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Cherry-pick various urgent fixes from 3.11 stable queue 

svn path=/dists/sid/linux/; revision=20767
This commit is contained in:
Ben Hutchings 2013-11-01 03:44:52 +00:00
parent a78dcf3d31
commit e3b8a9343f
17 changed files with 1278 additions and 0 deletions
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16
debian/changelog vendored
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@ -7,6 +7,22 @@ linux (3.11.6-2) UNRELEASED; urgency=low
(fixes FTBFS)
* [armhf] Bump ABI to 1a, as enabling Xen and KVM support changes ABI
* net: Fix infinite loop in in skb_flow_dissect() (CVE-2013-4348)
* net: do not call sock_put() on TIMEWAIT sockets
* l2tp: fix kernel panic when using IPv4-mapped IPv6 addresses
* net: heap overflow in __audit_sockaddr()
* proc connector: fix info leaks
* bridge: update mdb expiration timer upon reports.
* Revert "bridge: only expire the mdb entry when query is received"
* unix_diag: fix info leak
* be2net: pass if_id for v1 and V2 versions of TX_CREATE cmd
* net: fix cipso packet validation when !NETLABEL
* inet: fix possible memory corruption with UDP_CORK and UFO
* [arm] 7851/1: check for number of arguments in syscall_get/set_arguments()
* ext[34]: fix double put in tmpfile
* dm snapshot: fix data corruption (CVE-2013-4299)
* i2c: ismt: initialize DMA buffer
* mm: fix BUG in __split_huge_page_pmd
* writeback: fix negative bdi max pause
[ Aurelien Jarno ]
* UAPI: include <asm/byteorder.h> in linux/raid/md_p.h.

40
debian/patches/bugfix/all/be2net-pass-if_id-for-v1-and-v2-versions-of-tx_create-cmd.patch vendored Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
From b16dd2cff7a4eb3881f43371d71ed242332877dc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Vasundhara Volam <vasundhara.volam@emulex.com>
Date: Thu, 17 Oct 2013 11:47:14 +0530
Subject: be2net: pass if_id for v1 and V2 versions of TX_CREATE cmd
From: Vasundhara Volam <vasundhara.volam@emulex.com>
[ Upstream commit 0fb88d61bc60779dde88b0fc268da17eb81d0412 ]
It is a required field for all TX_CREATE cmd versions > 0.
This fixes a driver initialization failure, caused by recent SH-R Firmwares
(versions > 10.0.639.0) failing the TX_CREATE cmd when if_id field is
not passed.
Signed-off-by: Sathya Perla <sathya.perla@emulex.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/net/ethernet/emulex/benet/be_cmds.c | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/emulex/benet/be_cmds.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/emulex/benet/be_cmds.c
@@ -1150,7 +1150,6 @@ int be_cmd_txq_create(struct be_adapter
if (lancer_chip(adapter)) {
req->hdr.version = 1;
- req->if_id = cpu_to_le16(adapter->if_handle);
} else if (BEx_chip(adapter)) {
if (adapter->function_caps & BE_FUNCTION_CAPS_SUPER_NIC)
req->hdr.version = 2;
@@ -1158,6 +1157,8 @@ int be_cmd_txq_create(struct be_adapter
req->hdr.version = 2;
}
+ if (req->hdr.version > 0)
+ req->if_id = cpu_to_le16(adapter->if_handle);
req->num_pages = PAGES_4K_SPANNED(q_mem->va, q_mem->size);
req->ulp_num = BE_ULP1_NUM;
req->type = BE_ETH_TX_RING_TYPE_STANDARD;

63
debian/patches/bugfix/all/bridge-update-mdb-expiration-timer-upon-reports.patch vendored Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
From 74869292aeb07213144e34b0e21e23f7e3c9f61f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevic@redhat.com>
Date: Thu, 10 Oct 2013 15:57:59 -0400
Subject: bridge: update mdb expiration timer upon reports.
From: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevic@redhat.com>
[ Upstream commit f144febd93d5ee534fdf23505ab091b2b9088edc ]
commit 9f00b2e7cf241fa389733d41b615efdaa2cb0f5b
bridge: only expire the mdb entry when query is received
changed the mdb expiration timer to be armed only when QUERY is
received. Howerver, this causes issues in an environment where
the multicast server socket comes and goes very fast while a client
is trying to send traffic to it.
The root cause is a race where a sequence of LEAVE followed by REPORT
messages can race against QUERY messages generated in response to LEAVE.
The QUERY ends up starting the expiration timer, and that timer can
potentially expire after the new REPORT message has been received signaling
the new join operation. This leads to a significant drop in multicast
traffic and possible complete stall.
The solution is to have REPORT messages update the expiration timer
on entries that already exist.
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevic@redhat.com>
CC: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
CC: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CC: Stephen Hemminger <stephen@networkplumber.org>
Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
net/bridge/br_multicast.c | 9 ++++++++-
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/net/bridge/br_multicast.c
+++ b/net/bridge/br_multicast.c
@@ -610,6 +610,9 @@ rehash:
break;
default:
+ /* If we have an existing entry, update it's expire timer */
+ mod_timer(&mp->timer,
+ jiffies + br->multicast_membership_interval);
goto out;
}
@@ -679,8 +682,12 @@ static int br_multicast_add_group(struct
for (pp = &mp->ports;
(p = mlock_dereference(*pp, br)) != NULL;
pp = &p->next) {
- if (p->port == port)
+ if (p->port == port) {
+ /* We already have a portgroup, update the timer. */
+ mod_timer(&p->timer,
+ jiffies + br->multicast_membership_interval);
goto out;
+ }
if ((unsigned long)p->port < (unsigned long)port)
break;
}

