diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/rhel/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2010-5298.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/rhel/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2010-5298.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..b4f92cd585
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/rhel/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2010-5298.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+From: Ben Laurie <ben@links.org>
+Date: Wed, 23 Apr 2014 06:24:03 +0000 (+0100)
+Subject: Fix use after free.
+X-Git-Url: https://git.openssl.org/gitweb/?p=openssl.git;a=commitdiff_plain;h=94d1f4b
+
+Fix use after free.
+---
+
+diff --git a/ssl/s3_pkt.c b/ssl/s3_pkt.c
+index b9e45c7..d601a18 100644
+--- a/ssl/s3_pkt.c
++++ b/ssl/s3_pkt.c
+@@ -1334,7 +1334,7 @@ start:
+ 				{
+ 				s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
+ 				rr->off=0;
+-				if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS)
++				if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS && s->s3->rbuf.left == 0)
+ 					ssl3_release_read_buffer(s);
+ 				}
+ 			}
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/rhel/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2013-4353.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/rhel/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2013-4353.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..5f96116cf5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/rhel/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2013-4353.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+Fix for TLS record tampering bug. A carefully crafted invalid 
+handshake could crash OpenSSL with a NULL pointer exception.
+Thanks to Anton Johansson for reporting this issues.
+(CVE-2013-4353)
+diff --git a/ssl/s3_both.c b/ssl/s3_both.c
+index 1e5dcab..53b9390 100644
+--- a/ssl/s3_both.c
++++ b/ssl/s3_both.c
+@@ -210,7 +210,11 @@ static void ssl3_take_mac(SSL *s)
+ 	{
+ 	const char *sender;
+ 	int slen;
+-
++	/* If no new cipher setup return immediately: other functions will
++	 * set the appropriate error.
++	 */
++	if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL)
++		return;
+ 	if (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT)
+ 		{
+ 		sender=s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label;
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/rhel/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2013-6449.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/rhel/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2013-6449.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..d80a1788da
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/rhel/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2013-6449.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,111 @@
+Use version in SSL_METHOD not SSL structure.
+
+When deciding whether to use TLS 1.2 PRF and record hash algorithms
+use the version number in the corresponding SSL_METHOD structure
+instead of the SSL structure. The SSL structure version is sometimes
+inaccurate. Note: OpenSSL 1.0.2 and later effectively do this already.
+(CVE-2013-6449)
+
+Also preventively check EVP errors for handshake digests.
+
+diff --git a/ssl/s3_lib.c b/ssl/s3_lib.c
+index bf832bb..c4ef273 100644
+--- a/ssl/s3_lib.c
++++ b/ssl/s3_lib.c
+@@ -4286,7 +4286,7 @@ need to go to SSL_ST_ACCEPT.
+ long ssl_get_algorithm2(SSL *s)
+ 	{
+ 	long alg2 = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2;
+-	if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION &&
++	if (s->method->version == TLS1_2_VERSION &&
+ 	    alg2 == (SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF))
+ 		return SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256;
+ 	return alg2;
+diff --git a/ssl/s3_both.c b/ssl/s3_both.c
+index ead01c8..1e5dcab 100644
+--- a/ssl/s3_both.c
++++ b/ssl/s3_both.c
+@@ -161,6 +161,8 @@ int ssl3_send_finished(SSL *s, int a, int b, const char *sender, int slen)
+ 
+ 		i=s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s,
+ 			sender,slen,s->s3->tmp.finish_md);
++		if (i == 0)
++			return 0;
+ 		s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len = i;
+ 		memcpy(p, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, i);
+ 		p+=i;
+diff --git a/ssl/s3_pkt.c b/ssl/s3_pkt.c
+index 804291e..c4bc4e7 100644
+--- a/ssl/s3_pkt.c
++++ b/ssl/s3_pkt.c
+@@ -335,7 +335,7 @@ fprintf(stderr, "Record type=%d, Length=%d\n", rr->type, rr->length);
+ 			if (version != s->version)
+ 				{
+ 				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
+-                                if ((s->version & 0xFF00) == (version & 0xFF00))
++                                if ((s->version & 0xFF00) == (version & 0xFF00) && !s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash)
+                                 	/* Send back error using their minor version number :-) */
+ 					s->version = (unsigned short)version;
+ 				al=SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
+@@ -1459,8 +1459,14 @@ int ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s)
+ 		slen=s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len;
+ 		}
+ 
+-	s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s,
++	i = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s,
+ 		sender,slen,s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md);
++	if (i == 0)
++		{
++		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_DO_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
++		return 0;
++		}
++	s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len = i;
+ 
+ 	return(1);
+ 	}
+diff --git a/ssl/s3_srvr.c b/ssl/s3_srvr.c
+index e5a8b3f..52efed3 100644
+--- a/ssl/s3_srvr.c
++++ b/ssl/s3_srvr.c
+@@ -958,7 +958,8 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
+ 	    (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version < s->version))
+ 		{
+ 		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
+-		if ((s->client_version>>8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
++		if ((s->client_version>>8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR && 
++			!s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash)
+ 			{
+ 			/* similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
+ 			s->version = s->client_version;
+diff --git a/ssl/t1_enc.c b/ssl/t1_enc.c
+index 809ad2e..72015f5 100644
+--- a/ssl/t1_enc.c
++++ b/ssl/t1_enc.c
+@@ -915,18 +915,19 @@ int tls1_final_finish_mac(SSL *s,
+ 		if (mask & ssl_get_algorithm2(s))
+ 			{
+ 			int hashsize = EVP_MD_size(md);
+-			if (hashsize < 0 || hashsize > (int)(sizeof buf - (size_t)(q-buf)))
++			EVP_MD_CTX *hdgst = s->s3->handshake_dgst[idx];
++			if (!hdgst || hashsize < 0 || hashsize > (int)(sizeof buf - (size_t)(q-buf)))
+ 				{
+ 				/* internal error: 'buf' is too small for this cipersuite! */
+ 				err = 1;
+ 				}
+ 			else
+ 				{
+-				EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx,s->s3->handshake_dgst[idx]);
+-				EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx,q,&i);
+-				if (i != (unsigned int)hashsize) /* can't really happen */
++				if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx, hdgst) ||
++					!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx,q,&i) ||
++					(i != (unsigned int)hashsize))
+ 					err = 1;
+-				q+=i;
++				q+=hashsize;
+ 				}
+ 			}
+ 		}
+-- 
+1.8.3.1
+
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/rhel/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2013-6450.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/rhel/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2013-6450.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..fa096c8b2f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/rhel/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2013-6450.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
+Fix DTLS retransmission from previous session.
+
+For DTLS we might need to retransmit messages from the previous session
+so keep a copy of write context in DTLS retransmission buffers instead
+of replacing it after sending CCS. CVE-2013-6450.
+
+diff --git a/ssl/d1_both.c b/ssl/d1_both.c
+index 65ec001..7a5596a 100644
+--- a/ssl/d1_both.c
++++ b/ssl/d1_both.c
+@@ -214,6 +214,12 @@ dtls1_hm_fragment_new(unsigned long frag_len, int reassembly)
+ static void
+ dtls1_hm_fragment_free(hm_fragment *frag)
+ 	{
++
++	if (frag->msg_header.is_ccs)
++		{
++		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.enc_write_ctx);
++		EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.write_hash);
++		}
+ 	if (frag->fragment) OPENSSL_free(frag->fragment);
+ 	if (frag->reassembly) OPENSSL_free(frag->reassembly);
+ 	OPENSSL_free(frag);
+diff --git a/ssl/ssl_locl.h b/ssl/ssl_locl.h
+index 96ce9a7..e485907 100644
+--- a/ssl/ssl_locl.h
++++ b/ssl/ssl_locl.h
+@@ -621,6 +621,8 @@ extern SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_enc_data;
+ extern SSL3_ENC_METHOD SSLv3_enc_data;
+ extern SSL3_ENC_METHOD DTLSv1_enc_data;
+ 
++#define SSL_IS_DTLS(s) (s->method->version == DTLS1_VERSION)
++
+ #define IMPLEMENT_tls_meth_func(version, func_name, s_accept, s_connect, \
+ 				s_get_meth) \
+ const SSL_METHOD *func_name(void)  \
+diff --git a/ssl/t1_enc.c b/ssl/t1_enc.c
+index 72015f5..56db834 100644
+--- a/ssl/t1_enc.c
++++ b/ssl/t1_enc.c
+@@ -414,15 +414,20 @@ int tls1_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which)
+ 			s->mac_flags |= SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM;
+ 			else
+ 			s->mac_flags &= ~SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM;
+-		if (s->enc_write_ctx != NULL)
++		if (s->enc_write_ctx != NULL && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
+ 			reuse_dd = 1;
+-		else if ((s->enc_write_ctx=OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(EVP_CIPHER_CTX))) == NULL)
++		else if ((s->enc_write_ctx=EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new()) == NULL)
+ 			goto err;
+-		else
+-			/* make sure it's intialized in case we exit later with an error */
+-			EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(s->enc_write_ctx);
+ 		dd= s->enc_write_ctx;
+-		mac_ctx = ssl_replace_hash(&s->write_hash,NULL);
++		if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
++			{
++			mac_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
++			if (!mac_ctx)
++				goto err;
++			s->write_hash = mac_ctx;
++			}
++		else
++			mac_ctx = ssl_replace_hash(&s->write_hash,NULL);
+ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+ 		if (s->compress != NULL)
+ 			{
+diff --git a/crypto/evp/digest.c b/crypto/evp/digest.c
+index 6fc469f..d14e8e4 100644
+--- a/crypto/evp/digest.c
++++ b/crypto/evp/digest.c
+@@ -366,8 +366,11 @@ int EVP_Digest(const void *data, size_t count,
+ 
+ void EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx)
+ 	{
+-	EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
+-	OPENSSL_free(ctx);
++	if (ctx)
++		{
++		EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
++		OPENSSL_free(ctx);
++		}
+ 	}
+ 
+ /* This call frees resources associated with the context */
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/rhel/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0160.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/rhel/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0160.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..6d5c5cef6f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/rhel/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0160.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,89 @@
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/d1_both.c.heartbeat openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/d1_both.c
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/d1_both.c.heartbeat	2014-04-07 12:52:01.884308971 +0200
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/d1_both.c	2014-04-07 13:04:32.860128295 +0200
+@@ -1458,26 +1458,36 @@ dtls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
+ 	unsigned int payload;
+ 	unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
+ 
+-	/* Read type and payload length first */
+-	hbtype = *p++;
+-	n2s(p, payload);
+-	pl = p;
+-
+ 	if (s->msg_callback)
+ 		s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
+ 			&s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length,
+ 			s, s->msg_callback_arg);
+ 
++	/* Read type and payload length first */
++	if (1 + 2 + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
++		return 0; /* silently discard */
++	hbtype = *p++;
++	n2s(p, payload);
++	if (1 + 2 + payload + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
++		return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */
++	pl = p;
++
+ 	if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST)
+ 		{
+ 		unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
++		unsigned int write_length = 1 /* heartbeat type */ +
++			2 /* heartbeat length */ +
++			payload + padding;
+ 		int r;
+ 
++		if (write_length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)
++			return 0;
++
+ 		/* Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 byte
+ 		 * message type, plus 2 bytes payload length, plus
+ 		 * payload, plus padding
+ 		 */
+-		buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
++		buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(write_length);
+ 		bp = buffer;
+ 
+ 		/* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
+@@ -1488,11 +1498,11 @@ dtls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
+ 		/* Random padding */
+ 		RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding);
+ 
+-		r = dtls1_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, 3 + payload + padding);
++		r = dtls1_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, write_length);
+ 
+ 		if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback)
+ 			s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
+-				buffer, 3 + payload + padding,
++				buffer, write_length,
+ 				s, s->msg_callback_arg);
+ 
+ 		OPENSSL_free(buffer);
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/t1_lib.c.heartbeat openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/t1_lib.c
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/t1_lib.c.heartbeat	2014-04-07 12:52:01.891308997 +0200
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/t1_lib.c	2014-04-07 12:57:45.063603587 +0200
+@@ -2463,16 +2463,20 @@ tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
+ 	unsigned int payload;
+ 	unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
+ 
+-	/* Read type and payload length first */
+-	hbtype = *p++;
+-	n2s(p, payload);
+-	pl = p;
+-
+ 	if (s->msg_callback)
+ 		s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
+ 			&s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length,
+ 			s, s->msg_callback_arg);
+ 
++	/* Read type and payload length first */
++	if (1 + 2 + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
++		return 0; /* silently discard */
++	hbtype = *p++;
++	n2s(p, payload);
++	if (1 + 2 + payload + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
++		return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */
++	pl = p;
++
+ 	if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST)
+ 		{
+ 		unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/rhel/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0195.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/rhel/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0195.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..434eee2052
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/rhel/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0195.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+commit 208d54db20d58c9a5e45e856a0650caadd7d9612
+Author: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
+Date:   Tue May 13 18:48:31 2014 +0100
+
+    Fix for CVE-2014-0195
+    
+    A buffer overrun attack can be triggered by sending invalid DTLS fragments
+    to an OpenSSL DTLS client or server. This is potentially exploitable to
+    run arbitrary code on a vulnerable client or server.
+    
+    Fixed by adding consistency check for DTLS fragments.
+    
+    Thanks to Jüri Aedla for reporting this issue.
+
+diff --git a/ssl/d1_both.c b/ssl/d1_both.c
+index 2e8cf68..07f67f8 100644
+--- a/ssl/d1_both.c
++++ b/ssl/d1_both.c
+@@ -627,7 +627,16 @@ dtls1_reassemble_fragment(SSL *s, struct hm_header_st* msg_hdr, int *ok)
+ 		frag->msg_header.frag_off = 0;
+ 		}
+ 	else
++		{
+ 		frag = (hm_fragment*) item->data;
++		if (frag->msg_header.msg_len != msg_hdr->msg_len)
++			{
++			item = NULL;
++			frag = NULL;
++			goto err;
++			}
++		}
++
+ 
+ 	/* If message is already reassembled, this must be a
+ 	 * retransmit and can be dropped.
+
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/rhel/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0198.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/rhel/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0198.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..2c94bca5df
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/rhel/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0198.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
+Date: Sun, 11 May 2014 23:38:37 +0000 (+0100)
+Subject: Fixed NULL pointer dereference. See PR#3321
+X-Git-Url: https://git.openssl.org/gitweb/?p=openssl.git;a=commitdiff_plain;h=b107586
+
+Fixed NULL pointer dereference. See PR#3321
+---
+
+diff --git a/ssl/s3_pkt.c b/ssl/s3_pkt.c
+index 40eb0dd..d961d12 100644
+--- a/ssl/s3_pkt.c
++++ b/ssl/s3_pkt.c
+@@ -657,9 +657,6 @@ static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
+ 	SSL3_BUFFER *wb=&(s->s3->wbuf);
+ 	SSL_SESSION *sess;
+ 
+- 	if (wb->buf == NULL)
+-		if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s))
+-			return -1;
+ 
+ 	/* first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written
+ 	 * out.  This will happen with non blocking IO */
+@@ -675,6 +672,10 @@ static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
+ 		/* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
+ 		}
+ 
++ 	if (wb->buf == NULL)
++		if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s))
++			return -1;
++
+ 	if (len == 0 && !create_empty_fragment)
+ 		return 0;
+ 
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/rhel/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0221.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/rhel/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0221.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..deb3a8b89c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/rhel/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0221.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+commit d30e582446b027868cdabd0994681643682045a4
+Author: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
+Date:   Fri May 16 13:00:45 2014 +0100
+
+    Fix CVE-2014-0221
+    
+    Unnecessary recursion when receiving a DTLS hello request can be used to
+    crash a DTLS client. Fixed by handling DTLS hello request without recursion.
+    
+    Thanks to Imre Rad (Search-Lab Ltd.) for discovering this issue.
+
+diff --git a/ssl/d1_both.c b/ssl/d1_both.c
+index 07f67f8..4c2fd03 100644
+--- a/ssl/d1_both.c
++++ b/ssl/d1_both.c
+@@ -793,6 +793,7 @@ dtls1_get_message_fragment(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, long max, int *ok)
+ 	int i,al;
+ 	struct hm_header_st msg_hdr;
+ 
++	redo:
+ 	/* see if we have the required fragment already */
+ 	if ((frag_len = dtls1_retrieve_buffered_fragment(s,max,ok)) || *ok)
+ 		{
+@@ -851,8 +852,7 @@ dtls1_get_message_fragment(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, long max, int *ok)
+ 					s->msg_callback_arg);
+ 			
+ 			s->init_num = 0;
+-			return dtls1_get_message_fragment(s, st1, stn,
+-				max, ok);
++			goto redo;
+ 			}
+ 		else /* Incorrectly formated Hello request */
+ 			{
+
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/rhel/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0224.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/rhel/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0224.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..05e7e795bc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/rhel/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0224.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,104 @@
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/ssl3.h.keying-mitm openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/ssl3.h
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/ssl3.h.keying-mitm	2014-06-02 19:48:04.518100562 +0200
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/ssl3.h	2014-06-02 19:48:04.642103429 +0200
+@@ -388,6 +388,7 @@ typedef struct ssl3_buffer_st
+ #define TLS1_FLAGS_TLS_PADDING_BUG		0x0008
+ #define TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY		0x0010
+ #define TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE		0x0020
++#define SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK			0x0080
+  
+ /* SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE is set when we
+  * restart a handshake because of MS SGC and so prevents us
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s3_clnt.c.keying-mitm openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s3_clnt.c
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s3_clnt.c.keying-mitm	2013-02-11 16:26:04.000000000 +0100
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s3_clnt.c	2014-06-02 19:49:57.042701985 +0200
+@@ -510,6 +510,7 @@ int ssl3_connect(SSL *s)
+ 				s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label,
+ 				s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len);
+ 			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
++			s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
+ 			s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH;
+ 
+ 			/* clear flags */
+@@ -559,6 +560,7 @@ int ssl3_connect(SSL *s)
+ 		case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A:
+ 		case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B:
+ 
++			s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
+ 			ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A,
+ 				SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B);
+ 			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+@@ -901,6 +903,7 @@ int ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL *s)
+ 			{
+ 			s->session->cipher = pref_cipher ?
+ 				pref_cipher : ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, p+j);
++			s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
+ 			}
+ 		}
+ #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
+@@ -916,6 +918,7 @@ int ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL *s)
+ 		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT);
+ 		goto f_err;
+ 		}
++	    s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
+ 	    s->hit=1;
+ 	    }
+ 	else	/* a miss or crap from the other end */
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s3_pkt.c.keying-mitm openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s3_pkt.c
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s3_pkt.c.keying-mitm	2014-06-02 19:48:04.640103383 +0200
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s3_pkt.c	2014-06-02 19:48:04.643103452 +0200
+@@ -1298,6 +1298,15 @@ start:
+ 			goto f_err;
+ 			}
+ 
++		if (!(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK))
++			{
++			al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
++			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
++			goto f_err;
++			}
++
++		s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
++
+ 		rr->length=0;
+ 
+ 		if (s->msg_callback)
+@@ -1432,7 +1441,7 @@ int ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s)
+ 
+ 	if (s->s3->tmp.key_block == NULL)
+ 		{
+-		if (s->session == NULL) 
++		if (s->session == NULL || s->session->master_key_length == 0)
+ 			{
+ 			/* might happen if dtls1_read_bytes() calls this */
+ 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_DO_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s3_srvr.c.keying-mitm openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s3_srvr.c
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s3_srvr.c.keying-mitm	2014-06-02 19:48:04.630103151 +0200
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s3_srvr.c	2014-06-02 19:48:04.643103452 +0200
+@@ -673,6 +673,7 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
+ 		case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
+ 		case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
+ 
++			s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
+ 			/* we should decide if we expected this one */
+ 			ret=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
+ 			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+@@ -700,6 +701,7 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
+ 
+ 		case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
+ 		case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
++			s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
+ 			ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
+ 				SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
+ 			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+@@ -770,7 +772,10 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
+ 				s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
+ #else
+ 				if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
++					{
++					s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
+ 					s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
++					}
+ 				else
+ 					s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
+ #endif
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/rhel/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-3470.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/rhel/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-3470.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..32f4487302
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/rhel/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-3470.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+commit 4ad43d511f6cf064c66eb4bfd0fb0919b5dd8a86
+Author: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
+Date:   Thu May 29 15:00:05 2014 +0100
+
+    Fix CVE-2014-3470
+    
+    Check session_cert is not NULL before dereferencing it.
+
+diff --git a/ssl/s3_clnt.c b/ssl/s3_clnt.c
+index d35376d..4324f8d 100644
+--- a/ssl/s3_clnt.c
++++ b/ssl/s3_clnt.c
+@@ -2511,6 +2511,13 @@ int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
+ 			int ecdh_clnt_cert = 0;
+ 			int field_size = 0;
+ 
++			if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) 
++				{
++				ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
++				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
++				goto err;
++				}
++
+ 			/* Did we send out the client's
+ 			 * ECDH share for use in premaster
+ 			 * computation as part of client certificate?
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/rhel/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-3505.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/rhel/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-3505.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..8716fae9ed
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/rhel/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-3505.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+From 2172d4f63c61922487008f42511cc6bdae9b47a0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Adam Langley <agl@imperialviolet.org>
+Date: Fri, 6 Jun 2014 14:19:21 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH] Avoid double free when processing DTLS packets.
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+The |item| variable, in both of these cases, may contain a pointer to a
+|pitem| structure within |s->d1->buffered_messages|. It was being freed
+in the error case while still being in |buffered_messages|. When the
+error later caused the |SSL*| to be destroyed, the item would be double
+freed.
+
+Thanks to Wah-Teh Chang for spotting that the fix in 1632ef74 was
+inconsistent with the other error paths (but correct).
+
+Fixes CVE-2014-3505
+
+Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
+Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
+---
+ ssl/d1_both.c | 6 ++----
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/ssl/d1_both.c b/ssl/d1_both.c
+index c1eb970..cdb83b6 100644
+--- a/ssl/d1_both.c
++++ b/ssl/d1_both.c
+@@ -693,8 +693,7 @@ dtls1_reassemble_fragment(SSL *s, struct hm_header_st* msg_hdr, int *ok)
+ 	return DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY;
+ 
+ err:
+-	if (frag != NULL) dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag);
+-	if (item != NULL) OPENSSL_free(item);
++	if (frag != NULL && item == NULL) dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag);
+ 	*ok = 0;
+ 	return i;
+ 	}
+@@ -778,8 +777,7 @@ dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message(SSL *s, struct hm_header_st* msg_hdr, int *ok)
+ 	return DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY;
+ 
+ err:
+-	if ( frag != NULL) dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag);
+-	if ( item != NULL) OPENSSL_free(item);
++	if (frag != NULL && item == NULL) dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag);
+ 	*ok = 0;
+ 	return i;
+ 	}
+-- 
+1.8.3.1
+
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/rhel/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-3506.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/rhel/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-3506.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..05e364f5b9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/rhel/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-3506.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
+From fc7804ec392fcf8051abe6bc9da9108744d2ae35 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
+Date: Fri, 6 Jun 2014 14:25:52 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix DTLS handshake message size checks.
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+In |dtls1_reassemble_fragment|, the value of
+|msg_hdr->frag_off+frag_len| was being checked against the maximum
+handshake message size, but then |msg_len| bytes were allocated for the
+fragment buffer. This means that so long as the fragment was within the
+allowed size, the pending handshake message could consume 16MB + 2MB
+(for the reassembly bitmap). Approx 10 outstanding handshake messages
+are allowed, meaning that an attacker could consume ~180MB per DTLS
+connection.
+
+In the non-fragmented path (in |dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message|), no
+check was applied.
+
+Fixes CVE-2014-3506
+
+Wholly based on patch by Adam Langley with one minor amendment.
+
+Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
+---
+ ssl/d1_both.c | 29 ++++++++++++++++-------------
+ 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/ssl/d1_both.c b/ssl/d1_both.c
+index 6559dfc..b9e15df 100644
+--- a/ssl/d1_both.c
++++ b/ssl/d1_both.c
+@@ -587,6 +587,16 @@ dtls1_retrieve_buffered_fragment(SSL *s, long max, int *ok)
+ 		return 0;
+ 	}
+ 
++/* dtls1_max_handshake_message_len returns the maximum number of bytes
++ * permitted in a DTLS handshake message for |s|. The minimum is 16KB, but may
++ * be greater if the maximum certificate list size requires it. */
++static unsigned long dtls1_max_handshake_message_len(const SSL *s)
++	{
++	unsigned long max_len = DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH;
++	if (max_len < (unsigned long)s->max_cert_list)
++		return s->max_cert_list;
++	return max_len;
++	}
+ 
+ static int
+ dtls1_reassemble_fragment(SSL *s, struct hm_header_st* msg_hdr, int *ok)
+@@ -595,20 +605,10 @@ dtls1_reassemble_fragment(SSL *s, struct hm_header_st* msg_hdr, int *ok)
+ 	pitem *item = NULL;
+ 	int i = -1, is_complete;
+ 	unsigned char seq64be[8];
+-	unsigned long frag_len = msg_hdr->frag_len, max_len;
+-
+-	if ((msg_hdr->frag_off+frag_len) > msg_hdr->msg_len)
+-		goto err;
+-
+-	/* Determine maximum allowed message size. Depends on (user set)
+-	 * maximum certificate length, but 16k is minimum.
+-	 */
+-	if (DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH < s->max_cert_list)
+-		max_len = s->max_cert_list;
+-	else
+-		max_len = DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH;
++	unsigned long frag_len = msg_hdr->frag_len;
+ 
+-	if ((msg_hdr->frag_off+frag_len) > max_len)
++	if ((msg_hdr->frag_off+frag_len) > msg_hdr->msg_len ||
++	    msg_hdr->msg_len > dtls1_max_handshake_message_len(s))
+ 		goto err;
+ 
+ 	/* Try to find item in queue */
+@@ -749,6 +749,9 @@ dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message(SSL *s, struct hm_header_st* msg_hdr, int *ok)
+ 		if (frag_len && frag_len < msg_hdr->msg_len)
+ 			return dtls1_reassemble_fragment(s, msg_hdr, ok);
+ 
++		if (frag_len > dtls1_max_handshake_message_len(s))
++			goto err;
++
+ 		frag = dtls1_hm_fragment_new(frag_len, 0);
+ 		if ( frag == NULL)
+ 			goto err;
+-- 
+1.8.3.1
+
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/rhel/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-3507.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/rhel/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-3507.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..05073152c9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/rhel/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-3507.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/d1_both.c.dtls-memleak openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/d1_both.c
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/d1_both.c.dtls-memleak	2014-08-07 17:51:18.457493922 +0200
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/d1_both.c	2014-08-07 17:58:28.478558785 +0200
+@@ -610,6 +610,9 @@ dtls1_reassemble_fragment(SSL *s, struct
+ 	    msg_hdr->msg_len > dtls1_max_handshake_message_len(s))
+ 		goto err;
+ 
++	if (frag_len == 0)
++		return DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY;
++
+ 	/* Try to find item in queue */
+ 	memset(seq64be,0,sizeof(seq64be));
+ 	seq64be[6] = (unsigned char) (msg_hdr->seq>>8);
+@@ -686,7 +689,12 @@ dtls1_reassemble_fragment(SSL *s, struct
+ 			i = -1;
+ 			}
+ 
+-		pqueue_insert(s->d1->buffered_messages, item);
++		item = pqueue_insert(s->d1->buffered_messages, item);
++		/* pqueue_insert fails iff a duplicate item is inserted.
++		 * However, |item| cannot be a duplicate. If it were,
++		 * |pqueue_find|, above, would have returned it and control
++		 * would never have reached this branch. */
++		OPENSSL_assert(item != NULL);
+ 		}
+ 
+ 	return DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY;
+@@ -744,7 +752,7 @@ dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message(SSL *s,
+ 		}
+ 	else
+ 		{
+-		if (frag_len && frag_len < msg_hdr->msg_len)
++		if (frag_len < msg_hdr->msg_len)
+ 			return dtls1_reassemble_fragment(s, msg_hdr, ok);
+ 
+ 		if (frag_len > dtls1_max_handshake_message_len(s))
+@@ -773,7 +781,15 @@ dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message(SSL *s,
+ 		if ( item == NULL)
+ 			goto err;
+ 
+-		pqueue_insert(s->d1->buffered_messages, item);
++		item = pqueue_insert(s->d1->buffered_messages, item);
++		/* pqueue_insert fails iff a duplicate item is inserted.
++		 * However, |item| cannot be a duplicate. If it were,
++		 * |pqueue_find|, above, would have returned it. Then, either
++		 * |frag_len| != |msg_hdr->msg_len| in which case |item| is set
++		 * to NULL and it will have been processed with
++		 * |dtls1_reassemble_fragment|, above, or the record will have
++		 * been discarded. */
++		OPENSSL_assert(item != NULL);
+ 		}
+ 
+ 	return DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY;
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/rhel/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-3508.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/rhel/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-3508.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..31dd08db9d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/rhel/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-3508.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,138 @@
+From 03b04ddac162c7b7fa3c57eadccc5a583a00d291 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Emilia Kasper <emilia@openssl.org>
+Date: Wed, 2 Jul 2014 19:02:33 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix OID handling:
+
+- Upon parsing, reject OIDs with invalid base-128 encoding.
+- Always NUL-terminate the destination buffer in OBJ_obj2txt printing function.
+
+CVE-2014-3508
+
+Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
+Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
+Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
+---
+ crypto/asn1/a_object.c   | 30 +++++++++++++++++++++---------
+ crypto/objects/obj_dat.c | 16 +++++++++-------
+ 2 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/crypto/asn1/a_object.c b/crypto/asn1/a_object.c
+index 3978c91..77b2768 100644
+--- a/crypto/asn1/a_object.c
++++ b/crypto/asn1/a_object.c
+@@ -283,17 +283,29 @@ err:
+ 	ASN1err(ASN1_F_D2I_ASN1_OBJECT,i);
+ 	return(NULL);
+ }
++
+ ASN1_OBJECT *c2i_ASN1_OBJECT(ASN1_OBJECT **a, const unsigned char **pp,
+ 	     long len)
+ 	{
+ 	ASN1_OBJECT *ret=NULL;
+ 	const unsigned char *p;
+ 	unsigned char *data;
+-	int i;
+-	/* Sanity check OID encoding: can't have leading 0x80 in
+-	 * subidentifiers, see: X.690 8.19.2
++	int i, length;
++
++	/* Sanity check OID encoding.
++	 * Need at least one content octet.
++	 * MSB must be clear in the last octet.
