Add TCP DoS fixes
This commit is contained in:
Ben Hutchings
parent
4ea468554d
commit
1e253edaa7
|
|
@ -15,6 +15,10 @@ linux (4.19.37-4) UNRELEASED; urgency=medium
|
|||
* mm/mincore.c: make mincore() more conservative (CVE-2019-5489)
|
||||
* mwifiex: Fix heap overflow in mwifiex_uap_parse_tail_ies()
|
||||
(CVE-2019-10126)
|
||||
* tcp: limit payload size of sacked skbs (CVE-2019-11477)
|
||||
* tcp: tcp_fragment() should apply sane memory limits (CVE-2019-11478)
|
||||
* tcp: add tcp_min_snd_mss sysctl (CVE-2019-11479)
|
||||
* tcp: enforce tcp_min_snd_mss in tcp_mtu_probing()
|
||||
|
||||
[ Romain Perier ]
|
||||
* [rt] Update to 4.19.37-rt20
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,123 @@
|
|||
From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
|
||||
Date: Mon, 17 Jun 2019 10:03:53 -0700
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH net 3/4] tcp: add tcp_min_snd_mss sysctl
|
||||
Origin: https://patchwork.ozlabs.org/patch/1117157/
|
||||
|
||||
Some TCP peers announce a very small MSS option in their SYN and/or
|
||||
SYN/ACK messages.
|
||||
|
||||
This forces the stack to send packets with a very high network/cpu
|
||||
overhead.
|
||||
|
||||
Linux has enforced a minimal value of 48. Since this value includes
|
||||
the size of TCP options, and that the options can consume up to 40
|
||||
bytes, this means that each segment can include only 8 bytes of payload.
|
||||
|
||||
In some cases, it can be useful to increase the minimal value
|
||||
to a saner value.
|
||||
|
||||
We still let the default to 48 (TCP_MIN_SND_MSS), for compatibility
|
||||
reasons.
|
||||
|
||||
Note that TCP_MAXSEG socket option enforces a minimal value
|
||||
of (TCP_MIN_MSS). David Miller increased this minimal value
|
||||
in commit c39508d6f118 ("tcp: Make TCP_MAXSEG minimum more correct.")
|
||||
from 64 to 88.
|
||||
|
||||
We might in the future merge TCP_MIN_SND_MSS and TCP_MIN_MSS.
|
||||
|
||||
CVE-2019-11479 -- tcp mss hardcoded to 48
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
|
||||
Suggested-by: Jonathan Looney <jtl@netflix.com>
|
||||
Acked-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
|
||||
Cc: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
|
||||
Cc: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
|
||||
Cc: Bruce Curtis <brucec@netflix.com>
|
||||
Cc: Jonathan Lemon <jonathan.lemon@gmail.com>
|
||||
Acked-by: Jonathan Lemon <jonathan.lemon@gmail.com>
|
||||
Acked-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
|
||||
---
|
||||
Documentation/networking/ip-sysctl.txt | 8 ++++++++
|
||||
include/net/netns/ipv4.h | 1 +
|
||||
net/ipv4/sysctl_net_ipv4.c | 11 +++++++++++
|
||||
net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c | 1 +
|
||||
net/ipv4/tcp_output.c | 3 +--
|
||||
5 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
|
||||
|
||||
--- a/Documentation/networking/ip-sysctl.txt
|
||||
+++ b/Documentation/networking/ip-sysctl.txt
|
||||
@@ -250,6 +250,14 @@ tcp_base_mss - INTEGER
|
||||
Path MTU discovery (MTU probing). If MTU probing is enabled,
|
||||
this is the initial MSS used by the connection.
|
||||
|
||||
+tcp_min_snd_mss - INTEGER
|
||||
+ TCP SYN and SYNACK messages usually advertise an ADVMSS option,
|
||||
+ as described in RFC 1122 and RFC 6691.
|
||||
+ If this ADVMSS option is smaller than tcp_min_snd_mss,
|
||||
+ it is silently capped to tcp_min_snd_mss.