88
debian/patches/bugfix/all/dm-snapshot-fix-data-corruption.patch vendored Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,88 @@
From e9c6a182649f4259db704ae15a91ac820e63b0ca Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
Date: Wed, 16 Oct 2013 03:17:47 +0100
Subject: dm snapshot: fix data corruption
From: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
commit e9c6a182649f4259db704ae15a91ac820e63b0ca upstream.
This patch fixes a particular type of data corruption that has been
encountered when loading a snapshot's metadata from disk.
When we allocate a new chunk in persistent_prepare, we increment
ps->next_free and we make sure that it doesn't point to a metadata area
by further incrementing it if necessary.
When we load metadata from disk on device activation, ps->next_free is
positioned after the last used data chunk. However, if this last used
data chunk is followed by a metadata area, ps->next_free is positioned
erroneously to the metadata area. A newly-allocated chunk is placed at
the same location as the metadata area, resulting in data or metadata
corruption.
This patch changes the code so that ps->next_free skips the metadata
area when metadata are loaded in function read_exceptions.
The patch also moves a piece of code from persistent_prepare_exception
to a separate function skip_metadata to avoid code duplication.
CVE-2013-4299
Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
Cc: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Alasdair G Kergon <agk@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/md/dm-snap-persistent.c | 18 ++++++++++++------
1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/md/dm-snap-persistent.c
+++ b/drivers/md/dm-snap-persistent.c
@@ -269,6 +269,14 @@ static chunk_t area_location(struct psto
return NUM_SNAPSHOT_HDR_CHUNKS + ((ps->exceptions_per_area + 1) * area);
}
+static void skip_metadata(struct pstore *ps)
+{
+ uint32_t stride = ps->exceptions_per_area + 1;
+ chunk_t next_free = ps->next_free;
+ if (sector_div(next_free, stride) == NUM_SNAPSHOT_HDR_CHUNKS)
+ ps->next_free++;
+}
+
/*
* Read or write a metadata area. Remembering to skip the first
* chunk which holds the header.
@@ -502,6 +510,8 @@ static int read_exceptions(struct pstore
ps->current_area--;
+ skip_metadata(ps);
+
return 0;
}
@@ -616,8 +626,6 @@ static int persistent_prepare_exception(
struct dm_exception *e)
{
struct pstore *ps = get_info(store);
- uint32_t stride;
- chunk_t next_free;
sector_t size = get_dev_size(dm_snap_cow(store->snap)->bdev);
/* Is there enough room ? */
@@ -630,10 +638,8 @@ static int persistent_prepare_exception(
* Move onto the next free pending, making sure to take
* into account the location of the metadata chunks.
*/
- stride = (ps->exceptions_per_area + 1);
- next_free = ++ps->next_free;
- if (sector_div(next_free, stride) == 1)
- ps->next_free++;
+ ps->next_free++;
+ skip_metadata(ps);
atomic_inc(&ps->pending_count);
return 0;

66
debian/patches/bugfix/all/ext-fix-double-put-in-tmpfile.patch vendored Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
From 43ae9e3fc70ca0057ae0a24ef5eedff05e3fae06 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
Date: Thu, 10 Oct 2013 16:48:19 +0200
Subject: ext[34]: fix double put in tmpfile
From: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
commit 43ae9e3fc70ca0057ae0a24ef5eedff05e3fae06 upstream.
d_tmpfile() already swallowed the inode ref.
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
fs/ext3/namei.c | 5 ++---
fs/ext4/namei.c | 5 ++---
2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
--- a/fs/ext3/namei.c
+++ b/fs/ext3/namei.c
@@ -1783,7 +1783,7 @@ retry:
d_tmpfile(dentry, inode);
err = ext3_orphan_add(handle, inode);
if (err)
- goto err_drop_inode;
+ goto err_unlock_inode;
mark_inode_dirty(inode);
unlock_new_inode(inode);
}
@@ -1791,10 +1791,9 @@ retry:
if (err == -ENOSPC && ext3_should_retry_alloc(dir->i_sb, &retries))
goto retry;
return err;
-err_drop_inode:
+err_unlock_inode:
ext3_journal_stop(handle);
unlock_new_inode(inode);
- iput(inode);
return err;
}
--- a/fs/ext4/namei.c
+++ b/fs/ext4/namei.c
@@ -2319,7 +2319,7 @@ retry:
d_tmpfile(dentry, inode);
err = ext4_orphan_add(handle, inode);
if (err)
- goto err_drop_inode;
+ goto err_unlock_inode;
mark_inode_dirty(inode);
unlock_new_inode(inode);
}
@@ -2328,10 +2328,9 @@ retry:
if (err == -ENOSPC && ext4_should_retry_alloc(dir->i_sb, &retries))
goto retry;
return err;
-err_drop_inode:
+err_unlock_inode:
ext4_journal_stop(handle);
unlock_new_inode(inode);
- iput(inode);
return err;
}

34
debian/patches/bugfix/all/i2c-ismt-initialize-dma-buffer.patch vendored Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
From bf4169100c909667ede6af67668b3ecce6928343 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: James Ralston <james.d.ralston@intel.com>
Date: Tue, 24 Sep 2013 16:47:55 -0700
Subject: i2c: ismt: initialize DMA buffer
From: James Ralston <james.d.ralston@intel.com>
commit bf4169100c909667ede6af67668b3ecce6928343 upstream.
This patch adds code to initialize the DMA buffer to compensate for
possible hardware data corruption.
Signed-off-by: James Ralston <james.d.ralston@intel.com>
[wsa: changed to use 'sizeof']
Signed-off-by: Wolfram Sang <wsa@the-dreams.de>
Cc: Jean Delvare <jdelvare@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-ismt.c | 3 +++
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
--- a/drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-ismt.c
+++ b/drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-ismt.c
@@ -393,6 +393,9 @@ static int ismt_access(struct i2c_adapte
desc = &priv->hw[priv->head];
+ /* Initialize the DMA buffer */
+ memset(priv->dma_buffer, 0, sizeof(priv->dma_buffer));
+
/* Initialize the descriptor */
memset(desc, 0, sizeof(struct ismt_desc));
desc->tgtaddr_rw = ISMT_DESC_ADDR_RW(addr, read_write);

