fuse_line = 31; fuse_line < 31 + idx; ++fuse_line)
+			fprintf(out, "fuse prog -y %u 0 00000001 00000000 1\n",
+				fuse_line);
+	} else {
+		fprintf(out, "# CSK index is 0; no mods needed\n");
+	}
+
+	e = image_find_option(IMAGE_CFG_BOX_ID);
+	if (e) {
+		fprintf(out, "# set box ID\n");
+		fprintf(out, "fuse prog -y 48 0 %08x 00000000 1\n", e->boxid);
+	}
+
+	e = image_find_option(IMAGE_CFG_FLASH_ID);
+	if (e) {
+		fprintf(out, "# set flash ID\n");
+		fprintf(out, "fuse prog -y 47 0 %08x 00000000 1\n", e->flashid);
+	}
+
+	fprintf(out, "# enable secure mode ");
+	fprintf(out, "(must be the last fuse line written)\n");
+
+	val = 1;
+	e = image_find_option(IMAGE_CFG_SEC_BOOT_DEV);
+	if (!e) {
+		fprintf(stderr, "ERROR: secured mode boot device not given\n");
+		ret = -EINVAL;
+		goto done;
+	}
+
+	if (e->sec_boot_dev > 0xff) {
+		fprintf(stderr, "ERROR: secured mode boot device invalid\n");
+		ret = -EINVAL;
+		goto done;
+	}
+
+	val |= (e->sec_boot_dev << 8);
+
+	fprintf(out, "fuse prog -y 24 0 %08x 0103e0a9 1\n", val);
+
+	fprintf(out, "# lock (unused) fuse lines (0-23)s\n");
+	for (fuse_line = 0; fuse_line < 24; ++fuse_line)
+		fprintf(out, "fuse prog -y %u 2 1\n", fuse_line);
+
+	fprintf(out, "# OK, that's all :-)\n");
+
+done:
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int kwb_dump_fuse_cmds(struct secure_hdr_v1 *sec_hdr)
+{
+	int ret = 0;
+	struct image_cfg_element *e;
+
+	e = image_find_option(IMAGE_CFG_SEC_FUSE_DUMP);
+	if (!e)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (!strcmp(e->name, "a38x")) {
+		FILE *out = fopen("kwb_fuses_a38x.txt", "w+");
+
+		kwb_dump_fuse_cmds_38x(out, sec_hdr);
+		fclose(out);
+		goto done;
+	}
+
+	ret = -ENOSYS;
+
+done:
+	return ret;
+}
+
+#endif
+
 static void *image_create_v0(size_t *imagesz, struct image_tool_params *params,
 			     int payloadsz)
 {
 	struct image_cfg_element *e;
 	size_t headersz;
 	struct main_hdr_v0 *main_hdr;
-	struct ext_hdr_v0 *ext_hdr;
-	void *image;
+	uint8_t *image;
 	int has_ext = 0;
 
 	/*
@@ -255,7 +836,7 @@ static void *image_create_v0(size_t *imagesz, struct image_tool_params *params,
 
 	memset(image, 0, headersz);
 
-	main_hdr = image;
+	main_hdr = (struct main_hdr_v0 *)image;
 
 	/* Fill in the main header */
 	main_hdr->blocksize =
@@ -279,9 +860,11 @@ static void *image_create_v0(size_t *imagesz, struct image_tool_params *params,
 
 	/* Generate the ext header */
 	if (has_ext) {
+		struct ext_hdr_v0 *ext_hdr;
 		int cfgi, datai;
 
-		ext_hdr = image + sizeof(struct main_hdr_v0);
+		ext_hdr = (struct ext_hdr_v0 *)
+				(image + sizeof(struct main_hdr_v0));
 		ext_hdr->offset = cpu_to_le32(0x40);
 
 		for (cfgi = 0, datai = 0; cfgi < cfgn; cfgi++) {
@@ -304,12 +887,10 @@ static void *image_create_v0(size_t *imagesz, struct image_tool_params *params,
 	return image;
 }
 
