KEYS: Fix race between read and revoke (CVE-2015-7550)
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@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ linux (4.3.3-3) UNRELEASED; urgency=medium
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* [xen] pciback: Fix state validation in MSI control operations
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(CVE-2015-8551, CVE-2015-8852, XSA-157)
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* ptrace: being capable wrt a process requires mapped uids/gids
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* KEYS: Fix race between read and revoke (CVE-2015-7550)
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[ Salvatore Bonaccorso ]
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* ovl: fix permission checking for setattr (CVE-2015-8660)
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@ -0,0 +1,110 @@
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From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
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Date: Fri, 18 Dec 2015 01:34:26 +0000
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Subject: KEYS: Fix race between read and revoke
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Origin: https://git.kernel.org/linus/b4a1b4f5047e4f54e194681125c74c0aa64d637d
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This fixes CVE-2015-7550.
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There's a race between keyctl_read() and keyctl_revoke(). If the revoke
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happens between keyctl_read() checking the validity of a key and the key's
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semaphore being taken, then the key type read method will see a revoked key.
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This causes a problem for the user-defined key type because it assumes in
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its read method that there will always be a payload in a non-revoked key
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and doesn't check for a NULL pointer.
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Fix this by making keyctl_read() check the validity of a key after taking
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semaphore instead of before.
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I think the bug was introduced with the original keyrings code.
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This was discovered by a multithreaded test program generated by syzkaller
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(http://github.com/google/syzkaller). Here's a cleaned up version:
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#include <sys/types.h>
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#include <keyutils.h>
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#include <pthread.h>
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void *thr0(void *arg)
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{
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key_serial_t key = (unsigned long)arg;
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keyctl_revoke(key);
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return 0;
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}
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void *thr1(void *arg)
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{
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key_serial_t key = (unsigned long)arg;
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char buffer[16];
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keyctl_read(key, buffer, 16);
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return 0;
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}
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int main()
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{
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key_serial_t key = add_key("user", "%", "foo", 3, KEY_SPEC_USER_KEYRING);
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pthread_t th[5];
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pthread_create(&th[0], 0, thr0, (void *)(unsigned long)key);
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pthread_create(&th[1], 0, thr1, (void *)(unsigned long)key);
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pthread_create(&th[2], 0, thr0, (void *)(unsigned long)key);
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pthread_create(&th[3], 0, thr1, (void *)(unsigned long)key);
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pthread_join(th[0], 0);
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pthread_join(th[1], 0);
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pthread_join(th[2], 0);
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pthread_join(th[3], 0);
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return 0;
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}
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Build as:
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cc -o keyctl-race keyctl-race.c -lkeyutils -lpthread
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Run as:
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while keyctl-race; do :; done
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as it may need several iterations to crash the kernel. The crash can be
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summarised as:
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BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000010
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IP: [<ffffffff81279b08>] user_read+0x56/0xa3
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...
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Call Trace:
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[<ffffffff81276aa9>] keyctl_read_key+0xb6/0xd7
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[<ffffffff81277815>] SyS_keyctl+0x83/0xe0
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[<ffffffff815dbb97>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x6f
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Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
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Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
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Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
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Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
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Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
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---
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security/keys/keyctl.c | 18 +++++++++---------
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1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
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--- a/security/keys/keyctl.c
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+++ b/security/keys/keyctl.c
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@@ -757,16 +757,16 @@ long keyctl_read_key(key_serial_t keyid,
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/* the key is probably readable - now try to read it */
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can_read_key:
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- ret = key_validate(key);
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- if (ret == 0) {
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- ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
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- if (key->type->read) {
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- /* read the data with the semaphore held (since we
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- * might sleep) */
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- down_read(&key->sem);
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+ ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
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+ if (key->type->read) {
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+ /* Read the data with the semaphore held (since we might sleep)
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+ * to protect against the key being updated or revoked.
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+ */
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+ down_read(&key->sem);
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+ ret = key_validate(key);
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+ if (ret == 0)
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ret = key->type->read(key, buffer, buflen);
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- up_read(&key->sem);
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- }
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+ up_read(&key->sem);
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}
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error2:
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@ -126,3 +126,4 @@ bugfix/all/xen-pciback-do-not-install-an-irq-handler-for-msi-in.patch
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bugfix/all/xen-pciback-for-xen_pci_op_disable_msi-x-only-disabl.patch
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bugfix/all/xen-pciback-don-t-allow-msi-x-ops-if-pci_command_mem.patch
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bugfix/all/ptrace-being-capable-wrt-a-process-requires-mapped-uids-gids.patch
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bugfix/all/keys-fix-race-between-read-and-revoke.patch
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