Merge tag 'debian/4.3.3-3'
Drop the ABI reference and ignored symbols. Drop most of the patches, as they're already upstream.
This commit is contained in:
commit
e2abaa403e
|
@ -44,6 +44,7 @@ class Gencontrol(Base):
|
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},
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'packages': {
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'docs': config.SchemaItemBoolean(),
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'headers-all': config.SchemaItemBoolean(),
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'installer': config.SchemaItemBoolean(),
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'libc-dev': config.SchemaItemBoolean(),
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|
@ -134,10 +135,6 @@ class Gencontrol(Base):
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self._setup_makeflags(self.arch_makeflags, makeflags, config_base)
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def do_arch_packages(self, packages, makefile, arch, vars, makeflags, extra):
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# Some userland architectures require kernels from another
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# (Debian) architecture, e.g. x32/amd64.
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foreign_kernel = not self.config['base', arch].get('featuresets')
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if self.version.linux_modifier is None:
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try:
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abiname_part = '-%s' % self.config['abi', arch]['abiname']
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@ -146,14 +143,19 @@ class Gencontrol(Base):
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makeflags['ABINAME'] = vars['abiname'] = \
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self.abiname_version + abiname_part
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if foreign_kernel:
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packages_headers_arch = []
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makeflags['FOREIGN_KERNEL'] = True
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else:
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# Some userland architectures require kernels from another
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# (Debian) architecture, e.g. x32/amd64.
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# And some derivatives don't need the headers-all packages
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# for other reasons.
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if (self.config['base', arch].get('featuresets') and
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self.config.merge('packages').get('headers-all', True)):
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headers_arch = self.templates["control.headers.arch"]
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packages_headers_arch = self.process_packages(headers_arch, vars)
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packages_headers_arch[-1]['Depends'].extend(PackageRelation())
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extra['headers_arch_depends'] = packages_headers_arch[-1]['Depends']
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else:
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packages_headers_arch = []
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makeflags['DO_HEADERS_ALL'] = False
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if self.config.merge('packages').get('libc-dev', True):
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libc_dev = self.templates["control.libc-dev"]
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|
@ -364,7 +366,8 @@ class Gencontrol(Base):
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package_headers = self.process_package(headers[0], vars)
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package_headers['Depends'].extend(relations_compiler_headers)
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packages_own.append(package_headers)
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extra['headers_arch_depends'].append('%s (= ${binary:Version})' % packages_own[-1]['Package'])
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if extra.get('headers_arch_depends'):
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extra['headers_arch_depends'].append('%s (= ${binary:Version})' % packages_own[-1]['Package'])
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build_debug = config_entry_build.get('debug-info')
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|
|
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@ -80,6 +80,38 @@ linux (4.4~rc4-1~exp1) experimental; urgency=medium
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-- Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Sun, 13 Dec 2015 16:25:45 +0000
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linux (4.3.3-3) unstable; urgency=medium
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|
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[ Ben Hutchings ]
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* [ppc64*] drm: Enable DRM_AST as module (Closes: #808338)
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* block: ensure to split after potentially bouncing a bio (Closes: #809082)
