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Update to 3.14.8 

svn path=/dists/sid/linux/; revision=21456
This commit is contained in:
Ben Hutchings 2014-06-17 16:00:06 +00:00
parent 78f00cf7ad
commit a96d1fd530
7 changed files with 10 additions and 394 deletions
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10
debian/changelog vendored
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@ -1,3 +1,13 @@
linux (3.14.8-1) UNRELEASED; urgency=medium
* New upstream stable update:
https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.x/ChangeLog-3.14.8
- Target/iscsi,iser: Avoid accepting transport connections during stop
stage
- iser-target: Fix multi network portal shutdown regression
-- Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Tue, 17 Jun 2014 16:44:33 +0100
linux (3.14.7-1) unstable; urgency=medium
* New upstream stable update:

33
debian/patches/bugfix/all/PCI-MSI-Fix-memory-leak-in-free_msi_irqs.patch vendored
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@ -1,33 +0,0 @@
From: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com>
Date: Wed, 4 Jun 2014 15:49:50 -0700
Subject: PCI/MSI: Fix memory leak in free_msi_irqs()
Origin: https://git.kernel.org/linus/b701c0b1fe819a2083fc6ec5332e0e4492b9516d
free_msi_irqs() is leaking memory, since list_for_each_entry(entry,
&dev->msi_list, list) {...} is never executed, because dev->msi_list is
made empty by the loop just above this one.
Fix it by relying on zero termination of attribute array like
populate_msi_sysfs() does.
Fixes: 1c51b50c2995 ("PCI/MSI: Export MSI mode using attributes, not kobjects")
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com>
Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.14+
---
drivers/pci/msi.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/drivers/pci/msi.c
+++ b/drivers/pci/msi.c
@@ -414,7 +414,7 @@ static void free_msi_irqs(struct pci_dev
if (dev->msi_irq_groups) {
sysfs_remove_groups(&dev->dev.kobj, dev->msi_irq_groups);
msi_attrs = dev->msi_irq_groups[0]->attrs;
- list_for_each_entry(entry, &dev->msi_list, list) {
+ while (msi_attrs[count]) {
dev_attr = container_of(msi_attrs[count],
struct device_attribute, attr);
kfree(dev_attr->attr.name);

80
debian/patches/bugfix/all/auditsc-audit_krule-mask-accesses-need-bounds-checki.patch vendored
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@ -1,80 +0,0 @@
From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Date: Wed, 28 May 2014 23:09:58 -0400
Subject: auditsc: audit_krule mask accesses need bounds checking
Origin: https://git.kernel.org/linus/a3c54931199565930d6d84f4c3456f6440aefd41
Fixes an easy DoS and possible information disclosure.
This does nothing about the broken state of x32 auditing.
eparis: If the admin has enabled auditd and has specifically loaded
audit rules. This bug has been around since before git. Wow...
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
---
kernel/auditsc.c | 27 ++++++++++++++++++---------
1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -720,6 +720,22 @@ static enum audit_state audit_filter_tas
return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT;
}
+static int audit_in_mask(const struct audit_krule *rule, unsigned long val)
+{
+ int word, bit;
+
+ if (val > 0xffffffff)
+ return false;
+
+ word = AUDIT_WORD(val);
+ if (word >= AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE)
+ return false;
+
+ bit = AUDIT_BIT(val);
+
+ return rule->mask[word] & bit;
+}
+
/* At syscall entry and exit time, this filter is called if the
* audit_state is not low enough that auditing cannot take place, but is
* also not high enough that we already know we have to write an audit
@@ -737,11 +753,8 @@ static enum audit_state audit_filter_sys
rcu_read_lock();
if (!list_empty(list)) {
- int word = AUDIT_WORD(ctx->major);
- int bit = AUDIT_BIT(ctx->major);
-
list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) {
- if ((e->rule.mask[word] & bit) == bit &&
+ if (audit_in_mask(&e->rule, ctx->major) &&
audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, NULL,
&state, false)) {
rcu_read_unlock();
@@ -761,20 +774,16 @@ static enum audit_state audit_filter_sys
static int audit_filter_inode_name(struct task_struct *tsk,
struct audit_names *n,
struct audit_context *ctx) {
- int word, bit;
int h = audit_hash_ino((u32)n->ino);
struct list_head *list = &audit_inode_hash[h];
struct audit_entry *e;
enum audit_state state;
- word = AUDIT_WORD(ctx->major);
- bit = AUDIT_BIT(ctx->major);
-
if (list_empty(list))
return 0;
list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) {
- if ((e->rule.mask[word] & bit) == bit &&
+ if (audit_in_mask(&e->rule, ctx->major) &&
audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, n, &state, false)) {
ctx->current_state = state;
return 1;

