Update to 4.14-rc5
This commit is contained in:
Ben Hutchings
parent
4925b9faa6
commit
4206eefe13
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@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
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linux (4.14~rc4-1~exp1) UNRELEASED; urgency=medium
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linux (4.14~rc5-1~exp1) UNRELEASED; urgency=medium
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* New upstream release candidate
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@ -1,141 +0,0 @@
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From: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
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Date: Mon, 9 Oct 2017 11:09:20 +0200
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Subject: ALSA: seq: Fix use-after-free at creating a port
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Origin: https://git.kernel.org/linus/71105998845fb012937332fe2e806d443c09e026
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Bug-Debian-Security: https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2017-15265
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There is a potential race window opened at creating and deleting a
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port via ioctl, as spotted by fuzzing. snd_seq_create_port() creates
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a port object and returns its pointer, but it doesn't take the
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refcount, thus it can be deleted immediately by another thread.
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Meanwhile, snd_seq_ioctl_create_port() still calls the function
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snd_seq_system_client_ev_port_start() with the created port object
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that is being deleted, and this triggers use-after-free like:
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BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in snd_seq_ioctl_create_port+0x504/0x630 [snd_seq] at addr ffff8801f2241cb1
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=============================================================================
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BUG kmalloc-512 (Tainted: G B ): kasan: bad access detected
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-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
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INFO: Allocated in snd_seq_create_port+0x94/0x9b0 [snd_seq] age=1 cpu=3 pid=4511
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___slab_alloc+0x425/0x460
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__slab_alloc+0x20/0x40
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kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x150/0x190
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snd_seq_create_port+0x94/0x9b0 [snd_seq]
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snd_seq_ioctl_create_port+0xd1/0x630 [snd_seq]
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snd_seq_do_ioctl+0x11c/0x190 [snd_seq]
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snd_seq_ioctl+0x40/0x80 [snd_seq]
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do_vfs_ioctl+0x54b/0xda0
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SyS_ioctl+0x79/0x90
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entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x16/0x75
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INFO: Freed in port_delete+0x136/0x1a0 [snd_seq] age=1 cpu=2 pid=4717
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__slab_free+0x204/0x310
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kfree+0x15f/0x180
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port_delete+0x136/0x1a0 [snd_seq]
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snd_seq_delete_port+0x235/0x350 [snd_seq]
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snd_seq_ioctl_delete_port+0xc8/0x180 [snd_seq]
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snd_seq_do_ioctl+0x11c/0x190 [snd_seq]
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snd_seq_ioctl+0x40/0x80 [snd_seq]
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do_vfs_ioctl+0x54b/0xda0
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SyS_ioctl+0x79/0x90
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entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x16/0x75
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Call Trace:
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[<ffffffff81b03781>] dump_stack+0x63/0x82
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[<ffffffff81531b3b>] print_trailer+0xfb/0x160
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[<ffffffff81536db4>] object_err+0x34/0x40
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[<ffffffff815392d3>] kasan_report.part.2+0x223/0x520
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[<ffffffffa07aadf4>] ? snd_seq_ioctl_create_port+0x504/0x630 [snd_seq]
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[<ffffffff815395fe>] __asan_report_load1_noabort+0x2e/0x30
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[<ffffffffa07aadf4>] snd_seq_ioctl_create_port+0x504/0x630 [snd_seq]
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[<ffffffffa07aa8f0>] ? snd_seq_ioctl_delete_port+0x180/0x180 [snd_seq]
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[<ffffffff8136be50>] ? taskstats_exit+0xbc0/0xbc0
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[<ffffffffa07abc5c>] snd_seq_do_ioctl+0x11c/0x190 [snd_seq]
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[<ffffffffa07abd10>] snd_seq_ioctl+0x40/0x80 [snd_seq]
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[<ffffffff8136d433>] ? acct_account_cputime+0x63/0x80
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[<ffffffff815b515b>] do_vfs_ioctl+0x54b/0xda0
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.....
