xen-netback: fix input validation in xenvif_set_hash_mapping() (CVE-2018-15471)
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@ -2,6 +2,8 @@ linux (4.18.10-2) UNRELEASED; urgency=medium
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[ Ben Hutchings ]
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* [rt][arm64,armhf] Fix build failure after rebasing onto 4.18.10
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* xen-netback: fix input validation in xenvif_set_hash_mapping()
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(CVE-2018-15471)
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[ Salvatore Bonaccorso ]
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* [arm64] KVM: Tighten guest core register access from userspace
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60
debian/patches/bugfix/all/xen-netback-fix-input-validation-in-xenvif_set_hash_.patch
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60
debian/patches/bugfix/all/xen-netback-fix-input-validation-in-xenvif_set_hash_.patch
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@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
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From: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com>
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Date: Tue, 25 Sep 2018 02:12:30 -0600
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Subject: xen-netback: fix input validation in xenvif_set_hash_mapping()
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Origin: https://git.kernel.org/linus/780e83c259fc33e8959fed8dfdad17e378d72b62
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Bug-Debian-Security: https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2018-15471
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Both len and off are frontend specified values, so we need to make
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sure there's no overflow when adding the two for the bounds check. We
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also want to avoid undefined behavior and hence use off to index into
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->hash.mapping[] only after bounds checking. This at the same time
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allows to take care of not applying off twice for the bounds checking
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against vif->num_queues.
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It is also insufficient to bounds check copy_op.len, as this is len
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truncated to 16 bits.
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This is XSA-270 / CVE-2018-15471.
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Reported-by: Felix Wilhelm <fwilhelm@google.com>
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Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
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Reviewed-by: Paul Durrant <paul.durrant@citrix.com>
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Tested-by: Paul Durrant <paul.durrant@citrix.com>
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Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org [4.7 onwards]
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Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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---
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drivers/net/xen-netback/hash.c | 12 +++++++-----
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1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
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diff --git a/drivers/net/xen-netback/hash.c b/drivers/net/xen-netback/hash.c
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index 3c4c58b9fe76..3b6fb5b3bdb2 100644
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--- a/drivers/net/xen-netback/hash.c
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+++ b/drivers/net/xen-netback/hash.c
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@@ -332,20 +332,22 @@ u32 xenvif_set_hash_mapping_size(struct xenvif *vif, u32 size)
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u32 xenvif_set_hash_mapping(struct xenvif *vif, u32 gref, u32 len,
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u32 off)
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{
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- u32 *mapping = &vif->hash.mapping[off];
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+ u32 *mapping = vif->hash.mapping;
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struct gnttab_copy copy_op = {
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.source.u.ref = gref,
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.source.domid = vif->domid,
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- .dest.u.gmfn = virt_to_gfn(mapping),
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.dest.domid = DOMID_SELF,
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- .dest.offset = xen_offset_in_page(mapping),
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- .len = len * sizeof(u32),
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+ .len = len * sizeof(*mapping),
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.flags = GNTCOPY_source_gref
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};
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- if ((off + len > vif->hash.size) || copy_op.len > XEN_PAGE_SIZE)
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+ if ((off + len < off) || (off + len > vif->hash.size) ||
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+ len > XEN_PAGE_SIZE / sizeof(*mapping))
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return XEN_NETIF_CTRL_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
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+ copy_op.dest.u.gmfn = virt_to_gfn(mapping + off);
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+ copy_op.dest.offset = xen_offset_in_page(mapping + off);
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+
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while (len-- != 0)
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if (mapping[off++] >= vif->num_queues)
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return XEN_NETIF_CTRL_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
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@ -147,6 +147,7 @@ bugfix/all/scsi-target-iscsi-Use-hex2bin-instead-of-a-re-implem.patch
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bugfix/all/scsi-target-iscsi-Use-bin2hex-instead-of-a-re-implem.patch
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bugfix/arm64/arm64-kvm-tighten-guest-core-register-access-from-us.patch
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bugfix/arm64/arm64-kvm-sanitize-pstate.m-when-being-set-from-user.patch
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bugfix/all/xen-netback-fix-input-validation-in-xenvif_set_hash_.patch
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# Fix exported symbol versions
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bugfix/all/module-disable-matching-missing-version-crc.patch
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