ptrace: being capable wrt a process requires mapped uids/gids
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@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ linux (4.3.3-3) UNRELEASED; urgency=medium
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* [xen] Fix race conditions in back-end drivers (CVE-2015-8550, XSA-155)
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* [xen] pciback: Fix state validation in MSI control operations
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(CVE-2015-8551, CVE-2015-8852, XSA-157)
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* ptrace: being capable wrt a process requires mapped uids/gids
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[ Salvatore Bonaccorso ]
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* ovl: fix permission checking for setattr (CVE-2015-8660)
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104
debian/patches/bugfix/all/ptrace-being-capable-wrt-a-process-requires-mapped-uids-gids.patch
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104
debian/patches/bugfix/all/ptrace-being-capable-wrt-a-process-requires-mapped-uids-gids.patch
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@ -0,0 +1,104 @@
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From: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>
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Subject: ptrace: being capable wrt a process requires mapped uids/gids
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Date: Sat, 26 Dec 2015 03:52:31 +0100
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Origin: https://lkml.org/lkml/2015/12/25/71
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ptrace_has_cap() checks whether the current process should be
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treated as having a certain capability for ptrace checks
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against another process. Until now, this was equivalent to
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has_ns_capability(current, target_ns, CAP_SYS_PTRACE).
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However, if a root-owned process wants to enter a user
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namespace for some reason without knowing who owns it and
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therefore can't change to the namespace owner's uid and gid
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before entering, as soon as it has entered the namespace,
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the namespace owner can attach to it via ptrace and thereby
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gain access to its uid and gid.
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While it is possible for the entering process to switch to
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the uid of a claimed namespace owner before entering,
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causing the attempt to enter to fail if the claimed uid is
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wrong, this doesn't solve the problem of determining an
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appropriate gid.
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With this change, the entering process can first enter the
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namespace and then safely inspect the namespace's
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properties, e.g. through /proc/self/{uid_map,gid_map},
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assuming that the namespace owner doesn't have access to
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uid 0.
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Changed in v2: The caller needs to be capable in the
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namespace into which tcred's uids/gids can be mapped.
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Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>
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---
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kernel/ptrace.c | 33 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
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1 file changed, 28 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
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diff --git a/kernel/ptrace.c b/kernel/ptrace.c
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index b760bae..260a08d 100644
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--- a/kernel/ptrace.c
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+++ b/kernel/ptrace.c
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@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
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#include <linux/uio.h>
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#include <linux/audit.h>
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#include <linux/pid_namespace.h>
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+#include <linux/user_namespace.h>
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#include <linux/syscalls.h>
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#include <linux/uaccess.h>
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#include <linux/regset.h>
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@@ -207,12 +208,34 @@ static int ptrace_check_attach(struct task_struct *child, bool ignore_state)
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return ret;
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}
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-static int ptrace_has_cap(struct user_namespace *ns, unsigned int mode)
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+static bool ptrace_has_cap(const struct cred *tcred, unsigned int mode)
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{
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+ struct user_namespace *tns = tcred->user_ns;
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+
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+ /* When a root-owned process enters a user namespace created by a
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+ * malicious user, the user shouldn't be able to execute code under
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+ * uid 0 by attaching to the root-owned process via ptrace.
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+ * Therefore, similar to the capable_wrt_inode_uidgid() check,
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+ * verify that all the uids and gids of the target process are
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+ * mapped into a namespace below the current one in which the caller
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+ * is capable.
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+ * No fsuid/fsgid check because __ptrace_may_access doesn't do it
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+ * either.
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+ */
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+ while (
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+ !kuid_has_mapping(tns, tcred->euid) ||
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+ !kuid_has_mapping(tns, tcred->suid) ||
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+ !kuid_has_mapping(tns, tcred->uid) ||
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+ !kgid_has_mapping(tns, tcred->egid) ||
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+ !kgid_has_mapping(tns, tcred->sgid) ||
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+ !kgid_has_mapping(tns, tcred->gid)) {
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+ tns = tns->parent;
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+ }
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+
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if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_NOAUDIT)
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- return has_ns_capability_noaudit(current, ns, CAP_SYS_PTRACE);
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+ return has_ns_capability_noaudit(current, tns, CAP_SYS_PTRACE);
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else
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- return has_ns_capability(current, ns, CAP_SYS_PTRACE);
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+ return has_ns_capability(current, tns, CAP_SYS_PTRACE);
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}
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/* Returns 0 on success, -errno on denial. */
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@@ -241,7 +264,7 @@ static int __ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode)
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gid_eq(cred->gid, tcred->sgid) &&
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gid_eq(cred->gid, tcred->gid))
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goto ok;
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- if (ptrace_has_cap(tcred->user_ns, mode))
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+ if (ptrace_has_cap(tcred, mode))
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goto ok;
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rcu_read_unlock();
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return -EPERM;
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@@ -252,7 +275,7 @@ ok:
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dumpable = get_dumpable(task->mm);
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rcu_read_lock();
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if (dumpable != SUID_DUMP_USER &&
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- !ptrace_has_cap(__task_cred(task)->user_ns, mode)) {
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+ !ptrace_has_cap(__task_cred(task), mode)) {
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rcu_read_unlock();
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return -EPERM;
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}
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@ -121,3 +121,4 @@ bugfix/all/xen-pciback-return-error-on-xen_pci_op_enable_msix-w.patch
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bugfix/all/xen-pciback-do-not-install-an-irq-handler-for-msi-in.patch
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bugfix/all/xen-pciback-for-xen_pci_op_disable_msi-x-only-disabl.patch
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bugfix/all/xen-pciback-don-t-allow-msi-x-ops-if-pci_command_mem.patch
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bugfix/all/ptrace-being-capable-wrt-a-process-requires-mapped-uids-gids.patch
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