-static size_t image_headersz_v1(struct image_tool_params *params,
-				int *hasext)
+static size_t image_headersz_v1(int *hasext)
 {
 	struct image_cfg_element *binarye;
 	size_t headersz;
-	int ret;
 
 	/*
 	 * Calculate the size of the header and the size of the
@@ -329,6 +910,7 @@ static size_t image_headersz_v1(struct image_tool_params *params,
 
 	binarye = image_find_option(IMAGE_CFG_BINARY);
 	if (binarye) {
+		int ret;
 		struct stat s;
 
 		ret = stat(binarye->binary.file, &s);
@@ -357,16 +939,25 @@ static size_t image_headersz_v1(struct image_tool_params *params,
 			*hasext = 1;
 	}
 
+#if defined(CONFIG_KWB_SECURE)
+	if (image_get_csk_index() >= 0) {
+		headersz += sizeof(struct secure_hdr_v1);
+		if (hasext)
+			*hasext = 1;
+	}
+#endif
+
 #if defined(CONFIG_SYS_U_BOOT_OFFS)
 	if (headersz > CONFIG_SYS_U_BOOT_OFFS) {
-		fprintf(stderr, "Error: Image header (incl. SPL image) too big!\n");
+		fprintf(stderr,
+			"Error: Image header (incl. SPL image) too big!\n");
 		fprintf(stderr, "header=0x%x CONFIG_SYS_U_BOOT_OFFS=0x%x!\n",
 			(int)headersz, CONFIG_SYS_U_BOOT_OFFS);
 		fprintf(stderr, "Increase CONFIG_SYS_U_BOOT_OFFS!\n");
 		return 0;
-	} else {
-		headersz = CONFIG_SYS_U_BOOT_OFFS;
 	}
+
+	headersz = CONFIG_SYS_U_BOOT_OFFS;
 #endif
 
 	/*
@@ -376,21 +967,210 @@ static size_t image_headersz_v1(struct image_tool_params *params,
 	return ALIGN_SUP(headersz, 4096);
 }
 
-static void *image_create_v1(size_t *imagesz, struct image_tool_params *params,
-			     int payloadsz)
+int add_binary_header_v1(uint8_t *cur)
 {
-	struct image_cfg_element *e, *binarye;
-	struct main_hdr_v1 *main_hdr;
-	size_t headersz;
-	void *image, *cur;
-	int hasext = 0;
+	struct image_cfg_element *binarye;
+	struct opt_hdr_v1 *hdr = (struct opt_hdr_v1 *)cur;
+	uint32_t *args;
+	size_t binhdrsz;
+	struct stat s;
+	int argi;
+	FILE *bin;
 	int ret;
 