76
debian/patches/bugfix/all/inet-fix-possible-memory-corruption-with-udp_cork-and-ufo.patch vendored Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,76 @@
From 27e33640a8905b1aeefe9998242551caf24e84a6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Date: Tue, 22 Oct 2013 00:07:47 +0200
Subject: inet: fix possible memory corruption with UDP_CORK and UFO
From: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
[ This is a simplified -stable version of a set of upstream commits. ]
This is a replacement patch only for stable which does fix the problems
handled by the following two commits in -net:
"ip_output: do skb ufo init for peeked non ufo skb as well" (e93b7d748be887cd7639b113ba7d7ef792a7efb9)
"ip6_output: do skb ufo init for peeked non ufo skb as well" (c547dbf55d5f8cf615ccc0e7265e98db27d3fb8b)
Three frames are written on a corked udp socket for which the output
netdevice has UFO enabled. If the first and third frame are smaller than
the mtu and the second one is bigger, we enqueue the second frame with
skb_append_datato_frags without initializing the gso fields. This leads
to the third frame appended regulary and thus constructing an invalid skb.
This fixes the problem by always using skb_append_datato_frags as soon
as the first frag got enqueued to the skb without marking the packet
as SKB_GSO_UDP.
The problem with only two frames for ipv6 was fixed by "ipv6: udp
packets following an UFO enqueued packet need also be handled by UFO"
(2811ebac2521ceac84f2bdae402455baa6a7fb47).
Cc: Jiri Pirko <jiri@resnulli.us>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
include/linux/skbuff.h | 5 +++++
net/ipv4/ip_output.c | 2 +-
net/ipv6/ip6_output.c | 2 +-
3 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/include/linux/skbuff.h
+++ b/include/linux/skbuff.h
@@ -1316,6 +1316,11 @@ static inline int skb_pagelen(const stru
return len + skb_headlen(skb);
}
+static inline bool skb_has_frags(const struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+ return skb_shinfo(skb)->nr_frags;
+}
+
/**
* __skb_fill_page_desc - initialise a paged fragment in an skb
* @skb: buffer containing fragment to be initialised
--- a/net/ipv4/ip_output.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/ip_output.c
@@ -836,7 +836,7 @@ static int __ip_append_data(struct sock
csummode = CHECKSUM_PARTIAL;
cork->length += length;
- if (((length > mtu) || (skb && skb_is_gso(skb))) &&
+ if (((length > mtu) || (skb && skb_has_frags(skb))) &&
(sk->sk_protocol == IPPROTO_UDP) &&
(rt->dst.dev->features & NETIF_F_UFO) && !rt->dst.header_len) {
err = ip_ufo_append_data(sk, queue, getfrag, from, length,
--- a/net/ipv6/ip6_output.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/ip6_output.c
@@ -1252,7 +1252,7 @@ int ip6_append_data(struct sock *sk, int
skb = skb_peek_tail(&sk->sk_write_queue);
cork->length += length;
if (((length > mtu) ||
- (skb && skb_is_gso(skb))) &&
+ (skb && skb_has_frags(skb))) &&
(sk->sk_protocol == IPPROTO_UDP) &&
(rt->dst.dev->features & NETIF_F_UFO)) {
err = ip6_ufo_append_data(sk, getfrag, from, length,

141
debian/patches/bugfix/all/l2tp-fix-kernel-panic-when-using-ipv4-mapped-ipv6-addresses.patch vendored Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,141 @@
From 8be4005ed947924104df5850944a20b7f6570137 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: François CACHEREUL <f.cachereul@alphalink.fr>
Date: Wed, 2 Oct 2013 10:16:02 +0200
Subject: l2tp: fix kernel panic when using IPv4-mapped IPv6 addresses
From: François CACHEREUL <f.cachereul@alphalink.fr>
[ Upstream commit e18503f41f9b12132c95d7c31ca6ee5155e44e5c ]
IPv4 mapped addresses cause kernel panic.
The patch juste check whether the IPv6 address is an IPv4 mapped
address. If so, use IPv4 API instead of IPv6.
[ 940.026915] general protection fault: 0000 [#1]
[ 940.026915] Modules linked in: l2tp_ppp l2tp_netlink l2tp_core pppox ppp_generic slhc loop psmouse
[ 940.026915] CPU: 0 PID: 3184 Comm: memcheck-amd64- Not tainted 3.11.0+ #1
[ 940.026915] Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2007
[ 940.026915] task: ffff880007130e20 ti: ffff88000737e000 task.ti: ffff88000737e000
[ 940.026915] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff81333780>] [<ffffffff81333780>] ip6_xmit+0x276/0x326
[ 940.026915] RSP: 0018:ffff88000737fd28 EFLAGS: 00010286
[ 940.026915] RAX: c748521a75ceff48 RBX: ffff880000c30800 RCX: 0000000000000000
[ 940.026915] RDX: ffff88000075cc4e RSI: 0000000000000028 RDI: ffff8800060e5a40
[ 940.026915] RBP: ffff8800060e5a40 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff88000075cc90
[ 940.026915] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff88000737fda0
[ 940.026915] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000002000 R15: ffff880005d3b580
[ 940.026915] FS: 00007f163dc5e800(0000) GS:ffffffff81623000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 940.026915] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 940.026915] CR2: 00000004032dc940 CR3: 0000000005c25000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
[ 940.026915] Stack:
[ 940.026915] ffff88000075cc4e ffffffff81694e90 ffff880000c30b38 0000000000000020
[ 940.026915] 11000000523c4bac ffff88000737fdb4 0000000000000000 ffff880000c30800
[ 940.026915] ffff880005d3b580 ffff880000c30b38 ffff8800060e5a40 0000000000000020
[ 940.026915] Call Trace:
[ 940.026915] [<ffffffff81356cc3>] ? inet6_csk_xmit+0xa4/0xc4
[ 940.026915] [<ffffffffa0038535>] ? l2tp_xmit_skb+0x503/0x55a [l2tp_core]
[ 940.026915] [<ffffffff812b8d3b>] ? pskb_expand_head+0x161/0x214
[ 940.026915] [<ffffffffa003e91d>] ? pppol2tp_xmit+0xf2/0x143 [l2tp_ppp]
[ 940.026915] [<ffffffffa00292e0>] ? ppp_channel_push+0x36/0x8b [ppp_generic]
[ 940.026915] [<ffffffffa00293fe>] ? ppp_write+0xaf/0xc5 [ppp_generic]
[ 940.026915] [<ffffffff8110ead4>] ? vfs_write+0xa2/0x106
[ 940.026915] [<ffffffff8110edd6>] ? SyS_write+0x56/0x8a
[ 940.026915] [<ffffffff81378ac0>] ? system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
[ 940.026915] Code: 00 49 8b 8f d8 00 00 00 66 83 7c 11 02 00 74 60 49
8b 47 58 48 83 e0 fe 48 8b 80 18 01 00 00 48 85 c0 74 13 48 8b 80 78 02
00 00 <48> ff 40 28 41 8b 57 68 48 01 50 30 48 8b 54 24 08 49 c7 c1 51
[ 940.026915] RIP [<ffffffff81333780>] ip6_xmit+0x276/0x326
[ 940.026915] RSP <ffff88000737fd28>
[ 940.057945] ---[ end trace be8aba9a61c8b7f3 ]---
[ 940.058583] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt
Signed-off-by: François CACHEREUL <f.cachereul@alphalink.fr>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
net/l2tp/l2tp_core.c | 27 +++++++++++++++++++++++----
net/l2tp/l2tp_core.h | 3 +++
2 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
--- a/net/l2tp/l2tp_core.c
+++ b/net/l2tp/l2tp_core.c
@@ -496,6 +496,7 @@ out:
static inline int l2tp_verify_udp_checksum(struct sock *sk,
struct sk_buff *skb)
{
+ struct l2tp_tunnel *tunnel = (struct l2tp_tunnel *)sk->sk_user_data;
struct udphdr *uh = udp_hdr(skb);
u16 ulen = ntohs(uh->len);
__wsum psum;
@@ -504,7 +505,7 @@ static inline int l2tp_verify_udp_checks
return 0;
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
- if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET6) {
+ if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET6 && !tunnel->v4mapped) {
if (!uh->check) {
LIMIT_NETDEBUG(KERN_INFO "L2TP: IPv6: checksum is 0\n");
return 1;
@@ -1128,7 +1129,7 @@ static int l2tp_xmit_core(struct l2tp_se
/* Queue the packet to IP for output */
skb->local_df = 1;
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
- if (skb->sk->sk_family == PF_INET6)
+ if (skb->sk->sk_family == PF_INET6 && !tunnel->v4mapped)
error = inet6_csk_xmit(skb, NULL);
else
#endif
@@ -1255,7 +1256,7 @@ int l2tp_xmit_skb(struct l2tp_session *s
/* Calculate UDP checksum if configured to do so */
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
- if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET6)
+ if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET6 && !tunnel->v4mapped)
l2tp_xmit_ipv6_csum(sk, skb, udp_len);
else
#endif
@@ -1704,6 +1705,24 @@ int l2tp_tunnel_create(struct net *net,
if (cfg != NULL)
tunnel->debug = cfg->debug;
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
+ if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET6) {
+ struct ipv6_pinfo *np = inet6_sk(sk);
+
+ if (ipv6_addr_v4mapped(&np->saddr) &&
+ ipv6_addr_v4mapped(&np->daddr)) {
+ struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
+
+ tunnel->v4mapped = true;
+ inet->inet_saddr = np->saddr.s6_addr32[3];
+ inet->inet_rcv_saddr = np->rcv_saddr.s6_addr32[3];
+ inet->inet_daddr = np->daddr.s6_addr32[3];
+ } else {
+ tunnel->v4mapped = false;
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+
/* Mark socket as an encapsulation socket. See net/ipv4/udp.c */
tunnel->encap = encap;
if (encap == L2TP_ENCAPTYPE_UDP) {
@@ -1712,7 +1731,7 @@ int l2tp_tunnel_create(struct net *net,
udp_sk(sk)->encap_rcv = l2tp_udp_encap_recv;
udp_sk(sk)->encap_destroy = l2tp_udp_encap_destroy;
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
- if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET6)
+ if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET6 && !tunnel->v4mapped)
udpv6_encap_enable();
else
#endif
--- a/net/l2tp/l2tp_core.h
+++ b/net/l2tp/l2tp_core.h
@@ -194,6 +194,9 @@ struct l2tp_tunnel {
struct sock *sock; /* Parent socket */
int fd; /* Parent fd, if tunnel socket
* was created by userspace */
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
+ bool v4mapped;
+#endif
struct work_struct del_work;

