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libceph: Apply critical fixes 

Several patches in 3.17 cc'd to stable, all of which look security- 
relevant though I don't think they have CVE IDs.

svn path=/dists/sid/linux/; revision=21835
This commit is contained in:
Ben Hutchings 2014-09-13 02:46:54 +00:00
parent fbff0a02fd
commit 816a86c97a
6 changed files with 565 additions and 0 deletions
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5
debian/changelog vendored
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@ -65,6 +65,11 @@ linux (3.16.2-3) UNRELEASED; urgency=medium
practice this meant we didn't see them until they appear in unstable
* udeb: Fix typo in dependencies of speakup-modules (fixes FTBFS on
mips64el due to interaction with another bug in kernel-wedge)
* libceph: Apply critical fixes:
- set last_piece in ceph_msg_data_pages_cursor_init() correctly
- gracefully handle large reply messages from the mon
- add process_one_ticket() helper
- do not hard code max auth ticket len
[ Ian Campbell ]
* [armel/orion5x] udeb: Include mvmdio in nic-modules udeb.

275
debian/patches/bugfix/all/libceph-add-process_one_ticket-helper.patch vendored Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,275 @@
From: Ilya Dryomov <ilya.dryomov@inktank.com>
Date: Mon, 8 Sep 2014 17:25:34 +0400
Subject: libceph: add process_one_ticket() helper
Origin: https://git.kernel.org/linus/597cda357716a3cf8d994cb11927af917c8d71fa
Add a helper for processing individual cephx auth tickets. Needed for
the next commit, which deals with allocating ticket buffers. (Most of
the diff here is whitespace - view with git diff -b).
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <ilya.dryomov@inktank.com>
Reviewed-by: Sage Weil <sage@redhat.com>
---
net/ceph/auth_x.c | 228 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------------
1 file changed, 124 insertions(+), 104 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/ceph/auth_x.c b/net/ceph/auth_x.c
index 96238ba..0eb146d 100644
--- a/net/ceph/auth_x.c
+++ b/net/ceph/auth_x.c
@@ -129,17 +129,131 @@ static void remove_ticket_handler(struct ceph_auth_client *ac,
kfree(th);
}
+static int process_one_ticket(struct ceph_auth_client *ac,
+ struct ceph_crypto_key *secret,
+ void **p, void *end,
+ void *dbuf, void *ticket_buf)
+{
+ struct ceph_x_info *xi = ac->private;
+ int type;
+ u8 tkt_struct_v, blob_struct_v;
+ struct ceph_x_ticket_handler *th;
+ void *dp, *dend;
+ int dlen;
+ char is_enc;
+ struct timespec validity;
+ struct ceph_crypto_key old_key;
+ void *tp, *tpend;
+ struct ceph_timespec new_validity;
+ struct ceph_crypto_key new_session_key;
+ struct ceph_buffer *new_ticket_blob;
+ unsigned long new_expires, new_renew_after;
+ u64 new_secret_id;
+ int ret;
+
+ ceph_decode_need(p, end, sizeof(u32) + 1, bad);
+
+ type = ceph_decode_32(p);
+ dout(" ticket type %d %s\n", type, ceph_entity_type_name(type));
+
+ tkt_struct_v = ceph_decode_8(p);
+ if (tkt_struct_v != 1)
+ goto bad;
+
+ th = get_ticket_handler(ac, type);
+ if (IS_ERR(th)) {
+ ret = PTR_ERR(th);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* blob for me */
+ dlen = ceph_x_decrypt(secret, p, end, dbuf,
+ TEMP_TICKET_BUF_LEN);
+ if (dlen <= 0) {
