Update to 3.8.4

svn path=/dists/trunk/linux/; revision=19922
This commit is contained in:
Ben Hutchings 2013-03-20 23:44:51 +00:00
parent b8639bbdc5
commit 9a1fdd2260
11 changed files with 8 additions and 597 deletions

8
debian/changelog vendored
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@ -1,3 +1,11 @@
linux (3.8.4-1~experimental.1) UNRELEASED; urgency=low
* New upstream stable update:
http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.x/ChangeLog-3.8.4
- atl1c: restore buffer state (Closes: #701189)
-- Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Wed, 20 Mar 2013 23:32:20 +0000
linux (3.8.3-1~experimental.1) experimental; urgency=high
* New upstream stable update:

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@ -1,74 +0,0 @@
From 66efdc71d95887b652a742a5dae51fa834d71465 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Date: Fri, 8 Mar 2013 18:11:17 +0100
Subject: ALSA: seq: Fix missing error handling in snd_seq_timer_open()
From: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
commit 66efdc71d95887b652a742a5dae51fa834d71465 upstream.
snd_seq_timer_open() didn't catch the whole error path but let through
if the timer id is a slave. This may lead to Oops by accessing the
uninitialized pointer.
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 00000000000002ae
IP: [<ffffffff819b3477>] snd_seq_timer_open+0xe7/0x130
PGD 785cd067 PUD 76964067 PMD 0
Oops: 0002 [#4] SMP
CPU 0
Pid: 4288, comm: trinity-child7 Tainted: G D W 3.9.0-rc1+ #100 Bochs Bochs
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff819b3477>] [<ffffffff819b3477>] snd_seq_timer_open+0xe7/0x130
RSP: 0018:ffff88006ece7d38 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 0000000000000286 RBX: ffff88007851b400 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 000000000000ffff RSI: ffff88006ece7d58 RDI: ffff88006ece7d38
RBP: ffff88006ece7d98 R08: 000000000000000a R09: 000000000000fffe
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: ffff8800792c5400 R14: 0000000000e8f000 R15: 0000000000000007
FS: 00007f7aaa650700(0000) GS:ffff88007f800000(0000) GS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00000000000002ae CR3: 000000006efec000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Process trinity-child7 (pid: 4288, threadinfo ffff88006ece6000, task ffff880076a8a290)
Stack:
0000000000000286 ffffffff828f2be0 ffff88006ece7d58 ffffffff810f354d
65636e6575716573 2065756575712072 ffff8800792c0030 0000000000000000
ffff88006ece7d98 ffff8800792c5400 ffff88007851b400 ffff8800792c5520
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff810f354d>] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0xd/0x10
[<ffffffff819b17e9>] snd_seq_queue_timer_open+0x29/0x70
[<ffffffff819ae01a>] snd_seq_ioctl_set_queue_timer+0xda/0x120
[<ffffffff819acb9b>] snd_seq_do_ioctl+0x9b/0xd0
[<ffffffff819acbe0>] snd_seq_ioctl+0x10/0x20
[<ffffffff811b9542>] do_vfs_ioctl+0x522/0x570
[<ffffffff8130a4b3>] ? file_has_perm+0x83/0xa0
[<ffffffff810f354d>] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0xd/0x10
[<ffffffff811b95ed>] sys_ioctl+0x5d/0xa0
[<ffffffff813663fe>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_thunk+0x3a/0x3f
[<ffffffff81faed69>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
Reported-and-tested-by: Tommi Rantala <tt.rantala@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
sound/core/seq/seq_timer.c | 8 ++++----
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
--- a/sound/core/seq/seq_timer.c
+++ b/sound/core/seq/seq_timer.c
@@ -290,10 +290,10 @@ int snd_seq_timer_open(struct snd_seq_qu
tid.device = SNDRV_TIMER_GLOBAL_SYSTEM;
err = snd_timer_open(&t, str, &tid, q->queue);
}
- if (err < 0) {
- snd_printk(KERN_ERR "seq fatal error: cannot create timer (%i)\n", err);
- return err;
- }
+ }
+ if (err < 0) {
+ snd_printk(KERN_ERR "seq fatal error: cannot create timer (%i)\n", err);
+ return err;
}
t->callback = snd_seq_timer_interrupt;
t->callback_data = q;