57
debian/patches/bugfix/all/mm-fix-bug-in-__split_huge_page_pmd.patch vendored Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
From 750e8165f5e87b6a142be953640eabb13a9d350a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Date: Wed, 16 Oct 2013 13:47:08 -0700
Subject: mm: fix BUG in __split_huge_page_pmd
From: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
commit 750e8165f5e87b6a142be953640eabb13a9d350a upstream.
Occasionally we hit the BUG_ON(pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) at the end of
__split_huge_page_pmd(): seen when doing madvise(,,MADV_DONTNEED).
It's invalid: we don't always have down_write of mmap_sem there: a racing
do_huge_pmd_wp_page() might have copied-on-write to another huge page
before our split_huge_page() got the anon_vma lock.
Forget the BUG_ON, just go back and try again if this happens.
Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Acked-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Naoya Horiguchi <n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
mm/huge_memory.c | 10 +++++++++-
1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/mm/huge_memory.c
+++ b/mm/huge_memory.c
@@ -2709,6 +2709,7 @@ void __split_huge_page_pmd(struct vm_are
mmun_start = haddr;
mmun_end = haddr + HPAGE_PMD_SIZE;
+again:
mmu_notifier_invalidate_range_start(mm, mmun_start, mmun_end);
spin_lock(&mm->page_table_lock);
if (unlikely(!pmd_trans_huge(*pmd))) {
@@ -2731,7 +2732,14 @@ void __split_huge_page_pmd(struct vm_are
split_huge_page(page);
put_page(page);
- BUG_ON(pmd_trans_huge(*pmd));
+
+ /*
+ * We don't always have down_write of mmap_sem here: a racing
+ * do_huge_pmd_wp_page() might have copied-on-write to another
+ * huge page before our split_huge_page() got the anon_vma lock.
+ */
+ if (unlikely(pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)))
+ goto again;
}
void split_huge_page_pmd_mm(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long address,

44
debian/patches/bugfix/all/net-do-not-call-sock_put-on-timewait-sockets.patch vendored Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
From 05c9fdfad860abd64136d8ccd88dbf84e40bd5f5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Date: Tue, 1 Oct 2013 21:04:11 -0700
Subject: net: do not call sock_put() on TIMEWAIT sockets
From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
[ Upstream commit 80ad1d61e72d626e30ebe8529a0455e660ca4693 ]
commit 3ab5aee7fe84 ("net: Convert TCP & DCCP hash tables to use RCU /
hlist_nulls") incorrectly used sock_put() on TIMEWAIT sockets.
We should instead use inet_twsk_put()
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c | 2 +-
net/ipv6/inet6_hashtables.c | 2 +-
2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c
@@ -287,7 +287,7 @@ begintw:
if (unlikely(!INET_TW_MATCH(sk, net, acookie,
saddr, daddr, ports,
dif))) {
- sock_put(sk);
+ inet_twsk_put(inet_twsk(sk));
goto begintw;
}
goto out;
--- a/net/ipv6/inet6_hashtables.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/inet6_hashtables.c
@@ -116,7 +116,7 @@ begintw:
}
if (unlikely(!INET6_TW_MATCH(sk, net, saddr, daddr,
ports, dif))) {
- sock_put(sk);
+ inet_twsk_put(inet_twsk(sk));
goto begintw;
}
goto out;