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We may fix this in a few different ways, and in this patch, it's fixed
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simply by taking the refcount properly at snd_seq_create_port() and
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letting the caller unref the object after use. Also, there is another
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potential use-after-free by sprintf() call in snd_seq_create_port(),
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and this is moved inside the lock.
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This fix covers CVE-2017-15265.
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Reported-and-tested-by: Michael23 Yu <ycqzsy@gmail.com>
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Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
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Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
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---
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sound/core/seq/seq_clientmgr.c | 6 +++++-
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sound/core/seq/seq_ports.c | 7 +++++--
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2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
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diff --git a/sound/core/seq/seq_clientmgr.c b/sound/core/seq/seq_clientmgr.c
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index ea2d0ae85bd3..6c9cba2166d9 100644
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--- a/sound/core/seq/seq_clientmgr.c
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+++ b/sound/core/seq/seq_clientmgr.c
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@@ -1259,6 +1259,7 @@ static int snd_seq_ioctl_create_port(struct snd_seq_client *client, void *arg)
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struct snd_seq_port_info *info = arg;
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struct snd_seq_client_port *port;
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struct snd_seq_port_callback *callback;
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+ int port_idx;
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/* it is not allowed to create the port for an another client */
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if (info->addr.client != client->number)
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@@ -1269,7 +1270,9 @@ static int snd_seq_ioctl_create_port(struct snd_seq_client *client, void *arg)
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return -ENOMEM;
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if (client->type == USER_CLIENT && info->kernel) {
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- snd_seq_delete_port(client, port->addr.port);
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+ port_idx = port->addr.port;
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+ snd_seq_port_unlock(port);
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+ snd_seq_delete_port(client, port_idx);
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return -EINVAL;
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}
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if (client->type == KERNEL_CLIENT) {
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@@ -1290,6 +1293,7 @@ static int snd_seq_ioctl_create_port(struct snd_seq_client *client, void *arg)
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snd_seq_set_port_info(port, info);
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snd_seq_system_client_ev_port_start(port->addr.client, port->addr.port);
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+ snd_seq_port_unlock(port);
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return 0;
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}
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diff --git a/sound/core/seq/seq_ports.c b/sound/core/seq/seq_ports.c
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index 0a7020c82bfc..d21ece9f8d73 100644
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--- a/sound/core/seq/seq_ports.c
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+++ b/sound/core/seq/seq_ports.c
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@@ -122,7 +122,9 @@ static void port_subs_info_init(struct snd_seq_port_subs_info *grp)
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}
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-/* create a port, port number is returned (-1 on failure) */
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+/* create a port, port number is returned (-1 on failure);
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+ * the caller needs to unref the port via snd_seq_port_unlock() appropriately
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+ */
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struct snd_seq_client_port *snd_seq_create_port(struct snd_seq_client *client,
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int port)
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{
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@@ -151,6 +153,7 @@ struct snd_seq_client_port *snd_seq_create_port(struct snd_seq_client *client,
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snd_use_lock_init(&new_port->use_lock);
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port_subs_info_init(&new_port->c_src);
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port_subs_info_init(&new_port->c_dest);
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+ snd_use_lock_use(&new_port->use_lock);
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num = port >= 0 ? port : 0;
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mutex_lock(&client->ports_mutex);
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@@ -165,9 +168,9 @@ struct snd_seq_client_port *snd_seq_create_port(struct snd_seq_client *client,
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list_add_tail(&new_port->list, &p->list);
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client->num_ports++;
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new_port->addr.port = num; /* store the port number in the port */
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+ sprintf(new_port->name, "port-%d", num);
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write_unlock_irqrestore(&client->ports_lock, flags);
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mutex_unlock(&client->ports_mutex);
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- sprintf(new_port->name, "port-%d", num);
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return new_port;
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}
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--
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2.11.0
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@ -1,79 +0,0 @@
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From: Cyril Bur <cyrilbur@gmail.com>
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Date: Thu, 17 Aug 2017 20:42:26 +1000
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Subject: powerpc/64s: Use emergency stack for kernel TM Bad Thing program
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checks
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Origin: https://git.kernel.org/linus/265e60a170d0a0ecfc2d20490134ed2c48dd45ab
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Bug-Debian-Security: https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2017-1000255
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When using transactional memory (TM), the CPU can be in one of six
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states as far as TM is concerned, encoded in the Machine State
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Register (MSR). Certain state transitions are illegal and if attempted
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trigger a "TM Bad Thing" type program check exception.