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@ -1,59 +0,0 @@
From 9e989b12e61b81f93750f9eb5fb5aa147afb7cd9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Date: Sat, 9 Mar 2013 05:52:19 +0000
Subject: bridge: fix mdb info leaks
From: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
[ Upstream commit c085c49920b2f900ba716b4ca1c1a55ece9872cc ]
The bridging code discloses heap and stack bytes via the RTM_GETMDB
netlink interface and via the notify messages send to group RTNLGRP_MDB
afer a successful add/del.
Fix both cases by initializing all unset members/padding bytes with
memset(0).
Cc: Stephen Hemminger <stephen@networkplumber.org>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
net/bridge/br_mdb.c | 4 ++++
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
--- a/net/bridge/br_mdb.c
+++ b/net/bridge/br_mdb.c
@@ -82,6 +82,7 @@ static int br_mdb_fill_info(struct sk_bu
port = p->port;
if (port) {
struct br_mdb_entry e;
+ memset(&e, 0, sizeof(e));
e.ifindex = port->dev->ifindex;
e.state = p->state;
if (p->addr.proto == htons(ETH_P_IP))
@@ -138,6 +139,7 @@ static int br_mdb_dump(struct sk_buff *s
break;
bpm = nlmsg_data(nlh);
+ memset(bpm, 0, sizeof(*bpm));
bpm->ifindex = dev->ifindex;
if (br_mdb_fill_info(skb, cb, dev) < 0)
goto out;
@@ -173,6 +175,7 @@ static int nlmsg_populate_mdb_fill(struc
return -EMSGSIZE;
bpm = nlmsg_data(nlh);
+ memset(bpm, 0, sizeof(*bpm));
bpm->family = AF_BRIDGE;
bpm->ifindex = dev->ifindex;
nest = nla_nest_start(skb, MDBA_MDB);
@@ -230,6 +233,7 @@ void br_mdb_notify(struct net_device *de
{
struct br_mdb_entry entry;
+ memset(&entry, 0, sizeof(entry));
entry.ifindex = port->dev->ifindex;
entry.addr.proto = group->proto;
entry.addr.u.ip4 = group->u.ip4;