54
debian/patches/bugfix/all/net-fix-cipso-packet-validation-when-netlabel.patch vendored Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
From 7b48750febb4c3387db39fd0b547936c53ba7364 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Seif Mazareeb <seif@marvell.com>
Date: Thu, 17 Oct 2013 20:33:21 -0700
Subject: net: fix cipso packet validation when !NETLABEL
From: Seif Mazareeb <seif@marvell.com>
[ Upstream commit f2e5ddcc0d12f9c4c7b254358ad245c9dddce13b ]
When CONFIG_NETLABEL is disabled, the cipso_v4_validate() function could loop
forever in the main loop if opt[opt_iter +1] == 0, this will causing a kernel
crash in an SMP system, since the CPU executing this function will
stall /not respond to IPIs.
This problem can be reproduced by running the IP Stack Integrity Checker
(http://isic.sourceforge.net) using the following command on a Linux machine
connected to DUT:
"icmpsic -s rand -d <DUT IP address> -r 123456"
wait (1-2 min)
Signed-off-by: Seif Mazareeb <seif@marvell.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
include/net/cipso_ipv4.h | 6 ++++--
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/include/net/cipso_ipv4.h
+++ b/include/net/cipso_ipv4.h
@@ -290,6 +290,7 @@ static inline int cipso_v4_validate(cons
unsigned char err_offset = 0;
u8 opt_len = opt[1];
u8 opt_iter;
+ u8 tag_len;
if (opt_len < 8) {
err_offset = 1;
@@ -302,11 +303,12 @@ static inline int cipso_v4_validate(cons
}
for (opt_iter = 6; opt_iter < opt_len;) {
- if (opt[opt_iter + 1] > (opt_len - opt_iter)) {
+ tag_len = opt[opt_iter + 1];
+ if ((tag_len == 0) || (opt[opt_iter + 1] > (opt_len - opt_iter))) {
err_offset = opt_iter + 1;
goto out;
}
- opt_iter += opt[opt_iter + 1];
+ opt_iter += tag_len;
}
out:

86
debian/patches/bugfix/all/net-heap-overflow-in-__audit_sockaddr.patch vendored Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
From b8baf1c21a214c1b836eef390c9d6e153293fef9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Date: Thu, 3 Oct 2013 00:27:20 +0300
Subject: net: heap overflow in __audit_sockaddr()
From: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
[ Upstream commit 1661bf364ae9c506bc8795fef70d1532931be1e8 ]
We need to cap ->msg_namelen or it leads to a buffer overflow when we
to the memcpy() in __audit_sockaddr(). It requires CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL to
exploit this bug.
The call tree is:
___sys_recvmsg()
move_addr_to_user()
audit_sockaddr()
__audit_sockaddr()
Reported-by: Jüri Aedla <juri.aedla@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
net/compat.c | 2 ++
net/socket.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++----
2 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
--- a/net/compat.c
+++ b/net/compat.c
@@ -71,6 +71,8 @@ int get_compat_msghdr(struct msghdr *kms
__get_user(kmsg->msg_controllen, &umsg->msg_controllen) ||
__get_user(kmsg->msg_flags, &umsg->msg_flags))
return -EFAULT;
+ if (kmsg->msg_namelen > sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage))
+ return -EINVAL;
kmsg->msg_name = compat_ptr(tmp1);
kmsg->msg_iov = compat_ptr(tmp2);
kmsg->msg_control = compat_ptr(tmp3);
--- a/net/socket.c
+++ b/net/socket.c
@@ -1973,6 +1973,16 @@ struct used_address {
unsigned int name_len;
};
+static int copy_msghdr_from_user(struct msghdr *kmsg,
+ struct msghdr __user *umsg)
+{
+ if (copy_from_user(kmsg, umsg, sizeof(struct msghdr)))
+ return -EFAULT;
+ if (kmsg->msg_namelen > sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage))
+ return -EINVAL;
+ return 0;
+}
+
static int ___sys_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr __user *msg,
struct msghdr *msg_sys, unsigned int flags,
struct used_address *used_address)
@@ -1991,8 +2001,11 @@ static int ___sys_sendmsg(struct socket
if (MSG_CMSG_COMPAT & flags) {
if (get_compat_msghdr(msg_sys, msg_compat))
return -EFAULT;
- } else if (copy_from_user(msg_sys, msg, sizeof(struct msghdr)))
- return -EFAULT;
+ } else {
+ err = copy_msghdr_from_user(msg_sys, msg);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+ }
if (msg_sys->msg_iovlen > UIO_FASTIOV) {
err = -EMSGSIZE;
@@ -2200,8 +2213,11 @@ static int ___sys_recvmsg(struct socket
if (MSG_CMSG_COMPAT & flags) {
if (get_compat_msghdr(msg_sys, msg_compat))
return -EFAULT;
- } else if (copy_from_user(msg_sys, msg, sizeof(struct msghdr)))
- return -EFAULT;
+ } else {
+ err = copy_msghdr_from_user(msg_sys, msg);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+ }
if (msg_sys->msg_iovlen > UIO_FASTIOV) {
err = -EMSGSIZE;