191
debian/patches/bugfix/all/fs-userns-change-inode_capable-to-capable_wrt_inode_uidgid.patch vendored
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@ -1,191 +0,0 @@
From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Date: Tue, 10 Jun 2014 12:45:42 -0700
Subject: fs,userns: Change inode_capable to capable_wrt_inode_uidgid
Origin: https://git.kernel.org/linus/23adbe12ef7d3d4195e80800ab36b37bee28cd03
The kernel has no concept of capabilities with respect to inodes; inodes
exist independently of namespaces. For example, inode_capable(inode,
CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE) would be nonsense.
This patch changes inode_capable to check for uid and gid mappings and
renames it to capable_wrt_inode_uidgid, which should make it more
obvious what it does.
Fixes CVE-2014-4014.
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
---
fs/attr.c | 8 ++++----
fs/inode.c | 10 +++++++---
fs/namei.c | 11 ++++++-----
fs/xfs/xfs_ioctl.c | 2 +-
include/linux/capability.h | 2 +-
kernel/capability.c | 20 ++++++++------------
6 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-)
--- a/fs/attr.c
+++ b/fs/attr.c
@@ -50,14 +50,14 @@ int inode_change_ok(const struct inode *
if ((ia_valid & ATTR_UID) &&
(!uid_eq(current_fsuid(), inode->i_uid) ||
!uid_eq(attr->ia_uid, inode->i_uid)) &&
- !inode_capable(inode, CAP_CHOWN))
+ !capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(inode, CAP_CHOWN))
return -EPERM;
/* Make sure caller can chgrp. */
if ((ia_valid & ATTR_GID) &&
(!uid_eq(current_fsuid(), inode->i_uid) ||
(!in_group_p(attr->ia_gid) && !gid_eq(attr->ia_gid, inode->i_gid))) &&
- !inode_capable(inode, CAP_CHOWN))
+ !capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(inode, CAP_CHOWN))
return -EPERM;
/* Make sure a caller can chmod. */
@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ int inode_change_ok(const struct inode *
/* Also check the setgid bit! */
if (!in_group_p((ia_valid & ATTR_GID) ? attr->ia_gid :
inode->i_gid) &&
- !inode_capable(inode, CAP_FSETID))
+ !capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(inode, CAP_FSETID))
attr->ia_mode &= ~S_ISGID;
}
@@ -160,7 +160,7 @@ void setattr_copy(struct inode *inode, c
umode_t mode = attr->ia_mode;
if (!in_group_p(inode->i_gid) &&
- !inode_capable(inode, CAP_FSETID))
+ !capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(inode, CAP_FSETID))
mode &= ~S_ISGID;
inode->i_mode = mode;
}
--- a/fs/inode.c
+++ b/fs/inode.c
@@ -1842,14 +1842,18 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(inode_init_owner);
* inode_owner_or_capable - check current task permissions to inode
* @inode: inode being checked
*
- * Return true if current either has CAP_FOWNER to the inode, or
- * owns the file.
+ * Return true if current either has CAP_FOWNER in a namespace with the
+ * inode owner uid mapped, or owns the file.
*/
bool inode_owner_or_capable(const struct inode *inode)
{
+ struct user_namespace *ns;
+
if (uid_eq(current_fsuid(), inode->i_uid))
return true;
- if (inode_capable(inode, CAP_FOWNER))
+
+ ns = current_user_ns();
+ if (ns_capable(ns, CAP_FOWNER) && kuid_has_mapping(ns, inode->i_uid))
return true;
return false;
}
--- a/fs/namei.c
+++ b/fs/namei.c
@@ -332,10 +332,11 @@ int generic_permission(struct inode *ino
if (S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode)) {
/* DACs are overridable for directories */
- if (inode_capable(inode, CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE))
+ if (capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(inode, CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE))
return 0;
if (!(mask & MAY_WRITE))
- if (inode_capable(inode, CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH))
+ if (capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(inode,
+ CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH))
return 0;
return -EACCES;
}
@@ -345,7 +346,7 @@ int generic_permission(struct inode *ino
* at least one exec bit set.
*/
if (!(mask & MAY_EXEC) || (inode->i_mode & S_IXUGO))
- if (inode_capable(inode, CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE))
+ if (capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(inode, CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE))
return 0;
/*
@@ -353,7 +354,7 @@ int generic_permission(struct inode *ino
*/
mask &= MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC;
if (mask == MAY_READ)
- if (inode_capable(inode, CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH))
+ if (capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(inode, CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH))
return 0;
return -EACCES;
@@ -2370,7 +2371,7 @@ static inline int check_sticky(struct in
return 0;
if (uid_eq(dir->i_uid, fsuid))
return 0;
- return !inode_capable(inode, CAP_FOWNER);
+ return !capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(inode, CAP_FOWNER);
}
/*
--- a/fs/xfs/xfs_ioctl.c
+++ b/fs/xfs/xfs_ioctl.c
@@ -1241,7 +1241,7 @@ xfs_ioctl_setattr(
* cleared upon successful return from chown()
*/
if ((ip->i_d.di_mode & (S_ISUID|S_ISGID)) &&
- !inode_capable(VFS_I(ip), CAP_FSETID))
+ !capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(VFS_I(ip), CAP_FSETID))
ip->i_d.di_mode &= ~(S_ISUID|S_ISGID);
/*
--- a/include/linux/capability.h
+++ b/include/linux/capability.h
@@ -210,7 +210,7 @@ extern bool has_ns_capability_noaudit(st
struct user_namespace *ns, int cap);
extern bool capable(int cap);
extern bool ns_capable(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap);
-extern bool inode_capable(const struct inode *inode, int cap);
+extern bool capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(const struct inode *inode, int cap);
extern bool file_ns_capable(const struct file *file, struct user_namespace *ns, int cap);
/* audit system wants to get cap info from files as well */
--- a/kernel/capability.c
+++ b/kernel/capability.c
@@ -433,23 +433,19 @@ bool capable(int cap)
EXPORT_SYMBOL(capable);
/**
- * inode_capable - Check superior capability over inode
+ * capable_wrt_inode_uidgid - Check nsown_capable and uid and gid mapped
* @inode: The inode in question
* @cap: The capability in question
*
- * Return true if the current task has the given superior capability
- * targeted at it's own user namespace and that the given inode is owned
- * by the current user namespace or a child namespace.
- *
- * Currently we check to see if an inode is owned by the current
- * user namespace by seeing if the inode's owner maps into the
- * current user namespace.
- *
+ * Return true if the current task has the given capability targeted at
+ * its own user namespace and that the given inode's uid and gid are
+ * mapped into the current user namespace.
*/
-bool inode_capable(const struct inode *inode, int cap)
+bool capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(const struct inode *inode, int cap)
{
struct user_namespace *ns = current_user_ns();
- return ns_capable(ns, cap) && kuid_has_mapping(ns, inode->i_uid);
+ return ns_capable(ns, cap) && kuid_has_mapping(ns, inode->i_uid) &&
+ kgid_has_mapping(ns, inode->i_gid);
}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(inode_capable);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(capable_wrt_inode_uidgid);