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@ -1,95 +0,0 @@
From d6f60f50fead5fb769f447c20aa5b80a1fd627f3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Date: Sat, 9 Mar 2013 05:52:21 +0000
Subject: dcbnl: fix various netlink info leaks
From: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
[ Upstream commit 29cd8ae0e1a39e239a3a7b67da1986add1199fc0 ]
The dcb netlink interface leaks stack memory in various places:
* perm_addr[] buffer is only filled at max with 12 of the 32 bytes but
copied completely,
* no in-kernel driver fills all fields of an IEEE 802.1Qaz subcommand,
so we're leaking up to 58 bytes for ieee_ets structs, up to 136 bytes
for ieee_pfc structs, etc.,
* the same is true for CEE -- no in-kernel driver fills the whole
struct,
Prevent all of the above stack info leaks by properly initializing the
buffers/structures involved.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
net/dcb/dcbnl.c | 8 ++++++++
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
--- a/net/dcb/dcbnl.c
+++ b/net/dcb/dcbnl.c
@@ -284,6 +284,7 @@ static int dcbnl_getperm_hwaddr(struct n
if (!netdev->dcbnl_ops->getpermhwaddr)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+ memset(perm_addr, 0, sizeof(perm_addr));
netdev->dcbnl_ops->getpermhwaddr(netdev, perm_addr);
return nla_put(skb, DCB_ATTR_PERM_HWADDR, sizeof(perm_addr), perm_addr);
@@ -1042,6 +1043,7 @@ static int dcbnl_ieee_fill(struct sk_buf
if (ops->ieee_getets) {
struct ieee_ets ets;
+ memset(&ets, 0, sizeof(ets));
err = ops->ieee_getets(netdev, &ets);
if (!err &&
nla_put(skb, DCB_ATTR_IEEE_ETS, sizeof(ets), &ets))
@@ -1050,6 +1052,7 @@ static int dcbnl_ieee_fill(struct sk_buf
if (ops->ieee_getmaxrate) {
struct ieee_maxrate maxrate;
+ memset(&maxrate, 0, sizeof(maxrate));
err = ops->ieee_getmaxrate(netdev, &maxrate);
if (!err) {
err = nla_put(skb, DCB_ATTR_IEEE_MAXRATE,
@@ -1061,6 +1064,7 @@ static int dcbnl_ieee_fill(struct sk_buf
if (ops->ieee_getpfc) {
struct ieee_pfc pfc;
+ memset(&pfc, 0, sizeof(pfc));
err = ops->ieee_getpfc(netdev, &pfc);
if (!err &&
nla_put(skb, DCB_ATTR_IEEE_PFC, sizeof(pfc), &pfc))
@@ -1094,6 +1098,7 @@ static int dcbnl_ieee_fill(struct sk_buf
/* get peer info if available */
if (ops->ieee_peer_getets) {
struct ieee_ets ets;
+ memset(&ets, 0, sizeof(ets));
err = ops->ieee_peer_getets(netdev, &ets);
if (!err &&
nla_put(skb, DCB_ATTR_IEEE_PEER_ETS, sizeof(ets), &ets))
@@ -1102,6 +1107,7 @@ static int dcbnl_ieee_fill(struct sk_buf
if (ops->ieee_peer_getpfc) {
struct ieee_pfc pfc;
+ memset(&pfc, 0, sizeof(pfc));
err = ops->ieee_peer_getpfc(netdev, &pfc);
if (!err &&
nla_put(skb, DCB_ATTR_IEEE_PEER_PFC, sizeof(pfc), &pfc))
@@ -1280,6 +1286,7 @@ static int dcbnl_cee_fill(struct sk_buff
/* peer info if available */
if (ops->cee_peer_getpg) {
struct cee_pg pg;
+ memset(&pg, 0, sizeof(pg));
err = ops->cee_peer_getpg(netdev, &pg);
if (!err &&
nla_put(skb, DCB_ATTR_CEE_PEER_PG, sizeof(pg), &pg))
@@ -1288,6 +1295,7 @@ static int dcbnl_cee_fill(struct sk_buff
if (ops->cee_peer_getpfc) {
struct cee_pfc pfc;
+ memset(&pfc, 0, sizeof(pfc));
err = ops->cee_peer_getpfc(netdev, &pfc);
if (!err &&
nla_put(skb, DCB_ATTR_CEE_PEER_PFC, sizeof(pfc), &pfc))

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@ -1,48 +0,0 @@
From 8d0c2d10dd72c5292eda7a06231056a4c972e4cc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Lars-Peter Clausen <lars@metafoo.de>
Date: Sat, 9 Mar 2013 15:28:44 +0100
Subject: ext3: Fix format string issues
From: Lars-Peter Clausen <lars@metafoo.de>
commit 8d0c2d10dd72c5292eda7a06231056a4c972e4cc upstream.
ext3_msg() takes the printk prefix as the second parameter and the
format string as the third parameter. Two callers of ext3_msg omit the
prefix and pass the format string as the second parameter and the first
parameter to the format string as the third parameter. In both cases
this string comes from an arbitrary source. Which means the string may
contain format string characters, which will
lead to undefined and potentially harmful behavior.
The issue was introduced in commit 4cf46b67eb("ext3: Unify log messages
in ext3") and is fixed by this patch.
Signed-off-by: Lars-Peter Clausen <lars@metafoo.de>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
fs/ext3/super.c | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/fs/ext3/super.c
+++ b/fs/ext3/super.c
@@ -353,7 +353,7 @@ static struct block_device *ext3_blkdev_
return bdev;
fail:
- ext3_msg(sb, "error: failed to open journal device %s: %ld",
+ ext3_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "error: failed to open journal device %s: %ld",
__bdevname(dev, b), PTR_ERR(bdev));
return NULL;
@@ -887,7 +887,7 @@ static ext3_fsblk_t get_sb_block(void **
/*todo: use simple_strtoll with >32bit ext3 */
sb_block = simple_strtoul(options, &options, 0);
if (*options && *options != ',') {
- ext3_msg(sb, "error: invalid sb specification: %s",
+ ext3_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "error: invalid sb specification: %s",
(char *) *data);
return 1;
}