+ ret = dlen;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ dout(" decrypted %d bytes\n", dlen);
+ dp = dbuf;
+ dend = dp + dlen;
+
+ tkt_struct_v = ceph_decode_8(&dp);
+ if (tkt_struct_v != 1)
+ goto bad;
+
+ memcpy(&old_key, &th->session_key, sizeof(old_key));
+ ret = ceph_crypto_key_decode(&new_session_key, &dp, dend);
+ if (ret)
+ goto out;
+
+ ceph_decode_copy(&dp, &new_validity, sizeof(new_validity));
+ ceph_decode_timespec(&validity, &new_validity);
+ new_expires = get_seconds() + validity.tv_sec;
+ new_renew_after = new_expires - (validity.tv_sec / 4);
+ dout(" expires=%lu renew_after=%lu\n", new_expires,
+ new_renew_after);
+
+ /* ticket blob for service */
+ ceph_decode_8_safe(p, end, is_enc, bad);
+ tp = ticket_buf;
+ if (is_enc) {
+ /* encrypted */
+ dout(" encrypted ticket\n");
+ dlen = ceph_x_decrypt(&old_key, p, end, ticket_buf,
+ TEMP_TICKET_BUF_LEN);
+ if (dlen < 0) {
+ ret = dlen;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ dlen = ceph_decode_32(&tp);
+ } else {
+ /* unencrypted */
+ ceph_decode_32_safe(p, end, dlen, bad);
+ ceph_decode_need(p, end, dlen, bad);
+ ceph_decode_copy(p, ticket_buf, dlen);
+ }
+ tpend = tp + dlen;
+ dout(" ticket blob is %d bytes\n", dlen);
+ ceph_decode_need(&tp, tpend, 1 + sizeof(u64), bad);
+ blob_struct_v = ceph_decode_8(&tp);
+ new_secret_id = ceph_decode_64(&tp);
+ ret = ceph_decode_buffer(&new_ticket_blob, &tp, tpend);
+ if (ret)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* all is well, update our ticket */
+ ceph_crypto_key_destroy(&th->session_key);
+ if (th->ticket_blob)
+ ceph_buffer_put(th->ticket_blob);
+ th->session_key = new_session_key;
+ th->ticket_blob = new_ticket_blob;
+ th->validity = new_validity;
+ th->secret_id = new_secret_id;
+ th->expires = new_expires;
+ th->renew_after = new_renew_after;
+ dout(" got ticket service %d (%s) secret_id %lld len %d\n",
+ type, ceph_entity_type_name(type), th->secret_id,
+ (int)th->ticket_blob->vec.iov_len);
+ xi->have_keys |= th->service;
+
+out:
+ return ret;
+
+bad:
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+}
+
static int ceph_x_proc_ticket_reply(struct ceph_auth_client *ac,
struct ceph_crypto_key *secret,
void *buf, void *end)
{
- struct ceph_x_info *xi = ac->private;
- int num;
void *p = buf;
- int ret;
char *dbuf;
char *ticket_buf;
u8 reply_struct_v;
+ u32 num;
+ int ret;
dbuf = kmalloc(TEMP_TICKET_BUF_LEN, GFP_NOFS);
if (!dbuf)
@@ -150,112 +264,18 @@ static int ceph_x_proc_ticket_reply(struct ceph_auth_client *ac,
if (!ticket_buf)
goto out_dbuf;
- ceph_decode_need(&p, end, 1 + sizeof(u32), bad);
- reply_struct_v = ceph_decode_8(&p);
+ ceph_decode_8_safe(&p, end, reply_struct_v, bad);
if (reply_struct_v != 1)
- goto bad;
- num = ceph_decode_32(&p);
- dout("%d tickets\n", num);
- while (num--) {
- int type;
- u8 tkt_struct_v, blob_struct_v;
- struct ceph_x_ticket_handler *th;
- void *dp, *dend;
- int dlen;
- char is_enc;
- struct timespec validity;
- struct ceph_crypto_key old_key;
- void *tp, *tpend;
- struct ceph_timespec new_validity;
- struct ceph_crypto_key new_session_key;
- struct ceph_buffer *new_ticket_blob;
- unsigned long new_expires, new_renew_after;
- u64 new_secret_id;
-
- ceph_decode_need(&p, end, sizeof(u32) + 1, bad);
-