++	 * can't have leading 0x80 in subidentifiers, see: X.690 8.19.2
+ 	 */
+-	for (i = 0, p = *pp; i < len; i++, p++)
++	if (len <= 0 || len > INT_MAX || pp == NULL || (p = *pp) == NULL ||
++	    p[len - 1] & 0x80)
++		{
++		ASN1err(ASN1_F_C2I_ASN1_OBJECT,ASN1_R_INVALID_OBJECT_ENCODING);
++		return NULL;
++		}
++	/* Now 0 < len <= INT_MAX, so the cast is safe. */
++	length = (int)len;
++	for (i = 0; i < length; i++, p++)
+ 		{
+ 		if (*p == 0x80 && (!i || !(p[-1] & 0x80)))
+ 			{
+@@ -316,23 +328,23 @@ ASN1_OBJECT *c2i_ASN1_OBJECT(ASN1_OBJECT **a, const unsigned char **pp,
+ 	data = (unsigned char *)ret->data;
+ 	ret->data = NULL;
+ 	/* once detached we can change it */
+-	if ((data == NULL) || (ret->length < len))
++	if ((data == NULL) || (ret->length < length))
+ 		{
+ 		ret->length=0;
+ 		if (data != NULL) OPENSSL_free(data);
+-		data=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(len ? (int)len : 1);
++		data=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(length);
+ 		if (data == NULL)
+ 			{ i=ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE; goto err; }
+ 		ret->flags|=ASN1_OBJECT_FLAG_DYNAMIC_DATA;
+ 		}
+-	memcpy(data,p,(int)len);
++	memcpy(data,p,length);
+ 	/* reattach data to object, after which it remains const */
+ 	ret->data  =data;
+-	ret->length=(int)len;
++	ret->length=length;
+ 	ret->sn=NULL;
+ 	ret->ln=NULL;
+ 	/* ret->flags=ASN1_OBJECT_FLAG_DYNAMIC; we know it is dynamic */
+-	p+=len;
++	p+=length;
+ 
+ 	if (a != NULL) (*a)=ret;
+ 	*pp=p;
+diff --git a/crypto/objects/obj_dat.c b/crypto/objects/obj_dat.c
+index 8a342ba..0b2f442 100644
+--- a/crypto/objects/obj_dat.c
++++ b/crypto/objects/obj_dat.c
+@@ -471,11 +471,12 @@ int OBJ_obj2txt(char *buf, int buf_len, const ASN1_OBJECT *a, int no_name)
+ 	const unsigned char *p;
+ 	char tbuf[DECIMAL_SIZE(i)+DECIMAL_SIZE(l)+2];
+ 
+-	if ((a == NULL) || (a->data == NULL)) {
+-		buf[0]='\0';
+-		return(0);
+-	}
++	/* Ensure that, at every state, |buf| is NUL-terminated. */
++	if (buf && buf_len > 0)
++		buf[0] = '\0';
+ 
++	if ((a == NULL) || (a->data == NULL))
++		return(0);
+ 
+ 	if (!no_name && (nid=OBJ_obj2nid(a)) != NID_undef)
+ 		{
+@@ -554,9 +555,10 @@ int OBJ_obj2txt(char *buf, int buf_len, const ASN1_OBJECT *a, int no_name)
+ 				i=(int)(l/40);
+ 				l-=(long)(i*40);
+ 				}
+-			if (buf && (buf_len > 0))
++			if (buf && (buf_len > 1))
+ 				{
+ 				*buf++ = i + '0';
++				*buf = '\0';
+ 				buf_len--;
+ 				}
+ 			n++;
+@@ -571,9 +573,10 @@ int OBJ_obj2txt(char *buf, int buf_len, const ASN1_OBJECT *a, int no_name)
+ 			i = strlen(bndec);
+ 			if (buf)
+ 				{
+-				if (buf_len > 0)
++				if (buf_len > 1)
+ 					{
+ 					*buf++ = '.';
++					*buf = '\0';
+ 					buf_len--;
+ 					}
+ 				BUF_strlcpy(buf,bndec,buf_len);
+@@ -807,4 +810,3 @@ err:
+ 	OPENSSL_free(buf);
+ 	return(ok);
+ 	}
+-
+-- 
+1.8.3.1
+
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/rhel/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-3509.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/rhel/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-3509.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..cee4aadf5c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/rhel/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-3509.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+From 86788e1ee6908a5b3a4c95fa80caa4b724a8a434 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Gabor Tyukasz <Gabor.Tyukasz@logmein.com>
+Date: Wed, 23 Jul 2014 23:42:06 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix race condition in ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext
+
+CVE-2014-3509
+Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
+Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
+---
+ ssl/t1_lib.c | 17 ++++++++++-------
+ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/ssl/t1_lib.c b/ssl/t1_lib.c
+index 8167a51..022a4fb 100644
+--- a/ssl/t1_lib.c
++++ b/ssl/t1_lib.c
+@@ -1555,15 +1555,18 @@ int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, in
+ 				*al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ 				return 0;
+ 				}
+-			s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
+-			if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
+-			if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
++			if (!s->hit)
+ 				{
+-				*al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+-				return 0;
++				s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
++				if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
++				if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
++					{
++					*al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
++					return 0;
++					}
++				s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
++				memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
+ 				}
+-			s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
+-			memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
+ #if 0
+ 			fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist ");
+ 			sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
+-- 
+1.8.3.1
+
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/rhel/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-3510.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/rhel/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-3510.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..419653646f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/rhel/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-3510.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
+From 88ae012c8092852f03c50f6461175271104b4c8a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: =?UTF-8?q?Emilia=20K=C3=A4sper?= <emilia@openssl.org>
+Date: Thu, 24 Jul 2014 22:15:29 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix DTLS anonymous EC(DH) denial of service
+
+CVE-2014-3510
+
+Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
+---
+ ssl/d1_clnt.c | 23 +++++++++++++++++++++--
+ ssl/s3_clnt.c |  7 +++++++
+ 2 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/ssl/d1_clnt.c b/ssl/d1_clnt.c
+index 65dbb4a..fd6562c 100644
+--- a/ssl/d1_clnt.c
++++ b/ssl/d1_clnt.c
+@@ -996,6 +996,13 @@ int dtls1_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
+ 			RSA *rsa;
+ 			unsigned char tmp_buf[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
+ 
++			if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
++				{
++				/* We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA. */
++				SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
++				goto err;
++				}
++
+ 			if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp != NULL)
+ 				rsa=s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp;
+ 			else
+@@ -1186,6 +1193,13 @@ int dtls1_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
+ 			{
+ 			DH *dh_srvr,*dh_clnt;
+ 
++			if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
++				{
++				ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
++				SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
++				goto err;
++				}
++
+ 			if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp != NULL)
+ 				dh_srvr=s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp;
+ 			else
+@@ -1245,6 +1259,13 @@ int dtls1_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
+ 			int ecdh_clnt_cert = 0;
+ 			int field_size = 0;
+ 
++			if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
++				{
++				ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
++				SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
++				goto err;
++				}
++
+ 			/* Did we send out the client's
+ 			 * ECDH share for use in premaster
+ 			 * computation as part of client certificate?
+@@ -1720,5 +1741,3 @@ int dtls1_send_client_certificate(SSL *s)
+ 	/* SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D */
+ 	return(dtls1_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
+ 	}
+-
+-
+diff --git a/ssl/s3_clnt.c b/ssl/s3_clnt.c
+index 2afb892..df05f78 100644
+--- a/ssl/s3_clnt.c
++++ b/ssl/s3_clnt.c
+@@ -2253,6 +2253,13 @@ int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
+ 			RSA *rsa;
+ 			unsigned char tmp_buf[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
+ 
++			if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
++				{
++				/* We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA. */
++				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
++				goto err;
++				}
++
+ 			if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp != NULL)
+ 				rsa=s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp;
+ 			else
+-- 
+1.8.3.1
+
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/rhel/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-3511.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/rhel/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-3511.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..f9cb4ea39c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/rhel/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-3511.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
+From fc4f4cdb8bf9981904e652abf69b892a45bddacf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
+Date: Wed, 23 Jul 2014 22:32:21 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix protocol downgrade bug in case of fragmented packets
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+CVE-2014-3511
+
+Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
+Reviewed-by: Bodo Möller <bodo@openssl.org>
+---
+ ssl/s23_srvr.c | 30 +++++++++++++++++++++++-------
+ 1 file changed, 23 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/ssl/s23_srvr.c b/ssl/s23_srvr.c
+index 4877849..2901a6b 100644
+--- a/ssl/s23_srvr.c
++++ b/ssl/s23_srvr.c
+@@ -348,23 +348,19 @@ int ssl23_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
+ 			 * Client Hello message, this would be difficult, and we'd have
+ 			 * to read more records to find out.
+ 			 * No known SSL 3.0 client fragments ClientHello like this,
+-			 * so we simply assume TLS 1.0 to avoid protocol version downgrade
+-			 * attacks. */
++			 * so we simply reject such connections to avoid
++			 * protocol version downgrade attacks. */
+ 			if (p[3] == 0 && p[4] < 6)
+ 				{
+-#if 0
+ 				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_SMALL);
+ 				goto err;
+-#else
+-				v[1] = TLS1_VERSION_MINOR;
+-#endif
+ 				}
+ 			/* if major version number > 3 set minor to a value
+ 			 * which will use the highest version 3 we support.
+ 			 * If TLS 2.0 ever appears we will need to revise
+ 			 * this....
+ 			 */
+-			else if (p[9] > SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
++			if (p[9] > SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
+ 				v[1]=0xff;
+ 			else
+ 				v[1]=p[10]; /* minor version according to client_version */
+@@ -444,14 +440,34 @@ int ssl23_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
+ 		v[0] = p[3]; /* == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR */
+ 		v[1] = p[4];
+ 
++		/* An SSLv3/TLSv1 backwards-compatible CLIENT-HELLO in an SSLv2
++		 * header is sent directly on the wire, not wrapped as a TLS
++		 * record. It's format is:
++		 * Byte  Content
++		 * 0-1   msg_length
++		 * 2     msg_type
++		 * 3-4   version
++		 * 5-6   cipher_spec_length
++		 * 7-8   session_id_length
++		 * 9-10  challenge_length
++		 * ...   ...
++		 */
+ 		n=((p[0]&0x7f)<<8)|p[1];
+ 		if (n > (1024*4))
+ 			{
+ 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_LARGE);
+ 			goto err;
+ 			}
++		if (n < 9)
++			{
++			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
++			goto err;
++			}
+ 
+ 		j=ssl23_read_bytes(s,n+2);
++		/* We previously read 11 bytes, so if j > 0, we must have
++		 * j == n+2 == s->packet_length. We have at least 11 valid
++		 * packet bytes. */
+ 		if (j <= 0) return(j);
+ 
+ 		ssl3_finish_mac(s, s->packet+2, s->packet_length-2);
+-- 
+1.8.3.1
+
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/rhel/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-3513.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/rhel/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-3513.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..0d42eec4be
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/rhel/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-3513.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,186 @@
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/d1_srtp.c.srtp-leak openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/d1_srtp.c
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/d1_srtp.c.srtp-leak	2013-02-11 16:26:04.000000000 +0100
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/d1_srtp.c	2014-10-15 13:23:34.253040160 +0200
+@@ -168,25 +168,6 @@ static int find_profile_by_name(char *pr
+ 	return 1;
+ 	}
+ 
+-static int find_profile_by_num(unsigned profile_num,
+-			       SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE **pptr)
+-	{
+-	SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *p;
+-
+-	p=srtp_known_profiles;
+-	while(p->name)
+-		{
+-		if(p->id == profile_num)
+-			{
+-			*pptr=p;
+-			return 0;
+-			}
+-		p++;
+-		}
+-
+-	return 1;
+-	}
+-
+ static int ssl_ctx_make_profiles(const char *profiles_string,STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) **out)
+ 	{
+ 	STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *profiles;
+@@ -209,11 +190,19 @@ static int ssl_ctx_make_profiles(const c
+ 		if(!find_profile_by_name(ptr,&p,
+ 					 col ? col-ptr : (int)strlen(ptr)))
+ 			{
++			if (sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_find(profiles,p) >= 0)
++				{
++				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_MAKE_PROFILES,SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST);
++				sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_free(profiles);
++				return 1;
++				}
++
+ 			sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_push(profiles,p);
+ 			}
+ 		else
+ 			{
+ 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_MAKE_PROFILES,SSL_R_SRTP_UNKNOWN_PROTECTION_PROFILE);
++			sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_free(profiles);
+ 			return 1;
+ 			}
+ 
+@@ -305,13 +294,12 @@ int ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(SSL
+ 
+ int ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(SSL *s, unsigned char *d, int len,int *al)
+ 	{
+-	SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *cprof,*sprof;
+-	STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *clnt=0,*srvr;
++	SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *sprof;
++	STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *srvr;
+         int ct;
+         int mki_len;
+-	int i,j;
+-	int id;
+-	int ret;
++	int i, srtp_pref;
++	unsigned int id;
+ 
+          /* Length value + the MKI length */
+         if(len < 3)
+@@ -341,22 +329,32 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(S
+ 		return 1;
+ 		}
+ 
++	srvr=SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s);
++	s->srtp_profile = NULL;
++	/* Search all profiles for a match initially */
++	srtp_pref = sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_num(srvr);
+         
+-	clnt=sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_new_null();
+-
+ 	while(ct)
+ 		{
+ 		n2s(d,id);
+ 		ct-=2;
+                 len-=2;
+ 
+-		if(!find_profile_by_num(id,&cprof))
++		/*
++		 * Only look for match in profiles of higher preference than
++		 * current match.
++		 * If no profiles have been have been configured then this
++		 * does nothing.
++		 */
++		for (i = 0; i < srtp_pref; i++)
+ 			{
+-			sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_push(clnt,cprof);
+-			}
+-		else
+-			{
+-			; /* Ignore */
++			sprof = sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_value(srvr, i);
++			if (sprof->id == id)
++				{
++				s->srtp_profile = sprof;
++				srtp_pref = i;
++				break;
++				}
+ 			}
+ 		}
+ 
+@@ -371,36 +369,7 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(S
+ 		return 1;
+ 		}
+ 
+-	srvr=SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s);
+-
+-	/* Pick our most preferred profile. If no profiles have been
+-	 configured then the outer loop doesn't run 
+-	 (sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_num() = -1)
+-	 and so we just return without doing anything */
+-	for(i=0;i<sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_num(srvr);i++)
+-		{
+-		sprof=sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_value(srvr,i);
+-
+-		for(j=0;j<sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_num(clnt);j++)
+-			{
+-			cprof=sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_value(clnt,j);
+-            
+-			if(cprof->id==sprof->id)
+-				{
+-				s->srtp_profile=sprof;
+-				*al=0;
+-				ret=0;
+-				goto done;
+-				}
+-			}
+-		}
+-
+-	ret=0;
+-    
+-done:
+-	if(clnt) sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_free(clnt);
+-
+-	return ret;
++	return 0;
+ 	}
+ 
+ int ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, int *len, int maxlen)
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/t1_lib.c.srtp-leak openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/t1_lib.c
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/t1_lib.c.srtp-leak	2014-10-15 13:19:59.955202293 +0200
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/t1_lib.c	2014-10-15 13:23:34.254040182 +0200
+@@ -696,7 +696,7 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsex
+ #endif
+ 
+ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
+-        if(SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s))
++	if(SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s))
+                 {
+                 int el;
+ 
+@@ -829,7 +829,7 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsex
+ #endif
+ 
+ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
+-        if(s->srtp_profile)
++	if(SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->srtp_profile)
+                 {
+                 int el;
+ 
+@@ -1377,7 +1377,8 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s,
+ 
+ 		/* session ticket processed earlier */
+ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
+-		else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
++		else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)
++			 && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
+ 			{
+ 			if(ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
+ 							      al))
+@@ -1631,7 +1632,7 @@ int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s,
+ 			}
+ #endif
+ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
+-		else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
++		else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
+ 			{
+                         if(ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
+ 							      al))
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/rhel/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-3567.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/rhel/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-3567.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..a01ee694d0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/rhel/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-3567.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/t1_lib.c.ticket-leak openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/t1_lib.c
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/t1_lib.c.ticket-leak	2014-10-15 13:19:26.825454374 +0200
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/t1_lib.c	2014-10-15 13:19:59.955202293 +0200
+@@ -2280,7 +2280,10 @@ static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, co
+ 	HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
+ 	HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
+ 	if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen))
++		{
++		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
+ 		return 2;