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If we ever hit one of these exceptions it's treated as a bug, ie. we
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oops, and kill the process and/or panic, depending on configuration.
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One case where we can trigger a TM Bad Thing, is when returning to
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userspace after a system call or interrupt, using RFID. When this
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happens the CPU first restores the user register state, in particular
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r1 (the stack pointer) and then attempts to update the MSR. However
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the MSR update is not allowed and so we take the program check with
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the user register state, but the kernel MSR.
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This tricks the exception entry code into thinking we have a bad
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kernel stack pointer, because the MSR says we're coming from the
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kernel, but r1 is pointing to userspace.
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To avoid this we instead always switch to the emergency stack if we
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take a TM Bad Thing from the kernel. That way none of the user
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register values are used, other than for printing in the oops message.
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This is the fix for CVE-2017-1000255.
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Fixes: 5d176f751ee3 ("powerpc: tm: Enable transactional memory (TM) lazily for userspace")
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Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.9+
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Signed-off-by: Cyril Bur <cyrilbur@gmail.com>
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[mpe: Rewrite change log & comments, tweak asm slightly]
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Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
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---
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arch/powerpc/kernel/exceptions-64s.S | 24 +++++++++++++++++++++++-
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1 file changed, 23 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
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diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/exceptions-64s.S b/arch/powerpc/kernel/exceptions-64s.S
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index 48da0f5d2f7f..b82586c53560 100644
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--- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/exceptions-64s.S
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+++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/exceptions-64s.S
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@@ -734,7 +734,29 @@ EXC_REAL(program_check, 0x700, 0x100)
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EXC_VIRT(program_check, 0x4700, 0x100, 0x700)
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TRAMP_KVM(PACA_EXGEN, 0x700)
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EXC_COMMON_BEGIN(program_check_common)
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- EXCEPTION_PROLOG_COMMON(0x700, PACA_EXGEN)
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+ /*
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+ * It's possible to receive a TM Bad Thing type program check with
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+ * userspace register values (in particular r1), but with SRR1 reporting
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+ * that we came from the kernel. Normally that would confuse the bad
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+ * stack logic, and we would report a bad kernel stack pointer. Instead
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+ * we switch to the emergency stack if we're taking a TM Bad Thing from
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+ * the kernel.
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+ */
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+ li r10,MSR_PR /* Build a mask of MSR_PR .. */
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+ oris r10,r10,0x200000@h /* .. and SRR1_PROGTM */
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+ and r10,r10,r12 /* Mask SRR1 with that. */
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+ srdi r10,r10,8 /* Shift it so we can compare */
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+ cmpldi r10,(0x200000 >> 8) /* .. with an immediate. */
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+ bne 1f /* If != go to normal path. */
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+
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+ /* SRR1 had PR=0 and SRR1_PROGTM=1, so use the emergency stack */
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+ andi. r10,r12,MSR_PR; /* Set CR0 correctly for label */
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+ /* 3 in EXCEPTION_PROLOG_COMMON */
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+ mr r10,r1 /* Save r1 */
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+ ld r1,PACAEMERGSP(r13) /* Use emergency stack */
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+ subi r1,r1,INT_FRAME_SIZE /* alloc stack frame */
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+ b 3f /* Jump into the macro !! */
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+1: EXCEPTION_PROLOG_COMMON(0x700, PACA_EXGEN)
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bl save_nvgprs
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RECONCILE_IRQ_STATE(r10, r11)
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addi r3,r1,STACK_FRAME_OVERHEAD
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--
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2.11.0
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@ -1,62 +0,0 @@
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From: Gustavo Romero <gromero@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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Date: Tue, 22 Aug 2017 17:20:09 -0400
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Subject: powerpc/tm: Fix illegal TM state in signal handler
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Origin: https://git.kernel.org/linus/044215d145a7a8a60ffa8fdc859d110a795fa6ea
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Currently it's possible that on returning from the signal handler
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through the restore_tm_sigcontexts() code path (e.g. from a signal
|
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caught due to a `trap` instruction executed in the middle of an HTM
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block, or a deliberately constructed sigframe) an illegal TM state
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(like TS=10 TM=0, i.e. "T0") is set in SRR1 and when `rfid` sets
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implicitly the MSR register from SRR1 register on return to userspace
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it causes a TM Bad Thing exception.