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@ -1,52 +0,0 @@
From e5f9811e44fcf067a0dbb8abf55bbad454a1688a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Date: Wed, 27 Feb 2013 10:57:31 +0000
Subject: net/sctp: Validate parameter size for SCTP_GET_ASSOC_STATS
From: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
commit 726bc6b092da4c093eb74d13c07184b18c1af0f1 upstream.
Building sctp may fail with:
In function copy_from_user,
inlined from sctp_getsockopt_assoc_stats at
net/sctp/socket.c:5656:20:
arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_32.h:211:26: error: call to
copy_from_user_overflow declared with attribute error: copy_from_user()
buffer size is not provably correct
if built with W=1 due to a missing parameter size validation
before the call to copy_from_user.
Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
net/sctp/socket.c | 6 +++---
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
--- a/net/sctp/socket.c
+++ b/net/sctp/socket.c
@@ -5653,6 +5653,9 @@ static int sctp_getsockopt_assoc_stats(s
if (len < sizeof(sctp_assoc_t))
return -EINVAL;
+ /* Allow the struct to grow and fill in as much as possible */
+ len = min_t(size_t, len, sizeof(sas));
+
if (copy_from_user(&sas, optval, len))
return -EFAULT;
@@ -5686,9 +5689,6 @@ static int sctp_getsockopt_assoc_stats(s
/* Mark beginning of a new observation period */
asoc->stats.max_obs_rto = asoc->rto_min;
- /* Allow the struct to grow and fill in as much as possible */
- len = min_t(size_t, len, sizeof(sas));
-
if (put_user(len, optlen))
return -EFAULT;

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@ -1,71 +0,0 @@
From 55c315e31dac6ebe4b66c630d2127cab52b02cc3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Cong Wang <amwang@redhat.com>
Date: Sun, 3 Mar 2013 16:18:11 +0000
Subject: rds: limit the size allocated by rds_message_alloc()
From: Cong Wang <amwang@redhat.com>
[ Upstream commit ece6b0a2b25652d684a7ced4ae680a863af041e0 ]
Dave Jones reported the following bug:
"When fed mangled socket data, rds will trust what userspace gives it,
and tries to allocate enormous amounts of memory larger than what
kmalloc can satisfy."
WARNING: at mm/page_alloc.c:2393 __alloc_pages_nodemask+0xa0d/0xbe0()
Hardware name: GA-MA78GM-S2H
Modules linked in: vmw_vsock_vmci_transport vmw_vmci vsock fuse bnep dlci bridge 8021q garp stp mrp binfmt_misc l2tp_ppp l2tp_core rfcomm s
Pid: 24652, comm: trinity-child2 Not tainted 3.8.0+ #65
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff81044155>] warn_slowpath_common+0x75/0xa0
[<ffffffff8104419a>] warn_slowpath_null+0x1a/0x20
[<ffffffff811444ad>] __alloc_pages_nodemask+0xa0d/0xbe0
[<ffffffff8100a196>] ? native_sched_clock+0x26/0x90
[<ffffffff810b2128>] ? trace_hardirqs_off_caller+0x28/0xc0
[<ffffffff810b21cd>] ? trace_hardirqs_off+0xd/0x10
[<ffffffff811861f8>] alloc_pages_current+0xb8/0x180
[<ffffffff8113eaaa>] __get_free_pages+0x2a/0x80
[<ffffffff811934fe>] kmalloc_order_trace+0x3e/0x1a0
[<ffffffff81193955>] __kmalloc+0x2f5/0x3a0
[<ffffffff8104df0c>] ? local_bh_enable_ip+0x7c/0xf0
[<ffffffffa0401ab3>] rds_message_alloc+0x23/0xb0 [rds]
[<ffffffffa04043a1>] rds_sendmsg+0x2b1/0x990 [rds]
[<ffffffff810b21cd>] ? trace_hardirqs_off+0xd/0x10
[<ffffffff81564620>] sock_sendmsg+0xb0/0xe0
[<ffffffff810b2052>] ? get_lock_stats+0x22/0x70
[<ffffffff810b24be>] ? put_lock_stats.isra.23+0xe/0x40
[<ffffffff81567f30>] sys_sendto+0x130/0x180
[<ffffffff810b872d>] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0xd/0x10
[<ffffffff816c547b>] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x3b/0x60
[<ffffffff816cd767>] ? sysret_check+0x1b/0x56
[<ffffffff810b8695>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0x115/0x1a0
[<ffffffff81341d8e>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_thunk+0x3a/0x3f
[<ffffffff816cd742>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
---[ end trace eed6ae990d018c8b ]---
Reported-by: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Cc: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Venkat Venkatsubra <venkat.x.venkatsubra@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <amwang@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Venkat Venkatsubra <venkat.x.venkatsubra@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
net/rds/message.c | 3 +++
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
--- a/net/rds/message.c
+++ b/net/rds/message.c
@@ -197,6 +197,9 @@ struct rds_message *rds_message_alloc(un
{
struct rds_message *rm;
+ if (extra_len > KMALLOC_MAX_SIZE - sizeof(struct rds_message))
+ return NULL;
+
rm = kzalloc(sizeof(struct rds_message) + extra_len, gfp);
if (!rm)
goto out;