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ Default : 48 (at least 8 bytes of payload per segment)
|
||||
+
|
||||
tcp_congestion_control - STRING
|
||||
Set the congestion control algorithm to be used for new
|
||||
connections. The algorithm "reno" is always available, but
|
||||
--- a/include/net/netns/ipv4.h
|
||||
+++ b/include/net/netns/ipv4.h
|
||||
@@ -113,6 +113,7 @@ struct netns_ipv4 {
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
int sysctl_tcp_mtu_probing;
|
||||
int sysctl_tcp_base_mss;
|
||||
+ int sysctl_tcp_min_snd_mss;
|
||||
int sysctl_tcp_probe_threshold;
|
||||
u32 sysctl_tcp_probe_interval;
|
||||
|
||||
--- a/net/ipv4/sysctl_net_ipv4.c
|
||||
+++ b/net/ipv4/sysctl_net_ipv4.c
|
||||
@@ -39,6 +39,8 @@ static int ip_local_port_range_min[] = {
|
||||
static int ip_local_port_range_max[] = { 65535, 65535 };
|
||||
static int tcp_adv_win_scale_min = -31;
|
||||
static int tcp_adv_win_scale_max = 31;
|
||||
+static int tcp_min_snd_mss_min = TCP_MIN_SND_MSS;
|
||||
+static int tcp_min_snd_mss_max = 65535;
|
||||
static int ip_privileged_port_min;
|
||||
static int ip_privileged_port_max = 65535;
|
||||
static int ip_ttl_min = 1;
|
||||
@@ -737,6 +739,15 @@ static struct ctl_table ipv4_net_table[]
|
||||
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec,
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
+ .procname = "tcp_min_snd_mss",
|
||||
+ .data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_min_snd_mss,
|
||||
+ .maxlen = sizeof(int),
|
||||
+ .mode = 0644,
|
||||
+ .proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax,
|
||||
+ .extra1 = &tcp_min_snd_mss_min,
|
||||
+ .extra2 = &tcp_min_snd_mss_max,
|
||||
+ },
|
||||
+ {
|
||||
.procname = "tcp_probe_threshold",
|
||||
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_probe_threshold,
|
||||
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
|
||||
--- a/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c
|
||||
+++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c
|
||||
@@ -2527,6 +2527,7 @@ static int __net_init tcp_sk_init(struct
|
||||
net->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_ecn_fallback = 1;
|
||||
|
||||
net->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_base_mss = TCP_BASE_MSS;
|
||||
+ net->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_min_snd_mss = TCP_MIN_SND_MSS;
|
||||
net->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_probe_threshold = TCP_PROBE_THRESHOLD;
|
||||
net->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_probe_interval = TCP_PROBE_INTERVAL;
|
||||
|
||||
--- a/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c
|
||||
+++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c
|
||||
@@ -1462,8 +1462,7 @@ static inline int __tcp_mtu_to_mss(struc
|
||||
mss_now -= icsk->icsk_ext_hdr_len;
|
||||
|
||||
/* Then reserve room for full set of TCP options and 8 bytes of data */
|
||||
- if (mss_now < TCP_MIN_SND_MSS)
|
||||
- mss_now = TCP_MIN_SND_MSS;
|
||||
+ mss_now = max(mss_now, sock_net(sk)->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_min_snd_mss);
|
||||
return mss_now;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
36
debian/patches/bugfix/all/tcp-enforce-tcp_min_snd_mss-in-tcp_mtu_probing.patch
vendored
Normal file
36
debian/patches/bugfix/all/tcp-enforce-tcp_min_snd_mss-in-tcp_mtu_probing.patch
vendored
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
|
|||
From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
|
||||
Date: Mon, 17 Jun 2019 10:03:54 -0700
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH net 4/4] tcp: enforce tcp_min_snd_mss in tcp_mtu_probing()
|
||||
Origin: https://patchwork.ozlabs.org/patch/1117158/
|
||||
|
||||
If mtu probing is enabled tcp_mtu_probing() could very well end up
|
||||
with a too small MSS.
|
||||
|
||||
Use the new sysctl tcp_min_snd_mss to make sure MSS search
|
||||
is performed in an acceptable range.