+	binarye = image_find_option(IMAGE_CFG_BINARY);
+
+	if (!binarye)
+		return 0;
+
+	hdr->headertype = OPT_HDR_V1_BINARY_TYPE;
+
+	bin = fopen(binarye->binary.file, "r");
+	if (!bin) {
+		fprintf(stderr, "Cannot open binary file %s\n",
+			binarye->binary.file);
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	fstat(fileno(bin), &s);
+
+	binhdrsz = sizeof(struct opt_hdr_v1) +
+		(binarye->binary.nargs + 2) * sizeof(uint32_t) +
+		s.st_size;
+
+	/*
+	 * The size includes the binary image size, rounded
+	 * up to a 4-byte boundary. Plus 4 bytes for the
+	 * next-header byte and 3-byte alignment at the end.
+	 */
+	binhdrsz = ALIGN_SUP(binhdrsz, 4) + 4;
+	hdr->headersz_lsb = cpu_to_le16(binhdrsz & 0xFFFF);
+	hdr->headersz_msb = (binhdrsz & 0xFFFF0000) >> 16;
+
+	cur += sizeof(struct opt_hdr_v1);
+
+	args = (uint32_t *)cur;
+	*args = cpu_to_le32(binarye->binary.nargs);
+	args++;
+	for (argi = 0; argi < binarye->binary.nargs; argi++)
+		args[argi] = cpu_to_le32(binarye->binary.args[argi]);
+
+	cur += (binarye->binary.nargs + 1) * sizeof(uint32_t);
+
+	ret = fread(cur, s.st_size, 1, bin);
+	if (ret != 1) {
+		fprintf(stderr,
+			"Could not read binary image %s\n",
+			binarye->binary.file);
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	fclose(bin);
+
+	cur += ALIGN_SUP(s.st_size, 4);
+
+	/*
+	 * For now, we don't support more than one binary
+	 * header, and no other header types are
+	 * supported. So, the binary header is necessarily the
+	 * last one
+	 */
+	*((uint32_t *)cur) = 0x00000000;
+
+	cur += sizeof(uint32_t);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+#if defined(CONFIG_KWB_SECURE)
+
+int export_pub_kak_hash(RSA *kak, struct secure_hdr_v1 *secure_hdr)
+{
+	FILE *hashf;
+	int res;
+
+	hashf = fopen("pub_kak_hash.txt", "w");
+
+	res = kwb_export_pubkey(kak, &secure_hdr->kak, hashf, "KAK");
+
+	fclose(hashf);
+
+	return res < 0 ? 1 : 0;
+}
+
+int kwb_sign_csk_with_kak(struct image_tool_params *params,
+			  struct secure_hdr_v1 *secure_hdr, RSA *csk)
+{
+	RSA *kak = NULL;
+	RSA *kak_pub = NULL;
+	int csk_idx = image_get_csk_index();
+	struct sig_v1 tmp_sig;
+
+	if (csk_idx >= 16) {
+		fprintf(stderr, "Invalid CSK index %d\n", csk_idx);
+		return 1;
+	}
+
+	if (kwb_load_kak(params, &kak) < 0)
+		return 1;
+
+	if (export_pub_kak_hash(kak, secure_hdr))
+		return 1;
+
+	if (kwb_import_pubkey(&kak_pub, &secure_hdr->kak, "KAK") < 0)
+		return 1;
+
+	if (kwb_export_pubkey(csk, &secure_hdr->csk[csk_idx], NULL, "CSK") < 0)
+		return 1;
+
+	if (kwb_sign_and_verify(kak, &secure_hdr->csk,
+				sizeof(secure_hdr->csk) +
+				sizeof(secure_hdr->csksig),
+				&tmp_sig, "CSK") < 0)
+		return 1;
+
+	if (kwb_verify(kak_pub, &secure_hdr->csk,
+		       sizeof(secure_hdr->csk) +
+		       sizeof(secure_hdr->csksig),
+		       &tmp_sig, "CSK (2)") < 0)
+		return 1;
+
+	secure_hdr->csksig = tmp_sig;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int add_secure_header_v1(struct image_tool_params *params, uint8_t *ptr,
+			 int payloadsz, size_t headersz, uint8_t *image,
+			 struct secure_hdr_v1 *secure_hdr)
+{
+	struct image_cfg_element *e_jtagdelay;
+	struct image_cfg_element *e_boxid;
+	struct image_cfg_element *e_flashid;
+	RSA *csk = NULL;
+	unsigned char *image_ptr;
+	size_t image_size;
+	struct sig_v1 tmp_sig;
+	bool specialized_img = image_get_spezialized_img();
+
+	kwb_msg("Create secure header content\n");
+
+	e_jtagdelay = image_find_option(IMAGE_CFG_JTAG_DELAY);
+	e_boxid = image_find_option(IMAGE_CFG_BOX_ID);
+	e_flashid = image_find_option(IMAGE_CFG_FLASH_ID);
+
+	if (kwb_load_csk(params, &csk) < 0)
+		return 1;
+
+	secure_hdr->headertype = OPT_HDR_V1_SECURE_TYPE;
+	secure_hdr->headersz_msb = 0;
+	secure_hdr->headersz_lsb = cpu_to_le16(sizeof(struct secure_hdr_v1));
+	if (e_jtagdelay)
+		secure_hdr->jtag_delay = e_jtagdelay->jtag_delay;
+	if (e_boxid && specialized_img)
+		secure_hdr->boxid = cpu_to_le32(e_boxid->boxid);
+	if (e_flashid && specialized_img)
+		secure_hdr->flashid = cpu_to_le32(e_flashid->flashid);
+
+	if (kwb_sign_csk_with_kak(params, secure_hdr, csk))
+		return 1;
+
+	image_ptr = ptr + headersz;
+	image_size = payloadsz - headersz;
+
+	if (kwb_sign_and_verify(csk, image_ptr, image_size,
+				&secure_hdr->imgsig, "image") < 0)
+		return 1;
+
+	if (kwb_sign_and_verify(csk, image, headersz, &tmp_sig, "header") < 0)
+		return 1;
+
+	secure_hdr->hdrsig = tmp_sig;
+
+	kwb_dump_fuse_cmds(secure_hdr);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+#endif
+
+static void *image_create_v1(size_t *imagesz, struct image_tool_params *params,
+			     uint8_t *ptr, int payloadsz)
+{
+	struct image_cfg_element *e;
+	struct main_hdr_v1 *main_hdr;
+#if defined(CONFIG_KWB_SECURE)
+	struct secure_hdr_v1 *secure_hdr = NULL;
+#endif
+	size_t headersz;
+	uint8_t *image, *cur;
+	int hasext = 0;
+	uint8_t *next_ext = NULL;
+
 	/*
 	 * Calculate the size of the header and the size of the
 	 * payload
 	 */
-	headersz = image_headersz_v1(params, &hasext);
+	headersz = image_headersz_v1(&hasext);
 	if (headersz == 0)
 		return NULL;
 