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That illegal state can be set (a) by a malicious user that disables
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the TM bit by tweaking the bits in uc_mcontext before returning from
|
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the signal handler or (b) by a sufficient number of context switches
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occurring such that the load_tm counter overflows and TM is disabled
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whilst in the signal handler.
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This commit fixes the illegal TM state by ensuring that TM bit is
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always enabled before we return from restore_tm_sigcontexts(). A small
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comment correction is made as well.
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Fixes: 5d176f751ee3 ("powerpc: tm: Enable transactional memory (TM) lazily for userspace")
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Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.9+
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Signed-off-by: Gustavo Romero <gromero@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
|
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Signed-off-by: Breno Leitao <leitao@debian.org>
|
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Signed-off-by: Cyril Bur <cyrilbur@gmail.com>
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Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
|
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---
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arch/powerpc/kernel/signal_64.c | 13 ++++++++++++-
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1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
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|
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diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/signal_64.c b/arch/powerpc/kernel/signal_64.c
|
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index c83c115858c1..b2c002993d78 100644
|
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--- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/signal_64.c
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+++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/signal_64.c
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@@ -452,9 +452,20 @@ static long restore_tm_sigcontexts(struct task_struct *tsk,
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if (MSR_TM_RESV(msr))
|
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return -EINVAL;
|
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|
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- /* pull in MSR TM from user context */
|
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+ /* pull in MSR TS bits from user context */
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regs->msr = (regs->msr & ~MSR_TS_MASK) | (msr & MSR_TS_MASK);
|
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|
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+ /*
|
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+ * Ensure that TM is enabled in regs->msr before we leave the signal
|
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+ * handler. It could be the case that (a) user disabled the TM bit
|
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+ * through the manipulation of the MSR bits in uc_mcontext or (b) the
|
||||
+ * TM bit was disabled because a sufficient number of context switches
|
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+ * happened whilst in the signal handler and load_tm overflowed,
|
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+ * disabling the TM bit. In either case we can end up with an illegal
|
||||
+ * TM state leading to a TM Bad Thing when we return to userspace.
|
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+ */
|
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+ regs->msr |= MSR_TM;
|
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+
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/* pull in MSR LE from user context */
|
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regs->msr = (regs->msr & ~MSR_LE) | (msr & MSR_LE);
|
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--
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2.11.0
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|
|
@ -1,47 +0,0 @@
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From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
|
||||
Date: Mon, 9 Oct 2017 11:36:52 -0700
|
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Subject: waitid(): Add missing access_ok() checks
|
||||
Origin: https://git.kernel.org/linus/96ca579a1ecc943b75beba58bebb0356f6cc4b51
|
||||
Bug-Debian-Security: https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2017-5123
|
||||
|
||||
Adds missing access_ok() checks.