|
||||
|
||||
CVE-2019-11479 -- tcp mss hardcoded to 48
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
|
||||
Reported-by: Jonathan Lemon <jonathan.lemon@gmail.com>
|
||||
Cc: Jonathan Looney <jtl@netflix.com>
|
||||
Acked-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
|
||||
Cc: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
|
||||
Cc: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
|
||||
Cc: Bruce Curtis <brucec@netflix.com>
|
||||
Acked-by: Jonathan Lemon <jonathan.lemon@gmail.com>
|
||||
Acked-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
|
||||
---
|
||||
net/ipv4/tcp_timer.c | 1 +
|
||||
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
|
||||
|
||||
--- a/net/ipv4/tcp_timer.c
|
||||
+++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_timer.c
|
||||
@@ -166,6 +166,7 @@ static void tcp_mtu_probing(struct inet_
|
||||
mss = tcp_mtu_to_mss(sk, icsk->icsk_mtup.search_low) >> 1;
|
||||
mss = min(net->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_base_mss, mss);
|
||||
mss = max(mss, 68 - tcp_sk(sk)->tcp_header_len);
|
||||
+ mss = max(mss, net->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_min_snd_mss);
|
||||
icsk->icsk_mtup.search_low = tcp_mss_to_mtu(sk, mss);
|
||||
}
|
||||
tcp_sync_mss(sk, icsk->icsk_pmtu_cookie);
|
||||
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,154 @@
|
|||
From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
|
||||
Date: Mon, 17 Jun 2019 10:03:51 -0700
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH net 1/4] tcp: limit payload size of sacked skbs
|
||||
Origin: https://patchwork.ozlabs.org/patch/1117155/
|
||||
|
||||
Jonathan Looney reported that TCP can trigger the following crash
|
||||
in tcp_shifted_skb() :
|
||||
|
||||
BUG_ON(tcp_skb_pcount(skb) < pcount);
|
||||
|
||||
This can happen if the remote peer has advertized the smallest
|
||||
MSS that linux TCP accepts : 48
|
||||
|
||||
An skb can hold 17 fragments, and each fragment can hold 32KB
|
||||
on x86, or 64KB on PowerPC.
|
||||
|
||||
This means that the 16bit witdh of TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->tcp_gso_segs
|
||||
can overflow.
|
||||
|
||||
Note that tcp_sendmsg() builds skbs with less than 64KB
|
||||
of payload, so this problem needs SACK to be enabled.
|
||||
SACK blocks allow TCP to coalesce multiple skbs in the retransmit
|
||||
queue, thus filling the 17 fragments to maximal capacity.
|
||||
|
||||
CVE-2019-11477 -- u16 overflow of TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->tcp_gso_segs
|
||||
|
||||
Fixes: 832d11c5cd07 ("tcp: Try to restore large SKBs while SACK processing")
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
|
||||
Reported-by: Jonathan Looney <jtl@netflix.com>
|
||||
Acked-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
|
||||
Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
|
||||
Cc: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
|
||||
Cc: Bruce Curtis <brucec@netflix.com>
|
||||
Cc: Jonathan Lemon <jonathan.lemon@gmail.com>
|
||||
Acked-by: Jonathan Lemon <jonathan.lemon@gmail.com>
|
||||
---
|
||||
include/linux/tcp.h | 4 ++++
|
||||
include/net/tcp.h | 2 ++
|
||||
net/ipv4/tcp.c | 1 +
|
||||
net/ipv4/tcp_input.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++------
|
||||
net/ipv4/tcp_output.c | 6 +++---
|
||||
5 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
|
||||
|
||||
--- a/include/linux/tcp.h
|
||||
+++ b/include/linux/tcp.h
|
||||
@@ -485,4 +485,8 @@ static inline u16 tcp_mss_clamp(const st
|
||||
|
||||
return (user_mss && user_mss < mss) ? user_mss : mss;
|
||||
}
|
||||
+
|
||||
+int tcp_skb_shift(struct sk_buff *to, struct sk_buff *from, int pcount,
|
||||
+ int shiftlen);
|
||||
+
|
||||
#endif /* _LINUX_TCP_H */
|
||||
--- a/include/net/tcp.h
|
||||
+++ b/include/net/tcp.h
|
||||
@@ -55,6 +55,8 @@ void tcp_time_wait(struct sock *sk, int
|
||||
|
||||
#define MAX_TCP_HEADER (128 + MAX_HEADER)
|
||||
#define MAX_TCP_OPTION_SPACE 40
|
||||
+#define TCP_MIN_SND_MSS 48
|
||||
+#define TCP_MIN_GSO_SIZE (TCP_MIN_SND_MSS - MAX_TCP_OPTION_SPACE)
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Never offer a window over 32767 without using window scaling. Some
|
||||
--- a/net/ipv4/tcp.c
|
||||
+++ b/net/ipv4/tcp.c
|
||||
@@ -3829,6 +3829,7 @@ void __init tcp_init(void)
|
||||
unsigned long limit;
|
||||
unsigned int i;
|
||||
|
||||
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(TCP_MIN_SND_MSS <= MAX_TCP_OPTION_SPACE);
|
||||
BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(struct tcp_skb_cb) >
|
||||
FIELD_SIZEOF(struct sk_buff, cb));
|
||||
|
||||
--- a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c
|
||||
+++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c
|
||||
@@ -1315,7 +1315,7 @@ static bool tcp_shifted_skb(struct sock
|
||||
TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq += shifted;
|
||||
|
||||
tcp_skb_pcount_add(prev, pcount);
|
||||
- BUG_ON(tcp_skb_pcount(skb) < pcount);
|
||||
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(tcp_skb_pcount(skb) < pcount);
|
||||
tcp_skb_pcount_add(skb, -pcount);
|
||||
|
||||
/* When we're adding to gso_segs == 1, gso_size will be zero,
|
||||
@@ -1381,6 +1381,21 @@ static int skb_can_shift(const struct sk
|
||||
return !skb_headlen(skb) && skb_is_nonlinear(skb);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
+int tcp_skb_shift(struct sk_buff *to, struct sk_buff *from,
|
||||
+ int pcount, int shiftlen)
|
||||
+{
|
||||
+ /* TCP min gso_size is 8 bytes (TCP_MIN_GSO_SIZE)
|
||||
+ * Since TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->tcp_gso_segs is 16 bits, we need
|
||||
+ * to make sure not storing more than 65535 * 8 bytes per skb,
|
||||
+ * even if current MSS is bigger.