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@ -1,33 +0,0 @@
From 322aa953dd5565d1029a18d5bda0bd25a0dbb4bb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Date: Sat, 9 Mar 2013 05:52:20 +0000
Subject: rtnl: fix info leak on RTM_GETLINK request for VF devices
From: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
[ Upstream commit 84d73cd3fb142bf1298a8c13fd4ca50fd2432372 ]
Initialize the mac address buffer with 0 as the driver specific function
will probably not fill the whole buffer. In fact, all in-kernel drivers
fill only ETH_ALEN of the MAX_ADDR_LEN bytes, i.e. 6 of the 32 possible
bytes. Therefore we currently leak 26 bytes of stack memory to userland
via the netlink interface.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
net/core/rtnetlink.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
--- a/net/core/rtnetlink.c
+++ b/net/core/rtnetlink.c
@@ -976,6 +976,7 @@ static int rtnl_fill_ifinfo(struct sk_bu
* report anything.
*/
ivi.spoofchk = -1;
+ memset(ivi.mac, 0, sizeof(ivi.mac));
if (dev->netdev_ops->ndo_get_vf_config(dev, i, &ivi))
break;
vf_mac.vf =

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@ -1,69 +0,0 @@
From 2ca39528c01a933f6689cd6505ce65bd6d68a530 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Date: Wed, 13 Mar 2013 14:59:33 -0700
Subject: signal: always clear sa_restorer on execve
From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
commit 2ca39528c01a933f6689cd6505ce65bd6d68a530 upstream.
When the new signal handlers are set up, the location of sa_restorer is
not cleared, leaking a parent process's address space location to
children. This allows for a potential bypass of the parent's ASLR by
examining the sa_restorer value returned when calling sigaction().
Based on what should be considered "secret" about addresses, it only
matters across the exec not the fork (since the VMAs haven't changed
until the exec). But since exec sets SIG_DFL and keeps sa_restorer,
this is where it should be fixed.
Given the few uses of sa_restorer, a "set" function was not written
since this would be the only use. Instead, we use
__ARCH_HAS_SA_RESTORER, as already done in other places.
Example of the leak before applying this patch:
$ cat /proc/$$/maps
...
7fb9f3083000-7fb9f3238000 r-xp 00000000 fd:01 404469 .../libc-2.15.so
...
$ ./leak
...
7f278bc74000-7f278be29000 r-xp 00000000 fd:01 404469 .../libc-2.15.so
...
1 0 (nil) 0x7fb9f30b94a0
2 4000000 (nil) 0x7f278bcaa4a0
3 4000000 (nil) 0x7f278bcaa4a0
4 0 (nil) 0x7fb9f30b94a0
...
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: use SA_RESTORER for backportability]
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reported-by: Emese Revfy <re.emese@gmail.com>
Cc: Emese Revfy <re.emese@gmail.com>
Cc: PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Cc: Julien Tinnes <jln@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
kernel/signal.c | 3 +++
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
--- a/kernel/signal.c
+++ b/kernel/signal.c
@@ -485,6 +485,9 @@ flush_signal_handlers(struct task_struct
if (force_default || ka->sa.sa_handler != SIG_IGN)
ka->sa.sa_handler = SIG_DFL;
ka->sa.sa_flags = 0;
+#ifdef SA_RESTORER
+ ka->sa.sa_restorer = NULL;
+#endif
sigemptyset(&ka->sa.sa_mask);
ka++;
}

