Update to 4.19.101
Cleanup debian/changelog file Drop "random: try to actively add entropy rather than passively wait for it"
This commit is contained in:
Salvatore Bonaccorso
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c2975cd055
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f003f0dba9
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@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
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linux (4.19.100-1) UNRELEASED; urgency=medium
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linux (4.19.101-1) UNRELEASED; urgency=medium
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* New upstream stable update:
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https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/ChangeLog-4.19.99
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@ -515,6 +515,55 @@ linux (4.19.100-1) UNRELEASED; urgency=medium
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- mm/memunmap: don't access uninitialized memmap in memunmap_pages()
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- mm/memory_hotplug: fix try_offline_node()
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- mm/memory_hotplug: shrink zones when offlining memory
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https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/ChangeLog-4.19.101
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- orinoco_usb: fix interface sanity check
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- rsi_91x_usb: fix interface sanity check
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- usb: dwc3: pci: add ID for the Intel Comet Lake -V variant
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- USB: serial: ir-usb: add missing endpoint sanity check
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- USB: serial: ir-usb: fix link-speed handling
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- USB: serial: ir-usb: fix IrLAP framing
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- [arm64,armhf] usb: dwc3: turn off VBUS when leaving host mode
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- staging: wlan-ng: ensure error return is actually returned
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- [x86] staging: vt6656: correct packet types for CTS protect, mode.
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- [x86] staging: vt6656: use NULLFUCTION stack on mac80211
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- [x86] staging: vt6656: Fix false Tx excessive retries reporting.
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- [arm64,armel] serial: 8250_bcm2835aux: Fix line mismatch on driver
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unbind
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- component: do not dereference opaque pointer in debugfs
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- mei: me: add comet point (lake) H device ids
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- crypto: chelsio - fix writing tfm flags to wrong place
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- cifs: Fix memory allocation in __smb2_handle_cancelled_cmd()
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- ath9k: fix storage endpoint lookup
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- brcmfmac: fix interface sanity check
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- rtl8xxxu: fix interface sanity check
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- zd1211rw: fix storage endpoint lookup
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- net_sched: ematch: reject invalid TCF_EM_SIMPLE
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- net_sched: fix ops->bind_class() implementations
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- HID: multitouch: Add LG MELF0410 I2C touchscreen support
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- HID: Add quirk for Xin-Mo Dual Controller
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- HID: ite: Add USB id match for Acer SW5-012 keyboard dock
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- HID: Add quirk for incorrect input length on Lenovo Y720
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- drivers/hid/hid-multitouch.c: fix a possible null pointer access.
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- [arm64] phy: qcom-qmp: Increase PHY ready timeout
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- drivers/net/b44: Change to non-atomic bit operations on pwol_mask
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- [i386] net: wan: sdla: Fix cast from pointer to integer of different
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size
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- [arm64] gpio: max77620: Add missing dependency on GPIOLIB_IRQCHIP
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- atm: eni: fix uninitialized variable warning
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- HID: steam: Fix input device disappearing
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- [x86] platform/x86: dell-laptop: disable kbd backlight on Inspiron 10xx
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- PCI: Add DMA alias quirk for Intel VCA NTB
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- [amd64] iommu: Support multiple PCI DMA aliases in IRQ Remapping
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- usb-storage: Disable UAS on JMicron SATA enclosure
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- sched/fair: Add tmp_alone_branch assertion
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- sched/fair: Fix insertion in rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
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- rsi: fix use-after-free on probe errors
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- rsi: fix memory leak on failed URB submission
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- rsi: fix non-atomic allocation in completion handler
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- crypto: af_alg - Use bh_lock_sock in sk_destruct
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- block: cleanup __blkdev_issue_discard()
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- block: fix 32 bit overflow in __blkdev_issue_discard()
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- [arm64] KVM: Write arch.mdcr_el2 changes since last vcpu_load on VHE
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[ Salvatore Bonaccorso ]
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* vfs: fix do_last() regression
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@ -1,143 +0,0 @@
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From: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Date: Sat, 28 Sep 2019 16:53:52 -0700
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Subject: [PATCH] random: try to actively add entropy rather than passively
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wait for it
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Origin: https://git.kernel.org/linus/50ee7529ec4500c88f8664560770a7a1b65db72b
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Bug-Debian: https://bugs.debian.org/948519
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For 5.3 we had to revert a nice ext4 IO pattern improvement, because it
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caused a bootup regression due to lack of entropy at bootup together
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with arguably broken user space that was asking for secure random
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numbers when it really didn't need to.
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See commit 72dbcf721566 (Revert "ext4: make __ext4_get_inode_loc plug").
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This aims to solve the issue by actively generating entropy noise using
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the CPU cycle counter when waiting for the random number generator to
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initialize. This only works when you have a high-frequency time stamp
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counter available, but that's the case on all modern x86 CPU's, and on
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most other modern CPU's too.