++		}
+ 	/* Attempt to decrypt session data */
+ 	/* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
+ 	p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/rhel/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-3570.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/rhel/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-3570.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..aff2f025d0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/rhel/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-3570.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,3155 @@
+From e078642ddea29bbb6ba29788a6a513796387fbbb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
+Date: Mon, 5 Jan 2015 14:52:56 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix for CVE-2014-3570.
+
+Reviewed-by: Emilia Kasper <emilia@openssl.org>
+(cherry picked from commit e793809ba50c1e90ab592fb640a856168e50f3de)
+(with 1.0.1-specific addendum)
+---
+ crypto/bn/asm/mips.pl      |  611 +++---------
+ crypto/bn/asm/mips3.s      | 2201 --------------------------------------------
+ crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-gcc.c |   34 +-
+ crypto/bn/bn_asm.c         |   16 +-
+ crypto/bn/bntest.c         |  102 +-
+ 5 files changed, 234 insertions(+), 2730 deletions(-)
+ delete mode 100644 crypto/bn/asm/mips3.s
+
+diff --git a/crypto/bn/asm/mips.pl b/crypto/bn/asm/mips.pl
+index d2f3ef7..215c9a7 100644
+--- a/crypto/bn/asm/mips.pl
++++ b/crypto/bn/asm/mips.pl
+@@ -1872,6 +1872,41 @@ ___
+ 
+ ($a_4,$a_5,$a_6,$a_7)=($b_0,$b_1,$b_2,$b_3);
+ 
++sub add_c2 () {
++my ($hi,$lo,$c0,$c1,$c2,
++    $warm,      # !$warm denotes first call with specific sequence of
++                # $c_[XYZ] when there is no Z-carry to accumulate yet;
++    $an,$bn     # these two are arguments for multiplication which
++                # result is used in *next* step [which is why it's
++                # commented as "forward multiplication" below];
++    )=@_;
++$code.=<<___;
++	mflo	$lo
++	mfhi	$hi
++	$ADDU	$c0,$lo
++	sltu	$at,$c0,$lo
++	 $MULTU	$an,$bn			# forward multiplication
++	$ADDU	$c0,$lo
++	$ADDU	$at,$hi
++	sltu	$lo,$c0,$lo
++	$ADDU	$c1,$at
++	$ADDU	$hi,$lo
++___
++$code.=<<___	if (!$warm);
++	sltu	$c2,$c1,$at
++	$ADDU	$c1,$hi
++	sltu	$hi,$c1,$hi
++	$ADDU	$c2,$hi
++___
++$code.=<<___	if ($warm);
++	sltu	$at,$c1,$at
++	$ADDU	$c1,$hi
++	$ADDU	$c2,$at
++	sltu	$hi,$c1,$hi
++	$ADDU	$c2,$hi
++___
++}
++
+ $code.=<<___;
+ 
+ .align	5
+@@ -1920,21 +1955,10 @@ $code.=<<___;
+ 	sltu	$at,$c_2,$t_1
+ 	$ADDU	$c_3,$t_2,$at
+ 	$ST	$c_2,$BNSZ($a0)
+-
+-	mflo	$t_1
+-	mfhi	$t_2
+-	slt	$c_2,$t_2,$zero
+-	$SLL	$t_2,1
+-	$MULTU	$a_1,$a_1		# mul_add_c(a[1],b[1],c3,c1,c2);
+-	slt	$a2,$t_1,$zero
+-	$ADDU	$t_2,$a2
+-	$SLL	$t_1,1
+-	$ADDU	$c_3,$t_1
+-	sltu	$at,$c_3,$t_1
+-	$ADDU	$t_2,$at
+-	$ADDU	$c_1,$t_2
+-	sltu	$at,$c_1,$t_2
+-	$ADDU	$c_2,$at
++___
++	&add_c2($t_2,$t_1,$c_3,$c_1,$c_2,0,
++		$a_1,$a_1);		# mul_add_c(a[1],b[1],c3,c1,c2);
++$code.=<<___;
+ 	mflo	$t_1
+ 	mfhi	$t_2
+ 	$ADDU	$c_3,$t_1
+@@ -1945,67 +1969,19 @@ $code.=<<___;
+ 	sltu	$at,$c_1,$t_2
+ 	$ADDU	$c_2,$at
+ 	$ST	$c_3,2*$BNSZ($a0)
+-
+-	mflo	$t_1
+-	mfhi	$t_2
+-	slt	$c_3,$t_2,$zero
+-	$SLL	$t_2,1
+-	$MULTU	$a_1,$a_2		# mul_add_c2(a[1],b[2],c1,c2,c3);
+-	slt	$a2,$t_1,$zero
+-	$ADDU	$t_2,$a2
+-	$SLL	$t_1,1
+-	$ADDU	$c_1,$t_1
+-	sltu	$at,$c_1,$t_1
+-	$ADDU	$t_2,$at
+-	$ADDU	$c_2,$t_2
+-	sltu	$at,$c_2,$t_2
+-	$ADDU	$c_3,$at
+-	mflo	$t_1
+-	mfhi	$t_2
+-	slt	$at,$t_2,$zero
+-	$ADDU	$c_3,$at
+-	 $MULTU	$a_4,$a_0		# mul_add_c2(a[4],b[0],c2,c3,c1);
+-	$SLL	$t_2,1
+-	slt	$a2,$t_1,$zero
+-	$ADDU	$t_2,$a2
+-	$SLL	$t_1,1
+-	$ADDU	$c_1,$t_1
+-	sltu	$at,$c_1,$t_1
+-	$ADDU	$t_2,$at
+-	$ADDU	$c_2,$t_2
+-	sltu	$at,$c_2,$t_2
+-	$ADDU	$c_3,$at
++___
++	&add_c2($t_2,$t_1,$c_1,$c_2,$c_3,0,
++		$a_1,$a_2);		# mul_add_c2(a[1],b[2],c1,c2,c3);
++	&add_c2($t_2,$t_1,$c_1,$c_2,$c_3,1,
++		$a_4,$a_0);		# mul_add_c2(a[4],b[0],c2,c3,c1);
++$code.=<<___;
+ 	$ST	$c_1,3*$BNSZ($a0)
+-
+-	mflo	$t_1
+-	mfhi	$t_2
+-	slt	$c_1,$t_2,$zero
+-	$SLL	$t_2,1
+-	$MULTU	$a_3,$a_1		# mul_add_c2(a[3],b[1],c2,c3,c1);
+-	slt	$a2,$t_1,$zero
+-	$ADDU	$t_2,$a2
+-	$SLL	$t_1,1
+-	$ADDU	$c_2,$t_1
+-	sltu	$at,$c_2,$t_1
+-	$ADDU	$t_2,$at
+-	$ADDU	$c_3,$t_2
+-	sltu	$at,$c_3,$t_2
+-	$ADDU	$c_1,$at
+-	mflo	$t_1
+-	mfhi	$t_2
+-	slt	$at,$t_2,$zero
+-	$ADDU	$c_1,$at
+-	$MULTU	$a_2,$a_2		# mul_add_c(a[2],b[2],c2,c3,c1);
+-	$SLL	$t_2,1
+-	slt	$a2,$t_1,$zero
+-	$ADDU	$t_2,$a2
+-	$SLL	$t_1,1
+-	$ADDU	$c_2,$t_1
+-	sltu	$at,$c_2,$t_1
+-	$ADDU	$t_2,$at
+-	$ADDU	$c_3,$t_2
+-	sltu	$at,$c_3,$t_2
+-	$ADDU	$c_1,$at
++___
++	&add_c2($t_2,$t_1,$c_2,$c_3,$c_1,0,
++		$a_3,$a_1);		# mul_add_c2(a[3],b[1],c2,c3,c1);
++	&add_c2($t_2,$t_1,$c_2,$c_3,$c_1,1,
++		$a_2,$a_2);		# mul_add_c(a[2],b[2],c2,c3,c1);
++$code.=<<___;
+ 	mflo	$t_1
+ 	mfhi	$t_2
+ 	$ADDU	$c_2,$t_1
+@@ -2016,97 +1992,23 @@ $code.=<<___;
+ 	sltu	$at,$c_3,$t_2
+ 	$ADDU	$c_1,$at
+ 	$ST	$c_2,4*$BNSZ($a0)
+-
+-	mflo	$t_1
+-	mfhi	$t_2
+-	slt	$c_2,$t_2,$zero
+-	$SLL	$t_2,1
+-	$MULTU	$a_1,$a_4		# mul_add_c2(a[1],b[4],c3,c1,c2);
+-	slt	$a2,$t_1,$zero
+-	$ADDU	$t_2,$a2
+-	$SLL	$t_1,1
+-	$ADDU	$c_3,$t_1
+-	sltu	$at,$c_3,$t_1
+-	$ADDU	$t_2,$at
+-	$ADDU	$c_1,$t_2
+-	sltu	$at,$c_1,$t_2
+-	$ADDU	$c_2,$at
+-	mflo	$t_1
+-	mfhi	$t_2
+-	slt	$at,$t_2,$zero
+-	$ADDU	$c_2,$at
+-	$MULTU	$a_2,$a_3		# mul_add_c2(a[2],b[3],c3,c1,c2);
+-	$SLL	$t_2,1
+-	slt	$a2,$t_1,$zero
+-	$ADDU	$t_2,$a2
+-	$SLL	$t_1,1
+-	$ADDU	$c_3,$t_1
+-	sltu	$at,$c_3,$t_1
+-	$ADDU	$t_2,$at
+-	$ADDU	$c_1,$t_2
+-	sltu	$at,$c_1,$t_2
+-	$ADDU	$c_2,$at
+-	mflo	$t_1
+-	mfhi	$t_2
+-	slt	$at,$t_2,$zero
+-	 $MULTU	$a_6,$a_0		# mul_add_c2(a[6],b[0],c1,c2,c3);
+-	$ADDU	$c_2,$at
+-	$SLL	$t_2,1
+-	slt	$a2,$t_1,$zero
+-	$ADDU	$t_2,$a2
+-	$SLL	$t_1,1
+-	$ADDU	$c_3,$t_1
+-	sltu	$at,$c_3,$t_1
+-	$ADDU	$t_2,$at
+-	$ADDU	$c_1,$t_2
+-	sltu	$at,$c_1,$t_2
+-	$ADDU	$c_2,$at
++___
++	&add_c2($t_2,$t_1,$c_3,$c_1,$c_2,0,
++		$a_1,$a_4);		# mul_add_c2(a[1],b[4],c3,c1,c2);
++	&add_c2($t_2,$t_1,$c_3,$c_1,$c_2,1,
++		$a_2,$a_3);		# mul_add_c2(a[2],b[3],c3,c1,c2);
++	&add_c2($t_2,$t_1,$c_3,$c_1,$c_2,1,
++		$a_6,$a_0);		# mul_add_c2(a[6],b[0],c1,c2,c3);
++$code.=<<___;
+ 	$ST	$c_3,5*$BNSZ($a0)
+-
+-	mflo	$t_1
+-	mfhi	$t_2
+-	slt	$c_3,$t_2,$zero
+-	$SLL	$t_2,1
+-	$MULTU	$a_5,$a_1		# mul_add_c2(a[5],b[1],c1,c2,c3);
+-	slt	$a2,$t_1,$zero
+-	$ADDU	$t_2,$a2
+-	$SLL	$t_1,1
+-	$ADDU	$c_1,$t_1
+-	sltu	$at,$c_1,$t_1
+-	$ADDU	$t_2,$at
+-	$ADDU	$c_2,$t_2
+-	sltu	$at,$c_2,$t_2
+-	$ADDU	$c_3,$at
+-	mflo	$t_1
+-	mfhi	$t_2
+-	slt	$at,$t_2,$zero
+-	$ADDU	$c_3,$at
+-	$MULTU	$a_4,$a_2		# mul_add_c2(a[4],b[2],c1,c2,c3);
+-	$SLL	$t_2,1
+-	slt	$a2,$t_1,$zero
+-	$ADDU	$t_2,$a2
+-	$SLL	$t_1,1
+-	$ADDU	$c_1,$t_1
+-	sltu	$at,$c_1,$t_1
+-	$ADDU	$t_2,$at
+-	$ADDU	$c_2,$t_2
+-	sltu	$at,$c_2,$t_2
+-	$ADDU	$c_3,$at
+-	mflo	$t_1
+-	mfhi	$t_2
+-	slt	$at,$t_2,$zero
+-	$ADDU	$c_3,$at
+-	$MULTU	$a_3,$a_3		# mul_add_c(a[3],b[3],c1,c2,c3);
+-	$SLL	$t_2,1
+-	slt	$a2,$t_1,$zero
+-	$ADDU	$t_2,$a2
+-	$SLL	$t_1,1
+-	$ADDU	$c_1,$t_1
+-	sltu	$at,$c_1,$t_1
+-	$ADDU	$t_2,$at
+-	$ADDU	$c_2,$t_2
+-	sltu	$at,$c_2,$t_2
+-	$ADDU	$c_3,$at
++___
++	&add_c2($t_2,$t_1,$c_1,$c_2,$c_3,0,
++		$a_5,$a_1);		# mul_add_c2(a[5],b[1],c1,c2,c3);
++	&add_c2($t_2,$t_1,$c_1,$c_2,$c_3,1,
++		$a_4,$a_2);		# mul_add_c2(a[4],b[2],c1,c2,c3);
++	&add_c2($t_2,$t_1,$c_1,$c_2,$c_3,1,
++		$a_3,$a_3);		# mul_add_c(a[3],b[3],c1,c2,c3);
++$code.=<<___;
+ 	mflo	$t_1
+ 	mfhi	$t_2
+ 	$ADDU	$c_1,$t_1
+@@ -2117,112 +2019,25 @@ $code.=<<___;
+ 	sltu	$at,$c_2,$t_2
+ 	$ADDU	$c_3,$at
+ 	$ST	$c_1,6*$BNSZ($a0)
+-
+-	mflo	$t_1
+-	mfhi	$t_2
+-	slt	$c_1,$t_2,$zero
+-	$SLL	$t_2,1
+-	$MULTU	$a_1,$a_6		# mul_add_c2(a[1],b[6],c2,c3,c1);
+-	slt	$a2,$t_1,$zero
+-	$ADDU	$t_2,$a2
+-	$SLL	$t_1,1
+-	$ADDU	$c_2,$t_1
+-	sltu	$at,$c_2,$t_1
+-	$ADDU	$t_2,$at
+-	$ADDU	$c_3,$t_2
+-	sltu	$at,$c_3,$t_2
+-	$ADDU	$c_1,$at
+-	mflo	$t_1
+-	mfhi	$t_2
+-	slt	$at,$t_2,$zero
+-	$ADDU	$c_1,$at
+-	$MULTU	$a_2,$a_5		# mul_add_c2(a[2],b[5],c2,c3,c1);
+-	$SLL	$t_2,1
+-	slt	$a2,$t_1,$zero
+-	$ADDU	$t_2,$a2
+-	$SLL	$t_1,1
+-	$ADDU	$c_2,$t_1
+-	sltu	$at,$c_2,$t_1
+-	$ADDU	$t_2,$at
+-	$ADDU	$c_3,$t_2
+-	sltu	$at,$c_3,$t_2
+-	$ADDU	$c_1,$at
+-	mflo	$t_1
+-	mfhi	$t_2
+-	slt	$at,$t_2,$zero
+-	$ADDU	$c_1,$at
+-	$MULTU	$a_3,$a_4		# mul_add_c2(a[3],b[4],c2,c3,c1);
+-	$SLL	$t_2,1
+-	slt	$a2,$t_1,$zero
+-	$ADDU	$t_2,$a2
+-	$SLL	$t_1,1
+-	$ADDU	$c_2,$t_1
+-	sltu	$at,$c_2,$t_1
+-	$ADDU	$t_2,$at
+-	$ADDU	$c_3,$t_2
+-	sltu	$at,$c_3,$t_2
+-	$ADDU	$c_1,$at
+-	mflo	$t_1
+-	mfhi	$t_2
+-	slt	$at,$t_2,$zero
+-	$ADDU	$c_1,$at
+-	 $MULTU	$a_7,$a_1		# mul_add_c2(a[7],b[1],c3,c1,c2);
+-	$SLL	$t_2,1
+-	slt	$a2,$t_1,$zero
+-	$ADDU	$t_2,$a2
+-	$SLL	$t_1,1
+-	$ADDU	$c_2,$t_1
+-	sltu	$at,$c_2,$t_1
+-	$ADDU	$t_2,$at
+-	$ADDU	$c_3,$t_2
+-	sltu	$at,$c_3,$t_2
+-	$ADDU	$c_1,$at
++___
++	&add_c2($t_2,$t_1,$c_2,$c_3,$c_1,0,
++		$a_1,$a_6);		# mul_add_c2(a[1],b[6],c2,c3,c1);
++	&add_c2($t_2,$t_1,$c_2,$c_3,$c_1,1,
++		$a_2,$a_5);		# mul_add_c2(a[2],b[5],c2,c3,c1);
++	&add_c2($t_2,$t_1,$c_2,$c_3,$c_1,1,
++		$a_3,$a_4);		# mul_add_c2(a[3],b[4],c2,c3,c1);
++	&add_c2($t_2,$t_1,$c_2,$c_3,$c_1,1,
++		$a_7,$a_1);		# mul_add_c2(a[7],b[1],c3,c1,c2);
++$code.=<<___;
+ 	$ST	$c_2,7*$BNSZ($a0)
+-
+-	mflo	$t_1
+-	mfhi	$t_2
+-	slt	$c_2,$t_2,$zero
+-	$SLL	$t_2,1
+-	$MULTU	$a_6,$a_2		# mul_add_c2(a[6],b[2],c3,c1,c2);
+-	slt	$a2,$t_1,$zero
+-	$ADDU	$t_2,$a2
+-	$SLL	$t_1,1
+-	$ADDU	$c_3,$t_1
+-	sltu	$at,$c_3,$t_1
+-	$ADDU	$t_2,$at
+-	$ADDU	$c_1,$t_2
+-	sltu	$at,$c_1,$t_2
+-	$ADDU	$c_2,$at
+-	mflo	$t_1
+-	mfhi	$t_2
+-	slt	$at,$t_2,$zero
+-	$ADDU	$c_2,$at
+-	$MULTU	$a_5,$a_3		# mul_add_c2(a[5],b[3],c3,c1,c2);
+-	$SLL	$t_2,1
+-	slt	$a2,$t_1,$zero
+-	$ADDU	$t_2,$a2
+-	$SLL	$t_1,1
+-	$ADDU	$c_3,$t_1
+-	sltu	$at,$c_3,$t_1
+-	$ADDU	$t_2,$at
+-	$ADDU	$c_1,$t_2
+-	sltu	$at,$c_1,$t_2
+-	$ADDU	$c_2,$at
+-	mflo	$t_1
+-	mfhi	$t_2
+-	slt	$at,$t_2,$zero
+-	$ADDU	$c_2,$at
+-	$MULTU	$a_4,$a_4		# mul_add_c(a[4],b[4],c3,c1,c2);
+-	$SLL	$t_2,1
+-	slt	$a2,$t_1,$zero
+-	$ADDU	$t_2,$a2
+-	$SLL	$t_1,1
+-	$ADDU	$c_3,$t_1
+-	sltu	$at,$c_3,$t_1
+-	$ADDU	$t_2,$at
+-	$ADDU	$c_1,$t_2
+-	sltu	$at,$c_1,$t_2
+-	$ADDU	$c_2,$at
++___
++	&add_c2($t_2,$t_1,$c_3,$c_1,$c_2,0,
++		$a_6,$a_2);		# mul_add_c2(a[6],b[2],c3,c1,c2);
++	&add_c2($t_2,$t_1,$c_3,$c_1,$c_2,1,
++		$a_5,$a_3);		# mul_add_c2(a[5],b[3],c3,c1,c2);
++	&add_c2($t_2,$t_1,$c_3,$c_1,$c_2,1,
++		$a_4,$a_4);		# mul_add_c(a[4],b[4],c3,c1,c2);
++$code.=<<___;
+ 	mflo	$t_1
+ 	mfhi	$t_2
+ 	$ADDU	$c_3,$t_1
+@@ -2233,82 +2048,21 @@ $code.=<<___;
+ 	sltu	$at,$c_1,$t_2
+ 	$ADDU	$c_2,$at
+ 	$ST	$c_3,8*$BNSZ($a0)
+-
+-	mflo	$t_1
+-	mfhi	$t_2
+-	slt	$c_3,$t_2,$zero
+-	$SLL	$t_2,1
+-	$MULTU	$a_3,$a_6		# mul_add_c2(a[3],b[6],c1,c2,c3);
+-	slt	$a2,$t_1,$zero
+-	$ADDU	$t_2,$a2
+-	$SLL	$t_1,1
+-	$ADDU	$c_1,$t_1
+-	sltu	$at,$c_1,$t_1
+-	$ADDU	$t_2,$at
+-	$ADDU	$c_2,$t_2
+-	sltu	$at,$c_2,$t_2
+-	$ADDU	$c_3,$at
+-	mflo	$t_1
+-	mfhi	$t_2
+-	slt	$at,$t_2,$zero
+-	$ADDU	$c_3,$at
+-	$MULTU	$a_4,$a_5		# mul_add_c2(a[4],b[5],c1,c2,c3);
+-	$SLL	$t_2,1
+-	slt	$a2,$t_1,$zero
+-	$ADDU	$t_2,$a2
+-	$SLL	$t_1,1
+-	$ADDU	$c_1,$t_1
+-	sltu	$at,$c_1,$t_1
+-	$ADDU	$t_2,$at
+-	$ADDU	$c_2,$t_2
+-	sltu	$at,$c_2,$t_2
+-	$ADDU	$c_3,$at
+-	mflo	$t_1
+-	mfhi	$t_2
+-	slt	$at,$t_2,$zero
+-	$ADDU	$c_3,$at
+-	 $MULTU	$a_7,$a_3		# mul_add_c2(a[7],b[3],c2,c3,c1);
+-	$SLL	$t_2,1
+-	slt	$a2,$t_1,$zero
+-	$ADDU	$t_2,$a2
+-	$SLL	$t_1,1
+-	$ADDU	$c_1,$t_1
+-	sltu	$at,$c_1,$t_1
+-	$ADDU	$t_2,$at
+-	$ADDU	$c_2,$t_2
+-	sltu	$at,$c_2,$t_2
+-	$ADDU	$c_3,$at
++___
++	&add_c2($t_2,$t_1,$c_1,$c_2,$c_3,0,
++		$a_3,$a_6);		# mul_add_c2(a[3],b[6],c1,c2,c3);
++	&add_c2($t_2,$t_1,$c_1,$c_2,$c_3,1,
++		$a_4,$a_5);		# mul_add_c2(a[4],b[5],c1,c2,c3);
++	&add_c2($t_2,$t_1,$c_1,$c_2,$c_3,1,
++		$a_7,$a_3);		# mul_add_c2(a[7],b[3],c2,c3,c1);
++$code.=<<___;
+ 	$ST	$c_1,9*$BNSZ($a0)
+-
+-	mflo	$t_1
+-	mfhi	$t_2
+-	slt	$c_1,$t_2,$zero
+-	$SLL	$t_2,1
+-	$MULTU	$a_6,$a_4		# mul_add_c2(a[6],b[4],c2,c3,c1);
+-	slt	$a2,$t_1,$zero
+-	$ADDU	$t_2,$a2
+-	$SLL	$t_1,1
+-	$ADDU	$c_2,$t_1
+-	sltu	$at,$c_2,$t_1
+-	$ADDU	$t_2,$at
+-	$ADDU	$c_3,$t_2
+-	sltu	$at,$c_3,$t_2
+-	$ADDU	$c_1,$at
+-	mflo	$t_1
+-	mfhi	$t_2
+-	slt	$at,$t_2,$zero
+-	$ADDU	$c_1,$at
+-	$MULTU	$a_5,$a_5		# mul_add_c(a[5],b[5],c2,c3,c1);
+-	$SLL	$t_2,1
+-	slt	$a2,$t_1,$zero
+-	$ADDU	$t_2,$a2
+-	$SLL	$t_1,1
+-	$ADDU	$c_2,$t_1
+-	sltu	$at,$c_2,$t_1
+-	$ADDU	$t_2,$at
+-	$ADDU	$c_3,$t_2
+-	sltu	$at,$c_3,$t_2
+-	$ADDU	$c_1,$at
++___
++	&add_c2($t_2,$t_1,$c_2,$c_3,$c_1,0,
++		$a_6,$a_4);		# mul_add_c2(a[6],b[4],c2,c3,c1);
++	&add_c2($t_2,$t_1,$c_2,$c_3,$c_1,1,
++		$a_5,$a_5);		# mul_add_c(a[5],b[5],c2,c3,c1);
++$code.=<<___;
+ 	mflo	$t_1
+ 	mfhi	$t_2
+ 	$ADDU	$c_2,$t_1
+@@ -2319,52 +2073,17 @@ $code.=<<___;
+ 	sltu	$at,$c_3,$t_2
+ 	$ADDU	$c_1,$at
+ 	$ST	$c_2,10*$BNSZ($a0)
+-
+-	mflo	$t_1
+-	mfhi	$t_2
+-	slt	$c_2,$t_2,$zero
+-	$SLL	$t_2,1
+-	$MULTU	$a_5,$a_6		# mul_add_c2(a[5],b[6],c3,c1,c2);
+-	slt	$a2,$t_1,$zero
+-	$ADDU	$t_2,$a2
+-	$SLL	$t_1,1
+-	$ADDU	$c_3,$t_1
+-	sltu	$at,$c_3,$t_1
+-	$ADDU	$t_2,$at
+-	$ADDU	$c_1,$t_2
+-	sltu	$at,$c_1,$t_2
+-	$ADDU	$c_2,$at
+-	mflo	$t_1
+-	mfhi	$t_2
+-	slt	$at,$t_2,$zero
+-	$ADDU	$c_2,$at
+-	 $MULTU	$a_7,$a_5		# mul_add_c2(a[7],b[5],c1,c2,c3);
+-	$SLL	$t_2,1
+-	slt	$a2,$t_1,$zero
+-	$ADDU	$t_2,$a2
+-	$SLL	$t_1,1
+-	$ADDU	$c_3,$t_1
+-	sltu	$at,$c_3,$t_1
+-	$ADDU	$t_2,$at
+-	$ADDU	$c_1,$t_2
+-	sltu	$at,$c_1,$t_2
+-	$ADDU	$c_2,$at
++___
++	&add_c2($t_2,$t_1,$c_3,$c_1,$c_2,0,
++		$a_5,$a_6);		# mul_add_c2(a[5],b[6],c3,c1,c2);
++	&add_c2($t_2,$t_1,$c_3,$c_1,$c_2,1,
++		$a_7,$a_5);		# mul_add_c2(a[7],b[5],c1,c2,c3);
++$code.=<<___;
+ 	$ST	$c_3,11*$BNSZ($a0)
+-
+-	mflo	$t_1
+-	mfhi	$t_2
+-	slt	$c_3,$t_2,$zero
+-	$SLL	$t_2,1
+-	$MULTU	$a_6,$a_6		# mul_add_c(a[6],b[6],c1,c2,c3);
+-	slt	$a2,$t_1,$zero
+-	$ADDU	$t_2,$a2
+-	$SLL	$t_1,1
+-	$ADDU	$c_1,$t_1
+-	sltu	$at,$c_1,$t_1
+-	$ADDU	$t_2,$at
+-	$ADDU	$c_2,$t_2
+-	sltu	$at,$c_2,$t_2
+-	$ADDU	$c_3,$at
++___
++	&add_c2($t_2,$t_1,$c_1,$c_2,$c_3,0,
++		$a_6,$a_6);		# mul_add_c(a[6],b[6],c1,c2,c3);
++$code.=<<___;
+ 	mflo	$t_1
+ 	mfhi	$t_2
+ 	$ADDU	$c_1,$t_1
+@@ -2375,21 +2094,10 @@ $code.=<<___;
+ 	sltu	$at,$c_2,$t_2
+ 	$ADDU	$c_3,$at
+ 	$ST	$c_1,12*$BNSZ($a0)
+-
+-	mflo	$t_1
+-	mfhi	$t_2
+-	slt	$c_1,$t_2,$zero
+-	$SLL	$t_2,1
+-	 $MULTU	$a_7,$a_7		# mul_add_c(a[7],b[7],c3,c1,c2);
+-	slt	$a2,$t_1,$zero
+-	$ADDU	$t_2,$a2
+-	$SLL	$t_1,1
+-	$ADDU	$c_2,$t_1
+-	sltu	$at,$c_2,$t_1
+-	$ADDU	$t_2,$at
+-	$ADDU	$c_3,$t_2
+-	sltu	$at,$c_3,$t_2
+-	$ADDU	$c_1,$at
++___
++	&add_c2($t_2,$t_1,$c_2,$c_3,$c_1,0,
++		$a_7,$a_7);		# mul_add_c(a[7],b[7],c3,c1,c2);
++$code.=<<___;
+ 	$ST	$c_2,13*$BNSZ($a0)
+ 
+ 	mflo	$t_1
+@@ -2457,21 +2165,10 @@ $code.=<<___;
+ 	sltu	$at,$c_2,$t_1
+ 	$ADDU	$c_3,$t_2,$at
+ 	$ST	$c_2,$BNSZ($a0)
+-
+-	mflo	$t_1
+-	mfhi	$t_2
+-	slt	$c_2,$t_2,$zero
+-	$SLL	$t_2,1
+-	$MULTU	$a_1,$a_1		# mul_add_c(a[1],b[1],c3,c1,c2);
+-	slt	$a2,$t_1,$zero
+-	$ADDU	$t_2,$a2
+-	$SLL	$t_1,1
+-	$ADDU	$c_3,$t_1
+-	sltu	$at,$c_3,$t_1
+-	$ADDU	$t_2,$at
+-	$ADDU	$c_1,$t_2
+-	sltu	$at,$c_1,$t_2
+-	$ADDU	$c_2,$at
++___
++	&add_c2($t_2,$t_1,$c_3,$c_1,$c_2,0,
++		$a_1,$a_1);		# mul_add_c(a[1],b[1],c3,c1,c2);
++$code.=<<___;
+ 	mflo	$t_1
+ 	mfhi	$t_2
+ 	$ADDU	$c_3,$t_1
+@@ -2482,52 +2179,17 @@ $code.=<<___;
+ 	sltu	$at,$c_1,$t_2
+ 	$ADDU	$c_2,$at
+ 	$ST	$c_3,2*$BNSZ($a0)
+-
+-	mflo	$t_1
+-	mfhi	$t_2
+-	slt	$c_3,$t_2,$zero
+-	$SLL	$t_2,1
+-	$MULTU	$a_1,$a_2		# mul_add_c(a2[1],b[2],c1,c2,c3);
+-	slt	$a2,$t_1,$zero
+-	$ADDU	$t_2,$a2
+-	$SLL	$t_1,1
+-	$ADDU	$c_1,$t_1
+-	sltu	$at,$c_1,$t_1
+-	$ADDU	$t_2,$at
+-	$ADDU	$c_2,$t_2
+-	sltu	$at,$c_2,$t_2
+-	$ADDU	$c_3,$at
+-	mflo	$t_1
+-	mfhi	$t_2
+-	slt	$at,$t_2,$zero
+-	$ADDU	$c_3,$at
+-	 $MULTU	$a_3,$a_1		# mul_add_c2(a[3],b[1],c2,c3,c1);
+-	$SLL	$t_2,1
+-	slt	$a2,$t_1,$zero
+-	$ADDU	$t_2,$a2
+-	$SLL	$t_1,1
+-	$ADDU	$c_1,$t_1
+-	sltu	$at,$c_1,$t_1
+-	$ADDU	$t_2,$at
+-	$ADDU	$c_2,$t_2
+-	sltu	$at,$c_2,$t_2
+-	$ADDU	$c_3,$at
++___
++	&add_c2($t_2,$t_1,$c_1,$c_2,$c_3,0,
++		$a_1,$a_2);		# mul_add_c2(a2[1],b[2],c1,c2,c3);
++	&add_c2($t_2,$t_1,$c_1,$c_2,$c_3,1,
++		$a_3,$a_1);		# mul_add_c2(a[3],b[1],c2,c3,c1);
++$code.=<<___;
+ 	$ST	$c_1,3*$BNSZ($a0)
+-
+-	mflo	$t_1
+-	mfhi	$t_2
+-	slt	$c_1,$t_2,$zero
+-	$SLL	$t_2,1
+-	$MULTU	$a_2,$a_2		# mul_add_c(a[2],b[2],c2,c3,c1);
+-	slt	$a2,$t_1,$zero
+-	$ADDU	$t_2,$a2
+-	$SLL	$t_1,1
+-	$ADDU	$c_2,$t_1
+-	sltu	$at,$c_2,$t_1
+-	$ADDU	$t_2,$at
+-	$ADDU	$c_3,$t_2
+-	sltu	$at,$c_3,$t_2
+-	$ADDU	$c_1,$at
++___
++	&add_c2($t_2,$t_1,$c_2,$c_3,$c_1,0,
++		$a_2,$a_2);		# mul_add_c(a[2],b[2],c2,c3,c1);
++$code.=<<___;
+ 	mflo	$t_1
+ 	mfhi	$t_2
+ 	$ADDU	$c_2,$t_1
+@@ -2538,21 +2200,10 @@ $code.=<<___;
+ 	sltu	$at,$c_3,$t_2
+ 	$ADDU	$c_1,$at
+ 	$ST	$c_2,4*$BNSZ($a0)
+-
+-	mflo	$t_1
+-	mfhi	$t_2
+-	slt	$c_2,$t_2,$zero
+-	$SLL	$t_2,1
+-	 $MULTU	$a_3,$a_3		# mul_add_c(a[3],b[3],c1,c2,c3);
+-	slt	$a2,$t_1,$zero
+-	$ADDU	$t_2,$a2
+-	$SLL	$t_1,1
+-	$ADDU	$c_3,$t_1
+-	sltu	$at,$c_3,$t_1
+-	$ADDU	$t_2,$at
+-	$ADDU	$c_1,$t_2
+-	sltu	$at,$c_1,$t_2
+-	$ADDU	$c_2,$at
++___
++	&add_c2($t_2,$t_1,$c_3,$c_1,$c_2,0,
++		$a_3,$a_3);		# mul_add_c(a[3],b[3],c1,c2,c3);
++$code.=<<___;
+ 	$ST	$c_3,5*$BNSZ($a0)
+ 
+ 	mflo	$t_1
+diff --git a/crypto/bn/asm/mips3.s b/crypto/bn/asm/mips3.s
+deleted file mode 100644
+index dca4105..0000000
+--- a/crypto/bn/asm/mips3.s
++++ /dev/null
+@@ -1,2201 +0,0 @@
+-.rdata
+-.asciiz	"mips3.s, Version 1.1"
+-.asciiz	"MIPS III/IV ISA artwork by Andy Polyakov <appro@fy.chalmers.se>"
+-
+-/*
+- * ====================================================================
+- * Written by Andy Polyakov <appro@fy.chalmers.se> for the OpenSSL
+- * project.
+- *
+- * Rights for redistribution and usage in source and binary forms are
+- * granted according to the OpenSSL license. Warranty of any kind is
+- * disclaimed.
+- * ====================================================================
+- */
+-
+-/*
+- * This is my modest contributon to the OpenSSL project (see
+- * http://www.openssl.org/ for more information about it) and is
+- * a drop-in MIPS III/IV ISA replacement for crypto/bn/bn_asm.c
+- * module. For updates see http://fy.chalmers.se/~appro/hpe/.
+- *
+- * The module is designed to work with either of the "new" MIPS ABI(5),
+- * namely N32 or N64, offered by IRIX 6.x. It's not ment to work under
+- * IRIX 5.x not only because it doesn't support new ABIs but also
+- * because 5.x kernels put R4x00 CPU into 32-bit mode and all those
+- * 64-bit instructions (daddu, dmultu, etc.) found below gonna only
+- * cause illegal instruction exception:-(
+- *
+- * In addition the code depends on preprocessor flags set up by MIPSpro
+- * compiler driver (either as or cc) and therefore (probably?) can't be
+- * compiled by the GNU assembler. GNU C driver manages fine though...
+- * I mean as long as -mmips-as is specified or is the default option,
+- * because then it simply invokes /usr/bin/as which in turn takes
+- * perfect care of the preprocessor definitions. Another neat feature
+- * offered by the MIPSpro assembler is an optimization pass. This gave
+- * me the opportunity to have the code looking more regular as all those
+- * architecture dependent instruction rescheduling details were left to
+- * the assembler. Cool, huh?
+- *
+- * Performance improvement is astonishing! 'apps/openssl speed rsa dsa'
+- * goes way over 3 times faster!
+- *
+- *					<appro@fy.chalmers.se>
+- */
+-#include <asm.h>
+-#include <regdef.h>
+-
+-#if _MIPS_ISA>=4
+-#define	MOVNZ(cond,dst,src)	\
+-	movn	dst,src,cond
+-#else
+-#define	MOVNZ(cond,dst,src)	\
+-	.set	noreorder;	\
+-	bnezl	cond,.+8;	\
+-	move	dst,src;	\
+-	.set	reorder
+-#endif
+-
+-.text
+-
+-.set	noat
+-.set	reorder
+-
+-#define	MINUS4	v1
+-
+-.align	5
+-LEAF(bn_mul_add_words)
+-	.set	noreorder
+-	bgtzl	a2,.L_bn_mul_add_words_proceed
+-	ld	t0,0(a1)
+-	jr	ra
+-	move	v0,zero
+-	.set	reorder
+-
+-.L_bn_mul_add_words_proceed:
+-	li	MINUS4,-4
+-	and	ta0,a2,MINUS4
+-	move	v0,zero
+-	beqz	ta0,.L_bn_mul_add_words_tail
+-
+-.L_bn_mul_add_words_loop:
+-	dmultu	t0,a3
+-	ld	t1,0(a0)
+-	ld	t2,8(a1)
+-	ld	t3,8(a0)
+-	ld	ta0,16(a1)
+-	ld	ta1,16(a0)
+-	daddu	t1,v0
+-	sltu	v0,t1,v0	/* All manuals say it "compares 32-bit