- type = ceph_decode_32(&p);
- dout(" ticket type %d %s\n", type, ceph_entity_type_name(type));
-
- tkt_struct_v = ceph_decode_8(&p);
- if (tkt_struct_v != 1)
- goto bad;
-
- th = get_ticket_handler(ac, type);
- if (IS_ERR(th)) {
- ret = PTR_ERR(th);
- goto out;
- }
-
- /* blob for me */
- dlen = ceph_x_decrypt(secret, &p, end, dbuf,
- TEMP_TICKET_BUF_LEN);
- if (dlen <= 0) {
- ret = dlen;
- goto out;
- }
- dout(" decrypted %d bytes\n", dlen);
- dend = dbuf + dlen;
- dp = dbuf;
-
- tkt_struct_v = ceph_decode_8(&dp);
- if (tkt_struct_v != 1)
- goto bad;
+ return -EINVAL;
- memcpy(&old_key, &th->session_key, sizeof(old_key));
- ret = ceph_crypto_key_decode(&new_session_key, &dp, dend);
- if (ret)
- goto out;
+ ceph_decode_32_safe(&p, end, num, bad);
+ dout("%d tickets\n", num);
- ceph_decode_copy(&dp, &new_validity, sizeof(new_validity));
- ceph_decode_timespec(&validity, &new_validity);
- new_expires = get_seconds() + validity.tv_sec;
- new_renew_after = new_expires - (validity.tv_sec / 4);
- dout(" expires=%lu renew_after=%lu\n", new_expires,
- new_renew_after);
-
- /* ticket blob for service */
- ceph_decode_8_safe(&p, end, is_enc, bad);
- tp = ticket_buf;
- if (is_enc) {
- /* encrypted */
- dout(" encrypted ticket\n");
- dlen = ceph_x_decrypt(&old_key, &p, end, ticket_buf,
- TEMP_TICKET_BUF_LEN);
- if (dlen < 0) {
- ret = dlen;
- goto out;
- }
- dlen = ceph_decode_32(&tp);
- } else {
- /* unencrypted */
- ceph_decode_32_safe(&p, end, dlen, bad);
- ceph_decode_need(&p, end, dlen, bad);
- ceph_decode_copy(&p, ticket_buf, dlen);
- }
- tpend = tp + dlen;
- dout(" ticket blob is %d bytes\n", dlen);
- ceph_decode_need(&tp, tpend, 1 + sizeof(u64), bad);
- blob_struct_v = ceph_decode_8(&tp);
- new_secret_id = ceph_decode_64(&tp);
- ret = ceph_decode_buffer(&new_ticket_blob, &tp, tpend);
+ while (num--) {
+ ret = process_one_ticket(ac, secret, &p, end,
+ dbuf, ticket_buf);
if (ret)
goto out;
-
- /* all is well, update our ticket */
- ceph_crypto_key_destroy(&th->session_key);
- if (th->ticket_blob)
- ceph_buffer_put(th->ticket_blob);
- th->session_key = new_session_key;
- th->ticket_blob = new_ticket_blob;
- th->validity = new_validity;
- th->secret_id = new_secret_id;
- th->expires = new_expires;
- th->renew_after = new_renew_after;
- dout(" got ticket service %d (%s) secret_id %lld len %d\n",
- type, ceph_entity_type_name(type), th->secret_id,
- (int)th->ticket_blob->vec.iov_len);
- xi->have_keys |= th->service;
}
ret = 0;

195
debian/patches/bugfix/all/libceph-do-not-hard-code-max-auth-ticket-len.patch vendored Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,195 @@
From: Ilya Dryomov <ilya.dryomov@inktank.com>
Date: Tue, 9 Sep 2014 19:39:15 +0400
Subject: libceph: do not hard code max auth ticket len
Origin: https://git.kernel.org/linus/c27a3e4d667fdcad3db7b104f75659478e0c68d8
We hard code cephx auth ticket buffer size to 256 bytes. This isn't
enough for any moderate setups and, in case tickets themselves are not
encrypted, leads to buffer overflows (ceph_x_decrypt() errors out, but
ceph_decode_copy() doesn't - it's just a memcpy() wrapper). Since the
buffer is allocated dynamically anyway, allocated it a bit later, at
the point where we know how much is going to be needed.
