diff --git a/debian/changelog b/debian/changelog
index 1978318c2..4bea355d2 100644
--- a/debian/changelog
+++ b/debian/changelog
@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ linux (4.5.1-2) UNRELEASED; urgency=medium
 
   [ Salvatore Bonaccorso ]
   * [x86] xen: suppress hugetlbfs in PV guests (CVE-2016-3961)
+  * [x86] USB: usbip: fix potential out-of-bounds write (CVE-2016-3955)
 
   [ Ben Hutchings ]
   * fs: Consolidate softdep declarations in each module
diff --git a/debian/patches/bugfix/all/USB-usbip-fix-potential-out-of-bounds-write.patch b/debian/patches/bugfix/all/USB-usbip-fix-potential-out-of-bounds-write.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..2a2c4bdb4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/bugfix/all/USB-usbip-fix-potential-out-of-bounds-write.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+From: Ignat Korchagin <ignat.korchagin@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 17 Mar 2016 18:00:29 +0000
+Subject: USB: usbip: fix potential out-of-bounds write
+Origin: https://git.kernel.org/linus/b348d7dddb6c4fbfc810b7a0626e8ec9e29f7cbb
+
+Fix potential out-of-bounds write to urb->transfer_buffer
+usbip handles network communication directly in the kernel. When receiving a
+packet from its peer, usbip code parses headers according to protocol. As
+part of this parsing urb->actual_length is filled. Since the input for
+urb->actual_length comes from the network, it should be treated as untrusted.
+Any entity controlling the network may put any value in the input and the
+preallocated urb->transfer_buffer may not be large enough to hold the data.
+Thus, the malicious entity is able to write arbitrary data to kernel memory.
+
+Signed-off-by: Ignat Korchagin <ignat.korchagin@gmail.com>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ drivers/usb/usbip/usbip_common.c | 11 +++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/drivers/usb/usbip/usbip_common.c b/drivers/usb/usbip/usbip_common.c
+index facaaf0..e40da77 100644
+--- a/drivers/usb/usbip/usbip_common.c
++++ b/drivers/usb/usbip/usbip_common.c
+@@ -741,6 +741,17 @@ int usbip_recv_xbuff(struct usbip_device *ud, struct urb *urb)
+ 	if (!(size > 0))
+ 		return 0;
+ 
++	if (size > urb->transfer_buffer_length) {
++		/* should not happen, probably malicious packet */
++		if (ud->side == USBIP_STUB) {
++			usbip_event_add(ud, SDEV_EVENT_ERROR_TCP);
++			return 0;
++		} else {
++			usbip_event_add(ud, VDEV_EVENT_ERROR_TCP);
++			return -EPIPE;
++		}
++	}
++
+ 	ret = usbip_recv(ud->tcp_socket, urb->transfer_buffer, size);
+ 	if (ret != size) {
+ 		dev_err(&urb->dev->dev, "recv xbuf, %d\n", ret);
+-- 
+2.1.4
+
diff --git a/debian/patches/series b/debian/patches/series
index 719f1b984..850a13d4b 100644
--- a/debian/patches/series
+++ b/debian/patches/series
@@ -124,6 +124,7 @@ bugfix/all/netfilter-x_tables-make-sure-e-next_offset-covers-re.patch
 bugfix/all/ipv4-don-t-do-expensive-useless-work-during-inetdev-.patch
 bugfix/x86/x86-mm-32-enable-full-randomization-on-i386-and-x86_.patch
 bugfix/x86/x86-xen-suppress-hugetlbfs-in-PV-guests.patch
+bugfix/all/USB-usbip-fix-potential-out-of-bounds-write.patch
 
 # Tools bug fixes
 bugfix/all/usbip-document-tcp-wrappers.patch