|
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* pptp: verify sockaddr_len in pptp_bind() and pptp_connect() (CVE-2015-8569)
|
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* bluetooth: Validate socket address length in sco_sock_bind() (CVE-2015-8575)
|
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* [xen] Fix race conditions in back-end drivers (CVE-2015-8550, XSA-155)
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* [xen] pciback: Fix state validation in MSI control operations
|
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(CVE-2015-8551, CVE-2015-8852, XSA-157)
|
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* ptrace: being capable wrt a process requires mapped uids/gids
|
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(CVE-2015-8709)
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* KEYS: Fix race between read and revoke (CVE-2015-7550)
|
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* [armhf] udeb: Add modular clock, GPIO, PCIe PHY and regulator drivers to
|
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core-modules (Closes: #809521)
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* [armhf] udeb: Add more USB PHY drivers to usb-modules
|
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* drm/nouveau/pmu: do not assume a PMU is present (Closes: #809481)
|
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* [x86] drm/i915: Don't compare has_drrs strictly in pipe config
|
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(Closes: #808720)
|
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* [armhf] crypto: sun4i-ss - add missing statesize (Closes: #808625)
|
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* Revert "xhci: don't finish a TD if we get a short transfer event mid TD"
|
||||
(Closes: #808602, #808953, regression in 4.3-rc7)
|
||||
* [x86] pinctrl: Enable PINCTRL_CHERRYVIEW (Closes: #808044)
|
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* [s390x] udeb: Add crc-modules package (Closes: #808051)
|
||||
|
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[ Salvatore Bonaccorso ]
|
||||
* ovl: fix permission checking for setattr (CVE-2015-8660)
|
||||
* [x86] kvm: Reload pit counters for all channels when restoring state
|
||||
(CVE-2015-7513)
|
||||
|
||||
-- Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Sat, 02 Jan 2016 16:45:46 +0000
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|
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linux (4.3.3-2) unstable; urgency=medium
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|
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* [armhf,sparc64] Force ZONE_DMA to be enabled, reversing ABI change in
|
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|
|
|
@ -58,6 +58,11 @@ CONFIG_PATA_AMD=m
|
|||
# CONFIG_MAC_FLOPPY is not set
|
||||
CONFIG_BLK_DEV_RSXX=m
|
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|
||||
##
|
||||
## file: drivers/gpu/drm/ast/Kconfig
|
||||
##
|
||||
CONFIG_DRM_AST=m
|
||||
|
||||
##
|
||||
## file: drivers/net/ethernet/ibm/Kconfig
|
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##
|
||||
|
|
|
@ -1270,6 +1270,7 @@ CONFIG_TCIC=m
|
|||
## file: drivers/pinctrl/intel/Kconfig
|
||||
##
|
||||
CONFIG_PINCTRL_BAYTRAIL=y
|
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CONFIG_PINCTRL_CHERRYVIEW=y
|
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|
||||
##
|
||||
## file: drivers/platform/chrome/Kconfig
|
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|
|
|
@ -1 +1,30 @@
|
|||
#include <core-modules>
|
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|
||||
# Clocks
|
||||
clk-palmas ?
|
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clk-s2mps11 ?
|
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clk-twl6040 ?
|
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|
||||
# GPIO
|
||||
gpio-da9052 ?
|
||||
gpio-pca953x ?
|
||||
gpio-viperboard ?
|
||||
|
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# PCIe PHYs
|
||||
phy-omap-control ?
|
||||
phy-ti-pipe3 ?
|
||||
|
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# Regulators
|
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anatop-regulator ?
|
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axp20x-regulator ?
|
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da9052-regulator ?
|
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gpio-regulator ?
|
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mc13783-regulator ?
|
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mc13892-regulator ?
|
||||
pbias-regulator ?
|
||||
pfuze100-regulator ?
|
||||
s2mpa01 ?
|
||||
s2mps11 ?
|
||||
s5m8767 ?
|
||||
ti-abb-regulator ?
|
||||
vexpress ?
|
||||
|
|
|
@ -4,4 +4,6 @@ ahci_imx
|
|||
ahci_sunxi
|
||||
ahci_tegra
|
||||
sata_highbank
|
||||
|
||||
# SATA PHYs
|
||||
phy-exynos5250-sata
|
||||
|
|
|
@ -8,8 +8,19 @@ ehci-exynos
|
|||
ehci-omap
|
||||
ehci-orion
|
||||
ehci-tegra
|
||||
phy-exynos-usb2
|
||||
phy-omap-usb2
|
||||
ci_hdrc_imx
|
||||
phy-mxs-usb
|
||||
dwc2
|
||||
|
||||
# USB PHYs
|
||||
phy-am335x ?
|
||||
phy-am335x-control ?
|
||||
phy-exynos-usb2
|
||||
phy-exynos5-usbdrd ?
|
||||
phy-generic ?
|
||||
phy-mxs-usb
|
||||
phy-omap-usb2
|
||||
phy-sun4i-usb ?
|
||||
phy-sun9i-usb ?
|
||||
phy-tegra-usb ?
|
||||
phy-twl4030-usb ?