+-				 * values", but it seems to work fine
+-				 * even on 64-bit registers. */
+-	mflo	AT
+-	mfhi	t0
+-	daddu	t1,AT
+-	daddu	v0,t0
+-	sltu	AT,t1,AT
+-	sd	t1,0(a0)
+-	daddu	v0,AT
+-
+-	dmultu	t2,a3
+-	ld	ta2,24(a1)
+-	ld	ta3,24(a0)
+-	daddu	t3,v0
+-	sltu	v0,t3,v0
+-	mflo	AT
+-	mfhi	t2
+-	daddu	t3,AT
+-	daddu	v0,t2
+-	sltu	AT,t3,AT
+-	sd	t3,8(a0)
+-	daddu	v0,AT
+-
+-	dmultu	ta0,a3
+-	subu	a2,4
+-	PTR_ADD	a0,32
+-	PTR_ADD	a1,32
+-	daddu	ta1,v0
+-	sltu	v0,ta1,v0
+-	mflo	AT
+-	mfhi	ta0
+-	daddu	ta1,AT
+-	daddu	v0,ta0
+-	sltu	AT,ta1,AT
+-	sd	ta1,-16(a0)
+-	daddu	v0,AT
+-
+-
+-	dmultu	ta2,a3
+-	and	ta0,a2,MINUS4
+-	daddu	ta3,v0
+-	sltu	v0,ta3,v0
+-	mflo	AT
+-	mfhi	ta2
+-	daddu	ta3,AT
+-	daddu	v0,ta2
+-	sltu	AT,ta3,AT
+-	sd	ta3,-8(a0)
+-	daddu	v0,AT
+-	.set	noreorder
+-	bgtzl	ta0,.L_bn_mul_add_words_loop
+-	ld	t0,0(a1)
+-
+-	bnezl	a2,.L_bn_mul_add_words_tail
+-	ld	t0,0(a1)
+-	.set	reorder
+-
+-.L_bn_mul_add_words_return:
+-	jr	ra
+-
+-.L_bn_mul_add_words_tail:
+-	dmultu	t0,a3
+-	ld	t1,0(a0)
+-	subu	a2,1
+-	daddu	t1,v0
+-	sltu	v0,t1,v0
+-	mflo	AT
+-	mfhi	t0
+-	daddu	t1,AT
+-	daddu	v0,t0
+-	sltu	AT,t1,AT
+-	sd	t1,0(a0)
+-	daddu	v0,AT
+-	beqz	a2,.L_bn_mul_add_words_return
+-
+-	ld	t0,8(a1)
+-	dmultu	t0,a3
+-	ld	t1,8(a0)
+-	subu	a2,1
+-	daddu	t1,v0
+-	sltu	v0,t1,v0
+-	mflo	AT
+-	mfhi	t0
+-	daddu	t1,AT
+-	daddu	v0,t0
+-	sltu	AT,t1,AT
+-	sd	t1,8(a0)
+-	daddu	v0,AT
+-	beqz	a2,.L_bn_mul_add_words_return
+-
+-	ld	t0,16(a1)
+-	dmultu	t0,a3
+-	ld	t1,16(a0)
+-	daddu	t1,v0
+-	sltu	v0,t1,v0
+-	mflo	AT
+-	mfhi	t0
+-	daddu	t1,AT
+-	daddu	v0,t0
+-	sltu	AT,t1,AT
+-	sd	t1,16(a0)
+-	daddu	v0,AT
+-	jr	ra
+-END(bn_mul_add_words)
+-
+-.align	5
+-LEAF(bn_mul_words)
+-	.set	noreorder
+-	bgtzl	a2,.L_bn_mul_words_proceed
+-	ld	t0,0(a1)
+-	jr	ra
+-	move	v0,zero
+-	.set	reorder
+-
+-.L_bn_mul_words_proceed:
+-	li	MINUS4,-4
+-	and	ta0,a2,MINUS4
+-	move	v0,zero
+-	beqz	ta0,.L_bn_mul_words_tail
+-
+-.L_bn_mul_words_loop:
+-	dmultu	t0,a3
+-	ld	t2,8(a1)
+-	ld	ta0,16(a1)
+-	ld	ta2,24(a1)
+-	mflo	AT
+-	mfhi	t0
+-	daddu	v0,AT
+-	sltu	t1,v0,AT
+-	sd	v0,0(a0)
+-	daddu	v0,t1,t0
+-
+-	dmultu	t2,a3
+-	subu	a2,4
+-	PTR_ADD	a0,32
+-	PTR_ADD	a1,32
+-	mflo	AT
+-	mfhi	t2
+-	daddu	v0,AT
+-	sltu	t3,v0,AT
+-	sd	v0,-24(a0)
+-	daddu	v0,t3,t2
+-
+-	dmultu	ta0,a3
+-	mflo	AT
+-	mfhi	ta0
+-	daddu	v0,AT
+-	sltu	ta1,v0,AT
+-	sd	v0,-16(a0)
+-	daddu	v0,ta1,ta0
+-
+-
+-	dmultu	ta2,a3
+-	and	ta0,a2,MINUS4
+-	mflo	AT
+-	mfhi	ta2
+-	daddu	v0,AT
+-	sltu	ta3,v0,AT
+-	sd	v0,-8(a0)
+-	daddu	v0,ta3,ta2
+-	.set	noreorder
+-	bgtzl	ta0,.L_bn_mul_words_loop
+-	ld	t0,0(a1)
+-
+-	bnezl	a2,.L_bn_mul_words_tail
+-	ld	t0,0(a1)
+-	.set	reorder
+-
+-.L_bn_mul_words_return:
+-	jr	ra
+-
+-.L_bn_mul_words_tail:
+-	dmultu	t0,a3
+-	subu	a2,1
+-	mflo	AT
+-	mfhi	t0
+-	daddu	v0,AT
+-	sltu	t1,v0,AT
+-	sd	v0,0(a0)
+-	daddu	v0,t1,t0
+-	beqz	a2,.L_bn_mul_words_return
+-
+-	ld	t0,8(a1)
+-	dmultu	t0,a3
+-	subu	a2,1
+-	mflo	AT
+-	mfhi	t0
+-	daddu	v0,AT
+-	sltu	t1,v0,AT
+-	sd	v0,8(a0)
+-	daddu	v0,t1,t0
+-	beqz	a2,.L_bn_mul_words_return
+-
+-	ld	t0,16(a1)
+-	dmultu	t0,a3
+-	mflo	AT
+-	mfhi	t0
+-	daddu	v0,AT
+-	sltu	t1,v0,AT
+-	sd	v0,16(a0)
+-	daddu	v0,t1,t0
+-	jr	ra
+-END(bn_mul_words)
+-
+-.align	5
+-LEAF(bn_sqr_words)
+-	.set	noreorder
+-	bgtzl	a2,.L_bn_sqr_words_proceed
+-	ld	t0,0(a1)
+-	jr	ra
+-	move	v0,zero
+-	.set	reorder
+-
+-.L_bn_sqr_words_proceed:
+-	li	MINUS4,-4
+-	and	ta0,a2,MINUS4
+-	move	v0,zero
+-	beqz	ta0,.L_bn_sqr_words_tail
+-
+-.L_bn_sqr_words_loop:
+-	dmultu	t0,t0
+-	ld	t2,8(a1)
+-	ld	ta0,16(a1)
+-	ld	ta2,24(a1)
+-	mflo	t1
+-	mfhi	t0
+-	sd	t1,0(a0)
+-	sd	t0,8(a0)
+-
+-	dmultu	t2,t2
+-	subu	a2,4
+-	PTR_ADD	a0,64
+-	PTR_ADD	a1,32
+-	mflo	t3
+-	mfhi	t2
+-	sd	t3,-48(a0)
+-	sd	t2,-40(a0)
+-
+-	dmultu	ta0,ta0
+-	mflo	ta1
+-	mfhi	ta0
+-	sd	ta1,-32(a0)
+-	sd	ta0,-24(a0)
+-
+-
+-	dmultu	ta2,ta2
+-	and	ta0,a2,MINUS4
+-	mflo	ta3
+-	mfhi	ta2
+-	sd	ta3,-16(a0)
+-	sd	ta2,-8(a0)
+-
+-	.set	noreorder
+-	bgtzl	ta0,.L_bn_sqr_words_loop
+-	ld	t0,0(a1)
+-
+-	bnezl	a2,.L_bn_sqr_words_tail
+-	ld	t0,0(a1)
+-	.set	reorder
+-
+-.L_bn_sqr_words_return:
+-	move	v0,zero
+-	jr	ra
+-
+-.L_bn_sqr_words_tail:
+-	dmultu	t0,t0
+-	subu	a2,1
+-	mflo	t1
+-	mfhi	t0
+-	sd	t1,0(a0)
+-	sd	t0,8(a0)
+-	beqz	a2,.L_bn_sqr_words_return
+-
+-	ld	t0,8(a1)
+-	dmultu	t0,t0
+-	subu	a2,1
+-	mflo	t1
+-	mfhi	t0
+-	sd	t1,16(a0)
+-	sd	t0,24(a0)
+-	beqz	a2,.L_bn_sqr_words_return
+-
+-	ld	t0,16(a1)
+-	dmultu	t0,t0
+-	mflo	t1
+-	mfhi	t0
+-	sd	t1,32(a0)
+-	sd	t0,40(a0)
+-	jr	ra
+-END(bn_sqr_words)
+-
+-.align	5
+-LEAF(bn_add_words)
+-	.set	noreorder
+-	bgtzl	a3,.L_bn_add_words_proceed
+-	ld	t0,0(a1)
+-	jr	ra
+-	move	v0,zero
+-	.set	reorder
+-
+-.L_bn_add_words_proceed:
+-	li	MINUS4,-4
+-	and	AT,a3,MINUS4
+-	move	v0,zero
+-	beqz	AT,.L_bn_add_words_tail
+-
+-.L_bn_add_words_loop:
+-	ld	ta0,0(a2)
+-	subu	a3,4
+-	ld	t1,8(a1)
+-	and	AT,a3,MINUS4
+-	ld	t2,16(a1)
+-	PTR_ADD	a2,32
+-	ld	t3,24(a1)
+-	PTR_ADD	a0,32
+-	ld	ta1,-24(a2)
+-	PTR_ADD	a1,32
+-	ld	ta2,-16(a2)
+-	ld	ta3,-8(a2)
+-	daddu	ta0,t0
+-	sltu	t8,ta0,t0
+-	daddu	t0,ta0,v0
+-	sltu	v0,t0,ta0
+-	sd	t0,-32(a0)
+-	daddu	v0,t8
+-
+-	daddu	ta1,t1
+-	sltu	t9,ta1,t1
+-	daddu	t1,ta1,v0
+-	sltu	v0,t1,ta1
+-	sd	t1,-24(a0)
+-	daddu	v0,t9
+-
+-	daddu	ta2,t2
+-	sltu	t8,ta2,t2
+-	daddu	t2,ta2,v0
+-	sltu	v0,t2,ta2
+-	sd	t2,-16(a0)
+-	daddu	v0,t8
+-	
+-	daddu	ta3,t3
+-	sltu	t9,ta3,t3
+-	daddu	t3,ta3,v0
+-	sltu	v0,t3,ta3
+-	sd	t3,-8(a0)
+-	daddu	v0,t9
+-	
+-	.set	noreorder
+-	bgtzl	AT,.L_bn_add_words_loop
+-	ld	t0,0(a1)
+-
+-	bnezl	a3,.L_bn_add_words_tail
+-	ld	t0,0(a1)
+-	.set	reorder
+-
+-.L_bn_add_words_return:
+-	jr	ra
+-
+-.L_bn_add_words_tail:
+-	ld	ta0,0(a2)
+-	daddu	ta0,t0
+-	subu	a3,1
+-	sltu	t8,ta0,t0
+-	daddu	t0,ta0,v0
+-	sltu	v0,t0,ta0
+-	sd	t0,0(a0)
+-	daddu	v0,t8
+-	beqz	a3,.L_bn_add_words_return
+-
+-	ld	t1,8(a1)
+-	ld	ta1,8(a2)
+-	daddu	ta1,t1
+-	subu	a3,1
+-	sltu	t9,ta1,t1
+-	daddu	t1,ta1,v0
+-	sltu	v0,t1,ta1
+-	sd	t1,8(a0)
+-	daddu	v0,t9
+-	beqz	a3,.L_bn_add_words_return
+-
+-	ld	t2,16(a1)
+-	ld	ta2,16(a2)
+-	daddu	ta2,t2
+-	sltu	t8,ta2,t2
+-	daddu	t2,ta2,v0
+-	sltu	v0,t2,ta2
+-	sd	t2,16(a0)
+-	daddu	v0,t8
+-	jr	ra
+-END(bn_add_words)
+-
+-.align	5
+-LEAF(bn_sub_words)
+-	.set	noreorder
+-	bgtzl	a3,.L_bn_sub_words_proceed
+-	ld	t0,0(a1)
+-	jr	ra
+-	move	v0,zero
+-	.set	reorder
+-
+-.L_bn_sub_words_proceed:
+-	li	MINUS4,-4
+-	and	AT,a3,MINUS4
+-	move	v0,zero
+-	beqz	AT,.L_bn_sub_words_tail
+-
+-.L_bn_sub_words_loop:
+-	ld	ta0,0(a2)
+-	subu	a3,4
+-	ld	t1,8(a1)
+-	and	AT,a3,MINUS4
+-	ld	t2,16(a1)
+-	PTR_ADD	a2,32
+-	ld	t3,24(a1)
+-	PTR_ADD	a0,32
+-	ld	ta1,-24(a2)
+-	PTR_ADD	a1,32
+-	ld	ta2,-16(a2)
+-	ld	ta3,-8(a2)
+-	sltu	t8,t0,ta0
+-	dsubu	t0,ta0
+-	dsubu	ta0,t0,v0
+-	sd	ta0,-32(a0)
+-	MOVNZ	(t0,v0,t8)
+-
+-	sltu	t9,t1,ta1
+-	dsubu	t1,ta1
+-	dsubu	ta1,t1,v0
+-	sd	ta1,-24(a0)
+-	MOVNZ	(t1,v0,t9)
+-
+-
+-	sltu	t8,t2,ta2
+-	dsubu	t2,ta2
+-	dsubu	ta2,t2,v0
+-	sd	ta2,-16(a0)
+-	MOVNZ	(t2,v0,t8)
+-
+-	sltu	t9,t3,ta3
+-	dsubu	t3,ta3
+-	dsubu	ta3,t3,v0
+-	sd	ta3,-8(a0)
+-	MOVNZ	(t3,v0,t9)
+-
+-	.set	noreorder
+-	bgtzl	AT,.L_bn_sub_words_loop
+-	ld	t0,0(a1)
+-
+-	bnezl	a3,.L_bn_sub_words_tail
+-	ld	t0,0(a1)
+-	.set	reorder
+-
+-.L_bn_sub_words_return:
+-	jr	ra
+-
+-.L_bn_sub_words_tail:
+-	ld	ta0,0(a2)
+-	subu	a3,1
+-	sltu	t8,t0,ta0
+-	dsubu	t0,ta0
+-	dsubu	ta0,t0,v0
+-	MOVNZ	(t0,v0,t8)
+-	sd	ta0,0(a0)
+-	beqz	a3,.L_bn_sub_words_return
+-
+-	ld	t1,8(a1)
+-	subu	a3,1
+-	ld	ta1,8(a2)
+-	sltu	t9,t1,ta1
+-	dsubu	t1,ta1
+-	dsubu	ta1,t1,v0
+-	MOVNZ	(t1,v0,t9)
+-	sd	ta1,8(a0)
+-	beqz	a3,.L_bn_sub_words_return
+-
+-	ld	t2,16(a1)
+-	ld	ta2,16(a2)
+-	sltu	t8,t2,ta2
+-	dsubu	t2,ta2
+-	dsubu	ta2,t2,v0
+-	MOVNZ	(t2,v0,t8)
+-	sd	ta2,16(a0)
+-	jr	ra
+-END(bn_sub_words)
+-
+-#undef	MINUS4
+-
+-.align 5
+-LEAF(bn_div_3_words)
+-	.set	reorder
+-	move	a3,a0		/* we know that bn_div_words doesn't
+-				 * touch a3, ta2, ta3 and preserves a2
+-				 * so that we can save two arguments
+-				 * and return address in registers
+-				 * instead of stack:-)
+-				 */
+-	ld	a0,(a3)
+-	move	ta2,a1
+-	ld	a1,-8(a3)
+-	bne	a0,a2,.L_bn_div_3_words_proceed
+-	li	v0,-1
+-	jr	ra
+-.L_bn_div_3_words_proceed:
+-	move	ta3,ra
+-	bal	bn_div_words
+-	move	ra,ta3
+-	dmultu	ta2,v0
+-	ld	t2,-16(a3)
+-	move	ta0,zero
+-	mfhi	t1
+-	mflo	t0
+-	sltu	t8,t1,v1
+-.L_bn_div_3_words_inner_loop:
+-	bnez	t8,.L_bn_div_3_words_inner_loop_done
+-	sgeu	AT,t2,t0
+-	seq	t9,t1,v1
+-	and	AT,t9
+-	sltu	t3,t0,ta2
+-	daddu	v1,a2
+-	dsubu	t1,t3
+-	dsubu	t0,ta2
+-	sltu	t8,t1,v1
+-	sltu	ta0,v1,a2
+-	or	t8,ta0
+-	.set	noreorder
+-	beqzl	AT,.L_bn_div_3_words_inner_loop
+-	dsubu	v0,1
+-	.set	reorder
+-.L_bn_div_3_words_inner_loop_done:
+-	jr	ra
+-END(bn_div_3_words)
+-
+-.align	5
+-LEAF(bn_div_words)
+-	.set	noreorder
+-	bnezl	a2,.L_bn_div_words_proceed
+-	move	v1,zero
+-	jr	ra
+-	li	v0,-1		/* I'd rather signal div-by-zero
+-				 * which can be done with 'break 7' */
+-
+-.L_bn_div_words_proceed:
+-	bltz	a2,.L_bn_div_words_body
+-	move	t9,v1
+-	dsll	a2,1
+-	bgtz	a2,.-4
+-	addu	t9,1
+-
+-	.set	reorder
+-	negu	t1,t9
+-	li	t2,-1
+-	dsll	t2,t1
+-	and	t2,a0
+-	dsrl	AT,a1,t1
+-	.set	noreorder
+-	bnezl	t2,.+8
+-	break	6		/* signal overflow */
+-	.set	reorder
+-	dsll	a0,t9
+-	dsll	a1,t9
+-	or	a0,AT
+-
+-#define	QT	ta0
+-#define	HH	ta1
+-#define	DH	v1
+-.L_bn_div_words_body:
+-	dsrl	DH,a2,32
+-	sgeu	AT,a0,a2
+-	.set	noreorder
+-	bnezl	AT,.+8
+-	dsubu	a0,a2
+-	.set	reorder
+-
+-	li	QT,-1
+-	dsrl	HH,a0,32
+-	dsrl	QT,32	/* q=0xffffffff */
+-	beq	DH,HH,.L_bn_div_words_skip_div1
+-	ddivu	zero,a0,DH
+-	mflo	QT
+-.L_bn_div_words_skip_div1:
+-	dmultu	a2,QT
+-	dsll	t3,a0,32
+-	dsrl	AT,a1,32
+-	or	t3,AT
+-	mflo	t0
+-	mfhi	t1
+-.L_bn_div_words_inner_loop1:
+-	sltu	t2,t3,t0
+-	seq	t8,HH,t1
+-	sltu	AT,HH,t1
+-	and	t2,t8
+-	sltu	v0,t0,a2
+-	or	AT,t2
+-	.set	noreorder
+-	beqz	AT,.L_bn_div_words_inner_loop1_done
+-	dsubu	t1,v0
+-	dsubu	t0,a2
+-	b	.L_bn_div_words_inner_loop1
+-	dsubu	QT,1
+-	.set	reorder
+-.L_bn_div_words_inner_loop1_done:
+-
+-	dsll	a1,32
+-	dsubu	a0,t3,t0
+-	dsll	v0,QT,32
+-
+-	li	QT,-1
+-	dsrl	HH,a0,32
+-	dsrl	QT,32	/* q=0xffffffff */
+-	beq	DH,HH,.L_bn_div_words_skip_div2
+-	ddivu	zero,a0,DH
+-	mflo	QT
+-.L_bn_div_words_skip_div2:
+-#undef	DH
+-	dmultu	a2,QT
+-	dsll	t3,a0,32
+-	dsrl	AT,a1,32
+-	or	t3,AT
+-	mflo	t0
+-	mfhi	t1
+-.L_bn_div_words_inner_loop2:
+-	sltu	t2,t3,t0
+-	seq	t8,HH,t1
+-	sltu	AT,HH,t1
+-	and	t2,t8
+-	sltu	v1,t0,a2
+-	or	AT,t2
+-	.set	noreorder
+-	beqz	AT,.L_bn_div_words_inner_loop2_done
+-	dsubu	t1,v1
+-	dsubu	t0,a2
+-	b	.L_bn_div_words_inner_loop2
+-	dsubu	QT,1
+-	.set	reorder
+-.L_bn_div_words_inner_loop2_done:	
+-#undef	HH
+-
+-	dsubu	a0,t3,t0
+-	or	v0,QT
+-	dsrl	v1,a0,t9	/* v1 contains remainder if anybody wants it */
+-	dsrl	a2,t9		/* restore a2 */
+-	jr	ra
+-#undef	QT
+-END(bn_div_words)
+-
+-#define	a_0	t0
+-#define	a_1	t1
+-#define	a_2	t2
+-#define	a_3	t3
+-#define	b_0	ta0
+-#define	b_1	ta1
+-#define	b_2	ta2
+-#define	b_3	ta3
+-
+-#define	a_4	s0
+-#define	a_5	s2
+-#define	a_6	s4
+-#define	a_7	a1	/* once we load a[7] we don't need a anymore */
+-#define	b_4	s1
+-#define	b_5	s3
+-#define	b_6	s5
+-#define	b_7	a2	/* once we load b[7] we don't need b anymore */
+-
+-#define	t_1	t8
+-#define	t_2	t9
+-
+-#define	c_1	v0
+-#define	c_2	v1
+-#define	c_3	a3
+-
+-#define	FRAME_SIZE	48
+-
+-.align	5
+-LEAF(bn_mul_comba8)
+-	.set	noreorder
+-	PTR_SUB	sp,FRAME_SIZE
+-	.frame	sp,64,ra
+-	.set	reorder
+-	ld	a_0,0(a1)	/* If compiled with -mips3 option on
+-				 * R5000 box assembler barks on this
+-				 * line with "shouldn't have mult/div
+-				 * as last instruction in bb (R10K
+-				 * bug)" warning. If anybody out there
+-				 * has a clue about how to circumvent
+-				 * this do send me a note.
+-				 *		<appro@fy.chalmers.se>
+-				 */
+-	ld	b_0,0(a2)
+-	ld	a_1,8(a1)
+-	ld	a_2,16(a1)
+-	ld	a_3,24(a1)
+-	ld	b_1,8(a2)
+-	ld	b_2,16(a2)
+-	ld	b_3,24(a2)
+-	dmultu	a_0,b_0		/* mul_add_c(a[0],b[0],c1,c2,c3); */
+-	sd	s0,0(sp)
+-	sd	s1,8(sp)
+-	sd	s2,16(sp)
+-	sd	s3,24(sp)
+-	sd	s4,32(sp)
+-	sd	s5,40(sp)
+-	mflo	c_1
+-	mfhi	c_2
+-
+-	dmultu	a_0,b_1		/* mul_add_c(a[0],b[1],c2,c3,c1); */
+-	ld	a_4,32(a1)
+-	ld	a_5,40(a1)
+-	ld	a_6,48(a1)
+-	ld	a_7,56(a1)
+-	ld	b_4,32(a2)
+-	ld	b_5,40(a2)
+-	mflo	t_1
+-	mfhi	t_2
+-	daddu	c_2,t_1
+-	sltu	AT,c_2,t_1
+-	daddu	c_3,t_2,AT
+-	dmultu	a_1,b_0		/* mul_add_c(a[1],b[0],c2,c3,c1); */
+-	ld	b_6,48(a2)
+-	ld	b_7,56(a2)
+-	sd	c_1,0(a0)	/* r[0]=c1; */
+-	mflo	t_1
+-	mfhi	t_2
+-	daddu	c_2,t_1
+-	sltu	AT,c_2,t_1
+-	daddu	t_2,AT
+-	daddu	c_3,t_2
+-	sltu	c_1,c_3,t_2
+-	sd	c_2,8(a0)	/* r[1]=c2; */
+-
+-	dmultu	a_2,b_0		/* mul_add_c(a[2],b[0],c3,c1,c2); */
+-	mflo	t_1
+-	mfhi	t_2
+-	daddu	c_3,t_1
+-	sltu	AT,c_3,t_1
+-	daddu	t_2,AT
+-	daddu	c_1,t_2
+-	dmultu	a_1,b_1		/* mul_add_c(a[1],b[1],c3,c1,c2); */
+-	mflo	t_1
+-	mfhi	t_2
+-	daddu	c_3,t_1
+-	sltu	AT,c_3,t_1
+-	daddu	t_2,AT
+-	daddu	c_1,t_2
+-	sltu	c_2,c_1,t_2
+-	dmultu	a_0,b_2		/* mul_add_c(a[0],b[2],c3,c1,c2); */
+-	mflo	t_1
+-	mfhi	t_2
+-	daddu	c_3,t_1
+-	sltu	AT,c_3,t_1
+-	daddu	t_2,AT
+-	daddu	c_1,t_2
+-	sltu	AT,c_1,t_2
+-	daddu	c_2,AT
+-	sd	c_3,16(a0)	/* r[2]=c3; */
+-
+-	dmultu	a_0,b_3		/* mul_add_c(a[0],b[3],c1,c2,c3); */
+-	mflo	t_1
+-	mfhi	t_2
+-	daddu	c_1,t_1
+-	sltu	AT,c_1,t_1
+-	daddu	t_2,AT
+-	daddu	c_2,t_2
+-	sltu	c_3,c_2,t_2
+-	dmultu	a_1,b_2		/* mul_add_c(a[1],b[2],c1,c2,c3); */
+-	mflo	t_1
+-	mfhi	t_2
+-	daddu	c_1,t_1
+-	sltu	AT,c_1,t_1
+-	daddu	t_2,AT
+-	daddu	c_2,t_2
+-	sltu	AT,c_2,t_2
+-	daddu	c_3,AT
+-	dmultu	a_2,b_1		/* mul_add_c(a[2],b[1],c1,c2,c3); */
+-	mflo	t_1
+-	mfhi	t_2
+-	daddu	c_1,t_1
+-	sltu	AT,c_1,t_1
+-	daddu	t_2,AT
+-	daddu	c_2,t_2
+-	sltu	AT,c_2,t_2
+-	daddu	c_3,AT
+-	dmultu	a_3,b_0		/* mul_add_c(a[3],b[0],c1,c2,c3); */
+-	mflo	t_1
+-	mfhi	t_2
+-	daddu	c_1,t_1
+-	sltu	AT,c_1,t_1
+-	daddu	t_2,AT
+-	daddu	c_2,t_2
+-	sltu	AT,c_2,t_2
+-	daddu	c_3,AT
+-	sd	c_1,24(a0)	/* r[3]=c1; */
+-
+-	dmultu	a_4,b_0		/* mul_add_c(a[4],b[0],c2,c3,c1); */
+-	mflo	t_1
+-	mfhi	t_2
+-	daddu	c_2,t_1
+-	sltu	AT,c_2,t_1
+-	daddu	t_2,AT
+-	daddu	c_3,t_2
+-	sltu	c_1,c_3,t_2
+-	dmultu	a_3,b_1		/* mul_add_c(a[3],b[1],c2,c3,c1); */
+-	mflo	t_1
+-	mfhi	t_2
+-	daddu	c_2,t_1
+-	sltu	AT,c_2,t_1
+-	daddu	t_2,AT
+-	daddu	c_3,t_2
+-	sltu	AT,c_3,t_2
+-	daddu	c_1,AT
+-	dmultu	a_2,b_2		/* mul_add_c(a[2],b[2],c2,c3,c1); */
+-	mflo	t_1
+-	mfhi	t_2
+-	daddu	c_2,t_1
+-	sltu	AT,c_2,t_1
+-	daddu	t_2,AT
+-	daddu	c_3,t_2
+-	sltu	AT,c_3,t_2
+-	daddu	c_1,AT
+-	dmultu	a_1,b_3		/* mul_add_c(a[1],b[3],c2,c3,c1); */
+-	mflo	t_1
+-	mfhi	t_2
+-	daddu	c_2,t_1
+-	sltu	AT,c_2,t_1
+-	daddu	t_2,AT
+-	daddu	c_3,t_2
+-	sltu	AT,c_3,t_2
+-	daddu	c_1,AT
+-	dmultu	a_0,b_4		/* mul_add_c(a[0],b[4],c2,c3,c1); */
+-	mflo	t_1
+-	mfhi	t_2
+-	daddu	c_2,t_1
+-	sltu	AT,c_2,t_1
+-	daddu	t_2,AT
+-	daddu	c_3,t_2
+-	sltu	AT,c_3,t_2
+-	daddu	c_1,AT
+-	sd	c_2,32(a0)	/* r[4]=c2; */
+-
+-	dmultu	a_0,b_5		/* mul_add_c(a[0],b[5],c3,c1,c2); */
+-	mflo	t_1
+-	mfhi	t_2
+-	daddu	c_3,t_1
+-	sltu	AT,c_3,t_1
+-	daddu	t_2,AT
+-	daddu	c_1,t_2
+-	sltu	c_2,c_1,t_2
+-	dmultu	a_1,b_4		/* mul_add_c(a[1],b[4],c3,c1,c2); */
+-	mflo	t_1
+-	mfhi	t_2
+-	daddu	c_3,t_1
+-	sltu	AT,c_3,t_1
+-	daddu	t_2,AT
+-	daddu	c_1,t_2
+-	sltu	AT,c_1,t_2
+-	daddu	c_2,AT
+-	dmultu	a_2,b_3		/* mul_add_c(a[2],b[3],c3,c1,c2); */
+-	mflo	t_1
+-	mfhi	t_2
+-	daddu	c_3,t_1
+-	sltu	AT,c_3,t_1
+-	daddu	t_2,AT
+-	daddu	c_1,t_2
+-	sltu	AT,c_1,t_2
+-	daddu	c_2,AT
+-	dmultu	a_3,b_2		/* mul_add_c(a[3],b[2],c3,c1,c2); */
+-	mflo	t_1
+-	mfhi	t_2
+-	daddu	c_3,t_1
+-	sltu	AT,c_3,t_1
+-	daddu	t_2,AT
+-	daddu	c_1,t_2
+-	sltu	AT,c_1,t_2
+-	daddu	c_2,AT
+-	dmultu	a_4,b_1		/* mul_add_c(a[4],b[1],c3,c1,c2); */
+-	mflo	t_1
+-	mfhi	t_2
+-	daddu	c_3,t_1
+-	sltu	AT,c_3,t_1
+-	daddu	t_2,AT
+-	daddu	c_1,t_2
+-	sltu	AT,c_1,t_2
+-	daddu	c_2,AT
+-	dmultu	a_5,b_0		/* mul_add_c(a[5],b[0],c3,c1,c2); */
+-	mflo	t_1
+-	mfhi	t_2
+-	daddu	c_3,t_1
+-	sltu	AT,c_3,t_1
+-	daddu	t_2,AT
+-	daddu	c_1,t_2
+-	sltu	AT,c_1,t_2
+-	daddu	c_2,AT
+-	sd	c_3,40(a0)	/* r[5]=c3; */
+-
+-	dmultu	a_6,b_0		/* mul_add_c(a[6],b[0],c1,c2,c3); */
+-	mflo	t_1
+-	mfhi	t_2
+-	daddu	c_1,t_1
+-	sltu	AT,c_1,t_1
+-	daddu	t_2,AT
+-	daddu	c_2,t_2
+-	sltu	c_3,c_2,t_2
+-	dmultu	a_5,b_1		/* mul_add_c(a[5],b[1],c1,c2,c3); */
+-	mflo	t_1
+-	mfhi	t_2
+-	daddu	c_1,t_1
+-	sltu	AT,c_1,t_1
+-	daddu	t_2,AT
+-	daddu	c_2,t_2
+-	sltu	AT,c_2,t_2
+-	daddu	c_3,AT
+-	dmultu	a_4,b_2		/* mul_add_c(a[4],b[2],c1,c2,c3); */
+-	mflo	t_1
+-	mfhi	t_2
+-	daddu	c_1,t_1
+-	sltu	AT,c_1,t_1
+-	daddu	t_2,AT
+-	daddu	c_2,t_2
+-	sltu	AT,c_2,t_2
+-	daddu	c_3,AT
+-	dmultu	a_3,b_3		/* mul_add_c(a[3],b[3],c1,c2,c3); */
+-	mflo	t_1
+-	mfhi	t_2
+-	daddu	c_1,t_1
+-	sltu	AT,c_1,t_1
+-	daddu	t_2,AT
+-	daddu	c_2,t_2
+-	sltu	AT,c_2,t_2
+-	daddu	c_3,AT
+-	dmultu	a_2,b_4		/* mul_add_c(a[2],b[4],c1,c2,c3); */
+-	mflo	t_1
+-	mfhi	t_2
+-	daddu	c_1,t_1
+-	sltu	AT,c_1,t_1
+-	daddu	t_2,AT
+-	daddu	c_2,t_2
+-	sltu	AT,c_2,t_2
+-	daddu	c_3,AT
+-	dmultu	a_1,b_5		/* mul_add_c(a[1],b[5],c1,c2,c3); */
+-	mflo	t_1
+-	mfhi	t_2
+-	daddu	c_1,t_1
+-	sltu	AT,c_1,t_1
+-	daddu	t_2,AT
+-	daddu	c_2,t_2
+-	sltu	AT,c_2,t_2
+-	daddu	c_3,AT
+-	dmultu	a_0,b_6		/* mul_add_c(a[0],b[6],c1,c2,c3); */
+-	mflo	t_1
+-	mfhi	t_2
+-	daddu	c_1,t_1
+-	sltu	AT,c_1,t_1
+-	daddu	t_2,AT
+-	daddu	c_2,t_2
+-	sltu	AT,c_2,t_2
+-	daddu	c_3,AT
+-	sd	c_1,48(a0)	/* r[6]=c1; */
+-
+-	dmultu	a_0,b_7		/* mul_add_c(a[0],b[7],c2,c3,c1); */
+-	mflo	t_1
+-	mfhi	t_2
+-	daddu	c_2,t_1
+-	sltu	AT,c_2,t_1
+-	daddu	t_2,AT
+-	daddu	c_3,t_2
+-	sltu	c_1,c_3,t_2
+-	dmultu	a_1,b_6		/* mul_add_c(a[1],b[6],c2,c3,c1); */
+-	mflo	t_1
+-	mfhi	t_2
+-	daddu	c_2,t_1
+-	sltu	AT,c_2,t_1
+-	daddu	t_2,AT
+-	daddu	c_3,t_2
+-	sltu	AT,c_3,t_2
+-	daddu	c_1,AT
+-	dmultu	a_2,b_5		/* mul_add_c(a[2],b[5],c2,c3,c1); */
+-	mflo	t_1
+-	mfhi	t_2
+-	daddu	c_2,t_1
+-	sltu	AT,c_2,t_1
+-	daddu	t_2,AT
+-	daddu	c_3,t_2
+-	sltu	AT,c_3,t_2
+-	daddu	c_1,AT
+-	dmultu	a_3,b_4		/* mul_add_c(a[3],b[4],c2,c3,c1); */
+-	mflo	t_1
+-	mfhi	t_2
+-	daddu	c_2,t_1
+-	sltu	AT,c_2,t_1
+-	daddu	t_2,AT
+-	daddu	c_3,t_2
+-	sltu	AT,c_3,t_2
+-	daddu	c_1,AT
+-	dmultu	a_4,b_3		/* mul_add_c(a[4],b[3],c2,c3,c1); */
+-	mflo	t_1
+-	mfhi	t_2
+-	daddu	c_2,t_1
+-	sltu	AT,c_2,t_1
+-	daddu	t_2,AT
+-	daddu	c_3,t_2
+-	sltu	AT,c_3,t_2
+-	daddu	c_1,AT
+-	dmultu	a_5,b_2		/* mul_add_c(a[5],b[2],c2,c3,c1); */
+-	mflo	t_1
+-	mfhi	t_2
+-	daddu	c_2,t_1
+-	sltu	AT,c_2,t_1
+-	daddu	t_2,AT
+-	daddu	c_3,t_2
+-	sltu	AT,c_3,t_2
+-	daddu	c_1,AT
+-	dmultu	a_6,b_1		/* mul_add_c(a[6],b[1],c2,c3,c1); */
+-	mflo	t_1
+-	mfhi	t_2
+-	daddu	c_2,t_1
+-	sltu	AT,c_2,t_1
+-	daddu	t_2,AT
+-	daddu	c_3,t_2
+-	sltu	AT,c_3,t_2
+-	daddu	c_1,AT
+-	dmultu	a_7,b_0		/* mul_add_c(a[7],b[0],c2,c3,c1); */
+-	mflo	t_1
+-	mfhi	t_2
+-	daddu	c_2,t_1
+-	sltu	AT,c_2,t_1
+-	daddu	t_2,AT
+-	daddu	c_3,t_2
+-	sltu	AT,c_3,t_2
+-	daddu	c_1,AT
+-	sd	c_2,56(a0)	/* r[7]=c2; */
+-
+-	dmultu	a_7,b_1		/* mul_add_c(a[7],b[1],c3,c1,c2); */
+-	mflo	t_1
+-	mfhi	t_2
+-	daddu	c_3,t_1
+-	sltu	AT,c_3,t_1
+-	daddu	t_2,AT
+-	daddu	c_1,t_2
+-	sltu	c_2,c_1,t_2
+-	dmultu	a_6,b_2		/* mul_add_c(a[6],b[2],c3,c1,c2); */
+-	mflo	t_1
+-	mfhi	t_2
+-	daddu	c_3,t_1
+-	sltu	AT,c_3,t_1
+-	daddu	t_2,AT
+-	daddu	c_1,t_2
+-	sltu	AT,c_1,t_2
+-	daddu	c_2,AT
+-	dmultu	a_5,b_3		/* mul_add_c(a[5],b[3],c3,c1,c2); */
+-	mflo	t_1
+-	mfhi	t_2
+-	daddu	c_3,t_1
+-	sltu	AT,c_3,t_1
+-	daddu	t_2,AT
+-	daddu	c_1,t_2
+-	sltu	AT,c_1,t_2
+-	daddu	c_2,AT
+-	dmultu	a_4,b_4		/* mul_add_c(a[4],b[4],c3,c1,c2); */
+-	mflo	t_1
+-	mfhi	t_2
+-	daddu	c_3,t_1
+-	sltu	AT,c_3,t_1
+-	daddu	t_2,AT
+-	daddu	c_1,t_2
+-	sltu	AT,c_1,t_2
+-	daddu	c_2,AT
+-	dmultu	a_3,b_5		/* mul_add_c(a[3],b[5],c3,c1,c2); */
+-	mflo	t_1
+-	mfhi	t_2
+-	daddu	c_3,t_1
+-	sltu	AT,c_3,t_1
+-	daddu	t_2,AT
+-	daddu	c_1,t_2
+-	sltu	AT,c_1,t_2
+-	daddu	c_2,AT
+-	dmultu	a_2,b_6		/* mul_add_c(a[2],b[6],c3,c1,c2); */
+-	mflo	t_1
+-	mfhi	t_2
+-	daddu	c_3,t_1
+-	sltu	AT,c_3,t_1
+-	daddu	t_2,AT
+-	daddu	c_1,t_2
+-	sltu	AT,c_1,t_2
+-	daddu	c_2,AT
+-	dmultu	a_1,b_7		/* mul_add_c(a[1],b[7],c3,c1,c2); */
+-	mflo	t_1
+-	mfhi	t_2
+-	daddu	c_3,t_1
+-	sltu	AT,c_3,t_1
+-	daddu	t_2,AT
+-	daddu	c_1,t_2
+-	sltu	AT,c_1,t_2
+-	daddu	c_2,AT
+-	sd	c_3,64(a0)	/* r[8]=c3; */
+-
+-	dmultu	a_2,b_7		/* mul_add_c(a[2],b[7],c1,c2,c3); */
+-	mflo	t_1
+-	mfhi	t_2