Fixes: http://tracker.ceph.com/issues/8979
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <ilya.dryomov@inktank.com>
Reviewed-by: Sage Weil <sage@redhat.com>
---
net/ceph/auth_x.c | 64 +++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------------------
1 file changed, 29 insertions(+), 35 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/ceph/auth_x.c b/net/ceph/auth_x.c
index 0eb146d..de6662b 100644
--- a/net/ceph/auth_x.c
+++ b/net/ceph/auth_x.c
@@ -13,8 +13,6 @@
#include "auth_x.h"
#include "auth_x_protocol.h"
-#define TEMP_TICKET_BUF_LEN 256
-
static void ceph_x_validate_tickets(struct ceph_auth_client *ac, int *pneed);
static int ceph_x_is_authenticated(struct ceph_auth_client *ac)
@@ -64,7 +62,7 @@ static int ceph_x_encrypt(struct ceph_crypto_key *secret,
}
static int ceph_x_decrypt(struct ceph_crypto_key *secret,
- void **p, void *end, void *obuf, size_t olen)
+ void **p, void *end, void **obuf, size_t olen)
{
struct ceph_x_encrypt_header head;
size_t head_len = sizeof(head);
@@ -75,8 +73,14 @@ static int ceph_x_decrypt(struct ceph_crypto_key *secret,
return -EINVAL;
dout("ceph_x_decrypt len %d\n", len);
- ret = ceph_decrypt2(secret, &head, &head_len, obuf, &olen,
- *p, len);
+ if (*obuf == NULL) {
+ *obuf = kmalloc(len, GFP_NOFS);
+ if (!*obuf)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ olen = len;
+ }
+
+ ret = ceph_decrypt2(secret, &head, &head_len, *obuf, &olen, *p, len);
if (ret)
return ret;
if (head.struct_v != 1 || le64_to_cpu(head.magic) != CEPHX_ENC_MAGIC)
@@ -131,18 +135,19 @@ static void remove_ticket_handler(struct ceph_auth_client *ac,
static int process_one_ticket(struct ceph_auth_client *ac,
struct ceph_crypto_key *secret,
- void **p, void *end,
- void *dbuf, void *ticket_buf)
+ void **p, void *end)
{
struct ceph_x_info *xi = ac->private;
int type;
u8 tkt_struct_v, blob_struct_v;
struct ceph_x_ticket_handler *th;
+ void *dbuf = NULL;
void *dp, *dend;
int dlen;
char is_enc;
struct timespec validity;
struct ceph_crypto_key old_key;
+ void *ticket_buf = NULL;
void *tp, *tpend;
struct ceph_timespec new_validity;
struct ceph_crypto_key new_session_key;
@@ -167,8 +172,7 @@ static int process_one_ticket(struct ceph_auth_client *ac,
}
/* blob for me */
- dlen = ceph_x_decrypt(secret, p, end, dbuf,
- TEMP_TICKET_BUF_LEN);
+ dlen = ceph_x_decrypt(secret, p, end, &dbuf, 0);
if (dlen <= 0) {
ret = dlen;
goto out;
@@ -195,20 +199,25 @@ static int process_one_ticket(struct ceph_auth_client *ac,
/* ticket blob for service */
ceph_decode_8_safe(p, end, is_enc, bad);
- tp = ticket_buf;
if (is_enc) {
/* encrypted */
dout(" encrypted ticket\n");
- dlen = ceph_x_decrypt(&old_key, p, end, ticket_buf,
- TEMP_TICKET_BUF_LEN);