|
||||
phy-twl6030-usb ?
|
||||
|
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,110 @@
|
|||
From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
|
||||
Date: Fri, 18 Dec 2015 01:34:26 +0000
|
||||
Subject: KEYS: Fix race between read and revoke
|
||||
Origin: https://git.kernel.org/linus/b4a1b4f5047e4f54e194681125c74c0aa64d637d
|
||||
|
||||
This fixes CVE-2015-7550.
|
||||
|
||||
There's a race between keyctl_read() and keyctl_revoke(). If the revoke
|
||||
happens between keyctl_read() checking the validity of a key and the key's
|
||||
semaphore being taken, then the key type read method will see a revoked key.
|
||||
|
||||
This causes a problem for the user-defined key type because it assumes in
|
||||
its read method that there will always be a payload in a non-revoked key
|
||||
and doesn't check for a NULL pointer.
|
||||
|
||||
Fix this by making keyctl_read() check the validity of a key after taking
|
||||
semaphore instead of before.
|
||||
|
||||
I think the bug was introduced with the original keyrings code.
|
||||
|
||||
This was discovered by a multithreaded test program generated by syzkaller
|
||||
(http://github.com/google/syzkaller). Here's a cleaned up version:
|
||||
|
||||
#include <sys/types.h>
|
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#include <keyutils.h>
|
||||
#include <pthread.h>
|
||||
void *thr0(void *arg)
|
||||
{
|
||||
key_serial_t key = (unsigned long)arg;
|
||||
keyctl_revoke(key);
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
void *thr1(void *arg)
|
||||
{
|
||||
key_serial_t key = (unsigned long)arg;
|
||||
char buffer[16];
|
||||
keyctl_read(key, buffer, 16);
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
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int main()
|
||||
{
|
||||
key_serial_t key = add_key("user", "%", "foo", 3, KEY_SPEC_USER_KEYRING);
|
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pthread_t th[5];
|
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pthread_create(&th[0], 0, thr0, (void *)(unsigned long)key);
|
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pthread_create(&th[1], 0, thr1, (void *)(unsigned long)key);
|
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pthread_create(&th[2], 0, thr0, (void *)(unsigned long)key);
|
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pthread_create(&th[3], 0, thr1, (void *)(unsigned long)key);
|
||||
pthread_join(th[0], 0);
|
||||
pthread_join(th[1], 0);
|
||||
pthread_join(th[2], 0);
|
||||
pthread_join(th[3], 0);
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
Build as:
|
||||
|
||||
cc -o keyctl-race keyctl-race.c -lkeyutils -lpthread
|
||||
|
||||
Run as:
|
||||
|
||||
while keyctl-race; do :; done
|
||||
|
||||
as it may need several iterations to crash the kernel. The crash can be
|
||||
summarised as:
|
||||
|
||||
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000010
|
||||
IP: [<ffffffff81279b08>] user_read+0x56/0xa3
|
||||
...
|
||||
Call Trace:
|
||||
[<ffffffff81276aa9>] keyctl_read_key+0xb6/0xd7
|
||||
[<ffffffff81277815>] SyS_keyctl+0x83/0xe0
|
||||
[<ffffffff815dbb97>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x6f
|
||||
|
||||
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
|
||||
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
|
||||
Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
|
||||
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
|
||||
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
|
||||
---
|
||||
security/keys/keyctl.c | 18 +++++++++---------
|
||||
1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
|
||||
|
||||
--- a/security/keys/keyctl.c
|
||||
+++ b/security/keys/keyctl.c
|
||||
@@ -757,16 +757,16 @@ long keyctl_read_key(key_serial_t keyid,
|
||||
|
||||
/* the key is probably readable - now try to read it */
|
||||
can_read_key:
|
||||
- ret = key_validate(key);
|
||||
- if (ret == 0) {
|
||||
- ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
|
||||
- if (key->type->read) {
|
||||
- /* read the data with the semaphore held (since we
|
||||
- * might sleep) */
|
||||
- down_read(&key->sem);
|
||||
+ ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
|
||||
+ if (key->type->read) {
|
||||
+ /* Read the data with the semaphore held (since we might sleep)
|
||||
+ * to protect against the key being updated or revoked.