+-	daddu	c_1,t_1
+-	sltu	AT,c_1,t_1
+-	daddu	t_2,AT
+-	daddu	c_2,t_2
+-	sltu	c_3,c_2,t_2
+-	dmultu	a_3,b_6		/* mul_add_c(a[3],b[6],c1,c2,c3); */
+-	mflo	t_1
+-	mfhi	t_2
+-	daddu	c_1,t_1
+-	sltu	AT,c_1,t_1
+-	daddu	t_2,AT
+-	daddu	c_2,t_2
+-	sltu	AT,c_2,t_2
+-	daddu	c_3,AT
+-	dmultu	a_4,b_5		/* mul_add_c(a[4],b[5],c1,c2,c3); */
+-	mflo	t_1
+-	mfhi	t_2
+-	daddu	c_1,t_1
+-	sltu	AT,c_1,t_1
+-	daddu	t_2,AT
+-	daddu	c_2,t_2
+-	sltu	AT,c_2,t_2
+-	daddu	c_3,AT
+-	dmultu	a_5,b_4		/* mul_add_c(a[5],b[4],c1,c2,c3); */
+-	mflo	t_1
+-	mfhi	t_2
+-	daddu	c_1,t_1
+-	sltu	AT,c_1,t_1
+-	daddu	t_2,AT
+-	daddu	c_2,t_2
+-	sltu	AT,c_2,t_2
+-	daddu	c_3,AT
+-	dmultu	a_6,b_3		/* mul_add_c(a[6],b[3],c1,c2,c3); */
+-	mflo	t_1
+-	mfhi	t_2
+-	daddu	c_1,t_1
+-	sltu	AT,c_1,t_1
+-	daddu	t_2,AT
+-	daddu	c_2,t_2
+-	sltu	AT,c_2,t_2
+-	daddu	c_3,AT
+-	dmultu	a_7,b_2		/* mul_add_c(a[7],b[2],c1,c2,c3); */
+-	mflo	t_1
+-	mfhi	t_2
+-	daddu	c_1,t_1
+-	sltu	AT,c_1,t_1
+-	daddu	t_2,AT
+-	daddu	c_2,t_2
+-	sltu	AT,c_2,t_2
+-	daddu	c_3,AT
+-	sd	c_1,72(a0)	/* r[9]=c1; */
+-
+-	dmultu	a_7,b_3		/* mul_add_c(a[7],b[3],c2,c3,c1); */
+-	mflo	t_1
+-	mfhi	t_2
+-	daddu	c_2,t_1
+-	sltu	AT,c_2,t_1
+-	daddu	t_2,AT
+-	daddu	c_3,t_2
+-	sltu	c_1,c_3,t_2
+-	dmultu	a_6,b_4		/* mul_add_c(a[6],b[4],c2,c3,c1); */
+-	mflo	t_1
+-	mfhi	t_2
+-	daddu	c_2,t_1
+-	sltu	AT,c_2,t_1
+-	daddu	t_2,AT
+-	daddu	c_3,t_2
+-	sltu	AT,c_3,t_2
+-	daddu	c_1,AT
+-	dmultu	a_5,b_5		/* mul_add_c(a[5],b[5],c2,c3,c1); */
+-	mflo	t_1
+-	mfhi	t_2
+-	daddu	c_2,t_1
+-	sltu	AT,c_2,t_1
+-	daddu	t_2,AT
+-	daddu	c_3,t_2
+-	sltu	AT,c_3,t_2
+-	daddu	c_1,AT
+-	dmultu	a_4,b_6		/* mul_add_c(a[4],b[6],c2,c3,c1); */
+-	mflo	t_1
+-	mfhi	t_2
+-	daddu	c_2,t_1
+-	sltu	AT,c_2,t_1
+-	daddu	t_2,AT
+-	daddu	c_3,t_2
+-	sltu	AT,c_3,t_2
+-	daddu	c_1,AT
+-	dmultu	a_3,b_7		/* mul_add_c(a[3],b[7],c2,c3,c1); */
+-	mflo	t_1
+-	mfhi	t_2
+-	daddu	c_2,t_1
+-	sltu	AT,c_2,t_1
+-	daddu	t_2,AT
+-	daddu	c_3,t_2
+-	sltu	AT,c_3,t_2
+-	daddu	c_1,AT
+-	sd	c_2,80(a0)	/* r[10]=c2; */
+-
+-	dmultu	a_4,b_7		/* mul_add_c(a[4],b[7],c3,c1,c2); */
+-	mflo	t_1
+-	mfhi	t_2
+-	daddu	c_3,t_1
+-	sltu	AT,c_3,t_1
+-	daddu	t_2,AT
+-	daddu	c_1,t_2
+-	sltu	c_2,c_1,t_2
+-	dmultu	a_5,b_6		/* mul_add_c(a[5],b[6],c3,c1,c2); */
+-	mflo	t_1
+-	mfhi	t_2
+-	daddu	c_3,t_1
+-	sltu	AT,c_3,t_1
+-	daddu	t_2,AT
+-	daddu	c_1,t_2
+-	sltu	AT,c_1,t_2
+-	daddu	c_2,AT
+-	dmultu	a_6,b_5		/* mul_add_c(a[6],b[5],c3,c1,c2); */
+-	mflo	t_1
+-	mfhi	t_2
+-	daddu	c_3,t_1
+-	sltu	AT,c_3,t_1
+-	daddu	t_2,AT
+-	daddu	c_1,t_2
+-	sltu	AT,c_1,t_2
+-	daddu	c_2,AT
+-	dmultu	a_7,b_4		/* mul_add_c(a[7],b[4],c3,c1,c2); */
+-	mflo	t_1
+-	mfhi	t_2
+-	daddu	c_3,t_1
+-	sltu	AT,c_3,t_1
+-	daddu	t_2,AT
+-	daddu	c_1,t_2
+-	sltu	AT,c_1,t_2
+-	daddu	c_2,AT
+-	sd	c_3,88(a0)	/* r[11]=c3; */
+-
+-	dmultu	a_7,b_5		/* mul_add_c(a[7],b[5],c1,c2,c3); */
+-	mflo	t_1
+-	mfhi	t_2
+-	daddu	c_1,t_1
+-	sltu	AT,c_1,t_1
+-	daddu	t_2,AT
+-	daddu	c_2,t_2
+-	sltu	c_3,c_2,t_2
+-	dmultu	a_6,b_6		/* mul_add_c(a[6],b[6],c1,c2,c3); */
+-	mflo	t_1
+-	mfhi	t_2
+-	daddu	c_1,t_1
+-	sltu	AT,c_1,t_1
+-	daddu	t_2,AT
+-	daddu	c_2,t_2
+-	sltu	AT,c_2,t_2
+-	daddu	c_3,AT
+-	dmultu	a_5,b_7		/* mul_add_c(a[5],b[7],c1,c2,c3); */
+-	mflo	t_1
+-	mfhi	t_2
+-	daddu	c_1,t_1
+-	sltu	AT,c_1,t_1
+-	daddu	t_2,AT
+-	daddu	c_2,t_2
+-	sltu	AT,c_2,t_2
+-	daddu	c_3,AT
+-	sd	c_1,96(a0)	/* r[12]=c1; */
+-
+-	dmultu	a_6,b_7		/* mul_add_c(a[6],b[7],c2,c3,c1); */
+-	mflo	t_1
+-	mfhi	t_2
+-	daddu	c_2,t_1
+-	sltu	AT,c_2,t_1
+-	daddu	t_2,AT
+-	daddu	c_3,t_2
+-	sltu	c_1,c_3,t_2
+-	dmultu	a_7,b_6		/* mul_add_c(a[7],b[6],c2,c3,c1); */
+-	mflo	t_1
+-	mfhi	t_2
+-	daddu	c_2,t_1
+-	sltu	AT,c_2,t_1
+-	daddu	t_2,AT
+-	daddu	c_3,t_2
+-	sltu	AT,c_3,t_2
+-	daddu	c_1,AT
+-	sd	c_2,104(a0)	/* r[13]=c2; */
+-
+-	dmultu	a_7,b_7		/* mul_add_c(a[7],b[7],c3,c1,c2); */
+-	ld	s0,0(sp)
+-	ld	s1,8(sp)
+-	ld	s2,16(sp)
+-	ld	s3,24(sp)
+-	ld	s4,32(sp)
+-	ld	s5,40(sp)
+-	mflo	t_1
+-	mfhi	t_2
+-	daddu	c_3,t_1
+-	sltu	AT,c_3,t_1
+-	daddu	t_2,AT
+-	daddu	c_1,t_2
+-	sd	c_3,112(a0)	/* r[14]=c3; */
+-	sd	c_1,120(a0)	/* r[15]=c1; */
+-
+-	PTR_ADD	sp,FRAME_SIZE
+-
+-	jr	ra
+-END(bn_mul_comba8)
+-
+-.align	5
+-LEAF(bn_mul_comba4)
+-	.set	reorder
+-	ld	a_0,0(a1)
+-	ld	b_0,0(a2)
+-	ld	a_1,8(a1)
+-	ld	a_2,16(a1)
+-	dmultu	a_0,b_0		/* mul_add_c(a[0],b[0],c1,c2,c3); */
+-	ld	a_3,24(a1)
+-	ld	b_1,8(a2)
+-	ld	b_2,16(a2)
+-	ld	b_3,24(a2)
+-	mflo	c_1
+-	mfhi	c_2
+-	sd	c_1,0(a0)
+-
+-	dmultu	a_0,b_1		/* mul_add_c(a[0],b[1],c2,c3,c1); */
+-	mflo	t_1
+-	mfhi	t_2
+-	daddu	c_2,t_1
+-	sltu	AT,c_2,t_1
+-	daddu	c_3,t_2,AT
+-	dmultu	a_1,b_0		/* mul_add_c(a[1],b[0],c2,c3,c1); */
+-	mflo	t_1
+-	mfhi	t_2
+-	daddu	c_2,t_1
+-	sltu	AT,c_2,t_1
+-	daddu	t_2,AT
+-	daddu	c_3,t_2
+-	sltu	c_1,c_3,t_2
+-	sd	c_2,8(a0)
+-
+-	dmultu	a_2,b_0		/* mul_add_c(a[2],b[0],c3,c1,c2); */
+-	mflo	t_1
+-	mfhi	t_2
+-	daddu	c_3,t_1
+-	sltu	AT,c_3,t_1
+-	daddu	t_2,AT
+-	daddu	c_1,t_2
+-	dmultu	a_1,b_1		/* mul_add_c(a[1],b[1],c3,c1,c2); */
+-	mflo	t_1
+-	mfhi	t_2
+-	daddu	c_3,t_1
+-	sltu	AT,c_3,t_1
+-	daddu	t_2,AT
+-	daddu	c_1,t_2
+-	sltu	c_2,c_1,t_2
+-	dmultu	a_0,b_2		/* mul_add_c(a[0],b[2],c3,c1,c2); */
+-	mflo	t_1
+-	mfhi	t_2
+-	daddu	c_3,t_1
+-	sltu	AT,c_3,t_1
+-	daddu	t_2,AT
+-	daddu	c_1,t_2
+-	sltu	AT,c_1,t_2
+-	daddu	c_2,AT
+-	sd	c_3,16(a0)
+-
+-	dmultu	a_0,b_3		/* mul_add_c(a[0],b[3],c1,c2,c3); */
+-	mflo	t_1
+-	mfhi	t_2
+-	daddu	c_1,t_1
+-	sltu	AT,c_1,t_1
+-	daddu	t_2,AT
+-	daddu	c_2,t_2
+-	sltu	c_3,c_2,t_2
+-	dmultu	a_1,b_2		/* mul_add_c(a[1],b[2],c1,c2,c3); */
+-	mflo	t_1
+-	mfhi	t_2
+-	daddu	c_1,t_1
+-	sltu	AT,c_1,t_1
+-	daddu	t_2,AT
+-	daddu	c_2,t_2
+-	sltu	AT,c_2,t_2
+-	daddu	c_3,AT
+-	dmultu	a_2,b_1		/* mul_add_c(a[2],b[1],c1,c2,c3); */
+-	mflo	t_1
+-	mfhi	t_2
+-	daddu	c_1,t_1
+-	sltu	AT,c_1,t_1
+-	daddu	t_2,AT
+-	daddu	c_2,t_2
+-	sltu	AT,c_2,t_2
+-	daddu	c_3,AT
+-	dmultu	a_3,b_0		/* mul_add_c(a[3],b[0],c1,c2,c3); */
+-	mflo	t_1
+-	mfhi	t_2
+-	daddu	c_1,t_1
+-	sltu	AT,c_1,t_1
+-	daddu	t_2,AT
+-	daddu	c_2,t_2
+-	sltu	AT,c_2,t_2
+-	daddu	c_3,AT
+-	sd	c_1,24(a0)
+-
+-	dmultu	a_3,b_1		/* mul_add_c(a[3],b[1],c2,c3,c1); */
+-	mflo	t_1
+-	mfhi	t_2
+-	daddu	c_2,t_1
+-	sltu	AT,c_2,t_1
+-	daddu	t_2,AT
+-	daddu	c_3,t_2
+-	sltu	c_1,c_3,t_2
+-	dmultu	a_2,b_2		/* mul_add_c(a[2],b[2],c2,c3,c1); */
+-	mflo	t_1
+-	mfhi	t_2
+-	daddu	c_2,t_1
+-	sltu	AT,c_2,t_1
+-	daddu	t_2,AT
+-	daddu	c_3,t_2
+-	sltu	AT,c_3,t_2
+-	daddu	c_1,AT
+-	dmultu	a_1,b_3		/* mul_add_c(a[1],b[3],c2,c3,c1); */
+-	mflo	t_1
+-	mfhi	t_2
+-	daddu	c_2,t_1
+-	sltu	AT,c_2,t_1
+-	daddu	t_2,AT
+-	daddu	c_3,t_2
+-	sltu	AT,c_3,t_2
+-	daddu	c_1,AT
+-	sd	c_2,32(a0)
+-
+-	dmultu	a_2,b_3		/* mul_add_c(a[2],b[3],c3,c1,c2); */
+-	mflo	t_1
+-	mfhi	t_2
+-	daddu	c_3,t_1
+-	sltu	AT,c_3,t_1
+-	daddu	t_2,AT
+-	daddu	c_1,t_2
+-	sltu	c_2,c_1,t_2
+-	dmultu	a_3,b_2		/* mul_add_c(a[3],b[2],c3,c1,c2); */
+-	mflo	t_1
+-	mfhi	t_2
+-	daddu	c_3,t_1
+-	sltu	AT,c_3,t_1
+-	daddu	t_2,AT
+-	daddu	c_1,t_2
+-	sltu	AT,c_1,t_2
+-	daddu	c_2,AT
+-	sd	c_3,40(a0)
+-
+-	dmultu	a_3,b_3		/* mul_add_c(a[3],b[3],c1,c2,c3); */
+-	mflo	t_1
+-	mfhi	t_2
+-	daddu	c_1,t_1
+-	sltu	AT,c_1,t_1
+-	daddu	t_2,AT
+-	daddu	c_2,t_2
+-	sd	c_1,48(a0)
+-	sd	c_2,56(a0)
+-
+-	jr	ra
+-END(bn_mul_comba4)
+-
+-#undef	a_4
+-#undef	a_5
+-#undef	a_6
+-#undef	a_7
+-#define	a_4	b_0
+-#define	a_5	b_1
+-#define	a_6	b_2
+-#define	a_7	b_3
+-
+-.align	5
+-LEAF(bn_sqr_comba8)
+-	.set	reorder
+-	ld	a_0,0(a1)
+-	ld	a_1,8(a1)
+-	ld	a_2,16(a1)
+-	ld	a_3,24(a1)
+-
+-	dmultu	a_0,a_0		/* mul_add_c(a[0],b[0],c1,c2,c3); */
+-	ld	a_4,32(a1)
+-	ld	a_5,40(a1)
+-	ld	a_6,48(a1)
+-	ld	a_7,56(a1)
+-	mflo	c_1
+-	mfhi	c_2
+-	sd	c_1,0(a0)
+-
+-	dmultu	a_0,a_1		/* mul_add_c2(a[0],b[1],c2,c3,c1); */
+-	mflo	t_1
+-	mfhi	t_2
+-	slt	c_1,t_2,zero
+-	dsll	t_2,1
+-	slt	a2,t_1,zero
+-	daddu	t_2,a2
+-	dsll	t_1,1
+-	daddu	c_2,t_1
+-	sltu	AT,c_2,t_1
+-	daddu	c_3,t_2,AT
+-	sd	c_2,8(a0)
+-
+-	dmultu	a_2,a_0		/* mul_add_c2(a[2],b[0],c3,c1,c2); */
+-	mflo	t_1
+-	mfhi	t_2
+-	slt	c_2,t_2,zero
+-	dsll	t_2,1
+-	slt	a2,t_1,zero
+-	daddu	t_2,a2
+-	dsll	t_1,1
+-	daddu	c_3,t_1
+-	sltu	AT,c_3,t_1
+-	daddu	t_2,AT
+-	daddu	c_1,t_2
+-	sltu	AT,c_1,t_2
+-	daddu	c_2,AT
+-	dmultu	a_1,a_1		/* mul_add_c(a[1],b[1],c3,c1,c2); */
+-	mflo	t_1
+-	mfhi	t_2
+-	daddu	c_3,t_1
+-	sltu	AT,c_3,t_1
+-	daddu	t_2,AT
+-	daddu	c_1,t_2
+-	sltu	AT,c_1,t_2
+-	daddu	c_2,AT
+-	sd	c_3,16(a0)
+-
+-	dmultu	a_0,a_3		/* mul_add_c2(a[0],b[3],c1,c2,c3); */
+-	mflo	t_1
+-	mfhi	t_2
+-	slt	c_3,t_2,zero
+-	dsll	t_2,1
+-	slt	a2,t_1,zero
+-	daddu	t_2,a2
+-	dsll	t_1,1
+-	daddu	c_1,t_1
+-	sltu	AT,c_1,t_1
+-	daddu	t_2,AT
+-	daddu	c_2,t_2
+-	sltu	AT,c_2,t_2
+-	daddu	c_3,AT
+-	dmultu	a_1,a_2		/* mul_add_c2(a[1],b[2],c1,c2,c3); */
+-	mflo	t_1
+-	mfhi	t_2
+-	slt	AT,t_2,zero
+-	daddu	c_3,AT
+-	dsll	t_2,1
+-	slt	a2,t_1,zero
+-	daddu	t_2,a2
+-	dsll	t_1,1
+-	daddu	c_1,t_1
+-	sltu	AT,c_1,t_1
+-	daddu	t_2,AT
+-	daddu	c_2,t_2
+-	sltu	AT,c_2,t_2
+-	daddu	c_3,AT
+-	sd	c_1,24(a0)
+-
+-	dmultu	a_4,a_0		/* mul_add_c2(a[4],b[0],c2,c3,c1); */
+-	mflo	t_1
+-	mfhi	t_2
+-	slt	c_1,t_2,zero
+-	dsll	t_2,1
+-	slt	a2,t_1,zero
+-	daddu	t_2,a2
+-	dsll	t_1,1
+-	daddu	c_2,t_1
+-	sltu	AT,c_2,t_1
+-	daddu	t_2,AT
+-	daddu	c_3,t_2
+-	sltu	AT,c_3,t_2
+-	daddu	c_1,AT
+-	dmultu	a_3,a_1		/* mul_add_c2(a[3],b[1],c2,c3,c1); */
+-	mflo	t_1
+-	mfhi	t_2
+-	slt	AT,t_2,zero
+-	daddu	c_1,AT
+-	dsll	t_2,1
+-	slt	a2,t_1,zero
+-	daddu	t_2,a2
+-	dsll	t_1,1
+-	daddu	c_2,t_1
+-	sltu	AT,c_2,t_1
+-	daddu	t_2,AT
+-	daddu	c_3,t_2
+-	sltu	AT,c_3,t_2
+-	daddu	c_1,AT
+-	dmultu	a_2,a_2		/* mul_add_c(a[2],b[2],c2,c3,c1); */
+-	mflo	t_1
+-	mfhi	t_2
+-	daddu	c_2,t_1
+-	sltu	AT,c_2,t_1
+-	daddu	t_2,AT
+-	daddu	c_3,t_2
+-	sltu	AT,c_3,t_2
+-	daddu	c_1,AT
+-	sd	c_2,32(a0)
+-
+-	dmultu	a_0,a_5		/* mul_add_c2(a[0],b[5],c3,c1,c2); */
+-	mflo	t_1
+-	mfhi	t_2
+-	slt	c_2,t_2,zero
+-	dsll	t_2,1
+-	slt	a2,t_1,zero
+-	daddu	t_2,a2
+-	dsll	t_1,1
+-	daddu	c_3,t_1
+-	sltu	AT,c_3,t_1
+-	daddu	t_2,AT
+-	daddu	c_1,t_2
+-	sltu	AT,c_1,t_2
+-	daddu	c_2,AT
+-	dmultu	a_1,a_4		/* mul_add_c2(a[1],b[4],c3,c1,c2); */
+-	mflo	t_1
+-	mfhi	t_2
+-	slt	AT,t_2,zero
+-	daddu	c_2,AT
+-	dsll	t_2,1
+-	slt	a2,t_1,zero
+-	daddu	t_2,a2
+-	dsll	t_1,1
+-	daddu	c_3,t_1
+-	sltu	AT,c_3,t_1
+-	daddu	t_2,AT
+-	daddu	c_1,t_2
+-	sltu	AT,c_1,t_2
+-	daddu	c_2,AT
+-	dmultu	a_2,a_3		/* mul_add_c2(a[2],b[3],c3,c1,c2); */
+-	mflo	t_1
+-	mfhi	t_2
+-	slt	AT,t_2,zero
+-	daddu	c_2,AT
+-	dsll	t_2,1
+-	slt	a2,t_1,zero
+-	daddu	t_2,a2
+-	dsll	t_1,1
+-	daddu	c_3,t_1
+-	sltu	AT,c_3,t_1
+-	daddu	t_2,AT
+-	daddu	c_1,t_2
+-	sltu	AT,c_1,t_2
+-	daddu	c_2,AT
+-	sd	c_3,40(a0)
+-
+-	dmultu	a_6,a_0		/* mul_add_c2(a[6],b[0],c1,c2,c3); */
+-	mflo	t_1
+-	mfhi	t_2
+-	slt	c_3,t_2,zero
+-	dsll	t_2,1
+-	slt	a2,t_1,zero
+-	daddu	t_2,a2
+-	dsll	t_1,1
+-	daddu	c_1,t_1
+-	sltu	AT,c_1,t_1
+-	daddu	t_2,AT
+-	daddu	c_2,t_2
+-	sltu	AT,c_2,t_2
+-	daddu	c_3,AT
+-	dmultu	a_5,a_1		/* mul_add_c2(a[5],b[1],c1,c2,c3); */
+-	mflo	t_1
+-	mfhi	t_2
+-	slt	AT,t_2,zero
+-	daddu	c_3,AT
+-	dsll	t_2,1
+-	slt	a2,t_1,zero
+-	daddu	t_2,a2
+-	dsll	t_1,1
+-	daddu	c_1,t_1
+-	sltu	AT,c_1,t_1
+-	daddu	t_2,AT
+-	daddu	c_2,t_2
+-	sltu	AT,c_2,t_2
+-	daddu	c_3,AT
+-	dmultu	a_4,a_2		/* mul_add_c2(a[4],b[2],c1,c2,c3); */
+-	mflo	t_1
+-	mfhi	t_2
+-	slt	AT,t_2,zero
+-	daddu	c_3,AT
+-	dsll	t_2,1
+-	slt	a2,t_1,zero
+-	daddu	t_2,a2
+-	dsll	t_1,1
+-	daddu	c_1,t_1
+-	sltu	AT,c_1,t_1
+-	daddu	t_2,AT
+-	daddu	c_2,t_2
+-	sltu	AT,c_2,t_2
+-	daddu	c_3,AT
+-	dmultu	a_3,a_3		/* mul_add_c(a[3],b[3],c1,c2,c3); */
+-	mflo	t_1
+-	mfhi	t_2
+-	daddu	c_1,t_1
+-	sltu	AT,c_1,t_1
+-	daddu	t_2,AT
+-	daddu	c_2,t_2
+-	sltu	AT,c_2,t_2
+-	daddu	c_3,AT
+-	sd	c_1,48(a0)
+-
+-	dmultu	a_0,a_7		/* mul_add_c2(a[0],b[7],c2,c3,c1); */
+-	mflo	t_1
+-	mfhi	t_2
+-	slt	c_1,t_2,zero
+-	dsll	t_2,1
+-	slt	a2,t_1,zero
+-	daddu	t_2,a2
+-	dsll	t_1,1
+-	daddu	c_2,t_1
+-	sltu	AT,c_2,t_1
+-	daddu	t_2,AT
+-	daddu	c_3,t_2
+-	sltu	AT,c_3,t_2
+-	daddu	c_1,AT
+-	dmultu	a_1,a_6		/* mul_add_c2(a[1],b[6],c2,c3,c1); */
+-	mflo	t_1
+-	mfhi	t_2
+-	slt	AT,t_2,zero
+-	daddu	c_1,AT
+-	dsll	t_2,1
+-	slt	a2,t_1,zero
+-	daddu	t_2,a2
+-	dsll	t_1,1
+-	daddu	c_2,t_1
+-	sltu	AT,c_2,t_1
+-	daddu	t_2,AT
+-	daddu	c_3,t_2
+-	sltu	AT,c_3,t_2
+-	daddu	c_1,AT
+-	dmultu	a_2,a_5		/* mul_add_c2(a[2],b[5],c2,c3,c1); */
+-	mflo	t_1
+-	mfhi	t_2
+-	slt	AT,t_2,zero
+-	daddu	c_1,AT
+-	dsll	t_2,1
+-	slt	a2,t_1,zero
+-	daddu	t_2,a2
+-	dsll	t_1,1
+-	daddu	c_2,t_1
+-	sltu	AT,c_2,t_1
+-	daddu	t_2,AT
+-	daddu	c_3,t_2
+-	sltu	AT,c_3,t_2
+-	daddu	c_1,AT
+-	dmultu	a_3,a_4		/* mul_add_c2(a[3],b[4],c2,c3,c1); */
+-	mflo	t_1
+-	mfhi	t_2
+-	slt	AT,t_2,zero
+-	daddu	c_1,AT
+-	dsll	t_2,1
+-	slt	a2,t_1,zero
+-	daddu	t_2,a2
+-	dsll	t_1,1
+-	daddu	c_2,t_1
+-	sltu	AT,c_2,t_1
+-	daddu	t_2,AT
+-	daddu	c_3,t_2
+-	sltu	AT,c_3,t_2
+-	daddu	c_1,AT
+-	sd	c_2,56(a0)
+-
+-	dmultu	a_7,a_1		/* mul_add_c2(a[7],b[1],c3,c1,c2); */
+-	mflo	t_1
+-	mfhi	t_2
+-	slt	c_2,t_2,zero
+-	dsll	t_2,1
+-	slt	a2,t_1,zero
+-	daddu	t_2,a2
+-	dsll	t_1,1
+-	daddu	c_3,t_1
+-	sltu	AT,c_3,t_1
+-	daddu	t_2,AT
+-	daddu	c_1,t_2
+-	sltu	AT,c_1,t_2
+-	daddu	c_2,AT
+-	dmultu	a_6,a_2		/* mul_add_c2(a[6],b[2],c3,c1,c2); */
+-	mflo	t_1
+-	mfhi	t_2
+-	slt	AT,t_2,zero
+-	daddu	c_2,AT
+-	dsll	t_2,1
+-	slt	a2,t_1,zero
+-	daddu	t_2,a2
+-	dsll	t_1,1
+-	daddu	c_3,t_1
+-	sltu	AT,c_3,t_1
+-	daddu	t_2,AT
+-	daddu	c_1,t_2
+-	sltu	AT,c_1,t_2
+-	daddu	c_2,AT
+-	dmultu	a_5,a_3		/* mul_add_c2(a[5],b[3],c3,c1,c2); */
+-	mflo	t_1
+-	mfhi	t_2
+-	slt	AT,t_2,zero
+-	daddu	c_2,AT
+-	dsll	t_2,1
+-	slt	a2,t_1,zero
+-	daddu	t_2,a2
+-	dsll	t_1,1
+-	daddu	c_3,t_1
+-	sltu	AT,c_3,t_1
+-	daddu	t_2,AT
+-	daddu	c_1,t_2
+-	sltu	AT,c_1,t_2
+-	daddu	c_2,AT
+-	dmultu	a_4,a_4		/* mul_add_c(a[4],b[4],c3,c1,c2); */
+-	mflo	t_1
+-	mfhi	t_2
+-	daddu	c_3,t_1
+-	sltu	AT,c_3,t_1
+-	daddu	t_2,AT
+-	daddu	c_1,t_2
+-	sltu	AT,c_1,t_2
+-	daddu	c_2,AT
+-	sd	c_3,64(a0)
+-
+-	dmultu	a_2,a_7		/* mul_add_c2(a[2],b[7],c1,c2,c3); */
+-	mflo	t_1
+-	mfhi	t_2
+-	slt	c_3,t_2,zero
+-	dsll	t_2,1
+-	slt	a2,t_1,zero
+-	daddu	t_2,a2
+-	dsll	t_1,1
+-	daddu	c_1,t_1
+-	sltu	AT,c_1,t_1
+-	daddu	t_2,AT
+-	daddu	c_2,t_2
+-	sltu	AT,c_2,t_2
+-	daddu	c_3,AT
+-	dmultu	a_3,a_6		/* mul_add_c2(a[3],b[6],c1,c2,c3); */
+-	mflo	t_1
+-	mfhi	t_2
+-	slt	AT,t_2,zero
+-	daddu	c_3,AT
+-	dsll	t_2,1
+-	slt	a2,t_1,zero
+-	daddu	t_2,a2
+-	dsll	t_1,1
+-	daddu	c_1,t_1
+-	sltu	AT,c_1,t_1
+-	daddu	t_2,AT
+-	daddu	c_2,t_2
+-	sltu	AT,c_2,t_2
+-	daddu	c_3,AT
+-	dmultu	a_4,a_5		/* mul_add_c2(a[4],b[5],c1,c2,c3); */
+-	mflo	t_1
+-	mfhi	t_2
+-	slt	AT,t_2,zero
+-	daddu	c_3,AT
+-	dsll	t_2,1
+-	slt	a2,t_1,zero
+-	daddu	t_2,a2
+-	dsll	t_1,1
+-	daddu	c_1,t_1
+-	sltu	AT,c_1,t_1
+-	daddu	t_2,AT
+-	daddu	c_2,t_2
+-	sltu	AT,c_2,t_2
+-	daddu	c_3,AT
+-	sd	c_1,72(a0)
+-
+-	dmultu	a_7,a_3		/* mul_add_c2(a[7],b[3],c2,c3,c1); */
+-	mflo	t_1
+-	mfhi	t_2
+-	slt	c_1,t_2,zero
+-	dsll	t_2,1
+-	slt	a2,t_1,zero
+-	daddu	t_2,a2
+-	dsll	t_1,1
+-	daddu	c_2,t_1
+-	sltu	AT,c_2,t_1
+-	daddu	t_2,AT
+-	daddu	c_3,t_2
+-	sltu	AT,c_3,t_2
+-	daddu	c_1,AT
+-	dmultu	a_6,a_4		/* mul_add_c2(a[6],b[4],c2,c3,c1); */
+-	mflo	t_1
+-	mfhi	t_2
+-	slt	AT,t_2,zero
+-	daddu	c_1,AT
+-	dsll	t_2,1
+-	slt	a2,t_1,zero
+-	daddu	t_2,a2
+-	dsll	t_1,1
+-	daddu	c_2,t_1
+-	sltu	AT,c_2,t_1
+-	daddu	t_2,AT
+-	daddu	c_3,t_2
+-	sltu	AT,c_3,t_2
+-	daddu	c_1,AT
+-	dmultu	a_5,a_5		/* mul_add_c(a[5],b[5],c2,c3,c1); */
+-	mflo	t_1
+-	mfhi	t_2
+-	daddu	c_2,t_1
+-	sltu	AT,c_2,t_1
+-	daddu	t_2,AT
+-	daddu	c_3,t_2
+-	sltu	AT,c_3,t_2
+-	daddu	c_1,AT
+-	sd	c_2,80(a0)
+-
+-	dmultu	a_4,a_7		/* mul_add_c2(a[4],b[7],c3,c1,c2); */
+-	mflo	t_1
+-	mfhi	t_2
+-	slt	c_2,t_2,zero
+-	dsll	t_2,1
+-	slt	a2,t_1,zero
+-	daddu	t_2,a2
+-	dsll	t_1,1
+-	daddu	c_3,t_1
+-	sltu	AT,c_3,t_1
+-	daddu	t_2,AT
+-	daddu	c_1,t_2
+-	sltu	AT,c_1,t_2
+-	daddu	c_2,AT
+-	dmultu	a_5,a_6		/* mul_add_c2(a[5],b[6],c3,c1,c2); */
+-	mflo	t_1
+-	mfhi	t_2
+-	slt	AT,t_2,zero
+-	daddu	c_2,AT
+-	dsll	t_2,1
+-	slt	a2,t_1,zero
+-	daddu	t_2,a2
+-	dsll	t_1,1
+-	daddu	c_3,t_1
+-	sltu	AT,c_3,t_1
+-	daddu	t_2,AT
+-	daddu	c_1,t_2
+-	sltu	AT,c_1,t_2
+-	daddu	c_2,AT
+-	sd	c_3,88(a0)
+-
+-	dmultu	a_7,a_5		/* mul_add_c2(a[7],b[5],c1,c2,c3); */
+-	mflo	t_1
+-	mfhi	t_2
+-	slt	c_3,t_2,zero
+-	dsll	t_2,1
+-	slt	a2,t_1,zero
+-	daddu	t_2,a2
+-	dsll	t_1,1
+-	daddu	c_1,t_1
+-	sltu	AT,c_1,t_1
+-	daddu	t_2,AT
+-	daddu	c_2,t_2
+-	sltu	AT,c_2,t_2
+-	daddu	c_3,AT
+-	dmultu	a_6,a_6		/* mul_add_c(a[6],b[6],c1,c2,c3); */
+-	mflo	t_1
+-	mfhi	t_2
+-	daddu	c_1,t_1
+-	sltu	AT,c_1,t_1
+-	daddu	t_2,AT
+-	daddu	c_2,t_2
+-	sltu	AT,c_2,t_2
+-	daddu	c_3,AT
+-	sd	c_1,96(a0)
+-
+-	dmultu	a_6,a_7		/* mul_add_c2(a[6],b[7],c2,c3,c1); */
+-	mflo	t_1
+-	mfhi	t_2
+-	slt	c_1,t_2,zero
+-	dsll	t_2,1
+-	slt	a2,t_1,zero
+-	daddu	t_2,a2
+-	dsll	t_1,1
+-	daddu	c_2,t_1
+-	sltu	AT,c_2,t_1
+-	daddu	t_2,AT
+-	daddu	c_3,t_2
+-	sltu	AT,c_3,t_2
+-	daddu	c_1,AT
+-	sd	c_2,104(a0)
+-
+-	dmultu	a_7,a_7		/* mul_add_c(a[7],b[7],c3,c1,c2); */
+-	mflo	t_1
+-	mfhi	t_2
+-	daddu	c_3,t_1
+-	sltu	AT,c_3,t_1
+-	daddu	t_2,AT
+-	daddu	c_1,t_2
+-	sd	c_3,112(a0)
+-	sd	c_1,120(a0)
+-
+-	jr	ra
+-END(bn_sqr_comba8)
+-
+-.align	5
+-LEAF(bn_sqr_comba4)
+-	.set	reorder
+-	ld	a_0,0(a1)
+-	ld	a_1,8(a1)
+-	ld	a_2,16(a1)
+-	ld	a_3,24(a1)
+-	dmultu	a_0,a_0		/* mul_add_c(a[0],b[0],c1,c2,c3); */
+-	mflo	c_1
+-	mfhi	c_2
+-	sd	c_1,0(a0)
+-
+-	dmultu	a_0,a_1		/* mul_add_c2(a[0],b[1],c2,c3,c1); */
+-	mflo	t_1
+-	mfhi	t_2
+-	slt	c_1,t_2,zero
+-	dsll	t_2,1
+-	slt	a2,t_1,zero
+-	daddu	t_2,a2
+-	dsll	t_1,1
+-	daddu	c_2,t_1
+-	sltu	AT,c_2,t_1
+-	daddu	c_3,t_2,AT
+-	sd	c_2,8(a0)
+-
+-	dmultu	a_2,a_0		/* mul_add_c2(a[2],b[0],c3,c1,c2); */
+-	mflo	t_1
+-	mfhi	t_2
+-	slt	c_2,t_2,zero
+-	dsll	t_2,1
+-	slt	a2,t_1,zero
+-	daddu	t_2,a2
+-	dsll	t_1,1
+-	daddu	c_3,t_1
+-	sltu	AT,c_3,t_1
+-	daddu	t_2,AT
+-	daddu	c_1,t_2
+-	sltu	AT,c_1,t_2
+-	daddu	c_2,AT
+-	dmultu	a_1,a_1		/* mul_add_c(a[1],b[1],c3,c1,c2); */
+-	mflo	t_1
+-	mfhi	t_2
+-	daddu	c_3,t_1
+-	sltu	AT,c_3,t_1
+-	daddu	t_2,AT
+-	daddu	c_1,t_2
+-	sltu	AT,c_1,t_2
+-	daddu	c_2,AT
+-	sd	c_3,16(a0)
+-
+-	dmultu	a_0,a_3		/* mul_add_c2(a[0],b[3],c1,c2,c3); */
+-	mflo	t_1
+-	mfhi	t_2
+-	slt	c_3,t_2,zero
+-	dsll	t_2,1
+-	slt	a2,t_1,zero
+-	daddu	t_2,a2
+-	dsll	t_1,1
+-	daddu	c_1,t_1
+-	sltu	AT,c_1,t_1
+-	daddu	t_2,AT
+-	daddu	c_2,t_2
+-	sltu	AT,c_2,t_2
+-	daddu	c_3,AT
+-	dmultu	a_1,a_2		/* mul_add_c(a2[1],b[2],c1,c2,c3); */
+-	mflo	t_1
+-	mfhi	t_2
+-	slt	AT,t_2,zero
+-	daddu	c_3,AT
+-	dsll	t_2,1
+-	slt	a2,t_1,zero
+-	daddu	t_2,a2
+-	dsll	t_1,1
+-	daddu	c_1,t_1
+-	sltu	AT,c_1,t_1
+-	daddu	t_2,AT
+-	daddu	c_2,t_2
+-	sltu	AT,c_2,t_2
+-	daddu	c_3,AT
+-	sd	c_1,24(a0)
+-
+-	dmultu	a_3,a_1		/* mul_add_c2(a[3],b[1],c2,c3,c1); */
+-	mflo	t_1
+-	mfhi	t_2
+-	slt	c_1,t_2,zero
+-	dsll	t_2,1
+-	slt	a2,t_1,zero
+-	daddu	t_2,a2
+-	dsll	t_1,1
+-	daddu	c_2,t_1
+-	sltu	AT,c_2,t_1
+-	daddu	t_2,AT
+-	daddu	c_3,t_2
+-	sltu	AT,c_3,t_2
+-	daddu	c_1,AT
+-	dmultu	a_2,a_2		/* mul_add_c(a[2],b[2],c2,c3,c1); */
+-	mflo	t_1
+-	mfhi	t_2
+-	daddu	c_2,t_1
+-	sltu	AT,c_2,t_1
+-	daddu	t_2,AT
+-	daddu	c_3,t_2
+-	sltu	AT,c_3,t_2
+-	daddu	c_1,AT
+-	sd	c_2,32(a0)
+-
+-	dmultu	a_2,a_3		/* mul_add_c2(a[2],b[3],c3,c1,c2); */
+-	mflo	t_1
+-	mfhi	t_2
+-	slt	c_2,t_2,zero
+-	dsll	t_2,1
+-	slt	a2,t_1,zero
+-	daddu	t_2,a2
+-	dsll	t_1,1
+-	daddu	c_3,t_1
+-	sltu	AT,c_3,t_1
+-	daddu	t_2,AT
+-	daddu	c_1,t_2
+-	sltu	AT,c_1,t_2
+-	daddu	c_2,AT
+-	sd	c_3,40(a0)
+-
+-	dmultu	a_3,a_3		/* mul_add_c(a[3],b[3],c1,c2,c3); */
+-	mflo	t_1
+-	mfhi	t_2
+-	daddu	c_1,t_1
+-	sltu	AT,c_1,t_1
+-	daddu	t_2,AT
+-	daddu	c_2,t_2
+-	sd	c_1,48(a0)
+-	sd	c_2,56(a0)
+-
+-	jr	ra
+-END(bn_sqr_comba4)
+diff --git a/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-gcc.c b/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-gcc.c
+index 31476ab..2d39407 100644
+--- a/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-gcc.c
++++ b/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-gcc.c
+@@ -273,6 +273,10 @@ BN_ULONG bn_sub_words(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, BN_ULONG *b, int n)
+ /* sqr_add_c(a,i,c0,c1,c2)  -- c+=a[i]^2 for three word number c=(c2,c1,c0) */
+ /* sqr_add_c2(a,i,c0,c1,c2) -- c+=2*a[i]*a[j] for three word number c=(c2,c1,c0) */
+ 
++/*
++ * Keep in mind that carrying into high part of multiplication result
++ * can not overflow, because it cannot be all-ones.