@@ -402,15 +1182,18 @@ static void *image_create_v1(size_t *imagesz, struct image_tool_params *params,
 
 	memset(image, 0, headersz);
 
-	cur = main_hdr = image;
+	main_hdr = (struct main_hdr_v1 *)image;
+	cur = image;
 	cur += sizeof(struct main_hdr_v1);
+	next_ext = &main_hdr->ext;
 
 	/* Fill the main header */
 	main_hdr->blocksize    =
 		cpu_to_le32(payloadsz - headersz + sizeof(uint32_t));
 	main_hdr->headersz_lsb = cpu_to_le16(headersz & 0xFFFF);
 	main_hdr->headersz_msb = (headersz & 0xFFFF0000) >> 16;
-	main_hdr->destaddr     = cpu_to_le32(params->addr);
+	main_hdr->destaddr     = cpu_to_le32(params->addr)
+				 - sizeof(image_header_t);
 	main_hdr->execaddr     = cpu_to_le32(params->ep);
 	main_hdr->srcaddr      = cpu_to_le32(headersz);
 	main_hdr->ext          = hasext;
@@ -431,71 +1214,27 @@ static void *image_create_v1(size_t *imagesz, struct image_tool_params *params,
 	if (e)
 		main_hdr->flags = e->debug ? 0x1 : 0;
 