|
||||
+ */
|
||||
+ down_read(&key->sem);
|
||||
+ ret = key_validate(key);
|
||||
+ if (ret == 0)
|
||||
ret = key->type->read(key, buffer, buflen);
|
||||
- up_read(&key->sem);
|
||||
- }
|
||||
+ up_read(&key->sem);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
error2:
|
104
debian/patches/bugfix/all/ptrace-being-capable-wrt-a-process-requires-mapped-uids-gids.patch
vendored
Normal file
104
debian/patches/bugfix/all/ptrace-being-capable-wrt-a-process-requires-mapped-uids-gids.patch
vendored
Normal file
|
@ -0,0 +1,104 @@
|
|||
From: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>
|
||||
Subject: ptrace: being capable wrt a process requires mapped uids/gids
|
||||
Date: Sat, 26 Dec 2015 03:52:31 +0100
|
||||
Origin: https://lkml.org/lkml/2015/12/25/71
|
||||
|
||||
ptrace_has_cap() checks whether the current process should be
|
||||
treated as having a certain capability for ptrace checks
|
||||
against another process. Until now, this was equivalent to
|
||||
has_ns_capability(current, target_ns, CAP_SYS_PTRACE).
|
||||
|
||||
However, if a root-owned process wants to enter a user
|
||||
namespace for some reason without knowing who owns it and
|
||||
therefore can't change to the namespace owner's uid and gid
|
||||
before entering, as soon as it has entered the namespace,
|
||||
the namespace owner can attach to it via ptrace and thereby
|
||||
gain access to its uid and gid.
|
||||
|
||||
While it is possible for the entering process to switch to
|
||||
the uid of a claimed namespace owner before entering,
|
||||
causing the attempt to enter to fail if the claimed uid is
|
||||
wrong, this doesn't solve the problem of determining an
|
||||
appropriate gid.
|
||||
|
||||
With this change, the entering process can first enter the
|
||||
namespace and then safely inspect the namespace's
|
||||
properties, e.g. through /proc/self/{uid_map,gid_map},
|
||||
assuming that the namespace owner doesn't have access to
|
||||
uid 0.
|
||||
Changed in v2: The caller needs to be capable in the
|
||||
namespace into which tcred's uids/gids can be mapped.
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>
|
||||
---
|
||||
kernel/ptrace.c | 33 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
|
||||
1 file changed, 28 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/kernel/ptrace.c b/kernel/ptrace.c
|
||||
index b760bae..260a08d 100644
|
||||
--- a/kernel/ptrace.c
|
||||
+++ b/kernel/ptrace.c
|
||||
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
|
||||
#include <linux/uio.h>
|
||||
#include <linux/audit.h>
|
||||
#include <linux/pid_namespace.h>
|
||||
+#include <linux/user_namespace.h>
|
||||
#include <linux/syscalls.h>
|
||||
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
|
||||
#include <linux/regset.h>
|
||||
@@ -207,12 +208,34 @@ static int ptrace_check_attach(struct task_struct *child, bool ignore_state)
|
||||
return ret;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
-static int ptrace_has_cap(struct user_namespace *ns, unsigned int mode)
|
||||
+static bool ptrace_has_cap(const struct cred *tcred, unsigned int mode)
|
||||
{
|
||||
+ struct user_namespace *tns = tcred->user_ns;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ /* When a root-owned process enters a user namespace created by a
|
||||
+ * malicious user, the user shouldn't be able to execute code under
|
||||
+ * uid 0 by attaching to the root-owned process via ptrace.
|
||||
+ * Therefore, similar to the capable_wrt_inode_uidgid() check,
|
||||
+ * verify that all the uids and gids of the target process are
|
||||
+ * mapped into a namespace below the current one in which the caller
|
||||
+ * is capable.
|
||||
+ * No fsuid/fsgid check because __ptrace_may_access doesn't do it
|
||||
+ * either.