53
debian/patches/bugfix/all/netfilter-ipv4-defrag-set-local_df-flag-on-defragmen.patch vendored
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@ -1,53 +0,0 @@
From: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Date: Fri, 2 May 2014 15:32:16 +0200
Subject: netfilter: ipv4: defrag: set local_df flag on defragmented skb
Origin: https://git.kernel.org/linus/895162b1101b3ea5db08ca6822ae9672717efec0
else we may fail to forward skb even if original fragments do fit
outgoing link mtu:
1. remote sends 2k packets in two 1000 byte frags, DF set
2. we want to forward but only see '2k > mtu and DF set'
3. we then send icmp error saying that outgoing link is 1500
But original sender never sent a packet that would not fit
the outgoing link.
Setting local_df makes outgoing path test size vs.
IPCB(skb)->frag_max_size, so we will still send the correct
error in case the largest original size did not fit
outgoing link mtu.
Reported-by: Maxime Bizon <mbizon@freebox.fr>
Suggested-by: Maxime Bizon <mbizon@freebox.fr>
Fixes: 5f2d04f1f9 (ipv4: fix path MTU discovery with connection tracking)
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
---
net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_defrag_ipv4.c | 5 +++--
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_defrag_ipv4.c b/net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_defrag_ipv4.c
index 12e13bd..f40f321 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_defrag_ipv4.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_defrag_ipv4.c
@@ -22,7 +22,6 @@
#endif
#include <net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_zones.h>
-/* Returns new sk_buff, or NULL */
static int nf_ct_ipv4_gather_frags(struct sk_buff *skb, u_int32_t user)
{
int err;
@@ -33,8 +32,10 @@ static int nf_ct_ipv4_gather_frags(struct sk_buff *skb, u_int32_t user)
err = ip_defrag(skb, user);
local_bh_enable();
- if (!err)
+ if (!err) {
ip_send_check(ip_hdr(skb));
+ skb->local_df = 1;
+ }
return err;
}