|
||||
|
||||
CVE-2017-5123
|
||||
|
||||
Reported-by: Chris Salls <chrissalls5@gmail.com>
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
|
||||
Acked-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
|
||||
Fixes: 4c48abe91be0 ("waitid(): switch copyout of siginfo to unsafe_put_user()")
|
||||
Cc: stable@kernel.org # 4.13
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
||||
---
|
||||
kernel/exit.c | 6 ++++++
|
||||
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/kernel/exit.c b/kernel/exit.c
|
||||
index f2cd53e92147..cf28528842bc 100644
|
||||
--- a/kernel/exit.c
|
||||
+++ b/kernel/exit.c
|
||||
@@ -1610,6 +1610,9 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(waitid, int, which, pid_t, upid, struct siginfo __user *,
|
||||
if (!infop)
|
||||
return err;
|
||||
|
||||
+ if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, infop, sizeof(*infop)))
|
||||
+ goto Efault;
|
||||
+
|
||||
user_access_begin();
|
||||
unsafe_put_user(signo, &infop->si_signo, Efault);
|
||||
unsafe_put_user(0, &infop->si_errno, Efault);
|
||||
@@ -1735,6 +1738,9 @@ COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE5(waitid,
|
||||
if (!infop)
|
||||
return err;
|
||||
|
||||
+ if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, infop, sizeof(*infop)))
|
||||
+ goto Efault;
|
||||
+
|
||||
user_access_begin();
|
||||
unsafe_put_user(signo, &infop->si_signo, Efault);
|
||||
unsafe_put_user(0, &infop->si_errno, Efault);
|
||||
--
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||||
2.15.0.rc0
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -1,83 +0,0 @@
|
|||
From: Ladi Prosek <lprosek@redhat.com>
|
||||
Date: Thu, 5 Oct 2017 11:10:23 +0200
|
||||
Subject: KVM: MMU: always terminate page walks at level 1
|
||||
Origin: https://git.kernel.org/linus/829ee279aed43faa5cb1e4d65c0cad52f2426c53
|
||||
Bug-Debian-Security: https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2017-12188
|
||||
|
||||
is_last_gpte() is not equivalent to the pseudo-code given in commit
|
||||
6bb69c9b69c31 ("KVM: MMU: simplify last_pte_bitmap") because an incorrect
|
||||
value of last_nonleaf_level may override the result even if level == 1.
|
||||
|
||||
It is critical for is_last_gpte() to return true on level == 1 to
|
||||
terminate page walks. Otherwise memory corruption may occur as level
|
||||
is used as an index to various data structures throughout the page
|
||||
walking code. Even though the actual bug would be wherever the MMU is
|
||||
initialized (as in the previous patch), be defensive and ensure here
|
||||
that is_last_gpte() returns the correct value.
|
||||
|
||||
This patch is also enough to fix CVE-2017-12188.
|
||||
|
||||
Fixes: 6bb69c9b69c315200ddc2bc79aee14c0184cf5b2
|
||||
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
|
||||
Cc: Andy Honig <ahonig@google.com>
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Ladi Prosek <lprosek@redhat.com>
|
||||
[Panic if walk_addr_generic gets an incorrect level; this is a serious
|
||||
bug and it's not worth a WARN_ON where the recovery path might hide
|
||||
further exploitable issues; suggested by Andrew Honig. - Paolo]
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
||||
---
|
||||
arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c | 14 +++++++-------
|
||||
arch/x86/kvm/paging_tmpl.h | 3 ++-
|
||||
2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c
|
||||
index 3c25f20115bc..7a69cf053711 100644
|
||||
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c
|
||||
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c
|
||||
@@ -3974,19 +3974,19 @@ static inline bool is_last_gpte(struct kvm_mmu *mmu,
|
||||
unsigned level, unsigned gpte)
|
||||
{
|
||||
/*
|
||||
- * PT_PAGE_TABLE_LEVEL always terminates. The RHS has bit 7 set
|
||||
- * iff level <= PT_PAGE_TABLE_LEVEL, which for our purpose means
|
||||
- * level == PT_PAGE_TABLE_LEVEL; set PT_PAGE_SIZE_MASK in gpte then.
|
||||
- */
|
||||
- gpte |= level - PT_PAGE_TABLE_LEVEL - 1;
|
||||
-
|
||||
- /*
|
||||
* The RHS has bit 7 set iff level < mmu->last_nonleaf_level.
|
||||
* If it is clear, there are no large pages at this level, so clear
|
||||
* PT_PAGE_SIZE_MASK in gpte if that is the case.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
gpte &= level - mmu->last_nonleaf_level;
|
||||
|
||||
+ /*
|
||||
+ * PT_PAGE_TABLE_LEVEL always terminates. The RHS has bit 7 set
|
||||
+ * iff level <= PT_PAGE_TABLE_LEVEL, which for our purpose means
|
||||
+ * level == PT_PAGE_TABLE_LEVEL; set PT_PAGE_SIZE_MASK in gpte then.