|
||||
+ */
|
||||
+ if (unlikely(to->len + shiftlen >= 65535 * TCP_MIN_GSO_SIZE))
|
||||
+ return 0;
|
||||
+ if (unlikely(tcp_skb_pcount(to) + pcount > 65535))
|
||||
+ return 0;
|
||||
+ return skb_shift(to, from, shiftlen);
|
||||
+}
|
||||
+
|
||||
/* Try collapsing SACK blocks spanning across multiple skbs to a single
|
||||
* skb.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
@@ -1486,7 +1501,7 @@ static struct sk_buff *tcp_shift_skb_dat
|
||||
if (!after(TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq + len, tp->snd_una))
|
||||
goto fallback;
|
||||
|
||||
- if (!skb_shift(prev, skb, len))
|
||||
+ if (!tcp_skb_shift(prev, skb, pcount, len))
|
||||
goto fallback;
|
||||
if (!tcp_shifted_skb(sk, prev, skb, state, pcount, len, mss, dup_sack))
|
||||
goto out;
|
||||
@@ -1504,11 +1519,10 @@ static struct sk_buff *tcp_shift_skb_dat
|
||||
goto out;
|
||||
|
||||
len = skb->len;
|
||||
- if (skb_shift(prev, skb, len)) {
|
||||
- pcount += tcp_skb_pcount(skb);
|
||||
- tcp_shifted_skb(sk, prev, skb, state, tcp_skb_pcount(skb),
|
||||
+ pcount = tcp_skb_pcount(skb);
|
||||
+ if (tcp_skb_shift(prev, skb, pcount, len))
|
||||
+ tcp_shifted_skb(sk, prev, skb, state, pcount,
|
||||
len, mss, 0);
|
||||
- }
|
||||
|
||||
out:
|
||||
return prev;
|
||||
--- a/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c
|
||||
+++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c
|
||||
@@ -1457,8 +1457,8 @@ static inline int __tcp_mtu_to_mss(struc
|
||||
mss_now -= icsk->icsk_ext_hdr_len;
|
||||
|
||||
/* Then reserve room for full set of TCP options and 8 bytes of data */
|
||||
- if (mss_now < 48)
|
||||
- mss_now = 48;
|
||||
+ if (mss_now < TCP_MIN_SND_MSS)
|
||||
+ mss_now = TCP_MIN_SND_MSS;
|
||||
return mss_now;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -2727,7 +2727,7 @@ static bool tcp_collapse_retrans(struct
|
||||
if (next_skb_size <= skb_availroom(skb))
|
||||
skb_copy_bits(next_skb, 0, skb_put(skb, next_skb_size),
|
||||
next_skb_size);
|
||||
- else if (!skb_shift(skb, next_skb, next_skb_size))
|
||||
+ else if (!tcp_skb_shift(skb, next_skb, 1, next_skb_size))
|
||||
return false;
|
||||
}
|
||||
tcp_highest_sack_replace(sk, next_skb, skb);
|
||||
70
debian/patches/bugfix/all/tcp-tcp_fragment-should-apply-sane-memory-limits.patch
vendored
Normal file
70
debian/patches/bugfix/all/tcp-tcp_fragment-should-apply-sane-memory-limits.patch
vendored
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
|
|||
From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
|
||||
Date: Mon, 17 Jun 2019 10:03:52 -0700
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH net 2/4] tcp: tcp_fragment() should apply sane memory limits
|
||||
Origin: https://patchwork.ozlabs.org/patch/1117156/
|
||||
|
||||
Jonathan Looney reported that a malicious peer can force a sender
|
||||
to fragment its retransmit queue into tiny skbs, inflating memory
|
||||
usage and/or overflow 32bit counters.