32
debian/patches/bugfix/mips/MIPS-asm-thread_info-Add-_TIF_SECCOMP-flag.patch vendored
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@ -1,32 +0,0 @@
From: Markos Chandras <markos.chandras@imgtec.com>
Date: Wed, 22 Jan 2014 14:40:00 +0000
Subject: MIPS: asm: thread_info: Add _TIF_SECCOMP flag
Origin: https://git.kernel.org/linus/137f7df8cead00688524c82360930845396b8a21
Add _TIF_SECCOMP flag to _TIF_WORK_SYSCALL_ENTRY to indicate
that the system call needs to be checked against a seccomp filter.
Signed-off-by: Markos Chandras <markos.chandras@imgtec.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Burton <paul.burton@imgtec.com>
Reviewed-by: James Hogan <james.hogan@imgtec.com>
Cc: linux-mips@linux-mips.org
Patchwork: https://patchwork.linux-mips.org/patch/6405/
Signed-off-by: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
---
arch/mips/include/asm/thread_info.h | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/arch/mips/include/asm/thread_info.h b/arch/mips/include/asm/thread_info.h
index 24846f9..e80ae50 100644
--- a/arch/mips/include/asm/thread_info.h
+++ b/arch/mips/include/asm/thread_info.h
@@ -136,7 +136,8 @@ static inline struct thread_info *current_thread_info(void)
#define _TIF_SYSCALL_TRACEPOINT (1<<TIF_SYSCALL_TRACEPOINT)
#define _TIF_WORK_SYSCALL_ENTRY (_TIF_NOHZ | _TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE | \
- _TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT | _TIF_SYSCALL_TRACEPOINT)
+ _TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT | \
+ _TIF_SYSCALL_TRACEPOINT | _TIF_SECCOMP)
/* work to do in syscall_trace_leave() */
#define _TIF_WORK_SYSCALL_EXIT (_TIF_NOHZ | _TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE | \

5
debian/patches/series vendored
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@ -88,12 +88,7 @@ debian/sockdiag-avoid-abi-change-in-3.14.5.patch
debian/target-avoid-abi-change-in-3.14.5.patch
debian/netfilter-avoid-abi-change-in-3.14.5.patch
bugfix/mips/MIPS-Fix-branch-emulation-of-branch-likely-instructi.patch
bugfix/all/netfilter-ipv4-defrag-set-local_df-flag-on-defragmen.patch
bugfix/mips/MIPS-asm-thread_info-Add-_TIF_SECCOMP-flag.patch
bugfix/all/auditsc-audit_krule-mask-accesses-need-bounds-checki.patch
debian/drivers-base-platform-avoid-abi-change-in-3.14.6.patch
debian/dma-avoid-abi-change-in-3.14.6.patch
bugfix/all/fs-userns-change-inode_capable-to-capable_wrt_inode_uidgid.patch
debian/vfs-avoid-abi-change-for-cve-2014-4014.patch
bugfix/all/SCSI-Fix-spurious-request-sense-in-error-handling.patch
bugfix/all/PCI-MSI-Fix-memory-leak-in-free_msi_irqs.patch