|
||||
+ */
|
||||
+ gpte |= level - PT_PAGE_TABLE_LEVEL - 1;
|
||||
+
|
||||
return gpte & PT_PAGE_SIZE_MASK;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/paging_tmpl.h b/arch/x86/kvm/paging_tmpl.h
|
||||
index 86b68dc5a649..f18d1f8d332b 100644
|
||||
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/paging_tmpl.h
|
||||
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/paging_tmpl.h
|
||||
@@ -334,10 +334,11 @@ static int FNAME(walk_addr_generic)(struct guest_walker *walker,
|
||||
--walker->level;
|
||||
|
||||
index = PT_INDEX(addr, walker->level);
|
||||
-
|
||||
table_gfn = gpte_to_gfn(pte);
|
||||
offset = index * sizeof(pt_element_t);
|
||||
pte_gpa = gfn_to_gpa(table_gfn) + offset;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ BUG_ON(walker->level < 1);
|
||||
walker->table_gfn[walker->level - 1] = table_gfn;
|
||||
walker->pte_gpa[walker->level - 1] = pte_gpa;
|
||||
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.11.0
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
|
|||
From: Ladi Prosek <lprosek@redhat.com>
|
||||
Date: Thu, 5 Oct 2017 11:10:22 +0200
|
||||
Subject: KVM: nVMX: update last_nonleaf_level when initializing nested EPT
|
||||
Origin: https://git.kernel.org/linus/fd19d3b45164466a4adce7cbff448ba9189e1427
|
||||
Bug-Debian-Security: https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2017-12188
|
||||
|
||||
The function updates context->root_level but didn't call
|
||||
update_last_nonleaf_level so the previous and potentially wrong value
|
||||
was used for page walks. For example, a zero value of last_nonleaf_level
|
||||
would allow a potential out-of-bounds access in arch/x86/mmu/paging_tmpl.h's
|
||||
walk_addr_generic function (CVE-2017-12188).
|
||||
|
||||
Fixes: 155a97a3d7c78b46cef6f1a973c831bc5a4f82bb
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Ladi Prosek <lprosek@redhat.com>
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
||||
---
|
||||
arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c | 1 +
|
||||
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c
|
||||
index 106d4a029a8a..3c25f20115bc 100644
|
||||
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c
|
||||
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c
|
||||
@@ -4555,6 +4555,7 @@ void kvm_init_shadow_ept_mmu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool execonly,
|
||||
|
||||
update_permission_bitmask(vcpu, context, true);
|
||||
update_pkru_bitmask(vcpu, context, true);
|
||||
+ update_last_nonleaf_level(vcpu, context);
|
||||
reset_rsvds_bits_mask_ept(vcpu, context, execonly);
|
||||
reset_ept_shadow_zero_bits_mask(vcpu, context, execonly);
|
||||
}
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.11.0
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -112,12 +112,6 @@ features/all/lockdown/arm64-add-kernel-config-option-to-lock-down-when.patch
|
|||
|
||||
# Security fixes
|
||||
debian/i386-686-pae-pci-set-pci-nobios-by-default.patch
|
||||
bugfix/all/powerpc-64s-Use-emergency-stack-for-kernel-TM-Bad-Th.patch
|
||||
bugfix/all/powerpc-tm-Fix-illegal-TM-state-in-signal-handler.patch
|
||||
bugfix/all/waitid-Add-missing-access_ok-checks.patch
|
||||
bugfix/all/ALSA-seq-Fix-use-after-free-at-creating-a-port.patch
|
||||
bugfix/x86/KVM-nVMX-update-last_nonleaf_level-when-initializing.patch
|
||||
bugfix/x86/KVM-MMU-always-terminate-page-walks-at-level-1.patch
|
||||
|
||||
# Fix exported symbol versions
|
||||
bugfix/all/module-disable-matching-missing-version-crc.patch
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
Loading…
Reference in New Issue