++ */
+ #if 0
+ /* original macros are kept for reference purposes */
+ #define mul_add_c(a,b,c0,c1,c2) {	\
+@@ -287,10 +291,10 @@ BN_ULONG bn_sub_words(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, BN_ULONG *b, int n)
+ 	BN_ULONG ta=(a),tb=(b),t0;	\
+ 	t1 = BN_UMULT_HIGH(ta,tb);	\
+ 	t0 = ta * tb;			\
+-	t2 = t1+t1; c2 += (t2<t1)?1:0;	\
+-	t1 = t0+t0; t2 += (t1<t0)?1:0;	\
+-	c0 += t1; t2 += (c0<t1)?1:0;	\
++	c0 += t0; t2 = t1+((c0<t0)?1:0);\
+ 	c1 += t2; c2 += (c1<t2)?1:0;	\
++	c0 += t0; t1 += (c0<t0)?1:0;	\
++	c1 += t1; c2 += (c1<t1)?1:0;	\
+ 	}
+ #else
+ #define mul_add_c(a,b,c0,c1,c2)	do {	\
+@@ -328,22 +332,14 @@ BN_ULONG bn_sub_words(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, BN_ULONG *b, int n)
+ 		: "=a"(t1),"=d"(t2)	\
+ 		: "a"(a),"m"(b)		\
+ 		: "cc");		\
+-	asm ("addq %0,%0; adcq %2,%1"	\
+-		: "+d"(t2),"+r"(c2)	\
+-		: "g"(0)		\
+-		: "cc");		\
+-	asm ("addq %0,%0; adcq %2,%1"	\
+-		: "+a"(t1),"+d"(t2)	\
+-		: "g"(0)		\
+-		: "cc");		\
+-	asm ("addq %2,%0; adcq %3,%1"	\
+-		: "+r"(c0),"+d"(t2)	\
+-		: "a"(t1),"g"(0)	\
+-		: "cc");		\
+-	asm ("addq %2,%0; adcq %3,%1"	\
+-		: "+r"(c1),"+r"(c2)	\
+-		: "d"(t2),"g"(0)	\
+-		: "cc");		\
++	asm ("addq %3,%0; adcq %4,%1; adcq %5,%2"	\
++		: "+r"(c0),"+r"(c1),"+r"(c2)		\
++		: "r"(t1),"r"(t2),"g"(0)		\
++		: "cc");				\
++	asm ("addq %3,%0; adcq %4,%1; adcq %5,%2"	\
++		: "+r"(c0),"+r"(c1),"+r"(c2)		\
++		: "r"(t1),"r"(t2),"g"(0)		\
++		: "cc");				\
+ 	} while (0)
+ #endif
+ 
+diff --git a/crypto/bn/bn_asm.c b/crypto/bn/bn_asm.c
+index c43c91c..a33b634 100644
+--- a/crypto/bn/bn_asm.c
++++ b/crypto/bn/bn_asm.c
+@@ -438,6 +438,10 @@ BN_ULONG bn_sub_words(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG *a, const BN_ULONG *b, int n)
+ /* sqr_add_c(a,i,c0,c1,c2)  -- c+=a[i]^2 for three word number c=(c2,c1,c0) */
+ /* sqr_add_c2(a,i,c0,c1,c2) -- c+=2*a[i]*a[j] for three word number c=(c2,c1,c0) */
+ 
++/*
++ * Keep in mind that carrying into high part of multiplication result
++ * can not overflow, because it cannot be all-ones.
++ */
+ #ifdef BN_LLONG
+ #define mul_add_c(a,b,c0,c1,c2) \
+ 	t=(BN_ULLONG)a*b; \
+@@ -478,10 +482,10 @@ BN_ULONG bn_sub_words(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG *a, const BN_ULONG *b, int n)
+ #define mul_add_c2(a,b,c0,c1,c2) {	\
+ 	BN_ULONG ta=(a),tb=(b),t0;	\
+ 	BN_UMULT_LOHI(t0,t1,ta,tb);	\
+-	t2 = t1+t1; c2 += (t2<t1)?1:0;	\
+-	t1 = t0+t0; t2 += (t1<t0)?1:0;	\
+-	c0 += t1; t2 += (c0<t1)?1:0;	\
++	c0 += t0; t2 = t1+((c0<t0)?1:0);\
+ 	c1 += t2; c2 += (c1<t2)?1:0;	\
++	c0 += t0; t1 += (c0<t0)?1:0;	\
++	c1 += t1; c2 += (c1<t1)?1:0;	\
+ 	}
+ 
+ #define sqr_add_c(a,i,c0,c1,c2)	{	\
+@@ -508,10 +512,10 @@ BN_ULONG bn_sub_words(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG *a, const BN_ULONG *b, int n)
+ 	BN_ULONG ta=(a),tb=(b),t0;	\
+ 	t1 = BN_UMULT_HIGH(ta,tb);	\
+ 	t0 = ta * tb;			\
+-	t2 = t1+t1; c2 += (t2<t1)?1:0;	\
+-	t1 = t0+t0; t2 += (t1<t0)?1:0;	\
+-	c0 += t1; t2 += (c0<t1)?1:0;	\
++	c0 += t0; t2 = t1+((c0<t0)?1:0);\
+ 	c1 += t2; c2 += (c1<t2)?1:0;	\
++	c0 += t0; t1 += (c0<t0)?1:0;	\
++	c1 += t1; c2 += (c1<t1)?1:0;	\
+ 	}
+ 
+ #define sqr_add_c(a,i,c0,c1,c2)	{	\
+diff --git a/crypto/bn/bntest.c b/crypto/bn/bntest.c
+index 7771e92..48bc633 100644
+--- a/crypto/bn/bntest.c
++++ b/crypto/bn/bntest.c
+@@ -678,44 +678,98 @@ int test_mul(BIO *bp)
+ 
+ int test_sqr(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx)
+ 	{
+-	BIGNUM a,c,d,e;
+-	int i;
++	BIGNUM *a,*c,*d,*e;
++	int i, ret = 0;
+ 
+-	BN_init(&a);
+-	BN_init(&c);
+-	BN_init(&d);
+-	BN_init(&e);
++	a = BN_new();
++	c = BN_new();
++	d = BN_new();
++	e = BN_new();
++	if (a == NULL || c == NULL || d == NULL || e == NULL)
++		{
++		goto err;
++		}
+ 
+ 	for (i=0; i<num0; i++)
+ 		{
+-		BN_bntest_rand(&a,40+i*10,0,0);
+-		a.neg=rand_neg();
+-		BN_sqr(&c,&a,ctx);
++		BN_bntest_rand(a,40+i*10,0,0);
++		a->neg=rand_neg();
++		BN_sqr(c,a,ctx);
+ 		if (bp != NULL)
+ 			{
+ 			if (!results)
+ 				{
+-				BN_print(bp,&a);
++				BN_print(bp,a);
+ 				BIO_puts(bp," * ");
+-				BN_print(bp,&a);
++				BN_print(bp,a);
+ 				BIO_puts(bp," - ");
+ 				}
+-			BN_print(bp,&c);
++			BN_print(bp,c);
+ 			BIO_puts(bp,"\n");
+ 			}
+-		BN_div(&d,&e,&c,&a,ctx);
+-		BN_sub(&d,&d,&a);
+-		if(!BN_is_zero(&d) || !BN_is_zero(&e))
+-		    {
+-		    fprintf(stderr,"Square test failed!\n");
+-		    return 0;
+-		    }
++		BN_div(d,e,c,a,ctx);
++		BN_sub(d,d,a);
++		if(!BN_is_zero(d) || !BN_is_zero(e))
++			{
++			fprintf(stderr,"Square test failed!\n");
++			goto err;
++			}
+ 		}
+-	BN_free(&a);
+-	BN_free(&c);
+-	BN_free(&d);
+-	BN_free(&e);
+-	return(1);
++
++	/* Regression test for a BN_sqr overflow bug. */
++	BN_hex2bn(&a,
++		"80000000000000008000000000000001FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFE0000000000000000");
++	BN_sqr(c, a, ctx);
++	if (bp != NULL)
++		{
++		if (!results)
++			{
++			BN_print(bp,a);
++			BIO_puts(bp," * ");
++			BN_print(bp,a);
++			BIO_puts(bp," - ");
++			}
++		BN_print(bp,c);
++		BIO_puts(bp,"\n");
++		}
++	BN_mul(d, a, a, ctx);
++	if (BN_cmp(c, d))
++		{
++		fprintf(stderr, "Square test failed: BN_sqr and BN_mul produce "
++			"different results!\n");
++		goto err;
++		}
++
++	/* Regression test for a BN_sqr overflow bug. */
++	BN_hex2bn(&a,
++		"80000000000000000000000080000001FFFFFFFE000000000000000000000000");
++	BN_sqr(c, a, ctx);
++	if (bp != NULL)
++		{
++		if (!results)
++			{
++			BN_print(bp,a);
++			BIO_puts(bp," * ");
++			BN_print(bp,a);
++			BIO_puts(bp," - ");
++			}
++		BN_print(bp,c);
++		BIO_puts(bp,"\n");
++		}
++	BN_mul(d, a, a, ctx);
++	if (BN_cmp(c, d))
++		{
++		fprintf(stderr, "Square test failed: BN_sqr and BN_mul produce "
++			"different results!\n");
++		goto err;
++		}
++	ret = 1;
++err:
++	if (a != NULL) BN_free(a);
++	if (c != NULL) BN_free(c);
++	if (d != NULL) BN_free(d);
++	if (e != NULL) BN_free(e);
++	return ret;
+ 	}
+ 
+ int test_mont(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx)
+-- 
+1.8.3.1
+
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/rhel/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-3571.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/rhel/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-3571.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..9c93b7f573
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/rhel/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-3571.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/d1_pkt.c.dtls1-reads openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/d1_pkt.c
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/d1_pkt.c.dtls1-reads	2015-01-12 17:31:41.647213706 +0100
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/d1_pkt.c	2015-01-12 17:38:21.708261411 +0100
+@@ -641,8 +641,6 @@ again:
+ 		/* now s->packet_length == DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */
+ 		i=rr->length;
+ 		n=ssl3_read_n(s,i,i,1);
+-		if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking io */
+-
+ 		/* this packet contained a partial record, dump it */
+ 		if ( n != i)
+ 			{
+@@ -677,7 +675,8 @@ again:
+ 		 * would be dropped unnecessarily.
+ 		 */
+ 		if (!(s->d1->listen && rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE &&
+-		    *p == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) &&
++		    s->packet_length > DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH &&
++		    s->packet[DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) &&
+ 		    !dtls1_record_replay_check(s, bitmap))
+ 			{
+ 			rr->length = 0;
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s3_pkt.c.dtls1-reads openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s3_pkt.c
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s3_pkt.c.dtls1-reads	2015-01-12 17:31:41.680214453 +0100
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s3_pkt.c	2015-01-12 17:38:06.721922482 +0100
+@@ -182,6 +182,8 @@ int ssl3_read_n(SSL *s, int n, int max,
+ 	 * at once (as long as it fits into the buffer). */
+ 	if (SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION || SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
+ 		{
++		if (left == 0 && extend)
++			return 0;
+ 		if (left > 0 && n > left)
+ 			n = left;
+ 		}
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/rhel/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-3572.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/rhel/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-3572.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..013876b974
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/rhel/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-3572.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s3_clnt.c.ecdh-downgrade openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s3_clnt.c
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s3_clnt.c.ecdh-downgrade	2015-01-12 16:37:49.978126895 +0100
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s3_clnt.c	2015-01-12 17:02:01.740959687 +0100
+@@ -1287,6 +1287,8 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
+ 	int encoded_pt_len = 0;
+ #endif
+ 
++	EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
++
+ 	/* use same message size as in ssl3_get_certificate_request()
+ 	 * as ServerKeyExchange message may be skipped */
+ 	n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
+@@ -1297,14 +1299,26 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
+ 		&ok);
+ 	if (!ok) return((int)n);
+ 
++	alg_k=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
++
+ 	if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)
+ 		{
++		/*
++		 * Can't skip server key exchange if this is an ephemeral
++		 * ciphersuite.
++		 */
++		if (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kEECDH))
++			{
++			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
++			al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
++			goto f_err;
++			}
+ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+ 		/* In plain PSK ciphersuite, ServerKeyExchange can be
+ 		   omitted if no identity hint is sent. Set
+ 		   session->sess_cert anyway to avoid problems
+ 		   later.*/
+-		if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)
++		if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK)
+ 			{
+ 			s->session->sess_cert=ssl_sess_cert_new();
+ 			if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)
+@@ -1347,9 +1361,8 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
+ 		}
+ 
+ 	param_len=0;
+-	alg_k=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
++
+ 	alg_a=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
+-	EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
+ 
+ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+ 	if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK)
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/rhel/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-8176.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/rhel/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-8176.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..052b907af2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/rhel/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-8176.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+From bcc311668ede6ffdcd6dc5a65454a548b5404fcc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: zhu qun-ying <qunying@yahoo.com>
+Date: Mon, 2 Jun 2014 14:38:52 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] Free up s->d1->buffered_app_data.q properly.
+
+PR#3286
+(cherry picked from commit 71e95000afb2227fe5cac1c79ae884338bcd8d0b)
+---
+ ssl/d1_lib.c | 9 ++++++---
+ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/ssl/d1_lib.c b/ssl/d1_lib.c
+index 106939f..6bde16f 100644
+--- a/ssl/d1_lib.c
++++ b/ssl/d1_lib.c
+@@ -176,9 +176,12 @@ static void dtls1_clear_queues(SSL *s)
+ 
+ 	while ( (item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->buffered_app_data.q)) != NULL)
+ 		{
+-		frag = (hm_fragment *)item->data;
+-		OPENSSL_free(frag->fragment);
+-		OPENSSL_free(frag);
++		rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *) item->data;
++		if (rdata->rbuf.buf)
++			{
++			OPENSSL_free(rdata->rbuf.buf);
++			}
++		OPENSSL_free(item->data);
+ 		pitem_free(item);
+ 		}
+ 	}
+-- 
+2.1.0
+
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/rhel/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-8275.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/rhel/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-8275.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..91041ac4d0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/rhel/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-8275.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,202 @@
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/asn1/a_bitstr.c.cert-fingerprint openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/asn1/a_bitstr.c
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/asn1/a_bitstr.c.cert-fingerprint	2013-02-11 16:26:04.000000000 +0100
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/asn1/a_bitstr.c	2015-01-13 12:23:36.090478923 +0100
+@@ -136,11 +136,16 @@ ASN1_BIT_STRING *c2i_ASN1_BIT_STRING(ASN
+ 
+ 	p= *pp;
+ 	i= *(p++);
++	if (i > 7)
++		{
++		i=ASN1_R_INVALID_BIT_STRING_BITS_LEFT;
++		goto err;
++		}
+ 	/* We do this to preserve the settings.  If we modify
+ 	 * the settings, via the _set_bit function, we will recalculate
+ 	 * on output */
+ 	ret->flags&= ~(ASN1_STRING_FLAG_BITS_LEFT|0x07); /* clear */
+-	ret->flags|=(ASN1_STRING_FLAG_BITS_LEFT|(i&0x07)); /* set */
++	ret->flags|=(ASN1_STRING_FLAG_BITS_LEFT|i); /* set */
+ 
+ 	if (len-- > 1) /* using one because of the bits left byte */
+ 		{
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/asn1/asn1_err.c.cert-fingerprint openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/asn1/asn1_err.c
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/asn1/asn1_err.c.cert-fingerprint	2013-02-11 16:26:04.000000000 +0100
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/asn1/asn1_err.c	2015-01-13 12:23:36.090478923 +0100
+@@ -246,6 +246,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA ASN1_str_reasons[
+ {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_TIME_VALUE)   ,"illegal time value"},
+ {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_INTEGER_NOT_ASCII_FORMAT),"integer not ascii format"},
+ {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_INTEGER_TOO_LARGE_FOR_LONG),"integer too large for long"},
++{ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_INVALID_BIT_STRING_BITS_LEFT),"invalid bit string bits left"},
+ {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_INVALID_BMPSTRING_LENGTH),"invalid bmpstring length"},
+ {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_INVALID_DIGIT)        ,"invalid digit"},
+ {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_INVALID_MIME_TYPE)    ,"invalid mime type"},
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/asn1/asn1.h.cert-fingerprint openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/asn1/asn1.h
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/asn1/asn1.h.cert-fingerprint	2015-01-13 11:44:11.999013082 +0100
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/asn1/asn1.h	2015-01-13 12:23:36.090478923 +0100
+@@ -776,7 +776,7 @@ DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS_fname(ASN1_TYPE,
+ int ASN1_TYPE_get(ASN1_TYPE *a);
+ void ASN1_TYPE_set(ASN1_TYPE *a, int type, void *value);
+ int ASN1_TYPE_set1(ASN1_TYPE *a, int type, const void *value);
+-int            ASN1_TYPE_cmp(ASN1_TYPE *a, ASN1_TYPE *b);
++int            ASN1_TYPE_cmp(const ASN1_TYPE *a, const ASN1_TYPE *b);
+ 
+ ASN1_OBJECT *	ASN1_OBJECT_new(void );
+ void		ASN1_OBJECT_free(ASN1_OBJECT *a);
+@@ -1329,6 +1329,7 @@ void ERR_load_ASN1_strings(void);
+ #define ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_TIME_VALUE			 184
+ #define ASN1_R_INTEGER_NOT_ASCII_FORMAT			 185
+ #define ASN1_R_INTEGER_TOO_LARGE_FOR_LONG		 128
++#define ASN1_R_INVALID_BIT_STRING_BITS_LEFT		 220
+ #define ASN1_R_INVALID_BMPSTRING_LENGTH			 129
+ #define ASN1_R_INVALID_DIGIT				 130
+ #define ASN1_R_INVALID_MIME_TYPE			 205
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/asn1/a_type.c.cert-fingerprint openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/asn1/a_type.c
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/asn1/a_type.c.cert-fingerprint	2013-02-11 16:26:04.000000000 +0100
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/asn1/a_type.c	2015-01-13 12:43:36.779633480 +0100
+@@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(ASN1_TYPE)
+ IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(ASN1_TYPE)
+ 
+ /* Returns 0 if they are equal, != 0 otherwise. */
+-int ASN1_TYPE_cmp(ASN1_TYPE *a, ASN1_TYPE *b)
++int ASN1_TYPE_cmp(const ASN1_TYPE *a, const ASN1_TYPE *b)
+ 	{
+ 	int result = -1;
+ 
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/asn1/a_verify.c.cert-fingerprint openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/asn1/a_verify.c
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/asn1/a_verify.c.cert-fingerprint	2015-01-13 11:44:12.308020070 +0100
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/asn1/a_verify.c	2015-01-13 11:44:12.413022445 +0100
+@@ -93,6 +93,12 @@ int ASN1_verify(i2d_of_void *i2d, X509_A
+ 		ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_VERIFY,ASN1_R_UNKNOWN_MESSAGE_DIGEST_ALGORITHM);
+ 		goto err;
+ 		}
++
++	if (signature->type == V_ASN1_BIT_STRING && signature->flags & 0x7)
++		{
++		ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_VERIFY, ASN1_R_INVALID_BIT_STRING_BITS_LEFT);
++		goto err;
++		}
+ 	
+ 	inl=i2d(data,NULL);
+ 	buf_in=OPENSSL_malloc((unsigned int)inl);
+@@ -149,6 +155,12 @@ int ASN1_item_verify(const ASN1_ITEM *it
+ 		return -1;
+ 		}
+ 
++	if (signature->type == V_ASN1_BIT_STRING && signature->flags & 0x7)
++		{
++		ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_VERIFY, ASN1_R_INVALID_BIT_STRING_BITS_LEFT);
++		return -1;
++		}
++
+ 	EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
+ 
+ 	/* Convert signature OID into digest and public key OIDs */
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/asn1/x_algor.c.cert-fingerprint openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/asn1/x_algor.c
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/asn1/x_algor.c.cert-fingerprint	2013-02-11 16:26:04.000000000 +0100
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/asn1/x_algor.c	2015-01-13 12:43:36.780633502 +0100
+@@ -142,3 +142,14 @@ void X509_ALGOR_set_md(X509_ALGOR *alg,
+ 	X509_ALGOR_set0(alg, OBJ_nid2obj(EVP_MD_type(md)), param_type, NULL);
+ 
+ 	}
++
++int X509_ALGOR_cmp(const X509_ALGOR *a, const X509_ALGOR *b)
++	{
++	int rv;
++	rv = OBJ_cmp(a->algorithm, b->algorithm);
++	if (rv)
++		return rv;
++	if (!a->parameter && !b->parameter)
++		return 0;
++	return ASN1_TYPE_cmp(a->parameter, b->parameter);
++	}
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/dsa/dsa_asn1.c.cert-fingerprint openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/dsa/dsa_asn1.c
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/dsa/dsa_asn1.c.cert-fingerprint	2013-02-11 16:26:04.000000000 +0100
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/dsa/dsa_asn1.c	2015-01-13 11:44:12.414022468 +0100
+@@ -176,13 +176,25 @@ int DSA_verify(int type, const unsigned
+ 	     const unsigned char *sigbuf, int siglen, DSA *dsa)
+ 	{
+ 	DSA_SIG *s;
++	const unsigned char *p = sigbuf;
++	unsigned char *der = NULL;
++	int derlen = -1;
+ 	int ret=-1;
+ 
+ 	s = DSA_SIG_new();
+ 	if (s == NULL) return(ret);
+-	if (d2i_DSA_SIG(&s,&sigbuf,siglen) == NULL) goto err;
++	if (d2i_DSA_SIG(&s,&p,siglen) == NULL) goto err;
++	/* Ensure signature uses DER and doesn't have trailing garbage */
++	derlen = i2d_DSA_SIG(s, &der);
++	if (derlen != siglen || memcmp(sigbuf, der, derlen))
++		goto err;
+ 	ret=DSA_do_verify(dgst,dgst_len,s,dsa);
+ err:
++	if (derlen > 0)
++		{
++		OPENSSL_cleanse(der, derlen);
++		OPENSSL_free(der);
++		}
+ 	DSA_SIG_free(s);
+ 	return(ret);
+ 	}
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/ecdsa/ecs_vrf.c.cert-fingerprint openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/ecdsa/ecs_vrf.c
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/ecdsa/ecs_vrf.c.cert-fingerprint	2013-02-11 16:02:48.000000000 +0100
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/ecdsa/ecs_vrf.c	2015-01-13 11:44:12.414022468 +0100
+@@ -57,6 +57,7 @@
+  */
+ 
+ #include "ecs_locl.h"
++#include "cryptlib.h"
+ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+ #include <openssl/engine.h>
+ #endif
+@@ -84,13 +85,25 @@ int ECDSA_verify(int type, const unsigne
+ 		const unsigned char *sigbuf, int sig_len, EC_KEY *eckey)
+  	{
+ 	ECDSA_SIG *s;
++	const unsigned char *p = sigbuf;
++	unsigned char *der = NULL;
++	int derlen = -1;
+ 	int ret=-1;
+ 
+ 	s = ECDSA_SIG_new();
+ 	if (s == NULL) return(ret);
+-	if (d2i_ECDSA_SIG(&s, &sigbuf, sig_len) == NULL) goto err;
++	if (d2i_ECDSA_SIG(&s, &p, sig_len) == NULL) goto err;
++	/* Ensure signature uses DER and doesn't have trailing garbage */
++	derlen = i2d_ECDSA_SIG(s, &der);
++	if (derlen != sig_len || memcmp(sigbuf, der, derlen))
++		goto err;
+ 	ret=ECDSA_do_verify(dgst, dgst_len, s, eckey);
+ err:
++	if (derlen > 0)
++		{
++		OPENSSL_cleanse(der, derlen);
++		OPENSSL_free(der);
++		}
+ 	ECDSA_SIG_free(s);
+ 	return(ret);
+ 	}
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/x509/x_all.c.cert-fingerprint openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/x509/x_all.c
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/x509/x_all.c.cert-fingerprint	2015-01-13 11:44:12.330020568 +0100
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/x509/x_all.c	2015-01-13 11:44:12.414022468 +0100
+@@ -72,6 +72,8 @@
+ 
+ int X509_verify(X509 *a, EVP_PKEY *r)
+ 	{
++	if (X509_ALGOR_cmp(a->sig_alg, a->cert_info->signature))
++		return 0;
+ 	return(ASN1_item_verify(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509_CINF),a->sig_alg,
+ 		a->signature,a->cert_info,r));
+ 	}
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/x509/x509.h.cert-fingerprint openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/x509/x509.h
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/x509/x509.h.cert-fingerprint	2015-01-13 11:44:12.126015954 +0100
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/x509/x509.h	2015-01-13 12:43:36.780633502 +0100
+@@ -768,6 +768,7 @@ int X509_ALGOR_set0(X509_ALGOR *alg, ASN
+ void X509_ALGOR_get0(ASN1_OBJECT **paobj, int *pptype, void **ppval,
+ 						X509_ALGOR *algor);
+ void X509_ALGOR_set_md(X509_ALGOR *alg, const EVP_MD *md);
++int X509_ALGOR_cmp(const X509_ALGOR *a, const X509_ALGOR *b);
+ 
+ X509_NAME *X509_NAME_dup(X509_NAME *xn);
+ X509_NAME_ENTRY *X509_NAME_ENTRY_dup(X509_NAME_ENTRY *ne);
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/rhel/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2015-0204.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/rhel/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2015-0204.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..527f7c56bd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/rhel/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2015-0204.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,158 @@
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_options.pod.rsa-ephemeral openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_options.pod
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_options.pod.rsa-ephemeral	2013-02-11 16:26:04.000000000 +0100
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_options.pod	2015-01-13 11:15:25.096957795 +0100
+@@ -151,15 +151,7 @@ temporary/ephemeral DH parameters are us
+ 
+ =item SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA
+ 
+-Always use ephemeral (temporary) RSA key when doing RSA operations
+-(see L<SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa_callback(3)|SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa_callback(3)>).
+-According to the specifications this is only done, when a RSA key
+-can only be used for signature operations (namely under export ciphers
+-with restricted RSA keylength). By setting this option, ephemeral
+-RSA keys are always used. This option breaks compatibility with the
+-SSL/TLS specifications and may lead to interoperability problems with
+-clients and should therefore never be used. Ciphers with EDH (ephemeral
+-Diffie-Hellman) key exchange should be used instead.
++This option is no longer implemented and is treated as no op.
+ 
+ =item SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE
+ 
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa_callback.pod.rsa-ephemeral openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa_callback.pod
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa_callback.pod.rsa-ephemeral	2013-02-11 16:02:48.000000000 +0100
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa_callback.pod	2015-01-13 11:15:25.096957795 +0100
+@@ -74,21 +74,14 @@ exchange and use EDH (Ephemeral Diffie-H
+ in order to achieve forward secrecy (see
+ L<SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback(3)|SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback(3)>).
+ 
+-On OpenSSL servers ephemeral RSA key exchange is therefore disabled by default
+-and must be explicitly enabled  using the SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA option of
+-L<SSL_CTX_set_options(3)|SSL_CTX_set_options(3)>, violating the TLS/SSL
+-standard. When ephemeral RSA key exchange is required for export ciphers,
+-it will automatically be used without this option!