+ dlen = ceph_x_decrypt(&old_key, p, end, &ticket_buf, 0);
if (dlen < 0) {
ret = dlen;
goto out;
}
+ tp = ticket_buf;
dlen = ceph_decode_32(&tp);
} else {
/* unencrypted */
ceph_decode_32_safe(p, end, dlen, bad);
+ ticket_buf = kmalloc(dlen, GFP_NOFS);
+ if (!ticket_buf) {
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ tp = ticket_buf;
ceph_decode_need(p, end, dlen, bad);
ceph_decode_copy(p, ticket_buf, dlen);
}
@@ -237,6 +246,8 @@ static int process_one_ticket(struct ceph_auth_client *ac,
xi->have_keys |= th->service;
out:
+ kfree(ticket_buf);
+ kfree(dbuf);
return ret;
bad:
@@ -249,21 +260,10 @@ static int ceph_x_proc_ticket_reply(struct ceph_auth_client *ac,
void *buf, void *end)
{
void *p = buf;
- char *dbuf;
- char *ticket_buf;
u8 reply_struct_v;
u32 num;
int ret;
- dbuf = kmalloc(TEMP_TICKET_BUF_LEN, GFP_NOFS);
- if (!dbuf)
- return -ENOMEM;
-
- ret = -ENOMEM;
- ticket_buf = kmalloc(TEMP_TICKET_BUF_LEN, GFP_NOFS);
- if (!ticket_buf)
- goto out_dbuf;
-
ceph_decode_8_safe(&p, end, reply_struct_v, bad);
if (reply_struct_v != 1)
return -EINVAL;
@@ -272,22 +272,15 @@ static int ceph_x_proc_ticket_reply(struct ceph_auth_client *ac,
dout("%d tickets\n", num);
while (num--) {
- ret = process_one_ticket(ac, secret, &p, end,
- dbuf, ticket_buf);
+ ret = process_one_ticket(ac, secret, &p, end);
if (ret)
- goto out;
+ return ret;
}
- ret = 0;
-out:
- kfree(ticket_buf);
-out_dbuf:
- kfree(dbuf);
- return ret;
+ return 0;
bad:
- ret = -EINVAL;
- goto out;
+ return -EINVAL;
}
static int ceph_x_build_authorizer(struct ceph_auth_client *ac,
@@ -603,13 +596,14 @@ static int ceph_x_verify_authorizer_reply(struct ceph_auth_client *ac,
struct ceph_x_ticket_handler *th;
int ret = 0;
struct ceph_x_authorize_reply reply;
+ void *preply = &reply;
void *p = au->reply_buf;
void *end = p + sizeof(au->reply_buf);
th = get_ticket_handler(ac, au->service);
if (IS_ERR(th))
return PTR_ERR(th);
- ret = ceph_x_decrypt(&th->session_key, &p, end, &reply, sizeof(reply));
+ ret = ceph_x_decrypt(&th->session_key, &p, end, &preply, sizeof(reply));
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
if (ret != sizeof(reply))

36
debian/patches/bugfix/all/libceph-gracefully-handle-large-reply-messages-from-.patch vendored Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
From: Sage Weil <sage@redhat.com>
Date: Mon, 4 Aug 2014 07:01:54 -0700
Subject: libceph: gracefully handle large reply messages from the mon
Origin: https://git.kernel.org/linus/73c3d4812b4c755efeca0140f606f83772a39ce4
We preallocate a few of the message types we get back from the mon. If we
get a larger message than we are expecting, fall back to trying to allocate
a new one instead of blindly using the one we have.