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@ -1,87 +0,0 @@
From c0f5ecee4e741667b2493c742b60b6218d40b3aa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Oliver Neukum <oneukum@suse.de>
Date: Tue, 12 Mar 2013 14:52:42 +0100
Subject: USB: cdc-wdm: fix buffer overflow
From: Oliver Neukum <oneukum@suse.de>
commit c0f5ecee4e741667b2493c742b60b6218d40b3aa upstream.
The buffer for responses must not overflow.
If this would happen, set a flag, drop the data and return
an error after user space has read all remaining data.
Signed-off-by: Oliver Neukum <oliver@neukum.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/usb/class/cdc-wdm.c | 23 ++++++++++++++++++++---
1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/usb/class/cdc-wdm.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/class/cdc-wdm.c
@@ -56,6 +56,7 @@ MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE (usb, wdm_ids);
#define WDM_RESPONDING 7
#define WDM_SUSPENDING 8
#define WDM_RESETTING 9
+#define WDM_OVERFLOW 10
#define WDM_MAX 16
@@ -155,6 +156,7 @@ static void wdm_in_callback(struct urb *
{
struct wdm_device *desc = urb->context;
int status = urb->status;
+ int length = urb->actual_length;
spin_lock(&desc->iuspin);
clear_bit(WDM_RESPONDING, &desc->flags);
@@ -185,9 +187,17 @@ static void wdm_in_callback(struct urb *
}
desc->rerr = status;
- desc->reslength = urb->actual_length;
- memmove(desc->ubuf + desc->length, desc->inbuf, desc->reslength);
- desc->length += desc->reslength;
+ if (length + desc->length > desc->wMaxCommand) {
+ /* The buffer would overflow */
+ set_bit(WDM_OVERFLOW, &desc->flags);
+ } else {
+ /* we may already be in overflow */
+ if (!test_bit(WDM_OVERFLOW, &desc->flags)) {
+ memmove(desc->ubuf + desc->length, desc->inbuf, length);
+ desc->length += length;
+ desc->reslength = length;
+ }
+ }
skip_error:
wake_up(&desc->wait);
@@ -435,6 +445,11 @@ retry:
rv = -ENODEV;
goto err;
}
+ if (test_bit(WDM_OVERFLOW, &desc->flags)) {
+ clear_bit(WDM_OVERFLOW, &desc->flags);
+ rv = -ENOBUFS;
+ goto err;
+ }
i++;
if (file->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK) {
if (!test_bit(WDM_READ, &desc->flags)) {
@@ -478,6 +493,7 @@ retry:
spin_unlock_irq(&desc->iuspin);
goto retry;
}
+
if (!desc->reslength) { /* zero length read */
dev_dbg(&desc->intf->dev, "%s: zero length - clearing WDM_READ\n", __func__);
clear_bit(WDM_READ, &desc->flags);
@@ -1004,6 +1020,7 @@ static int wdm_post_reset(struct usb_int
struct wdm_device *desc = wdm_find_device(intf);
int rv;
+ clear_bit(WDM_OVERFLOW, &desc->flags);
clear_bit(WDM_RESETTING, &desc->flags);
rv = recover_from_urb_loss(desc);
mutex_unlock(&desc->wlock);

View File

@ -77,12 +77,3 @@ bugfix/x86/drm-i915-add-quirk-to-invert-brightness-on-packard-bell-ncl20.patch
bugfix/all/mm-Try-harder-to-allocate-vmemmap-blocks.patch
features/all/alx/alx-update-for-3.8.patch
bugfix/mips/mips-add-dependencies-for-have_arch_transparent_hugepage.patch
bugfix/all/usb-cdc-wdm-fix-buffer-overflow.patch
bugfix/all/signal-always-clear-sa_restorer-on-execve.patch
bugfix/all/ext3-fix-format-string-issues.patch
bugfix/all/net-sctp-validate-parameter-size-for-sctp_get_assoc_stats.patch
bugfix/all/rds-limit-the-size-allocated-by-rds_message_alloc.patch
bugfix/all/bridge-fix-mdb-info-leaks.patch
bugfix/all/rtnl-fix-info-leak-on-rtm_getlink-request-for-vf-devices.patch
bugfix/all/dcbnl-fix-various-netlink-info-leaks.patch
bugfix/all/alsa-seq-fix-missing-error-handling-in-snd_seq_timer_open.patch