|
||||
+ */
|
||||
+ while (
|
||||
+ !kuid_has_mapping(tns, tcred->euid) ||
|
||||
+ !kuid_has_mapping(tns, tcred->suid) ||
|
||||
+ !kuid_has_mapping(tns, tcred->uid) ||
|
||||
+ !kgid_has_mapping(tns, tcred->egid) ||
|
||||
+ !kgid_has_mapping(tns, tcred->sgid) ||
|
||||
+ !kgid_has_mapping(tns, tcred->gid)) {
|
||||
+ tns = tns->parent;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_NOAUDIT)
|
||||
- return has_ns_capability_noaudit(current, ns, CAP_SYS_PTRACE);
|
||||
+ return has_ns_capability_noaudit(current, tns, CAP_SYS_PTRACE);
|
||||
else
|
||||
- return has_ns_capability(current, ns, CAP_SYS_PTRACE);
|
||||
+ return has_ns_capability(current, tns, CAP_SYS_PTRACE);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* Returns 0 on success, -errno on denial. */
|
||||
@@ -241,7 +264,7 @@ static int __ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode)
|
||||
gid_eq(cred->gid, tcred->sgid) &&
|
||||
gid_eq(cred->gid, tcred->gid))
|
||||
goto ok;
|
||||
- if (ptrace_has_cap(tcred->user_ns, mode))
|
||||
+ if (ptrace_has_cap(tcred, mode))
|
||||
goto ok;
|
||||
rcu_read_unlock();
|
||||
return -EPERM;
|
||||
@@ -252,7 +275,7 @@ ok:
|
||||
dumpable = get_dumpable(task->mm);
|
||||
rcu_read_lock();
|
||||
if (dumpable != SUID_DUMP_USER &&
|
||||
- !ptrace_has_cap(__task_cred(task)->user_ns, mode)) {
|
||||
+ !ptrace_has_cap(__task_cred(task), mode)) {
|
||||
rcu_read_unlock();
|
||||
return -EPERM;
|
||||
}
|
36
debian/patches/bugfix/all/revert-xhci-don-t-finish-a-td-if-we-get-a-short-transfer.patch
vendored
Normal file
36
debian/patches/bugfix/all/revert-xhci-don-t-finish-a-td-if-we-get-a-short-transfer.patch
vendored
Normal file
|
@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
|
|||
From: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
|
||||
Date: Sat, 02 Jan 2016 03:03:27 +0000
|
||||
Subject: Revert "xhci: don't finish a TD if we get a short transfer event mid TD"
|
||||
Bug-Debian: https://bugs.debian.org/808602
|
||||
Bug-Debian: https://bugs.debian.org/808953
|
||||
|
||||
This reverts commit e210c422b6fdd2dc123bedc588f399aefd8bf9de. It
|
||||
caused serious regressions as referenced above.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
--- a/drivers/usb/host/xhci-ring.c
|
||||
+++ b/drivers/usb/host/xhci-ring.c
|
||||
@@ -2192,10 +2192,6 @@ static int process_bulk_intr_td(struct x
|
||||
}
|
||||
/* Fast path - was this the last TRB in the TD for this URB? */
|
||||
} else if (event_trb == td->last_trb) {
|
||||
- if (td->urb_length_set && trb_comp_code == COMP_SHORT_TX)
|
||||
- return finish_td(xhci, td, event_trb, event, ep,
|
||||
- status, false);
|
||||
-
|
||||
if (EVENT_TRB_LEN(le32_to_cpu(event->transfer_len)) != 0) {
|
||||
td->urb->actual_length =
|
||||
td->urb->transfer_buffer_length -
|
||||
@@ -2247,12 +2243,6 @@ static int process_bulk_intr_td(struct x
|
||||
td->urb->actual_length +=
|
||||
TRB_LEN(le32_to_cpu(cur_trb->generic.field[2])) -
|
||||
EVENT_TRB_LEN(le32_to_cpu(event->transfer_len));
|
||||
-
|
||||
- if (trb_comp_code == COMP_SHORT_TX) {
|
||||
- xhci_dbg(xhci, "mid bulk/intr SP, wait for last TRB event\n");
|
||||
- td->urb_length_set = true;
|
||||
- return 0;
|
||||
- }
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return finish_td(xhci, td, event_trb, event, ep, status, false);
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
|
|||
From: LABBE Corentin <clabbe.montjoie@gmail.com>
|
||||
Date: Mon, 16 Nov 2015 09:35:54 +0100
|
||||
Subject: crypto: sun4i-ss - add missing statesize
|
||||
Origin: https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/herbert/cryptodev-2.6.git/commit?id=4f9ea86604e3ba64edd2817795798168fbb3c1a6
|
||||
Bug-Debian: https://bugs.debian.org/808625
|
||||
|
||||
sun4i-ss implementaton of md5/sha1 is via ahash algorithms.