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sage Weil <sage@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ilya Dryomov <ilya.dryomov@inktank.com>
---
net/ceph/mon_client.c | 8 ++++++++
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
diff --git a/net/ceph/mon_client.c b/net/ceph/mon_client.c
index 067d3af..61fcfc3 100644
--- a/net/ceph/mon_client.c
+++ b/net/ceph/mon_client.c
@@ -1181,7 +1181,15 @@ static struct ceph_msg *mon_alloc_msg(struct ceph_connection *con,
if (!m) {
pr_info("alloc_msg unknown type %d\n", type);
*skip = 1;
+ } else if (front_len > m->front_alloc_len) {
+ pr_warning("mon_alloc_msg front %d > prealloc %d (%u#%llu)\n",
+ front_len, m->front_alloc_len,
+ (unsigned int)con->peer_name.type,
+ le64_to_cpu(con->peer_name.num));
+ ceph_msg_put(m);
+ m = ceph_msg_new(type, front_len, GFP_NOFS, false);
}
+
return m;
}

50
debian/patches/bugfix/all/libceph-set-last_piece-in-ceph_msg_data_pages_cursor.patch vendored Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
From: Ilya Dryomov <ilya.dryomov@inktank.com>
Date: Fri, 8 Aug 2014 12:43:39 +0400
Subject: libceph: set last_piece in ceph_msg_data_pages_cursor_init()
correctly
Origin: https://git.kernel.org/linus/5f740d7e1531099b888410e6bab13f68da9b1a4d
Determining ->last_piece based on the value of ->page_offset + length
is incorrect because length here is the length of the entire message.
->last_piece set to false even if page array data item length is <=
PAGE_SIZE, which results in invalid length passed to
ceph_tcp_{send,recv}page() and causes various asserts to fire.
# cat pages-cursor-init.sh
#!/bin/bash
rbd create --size 10 --image-format 2 foo
FOO_DEV=$(rbd map foo)
dd if=/dev/urandom of=$FOO_DEV bs=1M &>/dev/null
rbd snap create foo@snap
rbd snap protect foo@snap
rbd clone foo@snap bar
# rbd_resize calls librbd rbd_resize(), size is in bytes
./rbd_resize bar $(((4 << 20) + 512))
rbd resize --size 10 bar
BAR_DEV=$(rbd map bar)
# trigger a 512-byte copyup -- 512-byte page array data item
dd if=/dev/urandom of=$BAR_DEV bs=1M count=1 seek=5
The problem exists only in ceph_msg_data_pages_cursor_init(),
ceph_msg_data_pages_advance() does the right thing. The size_t cast is
unnecessary.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.10+
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <ilya.dryomov@inktank.com>
Reviewed-by: Sage Weil <sage@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Alex Elder <elder@linaro.org>
---
net/ceph/messenger.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/net/ceph/messenger.c
+++ b/net/ceph/messenger.c
@@ -900,7 +900,7 @@ static void ceph_msg_data_pages_cursor_i
BUG_ON(page_count > (int)USHRT_MAX);
cursor->page_count = (unsigned short)page_count;
BUG_ON(length > SIZE_MAX - cursor->page_offset);
- cursor->last_piece = (size_t)cursor->page_offset + length <= PAGE_SIZE;
+ cursor->last_piece = cursor->page_offset + cursor->resid <= PAGE_SIZE;
}
static struct page *

4
debian/patches/series vendored
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@ -115,6 +115,10 @@ bugfix/all/mnt-Add-tests-for-unprivileged-remount-cases-that-ha.patch
debian/i2o-disable-i2o_ext_adaptec-on-64bit.patch
bugfix/all/aic94xx-remove-broken-fallback-for-missing-ctrl-a.patch
bugfix/all/builddeb-put-the-dbg-files-into-the-correct-director.patch
bugfix/all/libceph-set-last_piece-in-ceph_msg_data_pages_cursor.patch
bugfix/all/libceph-gracefully-handle-large-reply-messages-from-.patch
bugfix/all/libceph-add-process_one_ticket-helper.patch
bugfix/all/libceph-do-not-hard-code-max-auth-ticket-len.patch
# Miscellaneous features
features/all/efi-autoload-efivars.patch