167
debian/patches/bugfix/all/proc-connector-fix-info-leaks.patch vendored Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,167 @@
From 6c7e3c3382670fe98debedf2ddaff8abf2944bb4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Date: Mon, 30 Sep 2013 22:03:06 +0200
Subject: proc connector: fix info leaks
From: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
[ Upstream commit e727ca82e0e9616ab4844301e6bae60ca7327682 ]
Initialize event_data for all possible message types to prevent leaking
kernel stack contents to userland (up to 20 bytes). Also set the flags
member of the connector message to 0 to prevent leaking two more stack
bytes this way.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/connector/cn_proc.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 18 insertions(+)
--- a/drivers/connector/cn_proc.c
+++ b/drivers/connector/cn_proc.c
@@ -65,6 +65,7 @@ void proc_fork_connector(struct task_str
msg = (struct cn_msg *)buffer;
ev = (struct proc_event *)msg->data;
+ memset(&ev->event_data, 0, sizeof(ev->event_data));
get_seq(&msg->seq, &ev->cpu);
ktime_get_ts(&ts); /* get high res monotonic timestamp */
put_unaligned(timespec_to_ns(&ts), (__u64 *)&ev->timestamp_ns);
@@ -80,6 +81,7 @@ void proc_fork_connector(struct task_str
memcpy(&msg->id, &cn_proc_event_id, sizeof(msg->id));
msg->ack = 0; /* not used */
msg->len = sizeof(*ev);
+ msg->flags = 0; /* not used */
/* If cn_netlink_send() failed, the data is not sent */
cn_netlink_send(msg, CN_IDX_PROC, GFP_KERNEL);
}
@@ -96,6 +98,7 @@ void proc_exec_connector(struct task_str
msg = (struct cn_msg *)buffer;
ev = (struct proc_event *)msg->data;
+ memset(&ev->event_data, 0, sizeof(ev->event_data));
get_seq(&msg->seq, &ev->cpu);
ktime_get_ts(&ts); /* get high res monotonic timestamp */
put_unaligned(timespec_to_ns(&ts), (__u64 *)&ev->timestamp_ns);
@@ -106,6 +109,7 @@ void proc_exec_connector(struct task_str
memcpy(&msg->id, &cn_proc_event_id, sizeof(msg->id));
msg->ack = 0; /* not used */
msg->len = sizeof(*ev);
+ msg->flags = 0; /* not used */
cn_netlink_send(msg, CN_IDX_PROC, GFP_KERNEL);
}
@@ -122,6 +126,7 @@ void proc_id_connector(struct task_struc
msg = (struct cn_msg *)buffer;
ev = (struct proc_event *)msg->data;
+ memset(&ev->event_data, 0, sizeof(ev->event_data));
ev->what = which_id;
ev->event_data.id.process_pid = task->pid;
ev->event_data.id.process_tgid = task->tgid;
@@ -145,6 +150,7 @@ void proc_id_connector(struct task_struc
memcpy(&msg->id, &cn_proc_event_id, sizeof(msg->id));
msg->ack = 0; /* not used */
msg->len = sizeof(*ev);
+ msg->flags = 0; /* not used */
cn_netlink_send(msg, CN_IDX_PROC, GFP_KERNEL);
}
@@ -160,6 +166,7 @@ void proc_sid_connector(struct task_stru
msg = (struct cn_msg *)buffer;
ev = (struct proc_event *)msg->data;
+ memset(&ev->event_data, 0, sizeof(ev->event_data));
get_seq(&msg->seq, &ev->cpu);
ktime_get_ts(&ts); /* get high res monotonic timestamp */
put_unaligned(timespec_to_ns(&ts), (__u64 *)&ev->timestamp_ns);
@@ -170,6 +177,7 @@ void proc_sid_connector(struct task_stru
memcpy(&msg->id, &cn_proc_event_id, sizeof(msg->id));
msg->ack = 0; /* not used */
msg->len = sizeof(*ev);
+ msg->flags = 0; /* not used */
cn_netlink_send(msg, CN_IDX_PROC, GFP_KERNEL);
}
@@ -185,6 +193,7 @@ void proc_ptrace_connector(struct task_s
msg = (struct cn_msg *)buffer;
ev = (struct proc_event *)msg->data;
+ memset(&ev->event_data, 0, sizeof(ev->event_data));
get_seq(&msg->seq, &ev->cpu);
ktime_get_ts(&ts); /* get high res monotonic timestamp */
put_unaligned(timespec_to_ns(&ts), (__u64 *)&ev->timestamp_ns);
@@ -203,6 +212,7 @@ void proc_ptrace_connector(struct task_s
memcpy(&msg->id, &cn_proc_event_id, sizeof(msg->id));
msg->ack = 0; /* not used */
msg->len = sizeof(*ev);
+ msg->flags = 0; /* not used */
cn_netlink_send(msg, CN_IDX_PROC, GFP_KERNEL);
}
@@ -218,6 +228,7 @@ void proc_comm_connector(struct task_str
msg = (struct cn_msg *)buffer;
ev = (struct proc_event *)msg->data;
+ memset(&ev->event_data, 0, sizeof(ev->event_data));
get_seq(&msg->seq, &ev->cpu);
ktime_get_ts(&ts); /* get high res monotonic timestamp */
put_unaligned(timespec_to_ns(&ts), (__u64 *)&ev->timestamp_ns);
@@ -229,6 +240,7 @@ void proc_comm_connector(struct task_str
memcpy(&msg->id, &cn_proc_event_id, sizeof(msg->id));
msg->ack = 0; /* not used */
msg->len = sizeof(*ev);
+ msg->flags = 0; /* not used */
cn_netlink_send(msg, CN_IDX_PROC, GFP_KERNEL);
}
@@ -244,6 +256,7 @@ void proc_coredump_connector(struct task
msg = (struct cn_msg *)buffer;
ev = (struct proc_event *)msg->data;
+ memset(&ev->event_data, 0, sizeof(ev->event_data));
get_seq(&msg->seq, &ev->cpu);
ktime_get_ts(&ts); /* get high res monotonic timestamp */
put_unaligned(timespec_to_ns(&ts), (__u64 *)&ev->timestamp_ns);
@@ -254,6 +267,7 @@ void proc_coredump_connector(struct task
memcpy(&msg->id, &cn_proc_event_id, sizeof(msg->id));
msg->ack = 0; /* not used */
msg->len = sizeof(*ev);
+ msg->flags = 0; /* not used */
cn_netlink_send(msg, CN_IDX_PROC, GFP_KERNEL);
}
@@ -269,6 +283,7 @@ void proc_exit_connector(struct task_str
msg = (struct cn_msg *)buffer;
ev = (struct proc_event *)msg->data;
+ memset(&ev->event_data, 0, sizeof(ev->event_data));
get_seq(&msg->seq, &ev->cpu);
ktime_get_ts(&ts); /* get high res monotonic timestamp */
put_unaligned(timespec_to_ns(&ts), (__u64 *)&ev->timestamp_ns);
@@ -281,6 +296,7 @@ void proc_exit_connector(struct task_str
memcpy(&msg->id, &cn_proc_event_id, sizeof(msg->id));
msg->ack = 0; /* not used */
msg->len = sizeof(*ev);
+ msg->flags = 0; /* not used */
cn_netlink_send(msg, CN_IDX_PROC, GFP_KERNEL);
}
@@ -304,6 +320,7 @@ static void cn_proc_ack(int err, int rcv
msg = (struct cn_msg *)buffer;
ev = (struct proc_event *)msg->data;
+ memset(&ev->event_data, 0, sizeof(ev->event_data));
msg->seq = rcvd_seq;
ktime_get_ts(&ts); /* get high res monotonic timestamp */
put_unaligned(timespec_to_ns(&ts), (__u64 *)&ev->timestamp_ns);
@@ -313,6 +330,7 @@ static void cn_proc_ack(int err, int rcv
memcpy(&msg->id, &cn_proc_event_id, sizeof(msg->id));
msg->ack = rcvd_ack + 1;
msg->len = sizeof(*ev);
+ msg->flags = 0; /* not used */
cn_netlink_send(msg, CN_IDX_PROC, GFP_KERNEL);
}