|
||||
Commit 8996eafdcbad ("crypto: ahash - ensure statesize is non-zero")
|
||||
made impossible to load them without giving statesize. This patch
|
||||
specifiy statesize for sha1 and md5.
|
||||
|
||||
Fixes: 6298e948215f ("crypto: sunxi-ss - Add Allwinner Security System crypto accelerator")
|
||||
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.3+
|
||||
Tested-by: Chen-Yu Tsai <wens@csie.org>
|
||||
Signed-off-by: LABBE Corentin <clabbe.montjoie@gmail.com>
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
|
||||
---
|
||||
drivers/crypto/sunxi-ss/sun4i-ss-core.c | 2 ++
|
||||
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/sunxi-ss/sun4i-ss-core.c b/drivers/crypto/sunxi-ss/sun4i-ss-core.c
|
||||
index eab6fe2..107cd2a 100644
|
||||
--- a/drivers/crypto/sunxi-ss/sun4i-ss-core.c
|
||||
+++ b/drivers/crypto/sunxi-ss/sun4i-ss-core.c
|
||||
@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@ static struct sun4i_ss_alg_template ss_algs[] = {
|
||||
.import = sun4i_hash_import_md5,
|
||||
.halg = {
|
||||
.digestsize = MD5_DIGEST_SIZE,
|
||||
+ .statesize = sizeof(struct md5_state),
|
||||
.base = {
|
||||
.cra_name = "md5",
|
||||
.cra_driver_name = "md5-sun4i-ss",
|
||||
@@ -66,6 +67,7 @@ static struct sun4i_ss_alg_template ss_algs[] = {
|
||||
.import = sun4i_hash_import_sha1,
|
||||
.halg = {
|
||||
.digestsize = SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE,
|
||||
+ .statesize = sizeof(struct sha1_state),
|
||||
.base = {
|
||||
.cra_name = "sha1",
|
||||
.cra_driver_name = "sha1-sun4i-ss",
|
|
@ -92,3 +92,9 @@ features/arm/rpi/arm-bcm2835-split-the-dt-for-peripherals-from-the-dt.patch
|
|||
features/arm/rpi/arm-bcm2835-move-the-cpu-peripheral-include-out-of-c.patch
|
||||
features/arm/rpi/arm-bcm2835-add-devicetree-for-bcm2836-and-raspberry.patch
|
||||
features/arm/rpi/arm-bcm2835-add-the-auxiliary-clocks-to-the-device-t.patch
|
||||
|
||||
# Security fixes
|
||||
bugfix/all/ptrace-being-capable-wrt-a-process-requires-mapped-uids-gids.patch
|
||||
bugfix/all/keys-fix-race-between-read-and-revoke.patch
|
||||
bugfix/arm/crypto-sun4i-ss-add-missing-statesize.patch
|
||||
bugfix/all/revert-xhci-don-t-finish-a-td-if-we-get-a-short-transfer.patch
|
||||
|
|
|
@ -50,7 +50,8 @@ MAKEOVERRIDES =
|
|||
#
|
||||
# Targets
|
||||
#
|
||||
ifneq ($(FOREIGN_KERNEL),True)
|
||||
binary-arch-arch:
|
||||
ifneq ($(DO_HEADERS_ALL),False)
|
||||
binary-arch-arch: install-headers_$(ARCH)
|
||||
endif
|
||||
ifneq ($(DO_LIBC),False)
|
||||
|
|
Loading…
Reference in New Issue