-	binarye = image_find_option(IMAGE_CFG_BINARY);
-	if (binarye) {
-		struct opt_hdr_v1 *hdr = cur;
-		uint32_t *args;
-		size_t binhdrsz;
-		struct stat s;
-		int argi;
-		FILE *bin;
-
-		hdr->headertype = OPT_HDR_V1_BINARY_TYPE;
-
-		bin = fopen(binarye->binary.file, "r");
-		if (!bin) {
-			fprintf(stderr, "Cannot open binary file %s\n",
-				binarye->binary.file);
-			return NULL;
-		}
-
-		fstat(fileno(bin), &s);
-
-		binhdrsz = sizeof(struct opt_hdr_v1) +
-			(binarye->binary.nargs + 2) * sizeof(uint32_t) +
-			s.st_size;
-
+#if defined(CONFIG_KWB_SECURE)
+	if (image_get_csk_index() >= 0) {
 		/*
-		 * The size includes the binary image size, rounded
-		 * up to a 4-byte boundary. Plus 4 bytes for the
-		 * next-header byte and 3-byte alignment at the end.
+		 * only reserve the space here; we fill the header later since
+		 * we need the header to be complete to compute the signatures
 		 */
-		binhdrsz = ALIGN_SUP(binhdrsz, 4) + 4;
-		hdr->headersz_lsb = cpu_to_le16(binhdrsz & 0xFFFF);
-		hdr->headersz_msb = (binhdrsz & 0xFFFF0000) >> 16;
-
-		cur += sizeof(struct opt_hdr_v1);
-
-		args = cur;
-		*args = cpu_to_le32(binarye->binary.nargs);
-		args++;
-		for (argi = 0; argi < binarye->binary.nargs; argi++)
-			args[argi] = cpu_to_le32(binarye->binary.args[argi]);
-
-		cur += (binarye->binary.nargs + 1) * sizeof(uint32_t);
-
-		ret = fread(cur, s.st_size, 1, bin);
-		if (ret != 1) {
-			fprintf(stderr,
-				"Could not read binary image %s\n",
-				binarye->binary.file);
-			return NULL;
-		}
-
-		fclose(bin);
-
-		cur += ALIGN_SUP(s.st_size, 4);
-
-		/*
-		 * For now, we don't support more than one binary
-		 * header, and no other header types are
-		 * supported. So, the binary header is necessarily the
-		 * last one
-		 */
-		*((uint32_t *)cur) = 0x00000000;
-
-		cur += sizeof(uint32_t);
+		secure_hdr = (struct secure_hdr_v1 *)cur;
+		cur += sizeof(struct secure_hdr_v1);
+		next_ext = &secure_hdr->next;
 	}
+#endif
+	*next_ext = 1;
+
+	if (add_binary_header_v1(cur))
+		return NULL;
+
+#if defined(CONFIG_KWB_SECURE)
+	if (secure_hdr && add_secure_header_v1(params, ptr, payloadsz,
+					       headersz, image, secure_hdr))
+		return NULL;
+#endif
 
 	/* Calculate and set the header checksum */
 	main_hdr->checksum = image_checksum8(main_hdr, headersz);
@@ -504,72 +1243,94 @@ static void *image_create_v1(size_t *imagesz, struct image_tool_params *params,
 	return image;
 }
 
+int recognize_keyword(char *keyword)
+{
+	int kw_id;
+
+	for (kw_id = 1; kw_id < IMAGE_CFG_COUNT; ++kw_id)
+		if (!strcmp(keyword, id_strs[kw_id]))
+			return kw_id;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
 static int image_create_config_parse_oneline(char *line,
 					     struct image_cfg_element *el)
 {
-	char *keyword, *saveptr;
-	char deliminiters[] = " \t";
+	char *keyword, *saveptr, *value1, *value2;
+	char delimiters[] = " \t";
+	int keyword_id, ret, argi;
+	char *unknown_msg = "Ignoring unknown line '%s'\n";
+
+	keyword = strtok_r(line, delimiters, &saveptr);
+	keyword_id = recognize_keyword(keyword);
+
+	if (!keyword_id) {
+		fprintf(stderr, unknown_msg, line);
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	el->type = keyword_id;
+
+	value1 = strtok_r(NULL, delimiters, &saveptr);
+
+	if (!value1) {
+		fprintf(stderr, "Parameter missing in line '%s'\n", line);
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	switch (keyword_id) {
+	case IMAGE_CFG_VERSION:
+		el->version = atoi(value1);
+		break;
+	case IMAGE_CFG_BOOT_FROM:
+		ret = image_boot_mode_id(value1);
 