207
debian/patches/bugfix/all/revert-bridge-only-expire-the-mdb-entry-when-query-is-received.patch vendored Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,207 @@
From d9f02cfe59400677feea276d4b27981f6d91825a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Linus Lüssing <linus.luessing@web.de>
Date: Sun, 20 Oct 2013 00:58:57 +0200
Subject: Revert "bridge: only expire the mdb entry when query is received"
From: Linus Lüssing <linus.luessing@web.de>
[ Upstream commit 454594f3b93a49ef568cd190c5af31376b105a7b ]
While this commit was a good attempt to fix issues occuring when no
multicast querier is present, this commit still has two more issues:
1) There are cases where mdb entries do not expire even if there is a
querier present. The bridge will unnecessarily continue flooding
multicast packets on the according ports.
2) Never removing an mdb entry could be exploited for a Denial of
Service by an attacker on the local link, slowly, but steadily eating up
all memory.
Actually, this commit became obsolete with
"bridge: disable snooping if there is no querier" (b00589af3b)
which included fixes for a few more cases.
Therefore reverting the following commits (the commit stated in the
commit message plus three of its follow up fixes):
====================
Revert "bridge: update mdb expiration timer upon reports."
This reverts commit f144febd93d5ee534fdf23505ab091b2b9088edc.
Revert "bridge: do not call setup_timer() multiple times"
This reverts commit 1faabf2aab1fdaa1ace4e8c829d1b9cf7bfec2f1.
Revert "bridge: fix some kernel warning in multicast timer"
This reverts commit c7e8e8a8f7a70b343ca1e0f90a31e35ab2d16de1.
Revert "bridge: only expire the mdb entry when query is received"
This reverts commit 9f00b2e7cf241fa389733d41b615efdaa2cb0f5b.
====================
CC: Cong Wang <amwang@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Lüssing <linus.luessing@web.de>
Reviewed-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
net/bridge/br_mdb.c | 2 -
net/bridge/br_multicast.c | 47 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------------
net/bridge/br_private.h | 1
3 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)
--- a/net/bridge/br_mdb.c
+++ b/net/bridge/br_mdb.c
@@ -451,7 +451,7 @@ static int __br_mdb_del(struct net_bridg
call_rcu_bh(&p->rcu, br_multicast_free_pg);
err = 0;
- if (!mp->ports && !mp->mglist && mp->timer_armed &&
+ if (!mp->ports && !mp->mglist &&
netif_running(br->dev))
mod_timer(&mp->timer, jiffies);
break;
--- a/net/bridge/br_multicast.c
+++ b/net/bridge/br_multicast.c
@@ -271,7 +271,7 @@ static void br_multicast_del_pg(struct n
del_timer(&p->timer);
call_rcu_bh(&p->rcu, br_multicast_free_pg);
- if (!mp->ports && !mp->mglist && mp->timer_armed &&
+ if (!mp->ports && !mp->mglist &&
netif_running(br->dev))
mod_timer(&mp->timer, jiffies);
@@ -610,9 +610,6 @@ rehash:
break;
default:
- /* If we have an existing entry, update it's expire timer */
- mod_timer(&mp->timer,
- jiffies + br->multicast_membership_interval);
goto out;
}
@@ -622,7 +619,6 @@ rehash:
mp->br = br;
mp->addr = *group;
-
setup_timer(&mp->timer, br_multicast_group_expired,
(unsigned long)mp);
@@ -662,6 +658,7 @@ static int br_multicast_add_group(struct
struct net_bridge_mdb_entry *mp;
struct net_bridge_port_group *p;
struct net_bridge_port_group __rcu **pp;
+ unsigned long now = jiffies;
int err;
spin_lock(&br->multicast_lock);
@@ -676,18 +673,15 @@ static int br_multicast_add_group(struct
if (!port) {
mp->mglist = true;
+ mod_timer(&mp->timer, now + br->multicast_membership_interval);
goto out;
}
for (pp = &mp->ports;
(p = mlock_dereference(*pp, br)) != NULL;
pp = &p->next) {
- if (p->port == port) {
- /* We already have a portgroup, update the timer. */
- mod_timer(&p->timer,
- jiffies + br->multicast_membership_interval);
- goto out;
- }
+ if (p->port == port)
+ goto found;
if ((unsigned long)p->port < (unsigned long)port)
break;
}
@@ -698,6 +692,8 @@ static int br_multicast_add_group(struct
rcu_assign_pointer(*pp, p);
br_mdb_notify(br->dev, port, group, RTM_NEWMDB);
+found:
+ mod_timer(&p->timer, now + br->multicast_membership_interval);
out:
err = 0;
@@ -1197,9 +1193,6 @@ static int br_ip4_multicast_query(struct
if (!mp)
goto out;
- mod_timer(&mp->timer, now + br->multicast_membership_interval);
- mp->timer_armed = true;
-
max_delay *= br->multicast_last_member_count;
if (mp->mglist &&
@@ -1276,9 +1269,6 @@ static int br_ip6_multicast_query(struct
if (!mp)
goto out;
- mod_timer(&mp->timer, now + br->multicast_membership_interval);
- mp->timer_armed = true;
-
max_delay *= br->multicast_last_member_count;
if (mp->mglist &&
(timer_pending(&mp->timer) ?
@@ -1364,7 +1354,7 @@ static void br_multicast_leave_group(str
call_rcu_bh(&p->rcu, br_multicast_free_pg);
br_mdb_notify(br->dev, port, group, RTM_DELMDB);
- if (!mp->ports && !mp->mglist && mp->timer_armed &&
+ if (!mp->ports && !mp->mglist &&
netif_running(br->dev))
mod_timer(&mp->timer, jiffies);
}
@@ -1376,12 +1366,30 @@ static void br_multicast_leave_group(str
br->multicast_last_member_interval;
if (!port) {
- if (mp->mglist && mp->timer_armed &&
+ if (mp->mglist &&
(timer_pending(&mp->timer) ?
time_after(mp->timer.expires, time) :
try_to_del_timer_sync(&mp->timer) >= 0)) {
mod_timer(&mp->timer, time);
}
+
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ for (p = mlock_dereference(mp->ports, br);
+ p != NULL;
+ p = mlock_dereference(p->next, br)) {
+ if (p->port != port)
+ continue;
+
+ if (!hlist_unhashed(&p->mglist) &&
+ (timer_pending(&p->timer) ?
+ time_after(p->timer.expires, time) :
+ try_to_del_timer_sync(&p->timer) >= 0)) {
+ mod_timer(&p->timer, time);
+ }
+
+ break;
}
out:
spin_unlock(&br->multicast_lock);
@@ -1798,7 +1806,6 @@ void br_multicast_stop(struct net_bridge
hlist_for_each_entry_safe(mp, n, &mdb->mhash[i],
hlist[ver]) {
del_timer(&mp->timer);
- mp->timer_armed = false;
call_rcu_bh(&mp->rcu, br_multicast_free_group);
}
}
--- a/net/bridge/br_private.h
+++ b/net/bridge/br_private.h
@@ -126,7 +126,6 @@ struct net_bridge_mdb_entry
struct timer_list timer;
struct br_ip addr;
bool mglist;
- bool timer_armed;
};
struct net_bridge_mdb_htable