|
||||
|
||||
TCP allows an application to queue up to sk_sndbuf bytes,
|
||||
so we need to give some allowance for non malicious splitting
|
||||
of retransmit queue.
|
||||
|
||||
A new SNMP counter is added to monitor how many times TCP
|
||||
did not allow to split an skb if the allowance was exceeded.
|
||||
|
||||
Note that this counter might increase in the case applications
|
||||
use SO_SNDBUF socket option to lower sk_sndbuf.
|
||||
|
||||
CVE-2019-11478 : tcp_fragment, prevent fragmenting a packet when the
|
||||
socket is already using more than half the allowed space
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
|
||||
Reported-by: Jonathan Looney <jtl@netflix.com>
|
||||
Acked-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
|
||||
Acked-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
|
||||
Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
|
||||
Cc: Bruce Curtis <brucec@netflix.com>
|
||||
Cc: Jonathan Lemon <jonathan.lemon@gmail.com>
|
||||
Acked-by: Jonathan Lemon <jonathan.lemon@gmail.com>
|
||||
---
|
||||
include/uapi/linux/snmp.h | 1 +
|
||||
net/ipv4/proc.c | 1 +
|
||||
net/ipv4/tcp_output.c | 5 +++++
|
||||
3 files changed, 7 insertions(+)
|
||||
|
||||
--- a/include/uapi/linux/snmp.h
|
||||
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/snmp.h
|
||||
@@ -282,6 +282,7 @@ enum
|
||||
LINUX_MIB_TCPACKCOMPRESSED, /* TCPAckCompressed */
|
||||
LINUX_MIB_TCPZEROWINDOWDROP, /* TCPZeroWindowDrop */
|
||||
LINUX_MIB_TCPRCVQDROP, /* TCPRcvQDrop */
|
||||
+ LINUX_MIB_TCPWQUEUETOOBIG, /* TCPWqueueTooBig */
|
||||
__LINUX_MIB_MAX
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
--- a/net/ipv4/proc.c
|
||||
+++ b/net/ipv4/proc.c
|
||||
@@ -290,6 +290,7 @@ static const struct snmp_mib snmp4_net_l
|
||||
SNMP_MIB_ITEM("TCPAckCompressed", LINUX_MIB_TCPACKCOMPRESSED),
|
||||
SNMP_MIB_ITEM("TCPZeroWindowDrop", LINUX_MIB_TCPZEROWINDOWDROP),
|
||||
SNMP_MIB_ITEM("TCPRcvQDrop", LINUX_MIB_TCPRCVQDROP),
|
||||
+ SNMP_MIB_ITEM("TCPWqueueTooBig", LINUX_MIB_TCPWQUEUETOOBIG),
|
||||
SNMP_MIB_SENTINEL
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
--- a/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c
|
||||
+++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c
|
||||
@@ -1299,6 +1299,11 @@ int tcp_fragment(struct sock *sk, enum t
|
||||
if (nsize < 0)
|
||||
nsize = 0;
|
||||
|
||||
+ if (unlikely((sk->sk_wmem_queued >> 1) > sk->sk_sndbuf)) {
|
||||
+ NET_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_TCPWQUEUETOOBIG);
|
||||
+ return -ENOMEM;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
if (skb_unclone(skb, gfp))
|
||||
return -ENOMEM;
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -222,6 +222,10 @@ bugfix/all/mwifiex-abort-at-too-short-bss-descriptor-element.patch
|
|||
bugfix/all/mwifiex-don-t-abort-on-small-spec-compliant-vendor-ies.patch
|
||||
bugfix/all/mm-mincore.c-make-mincore-more-conservative.patch
|
||||
bugfix/all/mwifiex-fix-heap-overflow-in-mwifiex_uap_parse_tail_.patch
|
||||
bugfix/all/tcp-limit-payload-size-of-sacked-skbs.patch
|
||||
bugfix/all/tcp-tcp_fragment-should-apply-sane-memory-limits.patch
|
||||
bugfix/all/tcp-add-tcp_min_snd_mss-sysctl.patch
|
||||
bugfix/all/tcp-enforce-tcp_min_snd_mss-in-tcp_mtu_probing.patch
|
||||
|
||||
# Fix exported symbol versions
|
||||
bugfix/all/module-disable-matching-missing-version-crc.patch
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
Loading…
Reference in New Issue