-	keyword = strtok_r(line, deliminiters, &saveptr);
-	if (!strcmp(keyword, "VERSION")) {
-		char *value = strtok_r(NULL, deliminiters, &saveptr);
-		el->type = IMAGE_CFG_VERSION;
-		el->version = atoi(value);
-	} else if (!strcmp(keyword, "BOOT_FROM")) {
-		char *value = strtok_r(NULL, deliminiters, &saveptr);
-		int ret = image_boot_mode_id(value);
 		if (ret < 0) {
-			fprintf(stderr,
-				"Invalid boot media '%s'\n", value);
+			fprintf(stderr, "Invalid boot media '%s'\n", value1);
 			return -1;
 		}
-		el->type = IMAGE_CFG_BOOT_FROM;
 		el->bootfrom = ret;
-	} else if (!strcmp(keyword, "NAND_BLKSZ")) {
-		char *value = strtok_r(NULL, deliminiters, &saveptr);
-		el->type = IMAGE_CFG_NAND_BLKSZ;
-		el->nandblksz = strtoul(value, NULL, 16);
-	} else if (!strcmp(keyword, "NAND_BADBLK_LOCATION")) {
-		char *value = strtok_r(NULL, deliminiters, &saveptr);
-		el->type = IMAGE_CFG_NAND_BADBLK_LOCATION;
-		el->nandbadblklocation =
-			strtoul(value, NULL, 16);
-	} else if (!strcmp(keyword, "NAND_ECC_MODE")) {
-		char *value = strtok_r(NULL, deliminiters, &saveptr);
-		int ret = image_nand_ecc_mode_id(value);
+		break;
+	case IMAGE_CFG_NAND_BLKSZ:
+		el->nandblksz = strtoul(value1, NULL, 16);
+		break;
+	case IMAGE_CFG_NAND_BADBLK_LOCATION:
+		el->nandbadblklocation = strtoul(value1, NULL, 16);
+		break;
+	case IMAGE_CFG_NAND_ECC_MODE:
+		ret = image_nand_ecc_mode_id(value1);
+
 		if (ret < 0) {
-			fprintf(stderr,
-				"Invalid NAND ECC mode '%s'\n", value);
+			fprintf(stderr, "Invalid NAND ECC mode '%s'\n", value1);
 			return -1;
 		}
-		el->type = IMAGE_CFG_NAND_ECC_MODE;
 		el->nandeccmode = ret;
-	} else if (!strcmp(keyword, "NAND_PAGE_SIZE")) {
-		char *value = strtok_r(NULL, deliminiters, &saveptr);
-		el->type = IMAGE_CFG_NAND_PAGESZ;
-		el->nandpagesz = strtoul(value, NULL, 16);
-	} else if (!strcmp(keyword, "BINARY")) {
-		char *value = strtok_r(NULL, deliminiters, &saveptr);
-		int argi = 0;
+		break;
+	case IMAGE_CFG_NAND_PAGESZ:
+		el->nandpagesz = strtoul(value1, NULL, 16);
+		break;
+	case IMAGE_CFG_BINARY:
+		argi = 0;
 
-		el->type = IMAGE_CFG_BINARY;
-		el->binary.file = strdup(value);
+		el->binary.file = strdup(value1);
 		while (1) {
-			value = strtok_r(NULL, deliminiters, &saveptr);
+			char *value = strtok_r(NULL, delimiters, &saveptr);
+
 			if (!value)
 				break;
 			el->binary.args[argi] = strtoul(value, NULL, 16);
 			argi++;
 			if (argi >= BINARY_MAX_ARGS) {
 				fprintf(stderr,
-					"Too many argument for binary\n");
+					"Too many arguments for BINARY\n");
 				return -1;
 			}
 		}
 		el->binary.nargs = argi;
-	} else if (!strcmp(keyword, "DATA")) {
-		char *value1 = strtok_r(NULL, deliminiters, &saveptr);
-		char *value2 = strtok_r(NULL, deliminiters, &saveptr);
+		break;
+	case IMAGE_CFG_DATA:
+		value2 = strtok_r(NULL, delimiters, &saveptr);
 
 		if (!value1 || !value2) {
 			fprintf(stderr,
@@ -577,19 +1338,47 @@ static int image_create_config_parse_oneline(char *line,
 			return -1;
 		}
 