30
debian/patches/bugfix/all/unix_diag-fix-info-leak.patch vendored Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
From e69ccba66791d0edd0d596520de268369aaab610 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Date: Mon, 30 Sep 2013 22:05:40 +0200
Subject: unix_diag: fix info leak
From: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
[ Upstream commit 6865d1e834be84ddd5808d93d5035b492346c64a ]
When filling the netlink message we miss to wipe the pad field,
therefore leak one byte of heap memory to userland. Fix this by
setting pad to 0.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
net/unix/diag.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
--- a/net/unix/diag.c
+++ b/net/unix/diag.c
@@ -124,6 +124,7 @@ static int sk_diag_fill(struct sock *sk,
rep->udiag_family = AF_UNIX;
rep->udiag_type = sk->sk_type;
rep->udiag_state = sk->sk_state;
+ rep->pad = 0;
rep->udiag_ino = sk_ino;
sock_diag_save_cookie(sk, rep->udiag_cookie);

93
debian/patches/bugfix/all/writeback-fix-negative-bdi-max-pause.patch vendored Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,93 @@
From e3b6c655b91e01a1dade056cfa358581b47a5351 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Fengguang Wu <fengguang.wu@intel.com>
Date: Wed, 16 Oct 2013 13:47:03 -0700
Subject: writeback: fix negative bdi max pause
From: Fengguang Wu <fengguang.wu@intel.com>
commit e3b6c655b91e01a1dade056cfa358581b47a5351 upstream.
Toralf runs trinity on UML/i386. After some time it hangs and the last
message line is
BUG: soft lockup - CPU#0 stuck for 22s! [trinity-child0:1521]
It's found that pages_dirtied becomes very large. More than 1000000000
pages in this case:
period = HZ * pages_dirtied / task_ratelimit;
BUG_ON(pages_dirtied > 2000000000);
BUG_ON(pages_dirtied > 1000000000); <---------
UML debug printf shows that we got negative pause here:
ick: pause : -984
ick: pages_dirtied : 0
ick: task_ratelimit: 0
pause:
+ if (pause < 0) {
+ extern int printf(char *, ...);
+ printf("ick : pause : %li\n", pause);
+ printf("ick: pages_dirtied : %lu\n", pages_dirtied);
+ printf("ick: task_ratelimit: %lu\n", task_ratelimit);
+ BUG_ON(1);
+ }
trace_balance_dirty_pages(bdi,
Since pause is bounded by [min_pause, max_pause] where min_pause is also
bounded by max_pause. It's suspected and demonstrated that the
max_pause calculation goes wrong:
ick: pause : -717
ick: min_pause : -177
ick: max_pause : -717
ick: pages_dirtied : 14
ick: task_ratelimit: 0
The problem lies in the two "long = unsigned long" assignments in
bdi_max_pause() which might go negative if the highest bit is 1, and the
min_t(long, ...) check failed to protect it falling under 0. Fix all of
them by using "unsigned long" throughout the function.
Signed-off-by: Fengguang Wu <fengguang.wu@intel.com>
Reported-by: Toralf Förster <toralf.foerster@gmx.de>
Tested-by: Toralf Förster <toralf.foerster@gmx.de>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Cc: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
mm/page-writeback.c | 10 +++++-----
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
--- a/mm/page-writeback.c
+++ b/mm/page-writeback.c
@@ -1104,11 +1104,11 @@ static unsigned long dirty_poll_interval
return 1;
}
-static long bdi_max_pause(struct backing_dev_info *bdi,
- unsigned long bdi_dirty)
+static unsigned long bdi_max_pause(struct backing_dev_info *bdi,
+ unsigned long bdi_dirty)
{
- long bw = bdi->avg_write_bandwidth;
- long t;
+ unsigned long bw = bdi->avg_write_bandwidth;
+ unsigned long t;
/*
* Limit pause time for small memory systems. If sleeping for too long
@@ -1120,7 +1120,7 @@ static long bdi_max_pause(struct backing
t = bdi_dirty / (1 + bw / roundup_pow_of_two(1 + HZ / 8));
t++;
- return min_t(long, t, MAX_PAUSE);
+ return min_t(unsigned long, t, MAX_PAUSE);
}
static long bdi_min_pause(struct backing_dev_info *bdi,

16
debian/patches/series vendored
View File

@ -81,3 +81,19 @@ features/all/mvsas-Recognise-device-subsystem-9485-9485-as-88SE94.patch
bugfix/all/kbuild-use-nostdinc-in-compile-tests.patch
bugfix/all/UAPI-include-asm-byteorder.h-in-linux-raid-md_p.h.patch
bugfix/all/CVE-2013-4348.patch
bugfix/all/net-do-not-call-sock_put-on-timewait-sockets.patch
bugfix/all/l2tp-fix-kernel-panic-when-using-ipv4-mapped-ipv6-addresses.patch
bugfix/all/net-heap-overflow-in-__audit_sockaddr.patch
bugfix/all/proc-connector-fix-info-leaks.patch
bugfix/all/bridge-update-mdb-expiration-timer-upon-reports.patch
bugfix/all/revert-bridge-only-expire-the-mdb-entry-when-query-is-received.patch
bugfix/all/unix_diag-fix-info-leak.patch
bugfix/all/be2net-pass-if_id-for-v1-and-v2-versions-of-tx_create-cmd.patch
bugfix/all/net-fix-cipso-packet-validation-when-netlabel.patch
bugfix/all/inet-fix-possible-memory-corruption-with-udp_cork-and-ufo.patch
bugfix/arm/arm-7851-1-check-for-number-of-arguments-in-syscall_get-set_arguments.patch
bugfix/all/ext-fix-double-put-in-tmpfile.patch
bugfix/all/dm-snapshot-fix-data-corruption.patch
bugfix/all/i2c-ismt-initialize-dma-buffer.patch
bugfix/all/mm-fix-bug-in-__split_huge_page_pmd.patch
bugfix/all/writeback-fix-negative-bdi-max-pause.patch