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openssl: backport fix for CVE-2014-0160 

Fixes the "heartbleed" TLS vulnerability (CVE-2014-0160). More
information here:

https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2014-0160

Patch borrowed from Debian; this is just a tweaked version of the
upstream commit (without patching the CHANGES file which otherwise
would fail to apply on top of this version).

(From OE-Core rev: c3acfdfe0c0c3579c5f469f10b87a2926214ba5d)

Signed-off-by: Paul Eggleton <paul.eggleton@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>
This commit is contained in:
Paul Eggleton 2014-04-08 19:15:08 +01:00 committed by Richard Purdie
parent 7f9dd3ff42
commit 609ae39284
2 changed files with 119 additions and 0 deletions
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118
meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/CVE-2014-0160.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,118 @@
From 96db9023b881d7cd9f379b0c154650d6c108e9a3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "Dr. Stephen Henson" <steve@openssl.org>
Date: Sun, 6 Apr 2014 00:51:06 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] Add heartbeat extension bounds check.
A missing bounds check in the handling of the TLS heartbeat extension
can be used to reveal up to 64k of memory to a connected client or
server.
Thanks for Neel Mehta of Google Security for discovering this bug and to
Adam Langley <agl@chromium.org> and Bodo Moeller <bmoeller@acm.org> for
preparing the fix (CVE-2014-0160)
Patch (tweaked version of upstream fix without CHANGES change) borrowed
from Debian.
Upstream-Status: Backport
Signed-off-by: Paul Eggleton <paul.eggleton@linux.intel.com>
---
ssl/d1_both.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++--------
ssl/t1_lib.c | 14 +++++++++-----
3 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
diff --git a/ssl/d1_both.c b/ssl/d1_both.c
index 7a5596a..2e8cf68 100644
--- a/ssl/d1_both.c
+++ b/ssl/d1_both.c
@@ -1459,26 +1459,36 @@ dtls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
unsigned int payload;
unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
- /* Read type and payload length first */
- hbtype = *p++;
- n2s(p, payload);
- pl = p;
-
if (s->msg_callback)
s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
&s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length,
s, s->msg_callback_arg);
+ /* Read type and payload length first */
+ if (1 + 2 + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
+ return 0; /* silently discard */
+ hbtype = *p++;
+ n2s(p, payload);
+ if (1 + 2 + payload + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
+ return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */
+ pl = p;
+
if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST)
{
unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
+ unsigned int write_length = 1 /* heartbeat type */ +
+ 2 /* heartbeat length */ +
+ payload + padding;
int r;
+ if (write_length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)
+ return 0;
+
/* Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 byte
* message type, plus 2 bytes payload length, plus
* payload, plus padding
*/
- buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
+ buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(write_length);
bp = buffer;
/* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
@@ -1489,11 +1499,11 @@ dtls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
/* Random padding */
RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding);
- r = dtls1_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, 3 + payload + padding);
+ r = dtls1_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, write_length);
if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback)
s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
- buffer, 3 + payload + padding,
+ buffer, write_length,
s, s->msg_callback_arg);
OPENSSL_free(buffer);
diff --git a/ssl/t1_lib.c b/ssl/t1_lib.c
index b82fada..bddffd9 100644
--- a/ssl/t1_lib.c
+++ b/ssl/t1_lib.c
@@ -2588,16 +2588,20 @@ tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
unsigned int payload;
unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
- /* Read type and payload length first */
- hbtype = *p++;
- n2s(p, payload);
- pl = p;
-
if (s->msg_callback)
s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
&s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length,
s, s->msg_callback_arg);
+ /* Read type and payload length first */
+ if (1 + 2 + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
+ return 0; /* silently discard */
+ hbtype = *p++;
+ n2s(p, payload);
+ if (1 + 2 + payload + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
+ return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */
+ pl = p;
+
if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST)
{
unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
--
1.9.1

1
meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.0.1e.bb
View File

@ -37,6 +37,7 @@ SRC_URI += "file://configure-targets.patch \
file://0001-Fix-for-TLS-record-tampering-bug-CVE-2013-4353.patch \
file://0001-Fix-DTLS-retransmission-from-previous-session.patch \
file://0001-Use-version-in-SSL_METHOD-not-SSL-structure.patch \
file://CVE-2014-0160.patch \
"
SRC_URI[md5sum] = "66bf6f10f060d561929de96f9dfe5b8c"