-		el->type = IMAGE_CFG_DATA;
 		el->regdata.raddr = strtoul(value1, NULL, 16);
 		el->regdata.rdata = strtoul(value2, NULL, 16);
-	} else if (!strcmp(keyword, "BAUDRATE")) {
-		char *value = strtok_r(NULL, deliminiters, &saveptr);
-		el->type = IMAGE_CFG_BAUDRATE;
-		el->baudrate = strtoul(value, NULL, 10);
-	} else if (!strcmp(keyword, "DEBUG")) {
-		char *value = strtok_r(NULL, deliminiters, &saveptr);
-		el->type = IMAGE_CFG_DEBUG;
-		el->debug = strtoul(value, NULL, 10);
-	} else {
-		fprintf(stderr, "Ignoring unknown line '%s'\n", line);
+		break;
+	case IMAGE_CFG_BAUDRATE:
+		el->baudrate = strtoul(value1, NULL, 10);
+		break;
+	case IMAGE_CFG_DEBUG:
+		el->debug = strtoul(value1, NULL, 10);
+		break;
+	case IMAGE_CFG_KAK:
+		el->key_name = strdup(value1);
+		break;
+	case IMAGE_CFG_CSK:
+		el->key_name = strdup(value1);
+		break;
+	case IMAGE_CFG_CSK_INDEX:
+		el->csk_idx = strtol(value1, NULL, 0);
+		break;
+	case IMAGE_CFG_JTAG_DELAY:
+		el->jtag_delay = strtoul(value1, NULL, 0);
+		break;
+	case IMAGE_CFG_BOX_ID:
+		el->boxid = strtoul(value1, NULL, 0);
+		break;
+	case IMAGE_CFG_FLASH_ID:
+		el->flashid = strtoul(value1, NULL, 0);
+		break;
+	case IMAGE_CFG_SEC_SPECIALIZED_IMG:
+		el->sec_specialized_img = true;
+		break;
+	case IMAGE_CFG_SEC_COMMON_IMG:
+		el->sec_specialized_img = false;
+		break;
+	case IMAGE_CFG_SEC_BOOT_DEV:
+		el->sec_boot_dev = strtoul(value1, NULL, 0);
+		break;
+	case IMAGE_CFG_SEC_FUSE_DUMP:
+		el->name = strdup(value1);
+		break;
+	default:
+		fprintf(stderr, unknown_msg, line);
 	}
 
 	return 0;
@@ -747,7 +1536,7 @@ static void kwbimage_set_header(void *ptr, struct stat *sbuf, int ifd,
 		break;
 
 	case 1:
-		image = image_create_v1(&headersz, params, sbuf->st_size);
+		image = image_create_v1(&headersz, params, ptr, sbuf->st_size);
 		break;
 
 	default:
@@ -799,18 +1588,17 @@ static int kwbimage_check_image_types(uint8_t type)
 {
 	if (type == IH_TYPE_KWBIMAGE)
 		return EXIT_SUCCESS;
-	else
-		return EXIT_FAILURE;
+
+	return EXIT_FAILURE;
 }
 
 static int kwbimage_verify_header(unsigned char *ptr, int image_size,
 				  struct image_tool_params *params)
 {
 	struct main_hdr_v0 *main_hdr;
-	struct ext_hdr_v0 *ext_hdr;
 	uint8_t checksum;
 