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What we do is to generate jitter entropy from the CPU cycle counter
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under a somewhat complex load: calling the scheduler while also
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guaranteeing a certain amount of timing noise by also triggering a
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timer.
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I'm sure we can tweak this, and that people will want to look at other
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alternatives, but there's been a number of papers written on jitter
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entropy, and this should really be fairly conservative by crediting one
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bit of entropy for every timer-induced jump in the cycle counter. Not
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because the timer itself would be all that unpredictable, but because
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the interaction between the timer and the loop is going to be.
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Even if (and perhaps particularly if) the timer actually happens on
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another CPU, the cacheline interaction between the loop that reads the
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cycle counter and the timer itself firing is going to add perturbations
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to the cycle counter values that get mixed into the entropy pool.
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As Thomas pointed out, with a modern out-of-order CPU, even quite simple
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loops show a fair amount of hard-to-predict timing variability even in
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the absense of external interrupts. But this tries to take that further
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by actually having a fairly complex interaction.
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This is not going to solve the entropy issue for architectures that have
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no CPU cycle counter, but it's not clear how (and if) that is solvable,
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and the hardware in question is largely starting to be irrelevant. And
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by doing this we can at least avoid some of the even more contentious
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approaches (like making the entropy waiting time out in order to avoid
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the possibly unbounded waiting).
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Cc: Ahmed Darwish <darwish.07@gmail.com>
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Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
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Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
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Cc: Nicholas Mc Guire <hofrat@opentech.at>
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Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
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Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
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Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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Cc: Alexander E. Patrakov <patrakov@gmail.com>
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Cc: Lennart Poettering <mzxreary@0pointer.de>
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Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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---
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drivers/char/random.c | 62 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
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1 file changed, 61 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
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Index: linux/drivers/char/random.c
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===================================================================
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--- linux.orig/drivers/char/random.c
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+++ linux/drivers/char/random.c
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@@ -1653,6 +1653,56 @@ void get_random_bytes(void *buf, int nby
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}
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EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_bytes);
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+
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+/*
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+ * Each time the timer fires, we expect that we got an unpredictable
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+ * jump in the cycle counter. Even if the timer is running on another
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+ * CPU, the timer activity will be touching the stack of the CPU that is
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+ * generating entropy..
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+ *
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+ * Note that we don't re-arm the timer in the timer itself - we are
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+ * happy to be scheduled away, since that just makes the load more
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+ * complex, but we do not want the timer to keep ticking unless the
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+ * entropy loop is running.
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+ *
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+ * So the re-arming always happens in the entropy loop itself.
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+ */
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+static void entropy_timer(struct timer_list *t)
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+{
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+ credit_entropy_bits(&input_pool, 1);
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+}
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+
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+/*
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+ * If we have an actual cycle counter, see if we can
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+ * generate enough entropy with timing noise
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+ */
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+static void try_to_generate_entropy(void)
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+{
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+ struct {
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+ unsigned long now;
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+ struct timer_list timer;
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+ } stack;
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+
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+ stack.now = random_get_entropy();
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+
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+ /* Slow counter - or none. Don't even bother */
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+ if (stack.now == random_get_entropy())
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+ return;
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+
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+ timer_setup_on_stack(&stack.timer, entropy_timer, 0);
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+ while (!crng_ready()) {
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+ if (!timer_pending(&stack.timer))
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+ mod_timer(&stack.timer, jiffies+1);
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+ mix_pool_bytes(&input_pool, &stack.now, sizeof(stack.now));
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+ schedule();
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+ stack.now = random_get_entropy();
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+ }
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+
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+ del_timer_sync(&stack.timer);
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+ destroy_timer_on_stack(&stack.timer);
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+ mix_pool_bytes(&input_pool, &stack.now, sizeof(stack.now));
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+}
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+
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/*
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* Wait for the urandom pool to be seeded and thus guaranteed to supply
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* cryptographically secure random numbers. This applies to: the /dev/urandom
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@@ -1667,7 +1717,17 @@ int wait_for_random_bytes(void)
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{
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if (likely(crng_ready()))
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return 0;
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- return wait_event_interruptible(crng_init_wait, crng_ready());
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+
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+ do {
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+ int ret;
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+ ret = wait_event_interruptible_timeout(crng_init_wait, crng_ready(), HZ);
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+ if (ret)
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+ return ret > 0 ? 0 : ret;
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+
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+ try_to_generate_entropy();
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+ } while (!crng_ready());
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+
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+ return 0;
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}
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EXPORT_SYMBOL(wait_for_random_bytes);
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@ -299,7 +299,4 @@ bugfix/all/wimax-i2400-fix-memory-leak.patch
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bugfix/all/wimax-i2400-fix-memory-leak-in-i2400m_op_rfkill_sw_toggle.patch
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bugfix/all/vfs-fix-do_last-regression.patch
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# Backported change to provide boot-time entropy
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bugfix/all/random-try-to-actively-add-entropy-rather-than-passi.patch
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# ABI maintenance
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