+-
+-An application may either directly specify the key or can supply the key via
+-a callback function. The callback approach has the advantage, that the
+-callback may generate the key only in case it is actually needed. As the
+-generation of a RSA key is however costly, it will lead to a significant
+-delay in the handshake procedure.  Another advantage of the callback function
+-is that it can supply keys of different size (e.g. for SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA
+-usage) while the explicit setting of the key is only useful for key size of
+-512 bits to satisfy the export restricted ciphers and does give away key length
+-if a longer key would be allowed.
++An application may either directly specify the key or can supply the key via a
++callback function. The callback approach has the advantage, that the callback
++may generate the key only in case it is actually needed. As the generation of a
++RSA key is however costly, it will lead to a significant delay in the handshake
++procedure.  Another advantage of the callback function is that it can supply
++keys of different size while the explicit setting of the key is only useful for
++key size of 512 bits to satisfy the export restricted ciphers and does give
++away key length if a longer key would be allowed.
+ 
+ The B<tmp_rsa_callback> is called with the B<keylength> needed and
+ the B<is_export> information. The B<is_export> flag is set, when the
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/CHANGES.rsa-ephemeral openssl-1.0.1e/CHANGES
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/d1_srvr.c.rsa-ephemeral openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/d1_srvr.c
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/d1_srvr.c.rsa-ephemeral	2015-01-12 17:49:04.912808002 +0100
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/d1_srvr.c	2015-01-13 11:15:25.096957795 +0100
+@@ -450,24 +450,15 @@ int dtls1_accept(SSL *s)
+ 		case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B:
+ 			alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
+ 
+-			/* clear this, it may get reset by
+-			 * send_server_key_exchange */
+-			if ((s->options & SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA)
+-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
+-				&& !(alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
+-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
+-				)
+-				/* option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA sends temporary RSA key
+-				 * even when forbidden by protocol specs
+-				 * (handshake may fail as clients are not required to
+-				 * be able to handle this) */
+-				s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
+-			else
+-				s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=0;
++			/*
++			 * clear this, it may get reset by
++			 * send_server_key_exchange
++			 */
++			s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=0;
+ 
+ 			/* only send if a DH key exchange or
+ 			 * RSA but we have a sign only certificate */
+-			if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp
++			if (0
+ 			/* PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity
+ 			 * hint if provided */
+ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/ssl.h.rsa-ephemeral openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/ssl.h
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/ssl.h.rsa-ephemeral	2015-01-12 17:49:04.936808545 +0100
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/ssl.h	2015-01-13 11:15:25.098957840 +0100
+@@ -587,9 +587,8 @@ struct ssl_session_st
+ #define SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE				0x00080000L
+ /* If set, always create a new key when using tmp_dh parameters */
+ #define SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE				0x00100000L
+-/* Set to always use the tmp_rsa key when doing RSA operations,
+- * even when this violates protocol specs */
+-#define SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA				0x00200000L
++/* Does nothing: retained for compatibiity */
++#define SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA				0x0
+ /* Set on servers to choose the cipher according to the server's
+  * preferences */
+ #define SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE			0x00400000L
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s3_clnt.c.rsa-ephemeral openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s3_clnt.c
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s3_clnt.c.rsa-ephemeral	2015-01-12 17:49:04.946808771 +0100
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s3_clnt.c	2015-01-13 11:15:25.097957817 +0100
+@@ -1492,6 +1492,13 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
+ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ 	if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
+ 		{
++		/* Temporary RSA keys only allowed in export ciphersuites */
++		if (!SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher))
++			{
++			al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
++			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
++			goto f_err;
++			}
+ 		if ((rsa=RSA_new()) == NULL)
+ 			{
+ 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s3_srvr.c.rsa-ephemeral openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s3_srvr.c
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s3_srvr.c.rsa-ephemeral	2015-01-12 17:51:32.044135496 +0100
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s3_srvr.c	2015-01-13 11:15:25.098957840 +0100
+@@ -441,20 +441,11 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
+ 		case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B:
+ 			alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
+ 
+-			/* clear this, it may get reset by
+-			 * send_server_key_exchange */
+-			if ((s->options & SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA)
+-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
+-				&& !(alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
+-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
+-				)
+-				/* option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA sends temporary RSA key
+-				 * even when forbidden by protocol specs
+-				 * (handshake may fail as clients are not required to
+-				 * be able to handle this) */
+-				s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
+-			else
+-				s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=0;
++			/*
++			 * clear this, it may get reset by
++			 * send_server_key_exchange
++			 */
++			s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=0;
+ 
+ 
+ 			/* only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or
+@@ -468,7 +459,7 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
+ 			 * server certificate contains the server's
+ 			 * public key for key exchange.
+ 			 */
+-			if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp
++			if (0
+ 			/* PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity
+ 			 * hint if provided */
+ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/rhel/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2015-0205.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/rhel/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2015-0205.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..ff378ae4ef
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/rhel/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2015-0205.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s3_srvr.c.dh-unauthenticated openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s3_srvr.c
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s3_srvr.c.dh-unauthenticated	2015-01-12 17:49:04.930808409 +0100
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s3_srvr.c	2015-01-13 11:15:25.098957840 +0100
+@@ -2951,7 +2951,7 @@ int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
+ 	if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY)
+ 		{
+ 		s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
+-		if ((peer != NULL) && (type & EVP_PKT_SIGN))
++		if (peer != NULL)
+ 			{
+ 			al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+ 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE);
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/rhel/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2015-0206.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/rhel/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2015-0206.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..e2d1718689
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/rhel/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2015-0206.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,116 @@
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/d1_pkt.c.dtls-recleak openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/d1_pkt.c
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/d1_pkt.c.dtls-rec-leak	2015-01-13 11:44:12.410022377 +0100
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/d1_pkt.c	2015-01-13 11:50:40.062789458 +0100
+@@ -212,7 +212,7 @@ dtls1_buffer_record(SSL *s, record_pqueu
+ 	/* Limit the size of the queue to prevent DOS attacks */
+ 	if (pqueue_size(queue->q) >= 100)
+ 		return 0;
+-		
++
+ 	rdata = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(DTLS1_RECORD_DATA));
+ 	item = pitem_new(priority, rdata);
+ 	if (rdata == NULL || item == NULL)
+@@ -239,14 +239,6 @@ dtls1_buffer_record(SSL *s, record_pqueu
+ 	}
+ #endif
+ 
+-	/* insert should not fail, since duplicates are dropped */
+-	if (pqueue_insert(queue->q, item) == NULL)
+-		{
+-		OPENSSL_free(rdata);
+-		pitem_free(item);
+-		return(0);
+-		}
+-
+ 	s->packet = NULL;
+ 	s->packet_length = 0;
+ 	memset(&(s->s3->rbuf), 0, sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER));
+@@ -255,11 +247,24 @@ dtls1_buffer_record(SSL *s, record_pqueu
+ 	if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
+ 		{
+ 		SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_BUFFER_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
++		if (rdata->rbuf.buf != NULL)
++			OPENSSL_free(rdata->rbuf.buf);
+ 		OPENSSL_free(rdata);
+ 		pitem_free(item);
+-		return(0);
++		return(-1);
+ 		}
+-	
++
++	/* insert should not fail, since duplicates are dropped */
++	if (pqueue_insert(queue->q, item) == NULL)
++		{
++		SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_BUFFER_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
++		if (rdata->rbuf.buf != NULL)
++			OPENSSL_free(rdata->rbuf.buf);
++		OPENSSL_free(rdata);
++		pitem_free(item);
++		return(-1);
++		}
++
+ 	return(1);
+ 	}
+ 
+@@ -313,8 +318,9 @@ dtls1_process_buffered_records(SSL *s)
+             dtls1_get_unprocessed_record(s);
+             if ( ! dtls1_process_record(s))
+                 return(0);
+-            dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->d1->processed_rcds), 
+-                s->s3->rrec.seq_num);
++            if(dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->d1->processed_rcds),
++                s->s3->rrec.seq_num)<0)
++                return -1;
+             }
+         }
+ 
+@@ -529,7 +535,6 @@ printf("\n");
+ 
+ 	/* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */
+ 	s->packet_length=0;
+-	dtls1_record_bitmap_update(s, &(s->d1->bitmap));/* Mark receipt of record. */
+ 	return(1);
+ 
+ f_err:
+@@ -562,7 +567,8 @@ int dtls1_get_record(SSL *s)
+ 
+ 	/* The epoch may have changed.  If so, process all the
+ 	 * pending records.  This is a non-blocking operation. */
+-	dtls1_process_buffered_records(s);
++	if(dtls1_process_buffered_records(s)<0)
++		return -1;
+ 
+ 	/* if we're renegotiating, then there may be buffered records */
+ 	if (dtls1_get_processed_record(s))
+@@ -699,7 +705,9 @@ again:
+ 		{
+ 		if ((SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake) && !s->d1->listen)
+ 			{
+-			dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->d1->unprocessed_rcds), rr->seq_num);
++			if(dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->d1->unprocessed_rcds), rr->seq_num)<0)
++				return -1;
++			dtls1_record_bitmap_update(s, bitmap);/* Mark receipt of record. */
+ 			}
+ 		rr->length = 0;
+ 		s->packet_length = 0;
+@@ -712,6 +720,7 @@ again:
+ 		s->packet_length = 0;  /* dump this record */
+ 		goto again;   /* get another record */
+ 		}
++	dtls1_record_bitmap_update(s, bitmap);/* Mark receipt of record. */
+ 
+ 	return(1);
+ 
+@@ -863,7 +872,11 @@ start:
+ 		 * buffer the application data for later processing rather
+ 		 * than dropping the connection.
+ 		 */
+-		dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->d1->buffered_app_data), rr->seq_num);
++		if(dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->d1->buffered_app_data), rr->seq_num)<0)
++			{
++			SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
++			return -1;
++			}
+ 		rr->length = 0;
+ 		goto start;
+ 		}
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/rhel/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2015-0209.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/rhel/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2015-0209.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..0ebcc56a66
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/rhel/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2015-0209.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/asn1/x_x509.c.use-after-free openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/asn1/x_x509.c
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/asn1/x_x509.c.use-after-free	2013-02-11 16:26:04.000000000 +0100
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/asn1/x_x509.c	2015-06-11 11:14:52.581856349 +0200
+@@ -170,8 +170,14 @@ X509 *d2i_X509_AUX(X509 **a, const unsig
+ {
+ 	const unsigned char *q;
+ 	X509 *ret;
++	int freeret = 0;
++
+ 	/* Save start position */
+ 	q = *pp;
++
++	if(!a || *a == NULL) {
++		freeret = 1;
++	}
+ 	ret = d2i_X509(a, pp, length);
+ 	/* If certificate unreadable then forget it */
+ 	if(!ret) return NULL;
+@@ -181,7 +187,11 @@ X509 *d2i_X509_AUX(X509 **a, const unsig
+ 	if(!d2i_X509_CERT_AUX(&ret->aux, pp, length)) goto err;
+ 	return ret;
+ 	err:
+-	X509_free(ret);
++	if(freeret) {
++		X509_free(ret);
++		if (a)
++			*a = NULL;
++	}
+ 	return NULL;
+ }
+ 
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c.use-after-free openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c.use-after-free	2013-02-11 16:26:04.000000000 +0100
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c	2015-06-11 11:14:52.581856349 +0200
+@@ -1140,8 +1140,6 @@ EC_KEY *d2i_ECPrivateKey(EC_KEY **a, con
+                                  ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ 			goto err;
+ 			}
+-		if (a)
+-			*a = ret;
+ 		}
+ 	else
+ 		ret = *a;
+@@ -1206,11 +1204,13 @@ EC_KEY *d2i_ECPrivateKey(EC_KEY **a, con
+ 			}
+ 		}
+ 
++	if (a)
++		*a = ret;
+ 	ok = 1;
+ err:
+ 	if (!ok)
+ 		{
+-		if (ret)
++		if (ret && (a == NULL || *a != ret))
+ 			EC_KEY_free(ret);
+ 		ret = NULL;
+ 		}
+@@ -1358,8 +1358,6 @@ EC_KEY *d2i_ECParameters(EC_KEY **a, con
+ 			ECerr(EC_F_D2I_ECPARAMETERS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ 			return NULL;
+ 			}
+-		if (a)
+-			*a = ret;
+ 		}
+ 	else
+ 		ret = *a;
+@@ -1367,9 +1365,14 @@ EC_KEY *d2i_ECParameters(EC_KEY **a, con
+ 	if (!d2i_ECPKParameters(&ret->group, in, len))
+ 		{
+ 		ECerr(EC_F_D2I_ECPARAMETERS, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
++		if (a == NULL || *a != ret)
++			EC_KEY_free(ret);
+ 		return NULL;
+ 		}
+ 
++	if (a)
++		*a = ret;
++
+ 	return ret;
+ 	}
+ 
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/rhel/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2015-0286.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/rhel/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2015-0286.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..64ec2b794b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/rhel/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2015-0286.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/asn1/a_type.c.bool-cmp openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/asn1/a_type.c
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/asn1/a_type.c.bool-cmp	2015-03-18 13:02:36.000000000 +0100
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/asn1/a_type.c	2015-03-18 14:38:07.111401390 +0100
+@@ -124,6 +124,9 @@ int ASN1_TYPE_cmp(const ASN1_TYPE *a, co
+ 	case V_ASN1_OBJECT:
+ 		result = OBJ_cmp(a->value.object, b->value.object);
+ 		break;
++	case V_ASN1_BOOLEAN:
++		result = a->value.boolean - b->value.boolean;
++		break;
+ 	case V_ASN1_NULL:
+ 		result = 0;	/* They do not have content. */
+ 		break;
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/rhel/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2015-0287.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/rhel/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2015-0287.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..f77b099c4e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/rhel/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2015-0287.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c.item-reuse openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c.item-reuse	2013-02-11 16:26:04.000000000 +0100
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c	2015-03-19 15:46:51.097022616 +0100
+@@ -310,9 +310,19 @@ int ASN1_item_ex_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval,
+ 		case ASN1_ITYPE_CHOICE:
+ 		if (asn1_cb && !asn1_cb(ASN1_OP_D2I_PRE, pval, it, NULL))
+ 				goto auxerr;
+-
+-		/* Allocate structure */
+-		if (!*pval && !ASN1_item_ex_new(pval, it))
++		if (*pval)
++			{
++			/* Free up and zero CHOICE value if initialised */
++			i = asn1_get_choice_selector(pval, it);
++			if ((i >= 0) && (i < it->tcount))
++				{
++				tt = it->templates + i;
++				pchptr = asn1_get_field_ptr(pval, tt);
++				ASN1_template_free(pchptr, tt);
++				asn1_set_choice_selector(pval, -1, it);
++				}
++			}
++		else if (!ASN1_item_ex_new(pval, it))
+ 			{
+ 			ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I,
+ 						ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR);
+@@ -407,6 +417,19 @@ int ASN1_item_ex_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval,
+ 		if (asn1_cb && !asn1_cb(ASN1_OP_D2I_PRE, pval, it, NULL))
+ 				goto auxerr;
+ 
++		/* Free up and zero any ADB found */
++		for (i = 0, tt = it->templates; i < it->tcount; i++, tt++)
++			{
++			if (tt->flags & ASN1_TFLG_ADB_MASK)
++				{
++				const ASN1_TEMPLATE *seqtt;
++				ASN1_VALUE **pseqval;
++				seqtt = asn1_do_adb(pval, tt, 1);
++				pseqval = asn1_get_field_ptr(pval, seqtt);
++				ASN1_template_free(pseqval, seqtt);
++				}
++			}
++
+ 		/* Get each field entry */
+ 		for (i = 0, tt = it->templates; i < it->tcount; i++, tt++)
+ 			{
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/rhel/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2015-0288.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/rhel/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2015-0288.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..c8dc6b9888
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/rhel/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2015-0288.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/x509/x509_req.c.req-null-deref openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/x509/x509_req.c
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/x509/x509_req.c.req-null-deref	2013-02-11 16:26:04.000000000 +0100
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/x509/x509_req.c	2015-03-18 18:34:35.732448017 +0100
+@@ -92,6 +92,8 @@ X509_REQ *X509_to_X509_REQ(X509 *x, EVP_
+ 		goto err;
+ 
+ 	pktmp = X509_get_pubkey(x);
++	if (pktmp == NULL)
++		goto err;
+ 	i=X509_REQ_set_pubkey(ret,pktmp);
+ 	EVP_PKEY_free(pktmp);
+ 	if (!i) goto err;
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/rhel/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2015-0289.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/rhel/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2015-0289.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..b52889d7e9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/rhel/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2015-0289.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,184 @@
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c.pkcs7-null-deref openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c.pkcs7-null-deref	2013-02-11 16:26:04.000000000 +0100
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c	2015-03-18 18:54:10.064871658 +0100
+@@ -272,6 +272,27 @@ BIO *PKCS7_dataInit(PKCS7 *p7, BIO *bio)
+ 	PKCS7_RECIP_INFO *ri=NULL;
+ 	ASN1_OCTET_STRING *os=NULL;
+ 
++	if (p7 == NULL)
++		{
++		PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAINIT, PKCS7_R_INVALID_NULL_POINTER);
++		return NULL;
++		}
++	/*
++	 * The content field in the PKCS7 ContentInfo is optional, but that really
++	 * only applies to inner content (precisely, detached signatures).
++	 *
++	 * When reading content, missing outer content is therefore treated as an
++	 * error.
++	 *
++	 * When creating content, PKCS7_content_new() must be called before
++	 * calling this method, so a NULL p7->d is always an error.
++	 */
++	if (p7->d.ptr == NULL)
++		{
++		PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAINIT, PKCS7_R_NO_CONTENT);
++		return NULL;
++		}
++
+ 	i=OBJ_obj2nid(p7->type);
+ 	p7->state=PKCS7_S_HEADER;
+ 
+@@ -433,6 +454,18 @@ BIO *PKCS7_dataDecode(PKCS7 *p7, EVP_PKE
+        unsigned char *ek = NULL, *tkey = NULL;
+        int eklen = 0, tkeylen = 0;
+ 
++	if (p7 == NULL)
++		{
++		PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATADECODE, PKCS7_R_INVALID_NULL_POINTER);
++		return NULL;
++		}
++
++	if (p7->d.ptr == NULL)
++		{
++		PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATADECODE, PKCS7_R_NO_CONTENT);
++		return NULL;
++		}
++
+ 	i=OBJ_obj2nid(p7->type);
+ 	p7->state=PKCS7_S_HEADER;
+ 
+@@ -440,6 +473,12 @@ BIO *PKCS7_dataDecode(PKCS7 *p7, EVP_PKE
+ 		{
+ 	case NID_pkcs7_signed:
+ 		data_body=PKCS7_get_octet_string(p7->d.sign->contents);
++		if (!PKCS7_is_detached(p7) && data_body == NULL)
++			{
++			PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATADECODE,
++				PKCS7_R_NO_CONTENT);
++			goto err;
++			}
+ 		md_sk=p7->d.sign->md_algs;
+ 		break;
+ 	case NID_pkcs7_signedAndEnveloped:
+@@ -747,6 +786,18 @@ int PKCS7_dataFinal(PKCS7 *p7, BIO *bio)
+ 	STACK_OF(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO) *si_sk=NULL;
+ 	ASN1_OCTET_STRING *os=NULL;
+ 
++	if (p7 == NULL)
++		{
++		PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAFINAL, PKCS7_R_INVALID_NULL_POINTER);
++		return 0;
++		}
++
++	if (p7->d.ptr == NULL)
++		{
++		PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAFINAL, PKCS7_R_NO_CONTENT);
++		return 0;
++		}
++
+ 	EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx_tmp);
+ 	i=OBJ_obj2nid(p7->type);
+ 	p7->state=PKCS7_S_HEADER;
+@@ -791,6 +842,7 @@ int PKCS7_dataFinal(PKCS7 *p7, BIO *bio)
+ 		/* If detached data then the content is excluded */
+ 		if(PKCS7_type_is_data(p7->d.sign->contents) && p7->detached) {
+ 			M_ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(os);
++			os = NULL;
+ 			p7->d.sign->contents->d.data = NULL;
+ 		}
+ 		break;
+@@ -801,6 +853,7 @@ int PKCS7_dataFinal(PKCS7 *p7, BIO *bio)
+ 		if(PKCS7_type_is_data(p7->d.digest->contents) && p7->detached)
+ 			{
+ 			M_ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(os);
++			os = NULL;
+ 			p7->d.digest->contents->d.data = NULL;
+ 			}
+ 		break;
+@@ -873,23 +926,32 @@ int PKCS7_dataFinal(PKCS7 *p7, BIO *bio)
+ 		M_ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(p7->d.digest->digest, md_data, md_len);
+ 		}
+ 
+-	if (!PKCS7_is_detached(p7) && !(os->flags & ASN1_STRING_FLAG_NDEF))
++	if (!PKCS7_is_detached(p7))
+ 		{
+-		char *cont;
+-		long contlen;
+-		btmp=BIO_find_type(bio,BIO_TYPE_MEM);
+-		if (btmp == NULL)
+-			{
+-			PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAFINAL,PKCS7_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_MEM_BIO);
++		/*
++		 * NOTE(emilia): I think we only reach os == NULL here because detached
++		 * digested data support is broken.
++		 */
++		if (os == NULL)
+ 			goto err;
++		if (!(os->flags & ASN1_STRING_FLAG_NDEF))
++			{
++			char *cont;
++			long contlen;
++			btmp=BIO_find_type(bio,BIO_TYPE_MEM);
++			if (btmp == NULL)
++				{
++				PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAFINAL,PKCS7_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_MEM_BIO);
++				goto err;
++				}
++			contlen = BIO_get_mem_data(btmp, &cont);
++			/* Mark the BIO read only then we can use its copy of the data
++			 * instead of making an extra copy.
++			 */
++			BIO_set_flags(btmp, BIO_FLAGS_MEM_RDONLY);
++			BIO_set_mem_eof_return(btmp, 0);
++			ASN1_STRING_set0(os, (unsigned char *)cont, contlen);
+ 			}
+-		contlen = BIO_get_mem_data(btmp, &cont);
+-		/* Mark the BIO read only then we can use its copy of the data
+-		 * instead of making an extra copy.
+-		 */
+-		BIO_set_flags(btmp, BIO_FLAGS_MEM_RDONLY);
+-		BIO_set_mem_eof_return(btmp, 0);
+-		ASN1_STRING_set0(os, (unsigned char *)cont, contlen);
+ 		}
+ 	ret=1;
+ err:
+@@ -928,6 +990,7 @@ int PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO_sign(PKCS7_SIGNER_
+ 	if (EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&mctx,abuf,alen) <= 0)
+ 		goto err;
+ 	OPENSSL_free(abuf);
++	abuf = NULL;
+ 	if (EVP_DigestSignFinal(&mctx, NULL, &siglen) <= 0)
+ 		goto err;
+ 	abuf = OPENSSL_malloc(siglen);
+@@ -965,6 +1028,18 @@ int PKCS7_dataVerify(X509_STORE *cert_st
+ 	STACK_OF(X509) *cert;
+ 	X509 *x509;
+ 
++	if (p7 == NULL)
++		{
++		PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAVERIFY, PKCS7_R_INVALID_NULL_POINTER);
++		return 0;
++		}
++
++	if (p7->d.ptr == NULL)
++		{
++		PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAVERIFY, PKCS7_R_NO_CONTENT);
++		return 0;
++		}
++
+ 	if (PKCS7_type_is_signed(p7))
+ 		{
+ 		cert=p7->d.sign->cert;
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_lib.c.pkcs7-null-deref openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_lib.c
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_lib.c.pkcs7-null-deref	2013-02-11 16:26:04.000000000 +0100
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_lib.c	2015-03-18 18:05:58.398767116 +0100
+@@ -459,6 +459,8 @@ int PKCS7_set_digest(PKCS7 *p7, const EV
+ 
+ STACK_OF(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO) *PKCS7_get_signer_info(PKCS7 *p7)
+ 	{
++	if (p7 == NULL || p7->d.ptr == NULL)
++		return NULL;
+ 	if (PKCS7_type_is_signed(p7))
+ 		{
+ 		return(p7->d.sign->signer_info);
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/rhel/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2015-0292.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/rhel/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2015-0292.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..dd6a737808
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/rhel/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2015-0292.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/evp/encode.c.b64-underflow openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/evp/encode.c
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/evp/encode.c.b64-underflow	2013-02-11 16:26:04.000000000 +0100
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/evp/encode.c	2015-03-18 18:16:26.452331934 +0100
+@@ -324,6 +324,7 @@ int EVP_DecodeUpdate(EVP_ENCODE_CTX *ctx
+ 				v=EVP_DecodeBlock(out,d,n);
+ 				n=0;
+ 				if (v < 0) { rv=0; goto end; }
++				if (eof > v) { rv=-1; goto end; }
+ 				ret+=(v-eof);
+ 				}
+ 			else
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/rhel/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2015-0293.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/rhel/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2015-0293.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..1ca78b3ae8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/rhel/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2015-0293.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,102 @@
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s2_lib.c.ssl2-assert openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s2_lib.c
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s2_lib.c.ssl2-assert	2015-03-18 13:02:36.000000000 +0100
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s2_lib.c	2015-03-18 18:22:20.195322489 +0100
+@@ -488,7 +488,7 @@ int ssl2_generate_key_material(SSL *s)
+ 
+ 		OPENSSL_assert(s->session->master_key_length >= 0
+ 		    && s->session->master_key_length
+-		    < (int)sizeof(s->session->master_key));
++		    <= (int)sizeof(s->session->master_key));
+ 		EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx,s->session->master_key,s->session->master_key_length);
+ 		EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx,&c,1);
+ 		c++;
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s2_srvr.c.ssl2-assert openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s2_srvr.c
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s2_srvr.c.ssl2-assert	2013-02-11 16:26:04.000000000 +0100
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s2_srvr.c	2015-03-18 18:30:11.403974038 +0100
+@@ -446,9 +446,6 @@ static int get_client_master_key(SSL *s)
+ 		SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY,SSL_R_NO_PRIVATEKEY);
+ 		return(-1);
+ 		}
+-	i=ssl_rsa_private_decrypt(s->cert,s->s2->tmp.enc,
+-		&(p[s->s2->tmp.clear]),&(p[s->s2->tmp.clear]),
+-		(s->s2->ssl2_rollback)?RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
+ 
+ 	is_export=SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->session->cipher);
+ 	
+@@ -467,21 +464,61 @@ static int get_client_master_key(SSL *s)
+ 	else
+ 		ek=5;
+ 
++	/*
++	 * The format of the CLIENT-MASTER-KEY message is
++	 * 1 byte message type
++	 * 3 bytes cipher
++	 * 2-byte clear key length (stored in s->s2->tmp.clear)
++	 * 2-byte encrypted key length (stored in s->s2->tmp.enc)
++	 * 2-byte key args length (IV etc)
++	 * clear key
++	 * encrypted key
++	 * key args
++	 *
++	 * If the cipher is an export cipher, then the encrypted key bytes
++	 * are a fixed portion of the total key (5 or 8 bytes). The size of
++	 * this portion is in |ek|. If the cipher is not an export cipher,
++	 * then the entire key material is encrypted (i.e., clear key length
++	 * must be zero).
++	 */
++	 if ((!is_export && s->s2->tmp.clear != 0) ||
++		(is_export && s->s2->tmp.clear + ek != EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c)))
++		{
++		ssl2_return_error(s, SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
++		SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY,SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
++		return -1;
++		}
++	/*
++	 * The encrypted blob must decrypt to the encrypted portion of the key.
++	 * Decryption can't be expanding, so if we don't have enough encrypted
++	 * bytes to fit the key in the buffer, stop now.
++	 */
++	if ((is_export && s->s2->tmp.enc < ek) ||
++		(!is_export && s->s2->tmp.enc < EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c)))
++		{
++		ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
++		SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY,SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
++		return -1;
++		}
++
++	i = ssl_rsa_private_decrypt(s->cert, s->s2->tmp.enc,
++		&(p[s->s2->tmp.clear]),
++		&(p[s->s2->tmp.clear]),
++		(s->s2->ssl2_rollback) ? RSA_SSLV23_PADDING : RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
++
+ 	/* bad decrypt */
+ #if 1
+ 	/* If a bad decrypt, continue with protocol but with a
+ 	 * random master secret (Bleichenbacher attack) */
+-	if ((i < 0) ||
+-		((!is_export && (i != EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c)))
+-		|| (is_export && ((i != ek) || (s->s2->tmp.clear+(unsigned int)i !=
+-			(unsigned int)EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c))))))
++	if ((i < 0) || ((!is_export && i != EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c))
++		|| (is_export && i != ek)))
+ 		{
+ 		ERR_clear_error();
+ 		if (is_export)
+ 			i=ek;
+ 		else
+ 			i=EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c);
+-		if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p,i) <= 0)
++		if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(&p[s->s2->tmp.clear],i) <= 0)
+ 			return 0;
+ 		}
+ #else
+@@ -505,7 +542,8 @@ static int get_client_master_key(SSL *s)
+ 		}
+ #endif
+ 
+-	if (is_export) i+=s->s2->tmp.clear;
++	if (is_export)
++		i = EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c);
+ 
+ 	if (i > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
+ 		{
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/rhel/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2015-1789.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/rhel/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2015-1789.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..8633a76849
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/rhel/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2015-1789.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c.oob-read openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c.oob-read	2015-05-25 12:03:41.000000000 +0200
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c	2015-06-09 15:01:51.688640453 +0200
+@@ -1702,49 +1702,92 @@ int X509_cmp_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm,
+ 	ASN1_TIME atm;
+ 	long offset;
+ 	char buff1[24],buff2[24],*p;
+-	int i,j;
++	int i, j, remaining;
+ 
+ 	p=buff1;
+-	i=ctm->length;
++	remaining=ctm->length;
+ 	str=(char *)ctm->data;
++	/*
++	 * Note that the following (historical) code allows much more slack in the
++	 * time format than RFC5280. In RFC5280, the representation is fixed:
++	 * UTCTime: YYMMDDHHMMSSZ
++	 * GeneralizedTime: YYYYMMDDHHMMSSZ
++	 */
+ 	if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
+ 		{
+-		if ((i < 11) || (i > 17)) return 0;
++		/* YYMMDDHHMM[SS]Z or YYMMDDHHMM[SS](+-)hhmm */
++		int min_length = sizeof("YYMMDDHHMMZ") - 1;
++		int max_length = sizeof("YYMMDDHHMMSS+hhmm") - 1;
++		if (remaining < min_length || remaining > max_length)
++			return 0;
+ 		memcpy(p,str,10);
+ 		p+=10;
+ 		str+=10;
++		remaining -= 10;
+ 		}
+ 	else
+ 		{
+-		if (i < 13) return 0;
++		/* YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS[.fff]]Z or YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS[.f[f[f]]]](+-)hhmm */
++		int min_length = sizeof("YYYYMMDDHHMMZ") - 1;
++		int max_length = sizeof("YYYYMMDDHHMMSS.fff+hhmm") - 1;
++		if (remaining < min_length || remaining > max_length)
++			return 0;
+ 		memcpy(p,str,12);
+ 		p+=12;
+ 		str+=12;
++		remaining -= 12;
+ 		}
+ 
+ 	if ((*str == 'Z') || (*str == '-') || (*str == '+'))
+ 		{ *(p++)='0'; *(p++)='0'; }
+ 	else
+ 		{ 
++		/* SS (seconds) */
++		if (remaining < 2)
++			return 0;
+ 		*(p++)= *(str++);
+ 		*(p++)= *(str++);
+-		/* Skip any fractional seconds... */
+-		if (*str == '.')
++		remaining -= 2;
++		/*
++		 * Skip any (up to three) fractional seconds...
++		 * TODO(emilia): in RFC5280, fractional seconds are forbidden.
++		 * Can we just kill them altogether?
++		 */
++		if (remaining && *str == '.')