-	main_hdr = (void *)ptr;
+	main_hdr = (struct main_hdr_v0 *)ptr;
 	checksum = image_checksum8(ptr,
 				   sizeof(struct main_hdr_v0)
 				   - sizeof(uint8_t));
@@ -819,7 +1607,10 @@ static int kwbimage_verify_header(unsigned char *ptr, int image_size,
 
 	/* Only version 0 extended header has checksum */
 	if (image_version((void *)ptr) == 0) {
-		ext_hdr = (void *)ptr + sizeof(struct main_hdr_v0);
+		struct ext_hdr_v0 *ext_hdr;
+
+		ext_hdr = (struct ext_hdr_v0 *)
+				(ptr + sizeof(struct main_hdr_v0));
 		checksum = image_checksum8(ext_hdr,
 					   sizeof(struct ext_hdr_v0)
 					   - sizeof(uint8_t));
@@ -842,7 +1633,7 @@ static int kwbimage_generate(struct image_tool_params *params,
 		alloc_len = sizeof(struct main_hdr_v0) +
 			sizeof(struct ext_hdr_v0);
 	} else {
-		alloc_len = image_headersz_v1(params, NULL);
+		alloc_len = image_headersz_v1(NULL);
 	}
 
 	hdr = malloc(alloc_len);
@@ -873,9 +1664,9 @@ static int kwbimage_generate(struct image_tool_params *params,
 static int kwbimage_check_params(struct image_tool_params *params)
 {
 	if (!strlen(params->imagename)) {
-		fprintf(stderr, "Error:%s - Configuration file not specified, "
-			"it is needed for kwbimage generation\n",
-			params->cmdname);
+		char *msg = "Configuration file for kwbimage creation omitted";
+
+		fprintf(stderr, "Error:%s - %s\n", params->cmdname, msg);
 		return CFG_INVALID;
 	}
 
diff --git a/tools/kwbimage.h b/tools/kwbimage.h
index 01c2f1f323..20f4d0d9dd 100644
--- a/tools/kwbimage.h
+++ b/tools/kwbimage.h
@@ -113,6 +113,43 @@ struct opt_hdr_v1 {
 	char     data[0];
 };
 
+/*
+ * Public Key data in DER format
+ */
+struct pubkey_der_v1 {
+	uint8_t key[524];
+};
+
+/*
+ * Signature (RSA 2048)
+ */
+struct sig_v1 {
+	uint8_t sig[256];
+};
+
+/*
+ * Structure of secure header (Armada 38x)
+ */
+struct secure_hdr_v1 {
+	uint8_t  headertype;		/* 0x0 */
+	uint8_t  headersz_msb;		/* 0x1 */
+	uint16_t headersz_lsb;		/* 0x2 - 0x3 */
+	uint32_t reserved1;		/* 0x4 - 0x7 */
+	struct pubkey_der_v1 kak;	/* 0x8 - 0x213 */
+	uint8_t  jtag_delay;		/* 0x214 */
+	uint8_t  reserved2;		/* 0x215 */
+	uint16_t reserved3;		/* 0x216 - 0x217 */
+	uint32_t boxid;			/* 0x218 - 0x21B */
+	uint32_t flashid;		/* 0x21C - 0x21F */
+	struct sig_v1 hdrsig;		/* 0x220 - 0x31F */
+	struct sig_v1 imgsig;		/* 0x320 - 0x41F */
+	struct pubkey_der_v1 csk[16];	/* 0x420 - 0x24DF */
+	struct sig_v1 csksig;		/* 0x24E0 - 0x25DF */
+	uint8_t  next;			/* 0x25E0 */
+	uint8_t  reserved4;		/* 0x25E1 */
+	uint16_t reserved5;		/* 0x25E2 - 0x25E3 */
+};
+
 /*
  * Various values for the opt_hdr_v1->headertype field, describing the
  * different types of optional headers. The "secure" header contains