+ 			{
+ 			str++;
+-			while ((*str >= '0') && (*str <= '9')) str++;
++			remaining--;
++			for (i = 0; i < 3 && remaining; i++, str++, remaining--)
++				{
++				if (*str < '0' || *str > '9')
++					break;
++				}
+ 			}
+ 		
+ 		}
+ 	*(p++)='Z';
+ 	*(p++)='\0';
+ 
++	/* We now need either a terminating 'Z' or an offset. */
++	if (!remaining)
++		return 0;
+ 	if (*str == 'Z')
++		{
++		if (remaining != 1)
++			return 0;
+ 		offset=0;
++		}
+ 	else
+ 		{
++	        /* (+-)HHMM */
+ 		if ((*str != '+') && (*str != '-'))
+ 			return 0;
++		/* Historical behaviour: the (+-)hhmm offset is forbidden in RFC5280. */
++		if (remaining != 5)
++			return 0;
++		if (str[1] < '0' || str[1] > '9' || str[2] < '0' || str[2] > '9' ||
++			str[3] < '0' || str[3] > '9' || str[4] < '0' || str[4] > '9')
++			return 0;
+ 		offset=((str[1]-'0')*10+(str[2]-'0'))*60;
+ 		offset+=(str[3]-'0')*10+(str[4]-'0');
+ 		if (*str == '-')
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/rhel/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2015-1790.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/rhel/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2015-1790.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..3b3024097d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/rhel/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2015-1790.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c.missing-content openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c.missing-content	2015-05-25 12:03:41.000000000 +0200
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c	2015-06-09 15:21:21.377951520 +0200
+@@ -472,6 +472,12 @@ BIO *PKCS7_dataDecode(PKCS7 *p7, EVP_PKE
+ 	switch (i)
+ 		{
+ 	case NID_pkcs7_signed:
++		/*
++		 * p7->d.sign->contents is a PKCS7 structure consisting of a contentType
++		 * field and optional content.
++		 * data_body is NULL if that structure has no (=detached) content
++		 * or if the contentType is wrong (i.e., not "data").
++		 */
+ 		data_body=PKCS7_get_octet_string(p7->d.sign->contents);
+ 		if (!PKCS7_is_detached(p7) && data_body == NULL)
+ 			{
+@@ -484,6 +490,7 @@ BIO *PKCS7_dataDecode(PKCS7 *p7, EVP_PKE
+ 	case NID_pkcs7_signedAndEnveloped:
+ 		rsk=p7->d.signed_and_enveloped->recipientinfo;
+ 		md_sk=p7->d.signed_and_enveloped->md_algs;
++		/* data_body is NULL if the optional EncryptedContent is missing. */
+ 		data_body=p7->d.signed_and_enveloped->enc_data->enc_data;
+ 		enc_alg=p7->d.signed_and_enveloped->enc_data->algorithm;
+ 		evp_cipher=EVP_get_cipherbyobj(enc_alg->algorithm);
+@@ -496,6 +503,7 @@ BIO *PKCS7_dataDecode(PKCS7 *p7, EVP_PKE
+ 	case NID_pkcs7_enveloped:
+ 		rsk=p7->d.enveloped->recipientinfo;
+ 		enc_alg=p7->d.enveloped->enc_data->algorithm;
++		/* data_body is NULL if the optional EncryptedContent is missing. */
+ 		data_body=p7->d.enveloped->enc_data->enc_data;
+ 		evp_cipher=EVP_get_cipherbyobj(enc_alg->algorithm);
+ 		if (evp_cipher == NULL)
+@@ -509,6 +517,13 @@ BIO *PKCS7_dataDecode(PKCS7 *p7, EVP_PKE
+ 	        goto err;
+ 		}
+ 
++	/* Detached content must be supplied via in_bio instead. */
++	if (data_body == NULL && in_bio == NULL)
++		{
++		PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATADECODE, PKCS7_R_NO_CONTENT);
++		goto err;
++		}
++
+ 	/* We will be checking the signature */
+ 	if (md_sk != NULL)
+ 		{
+@@ -665,7 +680,7 @@ BIO *PKCS7_dataDecode(PKCS7 *p7, EVP_PKE
+ 		}
+ 
+ #if 1
+-	if (PKCS7_is_detached(p7) || (in_bio != NULL))
++	if (in_bio != NULL)
+ 		{
+ 		bio=in_bio;
+ 		}
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/rhel/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2015-1791.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/rhel/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2015-1791.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..2b6f315b8d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/rhel/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2015-1791.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,231 @@
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/ssl_err.c.ticket-race openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/ssl_err.c
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/ssl_err.c.ticket-race	2015-06-09 15:40:41.000000000 +0200
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/ssl_err.c	2015-06-09 15:45:06.879198463 +0200
+@@ -245,6 +245,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA SSL_str_functs[]=
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_READ),	"SSL_read"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_RSA_PRIVATE_DECRYPT),	"SSL_RSA_PRIVATE_DECRYPT"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_RSA_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT),	"SSL_RSA_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT"},
++{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_DUP),	"ssl_session_dup"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_NEW),	"SSL_SESSION_new"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_PRINT_FP),	"SSL_SESSION_print_fp"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_SET1_ID_CONTEXT),	"SSL_SESSION_set1_id_context"},
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/ssl.h.ticket-race openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/ssl.h
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/ssl.h.ticket-race	2015-06-09 15:40:41.000000000 +0200
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/ssl.h	2015-06-09 15:44:22.696191291 +0200
+@@ -2176,6 +2176,7 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void);
+ #define SSL_F_SSL_READ					 223
+ #define SSL_F_SSL_RSA_PRIVATE_DECRYPT			 187
+ #define SSL_F_SSL_RSA_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT			 188
++#define SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_DUP				 348
+ #define SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_NEW				 189
+ #define SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_PRINT_FP			 190
+ #define SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_SET1_ID_CONTEXT		 312
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/ssl_locl.h.ticket-race openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/ssl_locl.h
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/ssl_locl.h.ticket-race	2015-06-09 15:40:41.000000000 +0200
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/ssl_locl.h	2015-06-09 16:02:41.105243796 +0200
+@@ -822,6 +822,7 @@ void ssl_sess_cert_free(SESS_CERT *sc);
+ int ssl_set_peer_cert_type(SESS_CERT *c, int type);
+ int ssl_get_new_session(SSL *s, int session);
+ int ssl_get_prev_session(SSL *s, unsigned char *session,int len, const unsigned char *limit);
++SSL_SESSION *ssl_session_dup(SSL_SESSION *src, int ticket);
+ int ssl_cipher_id_cmp(const SSL_CIPHER *a,const SSL_CIPHER *b);
+ DECLARE_OBJ_BSEARCH_GLOBAL_CMP_FN(SSL_CIPHER, SSL_CIPHER,
+ 				  ssl_cipher_id);
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/ssl_sess.c.ticket-race openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/ssl_sess.c
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/ssl_sess.c.ticket-race	2013-02-11 16:26:04.000000000 +0100
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/ssl_sess.c	2015-06-11 13:48:26.724348868 +0200
+@@ -224,6 +224,146 @@ SSL_SESSION *SSL_SESSION_new(void)
+ 	return(ss);
+ 	}
+ 
++/*
++ * Create a new SSL_SESSION and duplicate the contents of |src| into it. If
++ * ticket == 0 then no ticket information is duplicated, otherwise it is.
++ */
++SSL_SESSION *ssl_session_dup(SSL_SESSION *src, int ticket)
++{
++	SSL_SESSION *dest;
++
++	dest = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*src));
++	if (dest == NULL)
++		{
++		goto err;
++		}
++	memcpy(dest, src, sizeof(*dest));
++
++	/*
++	 * Set the various pointers to NULL so that we can call SSL_SESSION_free in
++	 * the case of an error whilst halfway through constructing dest
++	 */
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
++	dest->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
++	dest->psk_identity = NULL;
++#endif
++	dest->ciphers = NULL;
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
++	dest->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
++# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
++	dest->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
++	dest->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = NULL;
++# endif
++#endif
++	dest->tlsext_tick = NULL;
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
++	dest->srp_username = NULL;
++#endif
++	memset(&dest->ex_data, 0, sizeof(dest->ex_data));
++
++	/* We deliberately don't copy the prev and next pointers */
++	dest->prev = NULL;
++	dest->next = NULL;
++
++	dest->references = 1;
++
++	if (src->sess_cert != NULL)
++		CRYPTO_add(&src->sess_cert->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESS_CERT);
++
++	if (src->peer != NULL)
++		CRYPTO_add(&src->peer->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
++
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
++	if (src->psk_identity_hint)
++		{
++		dest->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(src->psk_identity_hint);
++		if (dest->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
++			{
++			goto err;
++			}
++		}
++	if (src->psk_identity)
++		{
++		dest->psk_identity = BUF_strdup(src->psk_identity);
++		if (dest->psk_identity == NULL)
++			{
++			goto err;
++			}
++		}
++#endif
++
++	if(src->ciphers != NULL)
++		{
++		dest->ciphers = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(src->ciphers);
++		if (dest->ciphers == NULL)
++			goto err;
++		}
++
++	if (!CRYPTO_dup_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_SESSION,
++				&dest->ex_data, &src->ex_data))
++		{
++		goto err;
++		}
++
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
++	if (src->tlsext_hostname)
++		{
++		dest->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(src->tlsext_hostname);
++		if (dest->tlsext_hostname == NULL)
++			{
++			goto err;
++			}
++		}
++# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
++	if (src->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
++		{
++		dest->tlsext_ecpointformatlist =
++			BUF_memdup(src->tlsext_ecpointformatlist,
++				src->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
++		if (dest->tlsext_ecpointformatlist == NULL)
++			goto err;
++		}
++	if (src->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist)
++		{
++		dest->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist =
++			BUF_memdup(src->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist,
++				src->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
++		if (dest->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist == NULL)
++			goto err;
++		}
++# endif
++#endif
++
++	if (ticket != 0)
++		{
++		dest->tlsext_tick = BUF_memdup(src->tlsext_tick, src->tlsext_ticklen);
++        	if(dest->tlsext_tick == NULL)
++			goto err;
++		}
++	else
++		{
++		dest->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint = 0;
++		dest->tlsext_ticklen = 0;
++		}
++
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
++	if (src->srp_username)
++		{
++		dest->srp_username = BUF_strdup(src->srp_username);
++		if (dest->srp_username == NULL)
++			{
++			goto err;
++			}
++		}
++#endif
++
++	return dest;
++err:
++	SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_DUP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
++	SSL_SESSION_free(dest);
++	return NULL;
++}
++
+ const unsigned char *SSL_SESSION_get_id(const SSL_SESSION *s, unsigned int *len)
+ 	{
+ 	if(len)
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s3_clnt.c.ticket-race openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s3_clnt.c
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s3_clnt.c.ticket-race	2015-06-09 15:40:41.000000000 +0200
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s3_clnt.c	2015-06-09 15:39:56.315119013 +0200
+@@ -2092,6 +2092,44 @@ int ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(SSL *s)
+ 		}
+ 
+ 	p=d=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
++
++	if (s->session->session_id_length > 0)
++		{
++		int i = s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode;
++		SSL_SESSION *new_sess;
++		/*
++		 * We reused an existing session, so we need to replace it with a new
++		 * one
++		 */
++		if (i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT)
++			{
++			/*
++			 * Remove the old session from the cache
++			 */
++			if (i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE)
++				{
++				if (s->session_ctx->remove_session_cb != NULL)
++					s->session_ctx->remove_session_cb(s->session_ctx,
++						s->session);
++				}
++			else
++				{
++				/* We carry on if this fails */
++				SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session);
++				}
++			}
++
++		if ((new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0)) == 0)
++			{
++			al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
++			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
++			goto f_err;
++			}
++
++		SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
++		s->session = new_sess;
++		}
++
+ 	n2l(p, s->session->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint);
+ 	n2s(p, ticklen);
+ 	/* ticket_lifetime_hint + ticket_length + ticket */
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/rhel/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2015-1792.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/rhel/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2015-1792.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..5f2b0cd976
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/rhel/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2015-1792.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/cms/cms_smime.c.unknown-hash openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/cms/cms_smime.c
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/cms/cms_smime.c.unknown-hash	2013-02-11 16:26:04.000000000 +0100
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/cms/cms_smime.c	2015-06-09 16:07:16.001516190 +0200
+@@ -141,7 +141,7 @@ static void do_free_upto(BIO *f, BIO *up
+ 			BIO_free(f);
+ 			f = tbio;
+ 			}
+-		while (f != upto);
++		while (f && f != upto);
+ 		}
+ 	else
+ 		BIO_free_all(f);
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/rhel/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2015-3194.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/rhel/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2015-3194.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..58b52f26e2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/rhel/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2015-3194.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/rsa/rsa_ameth.c.pss-check openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/rsa/rsa_ameth.c
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/rsa/rsa_ameth.c.pss-check	2013-02-11 16:26:04.000000000 +0100
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/rsa/rsa_ameth.c	2015-12-04 09:03:18.300660817 +0100
+@@ -287,7 +287,7 @@ static RSA_PSS_PARAMS *rsa_pss_decode(co
+ 		{
+ 		ASN1_TYPE *param = pss->maskGenAlgorithm->parameter;
+ 		if (OBJ_obj2nid(pss->maskGenAlgorithm->algorithm) == NID_mgf1
+-			&& param->type == V_ASN1_SEQUENCE)
++			&& param && param->type == V_ASN1_SEQUENCE)
+ 			{
+ 			p = param->value.sequence->data;
+ 			plen = param->value.sequence->length;
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/rhel/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2015-3195.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/rhel/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2015-3195.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..80f196fa74
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/rhel/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2015-3195.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c.combine-leak openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c.combine-leak	2015-12-04 09:01:53.000000000 +0100
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c	2015-12-04 09:09:30.629793475 +0100
+@@ -169,6 +169,8 @@ int ASN1_item_ex_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval,
+ 	int otag;
+ 	int ret = 0;
+ 	ASN1_VALUE **pchptr, *ptmpval;
++	int combine = aclass & ASN1_TFLG_COMBINE;
++	aclass &= ~ASN1_TFLG_COMBINE;
+ 	if (!pval)
+ 		return 0;
+ 	if (aux && aux->asn1_cb)
+@@ -539,7 +541,8 @@ int ASN1_item_ex_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval,
+ 	auxerr:
+ 	ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, ASN1_R_AUX_ERROR);
+ 	err:
+-	ASN1_item_ex_free(pval, it);
++	if (combine == 0)
++		ASN1_item_ex_free(pval, it);
+ 	if (errtt)
+ 		ERR_add_error_data(4, "Field=", errtt->field_name,
+ 					", Type=", it->sname);
+@@ -767,7 +770,7 @@ static int asn1_template_noexp_d2i(ASN1_
+ 		{
+ 		/* Nothing special */
+ 		ret = ASN1_item_ex_d2i(val, &p, len, ASN1_ITEM_ptr(tt->item),
+-							-1, 0, opt, ctx);
++							-1, tt->flags & ASN1_TFLG_COMBINE, opt, ctx);
+ 		if (!ret)
+ 			{
+ 			ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_TEMPLATE_NOEXP_D2I,
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/rhel/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2015-3196.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/rhel/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2015-3196.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..19dc323ab2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/rhel/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2015-3196.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s3_clnt.c.psk-identity openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s3_clnt.c
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s3_clnt.c.psk-identity	2015-12-04 09:01:53.000000000 +0100
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s3_clnt.c	2015-12-04 09:36:24.182010426 +0100
+@@ -1367,8 +1367,6 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
+ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+ 	if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK)
+ 		{
+-		char tmp_id_hint[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1];
+-
+ 		al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ 		n2s(p,i);
+ 		param_len=i+2;
+@@ -1389,16 +1387,8 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
+ 				SSL_R_BAD_PSK_IDENTITY_HINT_LENGTH);
+ 			goto f_err;
+ 			}
+-		/* If received PSK identity hint contains NULL
+-		 * characters, the hint is truncated from the first
+-		 * NULL. p may not be ending with NULL, so create a
+-		 * NULL-terminated string. */
+-		memcpy(tmp_id_hint, p, i);
+-		memset(tmp_id_hint+i, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1-i);
+-		if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
+-			OPENSSL_free(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
+-		s->ctx->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(tmp_id_hint);
+-		if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
++		s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strndup((char *)p, i);
++		if (s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
+ 			{
+ 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ 			goto f_err;
+@@ -2904,7 +2894,7 @@ int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s
+ 				goto err;
+ 				}
+ 
+-			psk_len = s->psk_client_callback(s, s->ctx->psk_identity_hint,
++			psk_len = s->psk_client_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity_hint,
+ 				identity, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN,
+ 				psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
+ 			if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN)
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s3_srvr.c.psk-identity openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s3_srvr.c
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s3_srvr.c.psk-identity	2015-12-04 09:01:53.000000000 +0100
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s3_srvr.c	2015-12-04 09:43:45.144086868 +0100
+@@ -2751,7 +2751,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
+ 
+ 			if (s->session->psk_identity != NULL)
+ 				OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
+-			s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup((char *)p);
++			s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strndup((char *)p, i);
+ 			if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL)
+ 				{
+ 				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/rhel/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2015-4000.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/rhel/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2015-4000.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..66dd559d8b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/rhel/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2015-4000.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,241 @@
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback.pod.logjam openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback.pod
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback.pod.logjam	2013-02-11 16:02:48.000000000 +0100
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback.pod	2015-05-25 11:37:08.893049771 +0200
+@@ -12,12 +12,10 @@ SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback, SSL_CTX_set
+             DH *(*tmp_dh_callback)(SSL *ssl, int is_export, int keylength));
+  long SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh(SSL_CTX *ctx, DH *dh);
+ 
+- void SSL_set_tmp_dh_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,
++ void SSL_set_tmp_dh_callback(SSL *ctx,
+             DH *(*tmp_dh_callback)(SSL *ssl, int is_export, int keylength));
+  long SSL_set_tmp_dh(SSL *ssl, DH *dh)
+ 
+- DH *(*tmp_dh_callback)(SSL *ssl, int is_export, int keylength));
+-
+ =head1 DESCRIPTION
+ 
+ SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback() sets the callback function for B<ctx> to be
+@@ -50,24 +48,25 @@ even if he gets hold of the normal (cert
+ only used for signing.
+ 
+ In order to perform a DH key exchange the server must use a DH group
+-(DH parameters) and generate a DH key. The server will always generate a new
+-DH key during the negotiation, when the DH parameters are supplied via
+-callback and/or when the SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE option of
+-L<SSL_CTX_set_options(3)|SSL_CTX_set_options(3)> is set. It will
+-immediately create a DH key, when DH parameters are supplied via
+-SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh() and SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE is not set. In this case,
++(DH parameters) and generate a DH key.
++The server will always generate a new DH key during the negotiation
++if either the DH parameters are supplied via callback or the
++SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE option of SSL_CTX_set_options(3) is set (or both).
++It will  immediately create a DH key if DH parameters are supplied via
++SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh() and SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE is not set.
++In this case,
+ it may happen that a key is generated on initialization without later
+ being needed, while on the other hand the computer time during the
+ negotiation is being saved.
+ 
+ If "strong" primes were used to generate the DH parameters, it is not strictly
+ necessary to generate a new key for each handshake but it does improve forward
+-secrecy. If it is not assured, that "strong" primes were used (see especially
+-the section about DSA parameters below), SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE must be used
+-in order to prevent small subgroup attacks. Always using SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE
+-has an impact on the computer time needed during negotiation, but it is not
+-very large, so application authors/users should consider to always enable
+-this option.
++secrecy. If it is not assured that "strong" primes were used,
++SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE must be used in order to prevent small subgroup
++attacks. Always using SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE has an impact on the
++computer time needed during negotiation, but it is not very large, so
++application authors/users should consider always enabling this option.
++The option is required to implement perfect forward secrecy (PFS).
+ 
+ As generating DH parameters is extremely time consuming, an application
+ should not generate the parameters on the fly but supply the parameters.
+@@ -75,82 +74,62 @@ DH parameters can be reused, as the actu
+ the negotiation. The risk in reusing DH parameters is that an attacker
+ may specialize on a very often used DH group. Applications should therefore
+ generate their own DH parameters during the installation process using the
+-openssl L<dhparam(1)|dhparam(1)> application. In order to reduce the computer
+-time needed for this generation, it is possible to use DSA parameters
+-instead (see L<dhparam(1)|dhparam(1)>), but in this case SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE
+-is mandatory.
++openssl L<dhparam(1)|dhparam(1)> application. This application
++guarantees that "strong" primes are used.
+ 
+-Application authors may compile in DH parameters. Files dh512.pem,
+-dh1024.pem, dh2048.pem, and dh4096 in the 'apps' directory of current
++Files dh2048.pem, and dh4096.pem in the 'apps' directory of the current
+ version of the OpenSSL distribution contain the 'SKIP' DH parameters,
+ which use safe primes and were generated verifiably pseudo-randomly.
+ These files can be converted into C code using the B<-C> option of the
+-L<dhparam(1)|dhparam(1)> application.
+-Authors may also generate their own set of parameters using
+-L<dhparam(1)|dhparam(1)>, but a user may not be sure how the parameters were
+-generated. The generation of DH parameters during installation is therefore
+-recommended.
++L<dhparam(1)|dhparam(1)> application. Generation of custom DH
++parameters during installation should still be preferred to stop an
++attacker from specializing on a commonly used group. Files dh1024.pem
++and dh512.pem contain old parameters that must not be used by
++applications.
+ 
+ An application may either directly specify the DH parameters or
+-can supply the DH parameters via a callback function. The callback approach
+-has the advantage, that the callback may supply DH parameters for different
+-key lengths.
+-
+-The B<tmp_dh_callback> is called with the B<keylength> needed and
+-the B<is_export> information. The B<is_export> flag is set, when the
+-ephemeral DH key exchange is performed with an export cipher.
++can supply the DH parameters via a callback function.
++
++Previous versions of the callback used B<is_export> and B<keylength>
++parameters to control parameter generation for export and non-export
++cipher suites. Modern servers that do not support export ciphersuites
++are advised to either use SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh() in combination with
++SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE, or alternatively, use the callback but ignore
++B<keylength> and B<is_export> and simply supply at least 2048-bit
++parameters in the callback.
+ 
+ =head1 EXAMPLES
+ 
+-Handle DH parameters for key lengths of 512 and 1024 bits. (Error handling
++Setup DH parameters with a key length of 2048 bits. (Error handling
+ partly left out.)
+ 
+- ...
+- /* Set up ephemeral DH stuff */
+- DH *dh_512 = NULL;
+- DH *dh_1024 = NULL;
+- FILE *paramfile;
++ Command-line parameter generation:
++ $ openssl dhparam -out dh_param_2048.pem 2048
+ 
++ Code for setting up parameters during server initialization:
++
++ ...
++ SSL_CTX ctx = SSL_CTX_new();
+  ...
+- /* "openssl dhparam -out dh_param_512.pem -2 512" */
+- paramfile = fopen("dh_param_512.pem", "r");
++
++ /* Set up ephemeral DH parameters. */
++ DH *dh_2048 = NULL;
++ FILE *paramfile;
++ paramfile = fopen("dh_param_2048.pem", "r");
+  if (paramfile) {
+-   dh_512 = PEM_read_DHparams(paramfile, NULL, NULL, NULL);
++   dh_2048 = PEM_read_DHparams(paramfile, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+    fclose(paramfile);
++ } else {
++   /* Error. */
+  }
+- /* "openssl dhparam -out dh_param_1024.pem -2 1024" */
+- paramfile = fopen("dh_param_1024.pem", "r");
+- if (paramfile) {
+-   dh_1024 = PEM_read_DHparams(paramfile, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+-   fclose(paramfile);
++ if (dh_2048 == NULL) {
++  /* Error. */
+  }
+- ...
+-
+- /* "openssl dhparam -C -2 512" etc... */
+- DH *get_dh512() { ... }
+- DH *get_dh1024() { ... }
+-
+- DH *tmp_dh_callback(SSL *s, int is_export, int keylength)
+- {
+-    DH *dh_tmp=NULL;
+-
+-    switch (keylength) {
+-    case 512:
+-      if (!dh_512)
+-        dh_512 = get_dh512();
+-      dh_tmp = dh_512;
+-      break;
+-    case 1024:
+-      if (!dh_1024) 
+-        dh_1024 = get_dh1024();
+-      dh_tmp = dh_1024;
+-      break;
+-    default:
+-      /* Generating a key on the fly is very costly, so use what is there */
+-      setup_dh_parameters_like_above();
+-    }
+-    return(dh_tmp);
++ if (SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh(ctx, dh_2048) != 1) {
++   /* Error. */
+  }
++ SSL_CTX_set_options(ctx, SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE);
++ ...
+ 
+ =head1 RETURN VALUES
+ 
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/ssl_err.c.logjam openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/ssl_err.c
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/ssl_err.c.logjam	2015-05-25 11:38:29.834858712 +0200
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/ssl_err.c	2015-05-25 11:42:01.041578905 +0200
+@@ -361,6 +361,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA SSL_str_reasons[]
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG)  ,"data length too long"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED)     ,"decryption failed"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC),"decryption failed or bad record mac"},
++{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL)      ,"dh key too small"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG),"dh public value length is wrong"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED)   ,"digest check failed"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_DTLS_MESSAGE_TOO_BIG)  ,"dtls message too big"},
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/ssl.h.logjam openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/ssl.h
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/ssl.h.logjam	2015-05-25 11:38:29.834858712 +0200
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/ssl.h	2015-05-25 11:40:42.482823220 +0200
+@@ -2289,6 +2289,7 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void);
+ #define SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG			 146
+ #define SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED				 147
+ #define SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC	 281
++#define SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL                           372
+ #define SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG		 148
+ #define SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED			 149
+ #define SSL_R_DTLS_MESSAGE_TOO_BIG			 334
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s3_clnt.c.logjam openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s3_clnt.c
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s3_clnt.c.logjam	2015-05-25 11:38:29.833858690 +0200
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s3_clnt.c	2015-05-25 11:51:05.845754562 +0200
+@@ -3277,24 +3277,34 @@ int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s
+ 		}
+ #endif
+ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+-	if ((alg_k & SSL_kEDH) &&
+-		!(has_bits(i,EVP_PK_DH|EVP_PKT_EXCH) || (dh != NULL)))
++	if ((alg_k & SSL_kEDH) && dh == NULL)
+ 		{
+-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_MISSING_DH_KEY);
++		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ 		goto f_err;
+ 		}
+-	else if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHr) && !has_bits(i,EVP_PK_DH|EVP_PKS_RSA))
++	if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHr) && !has_bits(i,EVP_PK_DH|EVP_PKS_RSA))
+ 		{
+ 		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_MISSING_DH_RSA_CERT);
+ 		goto f_err;
+ 		}
+ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+-	else if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHd) && !has_bits(i,EVP_PK_DH|EVP_PKS_DSA))
++	if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHd) && !has_bits(i,EVP_PK_DH|EVP_PKS_DSA))
+ 		{
+ 		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_MISSING_DH_DSA_CERT);
+ 		goto f_err;
+ 		}
+ #endif
++	/* Check DHE only: static DH not implemented. */
++	if (alg_k & SSL_kEDH)
++		{
++		int dh_size = BN_num_bits(dh->p);
++		if ((!SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) && dh_size < 768)
++		    || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) && dh_size < 512))
++			{
++			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
++			goto f_err;
++			}
++		}
+ #endif
+ 
+ 	if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) && !has_bits(i,EVP_PKT_EXP))
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/rhel/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2015-7575.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/rhel/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2015-7575.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..dc86361db5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/rhel/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2015-7575.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/t1_lib.c.no-md5-tls openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/t1_lib.c
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/t1_lib.c.no-md5-tls	2015-12-04 09:51:39.000000000 +0100
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/t1_lib.c	2015-12-21 14:09:35.239084727 +0100
+@@ -390,19 +390,11 @@ static unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
+ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
+ 	tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
+ #endif
+-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
+-	tlsext_sigalg_rsa(TLSEXT_hash_md5)
+-#endif
+ };
+ 
+ int tls12_get_req_sig_algs(SSL *s, unsigned char *p)
+ 	{
+ 	size_t slen = sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
+-#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
+-	/* If FIPS mode don't include MD5 which is last */
+-	if (FIPS_mode())
+-		slen -= 2;
+-#endif
+ 	if (p)
+ 		memcpy(p, tls12_sigalgs, slen);
+ 	return (int)slen;
+@@ -2413,14 +2405,6 @@ const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned ch
+ 	{
+ 	switch(hash_alg)
+ 		{
+-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
+-		case TLSEXT_hash_md5:
+-#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
+-		if (FIPS_mode())
+-			return NULL;
+-#endif
+-		return EVP_md5();
+-#endif
+ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
+ 		case TLSEXT_hash_sha1:
+ 		return EVP_sha1();
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.0.1e.bb b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.0.1e.bb
index b4d59ae2b0..9192bbdacb 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.0.1e.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.0.1e.bb
@@ -48,7 +48,65 @@ SRC_URI += "file://configure-targets.patch \
 	    file://openssl-fix-CVE-2014-3513.patch \
 	    file://openssl-fix-CVE-2014-3567.patch \
 	    file://openssl-fix-CVE-2014-3568.patch \
+\
+            file://rhel/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-3505.patch \
+            file://rhel/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-3506.patch \
+            file://rhel/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-3507.patch \
+            file://rhel/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-3508.patch \
+            file://rhel/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-3509.patch \
+            file://rhel/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-3510.patch \
+            file://rhel/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-3511.patch \
+            file://rhel/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-3570.patch \
+            file://rhel/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-3571.patch \
+            file://rhel/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-3572.patch \
+            file://rhel/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-8275.patch \
+            file://rhel/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2015-0204.patch \
+            file://rhel/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2015-0205.patch \
+            file://rhel/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2015-0206.patch \
+            file://rhel/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2015-0209.patch \
+            file://rhel/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2015-0286.patch \
+            file://rhel/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2015-0287.patch \
+            file://rhel/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2015-0288.patch \
+            file://rhel/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2015-0289.patch \
+            file://rhel/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2015-0292.patch \
+            file://rhel/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2015-0293.patch \
+            file://rhel/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2015-4000.patch \
+            file://rhel/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-8176.patch \
+            file://rhel/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2015-1789.patch \
+            file://rhel/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2015-1790.patch \
+            file://rhel/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2015-1791.patch \
+            file://rhel/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2015-1792.patch \
+            file://rhel/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2015-3194.patch \
+            file://rhel/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2015-3195.patch \
+            file://rhel/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2015-3196.patch \
+            file://rhel/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2015-7575.patch \
            "
+#            file://rhel/openssl-1.0.1e-evp-wrap.patch -- looks like a feature
+#            file://rhel/openssl-1.0.1e-backports.patch -- doesn't apply cleanly
+#            file://rhel/openssl-1.0.1-beta2-padlock64.patch -- via?
+#            file://rhel/openssl-1.0.1e-arm-use-elf-auxv-caps.patch  --feature
+#            file://rhel/openssl-1.0.1e-bad-mac.patch  -- aes-ni patch
+#            file://rhel/openssl-1.0.1e-trusted-first.patch -- feature
+#            file://rhel/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2013-6449.patch -- SSL_METHOD..
+#            file://rhel/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2013-6450.patch -- Fix-DTLS..
+#            file://rhel/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2013-4353.patch  -- Fix for TLS..
+#            file://rhel/openssl-1.0.1e-ephemeral-key-size.patch -- feature
+#            file://rhel/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0160.patch -- applied
+#            file://rhel/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2010-5298.patch -- applied
+#            file://rhel/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0195.patch -- applied
+#            file://rhel/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0198.patch -- applied
+#            file://rhel/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0221.patch -- applied
+#            file://rhel/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0224.patch -- applied
+#            file://rhel/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-3470.patch -- applied
+#            file://rhel/openssl-1.0.1e-dtls-ecc-ext.patch -- bug fix.. no security
+#            file://rhel/openssl-1.0.1e-doc-ciphersuites.patch --bugfix
+#            file://rhel/openssl-1.0.1e-sn-case.patch -- bugfix
+#            file://rhel/openssl-1.0.1e-ecdh-auto.patch -- feature
+#            file://rhel/openssl-1.0.1e-fallback-scsv.patch -- feature
+#            file://rhel/openssl-1.0.1e-copy-algo.patch -- bugfix?
+#            file://rhel/openssl-1.0.1e-cc-reqs.patch -- bugfix
+#            file://rhel/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-3567.patch -- applied
+#            file://rhel/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-3513.patch -- applied
 
 SRC_URI[md5sum] = "66bf6f10f060d561929de96f9dfe5b8c"
 SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "f74f15e8c8ff11aa3d5bb5f276d202ec18d7246e95f961db76054199c69c1ae3"